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INTRODUCTION
It seems entirely fitting at this point in time to hold a conference to
assess the legacy of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which was
animated by an effort to extend antidiscrimination civil rights law to the
private workplace, among other settings. The initial goal was to reduce
racial discrimination-although the meaning of race discrimination was
unclear and the stipulated private, litigation-based regulatory mecha-
nisms expressed at best a modest commitment to change. The fact that
"sex" was added as a secondary cause of action, ostensibly for mixed
motives, made gender discrimination the "orphan" of civil rights law,
and discrimination against LGBT persons was not publically acknowl-
edged at all. Given all that, we might wonder why there was any legacy
t Michael McCann is the Gordon Hirabayashi Professor for the Advancement of Citizen-
ship at the University of Washington.
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of change at all. But I come here not to praise the Civil Rights Act so
much as to reflect on the reasons for its limited impact and to speculate
about the future of civil rights law, policy, and politics.
At the outset, I want to recognize the challenge for me, a straight
white guy, to talk about the legacy of legislation, litigation, and related
struggles to combat race and sex discrimination. I ask myself, "why
me?" and it's a fair question. I should also recognize at the outset that I
am not an attorney. I don't have a J.D., and that puts me in a very distinct
minority in this room. Moreover, I have the unenviable task of following
all of the great speakers who have preceded me today and yesterday.
This has left me with a strong sense that everything has been said, and I
already mentioned in one of my questions to a previous panelist that I
need to change the name of my talk to "Summing Up," because I'm not
sure I have a whole lot that's new to say, although I think there will be a
little bit of a change in focus. And, finally, I have to recognize that I ap-
pear as someone who hails from Seattle, the land of the Seahawk, and I
find myself in a world of the Bronco ....
So let me state at the outset the standpoint from where I do speak
and what I'm going to try to bring to this talk. I grew up in the American
South during the 1960s. I went to schools that did not begin to desegre-
gate until over a decade after Brown v. Board of Education.' I worked in
the construction industry, while a teen, which lead me to involvement in
labor activism in the building trades and later among farm workers in
northern Florida, during the same years that the EEOC was aggressively
working with citizen groups to file lawsuits under Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. People yesterday talked about being nearly as old as the
Civil Rights Act; well, I'm a lot older than the statute. I eventually
moved to California, partly to get out of the South, but mostly to study
political science at UC Berkley, where I became a sociolegal scholar
interested in issues of class, gender, and race, with a focus in particular
on the history of labor in American society and the contrast between the
different trajectories of nation states in the U.S. and Europe. My primary
interest since then has been to understand how law shapes relationships
of hierarchical power, contests over asymmetric power, and the possibili-
ties for change in power relations affecting ordinary working people. I
have tried to balance my interest in class, gender, and race as a legal
scholar, as a political analyst, and as a labor activist, much of it from
various groups I've been associated with, but since 1991 as an affiliate of
the Harry Bridges Labor Center, at the University of Washington, which
in many ways is my proudest professional affiliation. Those commit-
ments were evident in the book that I wrote about gender-based pay equi-
I. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
[Vol. 91:4
MONEY, SEX, AND POWER
ty, entitled Rights at Work.2 It has been a great opportunity preparing for
this talk because I have not worked directly on gender-based pay equity
for a long time, although my scholarship has continued to address dis-
crimination, civil rights, and the various ways in which law provides
opportunities and constraints for struggles over social equality.
I have chosen as the title of my talk: Money, Sex, and Power. I real-
ly like that title, but it is not original. It owes to a good friend of mine,
Professor Emeritus Nancy Hartsock at the University of Washington.
3
She wrote a classic book on feminist theory in the 1980s, and I thought it
fit what I wanted to talk about. My focus will emphasize the lost poten-
tial of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for improving the capacities of women
and people of color to earn good incomes, find good jobs, exercise a
voice in the workplace, enhance their roles as providers for themselves
and their families, and take on roles as active citizens. My address will
focus to some degree on wage equity, but it will transcend that to talk
about other related issues as well.
I. SOME FRUSTRATING FACTS ABOUT CONTINUING GENDER
INEQUALITY
I begin by recognizing some important facts. I start with a graph
that I take from a study by Laura Beth Nielsen and Bob Nelson that has
been mentioned before by other speakers.4 What this shows is the
amount of employment-based civil rights litigation over the last forty
years. Whatever we might say about the legacy of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, there has not been a shortage of litigation. There were tens of thou-
sands of cases that have been pursued each year, especially with a big
spike in the 1980s. And I will come back to that in just a moment.
With this legacy of litigation in mind, I turn to some frustrating
facts about the status of women's income and earnings.5 We all know
that the earnings of women in 2012 working full-time, year-round were
about 76.5 cents to every dollar paid to male counterparts. The wage gap
was even larger for women of color. Black women who were working
full-time, year-round made only sixty-four cents to the white male stand-
2. MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
3. See NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX, AND POWER: TOWARD A FEMINIST
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM (1983).
4. A longitudinal bar graph was displayed in the talk, derived from a study by Laura Beth
Nielsen and Robert Nelson. See generally LAURA BETH NIELSEN ET AL., CONTESTING WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION IN COURT: CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTCOMES OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 1987-2003, at 3 (2008), available at
http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/documents/nielsen abf edlreport 08 final.pdf
5. The data referred to in the section on "frustrating facts" is primarily derived from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics and is widely available. I relied on several web-based sources to obtain
these findings. See, e.g., Women's Earnings and Income, CATALYST (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/womens-eamings-and-income.
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point. Hispanic women made only fifty-four cents for every dollar paid
to their white, non-Hispanic male counterparts. Median annual earnings
for full-time, year-round women workers in 2012 were $37,791 com-
pared to men's $49,398.
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Now in some ways we can see this as a glass half full. When one
compares these earnings ratios to the 1960s, when women made fifty-
nine cents to every dollar that men made, the increase to nearly 77% is
significant. But I want to suggest that the apparent gains in equity not
only still fall far short, but they are less than simple aggregate ratios sug-
gest. For one thing, the reasons for that decrease in the wage gap be-
tween men and women resulted partly from the advances of the roughly
15% of women who made it into the upper management positions where
the pay is very good. If you take those increases out of the overall picture
and look at the bottom two-thirds of women, then the data look a lot
more discouraging and depressing. I think it is important to see that if we
take out that upper crust, we see that women represent nearly two-thirds
(61%) of minimum-wage workers. Nearly four in ten of these female
minimum-wage workers are women of color. Women are, moreover,
nearly two-thirds of workers in occupations that depend largely on tips; it
is worth mentioning that the federal minimum cash-wage for tipped
workers is $2.31 an hour. Moreover, data on full-time earners, as Nancy
Reichman pointed out very appropriately, obscures the fact that a large
percentage of women do not work full-time, but rather are relegated to
part-time, temporary, contingent work, so that the earnings gap reflects
6. NAT'L WOMEN'S LAW CTR., FACT SHEET: THE WAGE GAP IS STAGNANT IN LAST
DECADE tbl.2 (2012), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/poverty daywagegapsheet.pdf.
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not just unequal wages but the different number of hours that women
tend to work.
Now there are many reasons that can be provided for why there is
this gender-based wage gap, but labor economists tell us that certainly
one of the primary reasons has to do with occupational segregation. Now
that actually has not been talked about that much in this conference, so
maybe everyone just took it for granted. The key point is that women
historically have tended to be channeled into certain kinds of occupa-
tions. Those occupations tend to be paid less, even when the value of the
work and the criteria for entering those jobs are comparable to men who
are paid at much higher rates. The graph displayed (Figure B) is a little
bit complicated, but on the left side you see different kinds of occupa-
tions; the red bars reflect level of female participation in those occupa-
tions, while the blue bars capture the levels of male participation in dif-
ferent jobs. This clearly captures the gender-intensive character of many
occupations. On the right side you can see the earnings for the different
occupations. You can see a direct correlation: the more red they are, the
lower paid they are, the more blue they are, the higher paid they are. This
is a classic comparison of occupational segregation and the ways in
which wages tend to follow that split.
Figure B: Occupational Sex Segregation
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7 One of Twenty Facts About U.S. Inequality that Everyone Should Know: Occupational Sex Segre-
gation, STANFORD UNIV., http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/cgi-bin/fact6.php (last visited Aug. 1,
2014) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HIGHLIGHTS OF
WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 2008: REPORT 1017 (2009), available at
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom2008.pdo.
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Job segregation has surprisingly not changed that much since the
1960s. A recent study by labor economist Francine Blau, at Cornell, and
her colleagues found that there was a significant change in the occupa-
tional segregation in the 1970s.8 They found about a 6.1% decline in
occupational segregation, and with that, women moving into higher pay-
ing jobs. But that rate of decline fell in the 1980s to 4.3%, and since then
it's been nearly flat, with only 2% decline in occupational segregation i
the 1990s; there has been virtually no change in occupational segregation
in the 2000s. So that, in part, gives us a handle on the problem, as we can
also see that moments of declining occupational segregation correlated
directly with the declining wage gap. As the declining occupational seg-
regation has slowed, so too has the decrease in the wage gap.
The larger picture is also complicated by the fact that the increase in
wage equity has reflected in part the overall stagnation of wages since
the 1970s. In particular, while women's wages went up some, part of the
reason for the declining gap was that men's wages have been declining
since the 1970s. So one of the problems with just focusing on wage equi-
ty is that equity is just about the comparison, either racial comparison or
gender comparison. But if everyone in the bottom half or even two-thirds
of wage earners is doing worse, then equity is actually a mixed cause for
celebration at best. This has led to some interesting dynamics among
married couples. The Pew Research Center looked at earnings data for
married women and men in the United States aged thirty to forty-four in
2007. The study found that recent economic gains usually associated
with marriage "have been greater for men than for women," and that is
because women are making more money, and men are making less mon-
ey.9 So what used to be the benefit for women of marrying a man with a
lot of money has actually been reversed, at least in a small kind of way.
Finally, the future does not look very encouraging. The projected
job growth in the next decade is disproportionately in low-wage, female-
dominated occupations. Of the thirty predicted high growth occupations
in Bureau of Labor statistics, those occupations that are projected to
grow the most tend to be female-intensive and low-paid. Disproportion-
ately, 60% of the workers in the thirty jobs that are expected to grow
most are female, and they are concentrated in low-wage occupations.
Nearly two-thirds of the thirty high-growth jobs are female-dominated,
within workforces that are 60% or more male. Almost half of those jobs
that are projected for growth typically pay less than $13.50 an hour. Five
of those job classes are very low-wage, typically paying less than $10 an
8. Francine D. Blau et al., Trends in Occupational Segregation by Gender 1970-2009:
Adjusting for the Impact of Changes in the Occupational Coding System 4, 26-27 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17993, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w17993.
9. RICHARD FRY & D'VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WOMEN, MEN AND THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 1 (2010), available at
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/1I/new-economics-of-marriage.pdf.
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hour. Among the thirteen lowest wage high-growth jobs, twice as many
are female-dominated compared to male-dominated jobs. So not only do
things look grim now, but they are not going in the direction we would
like for the great majority of working women. Twenty-five years ago we
might have thought things were getting better.
With low wages, also, it is important to realize there are fewer op-
portunities for upward mobility, for higher education skill development,
and especially for voice and choice over the terms of work at the work-
place. These are the jobs, low-paying jobs, that are often the most diffi-
cult to organize and to unionize, and they are the jobs that afford workers
the least control over the terms of the work they perform. They are the
most vulnerable jobs, not only in terms of income, but in almost all the
ways we think about work as an important part of life. Add all that-low
wages, low return, low opportunities-to the fact that female workers
have to contend with costs in the U.S. that are greater than in many parts
of the world, especially in the global north. The U.S. is far behind the
world in paid family leave, guaranteed healthcare, daycare for children,
and after-school programs. Single mothers are the most disadvantaged,
but a great majority of women are still the primary caregivers in society
and thus are negatively affected.
So that is just a quick trot through data suggesting the degree of
continued injustice. And this prompts the question: Why, fifty years after
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and after the Equal Pay Act, has there not been
more change in the wages of women and decreases in occupational seg-
regation and the other manifestations of gender and race-based discrimi-
nation in the workplace? As I mentioned, it's not for the lack of lawsuits.
There have been tens of thousands of lawsuits filed alleging gender and
racial-based discrimination in the workplace. So why has civil rights
litigation made so little difference, and what can we expect in the future?
II. CRITICAL FEMINIST THEORY ON THE LIMITS OF RIGHTS-BASED
STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE
One place to look for an answer is the abundant amount of scholar-
ship on rights and rights-based litigation. Feminist theorists in particular
offer many reasons why perhaps this rights-based, litigation-oriented
strategy of challenging discrimination and producing social justice was
very limited. I will just run through a couple of those arguments, alt-
hough I am sure you are already familiar with many of the points.
One very basic argument, going back to Marx, is that rights at best
are a "political lion's skin."'0 Rights tend to be useful for limiting arbi-
trary forms of harm, but are not very useful for challenging and trans-
forming the structural hierarchies created by capitalist societies. Much of
10. KARL MARX, ON THE JEWISH QUESTION 13 (Helen Lederer trans., 1958) (1844).
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feminist theory builds on that basic argument. Moreover, rights like those
guaranteed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act enable victims of invidious
wrongs to challenge injuries of discrimination, harmful exclusion, or
marginalization, but such rights claiming arguably only compounds the
problems. Scholars like Wendy Brown have argued that rights claiming
ends up reinforcing and reifying the subordinate identity of the injured
victim who needs the state's support and thus lacks the independence and
social power of the fully entitled, rights-bearing individual. 1 Rights
don't make people whole but rather institutionalize the stigmatized status
of the claimant. This dynamic is supported by some empirical sociolegal
studies of ordinary people in workplaces who have experienced discrim-
ination. These studies show that women and people of color are very
reluctant to even name the fact of discrimination or to claim rights, much
less to call a lawyer and initiate a formal action.12 This is very important.
I have heard a couple times over the last day that existing law is pretty
good at dealing with routine forms of overt, explicit discrimination. Well
that may be true when cases get into the courtroom; the problem is that
very little of the discrimination that actually occurs is ever challenged in
the courtroom because people are very reluctant to demand their rights.
Part of the reason is the stigma for rights-bearing individuals. Claiming
rights is a way to mark oneself as less than fully independent and less
than fully deserving of the rights that one claims: this is one of the great
paradoxes of rights.
Moreover, as Wendy Brown further argues, even when rights grant
momentary redress, inclusion, or even empowerment, they may "become
at another time a regulatory discourse-a means of obstructing or co-
opting more radical political demands or simply the most hollow of emp-
ty promises.' 3 It is not surprising that, historically, the conception of the
rights-bearing subject has been based on demonstrating discipline and
orderly conformity, and we have heard a lot at this conference about all
the pressures that are increasing on people to go along with whatever
their employers want in the workplace. That is going to be a theme that I
come back to in a moment.
Other feminist theorists like Nancy Fraser offer a slightly different
but related critique.14 Her work has very clearly shown that struggles for
equal rights often pursue along two different kinds of lines. One is a de-
mand for respect, for recognition, to be recognized for one's difference
in a way that is nonstigmatizing. This is what she calls "the politics of
recognition." But another demand often goes along with claims of rights,
11. Wendy Brown, Rights and Identity in Late Modernity: Revisiting the "Jewish Question,"
in IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 85, 87-89 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1995).
12. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS 1-4 (1988).
13. Brown, supra note 11, at 87.
14. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 3 NEW LEFT REV. 107, 107-09 (2000).
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which is demand for redistribution, in order to repair the injuries that are
longstanding in society and which provide remedy for those harms; it is a
demand for substantive material justice. But what Fraser argues is what
often happens, and did happen in second-wave feminist politics in par-
ticular, is that the focus on recognition, on winning respect as a rights-
bearing citizen, and not being treated in a differential way that stigmatiz-
es, often trumps the focus on redistribution. The material claims for
money or for a transfornation in material relations often get lost in a
claim of identity politics. It is easy to see that as a partial explanation for
the lack of focus on economic justice for women. Lots of other critical
arguments have been advanced about the limits and problems of rights.
One is that rights inherently individualize claims in the workplace, so
they divide workers in the workplace against each other. Workers have
little in common, and rights encourage them to pursue their own claims
for themselves in a way that diminishes the potential for solidarity and
collective action. Fraser specifically links this dynamic to the splintering
of the women's movement. The individualizing rights claiming impact
has something to do with the loss of solidarity over time.
One of the interesting points Nancy Fraser made in one of her more
recent books is a way in which feminism has become co-opted by, or
merged comfortably with, neoliberalism. The propensity for claiming
rights fits right in with the individualizing tendencies and even entrepre-
neurial ethic of neoliberalism. Moreover, the feminist attack on the old
family-wage idea was not really matched with an alternative conception
of living wages or minimum wages or minimum income to which people
should be entitled. The state and state policies were attacked as being
paternalistic, but with that went reliance on voluntarism and individual-
ism again which prevented the kind of collective action that was neces-
sary to challenge hierarchical organized power. Whereas in Europe and
Canada women often aimed to infiltrate the state to influence state policy
and state regulatory enforcement mechanisms dealing with questions of
inequality at work, women in the United States and feminists in particu-
lar pursued rights-based strategies that were more individualistic and less
transformative in the aggregate.
Partly for these reasons, I think there is some reason to believe that
we are witnessing a cultural exhaustion with civil rights in America. We
often think that the United States is a land where rights trump other kinds
of claims,15 but rights claims do not seem to carry the same kind of nor-
15. See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
POLITICAL CHANGE 131 (1974).
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mative authority or faith that they once did. In fact, there is a palpable
frustration with invoking civil rights types of claims.'
I offer one recent example supporting this claim. I am sure that
many of you have read the recent Shriver Report, A Women's Nation
Pushes Back from the Brink, sponsored by the Center for American Pro-
gress.17 A lot of the economic data presented in that report matches the
kind of frustrating facts that I just cited here and that has been talked
about at this conference, and a lot of the report's policy prescriptions
track those that have been talked about here as well. What I found really
interesting about that pamphlet, though, is that there is virtually nothing
about the Civil Rights Act, nothing about rights, nothing about law, and
no lawyers anywhere in the text. You see a bunch of celebrities: Be-
yonc6, Eva Longoria, and even LeBron James! But there's nothing about
the legacy of the Equal Pay Act, Civil Rights Act, litigation, lawyers, or
framing these issues in terms of basic rights to deal with the problems of
discrimination. I found that interesting and, perhaps, revealing about
where we are politically.
Now I think there is much truth in all of kinds of claims about the
limits of rights talk that I just listed briefly. But I want to suggest that this
frustration and disenchantment with rights, and even with litigation, is a
bit overblown. There should be no doubt that rights are a limited dis-
course, and they are linked to a history of constructing subjects in ways
that individualize aspirations and actions. But that is not the only way to
think about rights and how they work in social practice. Likewise, litiga-
tion by itself is a very limited kind of reform strategy, but litigation can
also often be a part of broader-based movements and, when joined to
other tactics, can be a very effective tactic. I understand critiques of
rights-I gave a presidential talk for the Law and Society Association,
where I made the case for the limitations and problems of rights as a re-
source for social change. I also used to be a part of a group of theoretical-
ly inclined empirical sociolegal scholars with the informal name the
"Rights Suck" group. All that said, my primary point here is we
shouldn't give up on rights, and we shouldn't give up on litigation, but
we need to rethink why civil rights law has not been more consequential.
III. A DIFFERENT EXPLANATION: POWER AND POLITICS OF LAW
I want to offer a simpler explanation for what I think happened, for
why I think the civil rights legacy was not more transformative than it
was. My account is going to be a much more political story. It is a story
16. See George 1. Lovell, The Myth ofthe Myth of Rights, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND
SOCIETY VOLUME 59, SPECIAL ISSUE: THE LEGACY OF STUART SCHEINGOLD I, 8 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2012).
17. MARIA SHRIVER, A WOMAN'S NATION PUSHES BACK FROM THE BRINK, SHRIVER REP.
(Jan. 12, 2014), http://shriverreport.org/special-report/a-womans-nation-pushes-back-from-the-
brink/.
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about the politics that Title VII facilitated and which flourished for a
particular moment, but then which was killed off by powerful opponents
and forces. In some ways what I want to do is try and present a short
story recovering the memory of what was killed off, not to urge repeating
that history, but to learn from it and think about how we can reproduce it
in new forms today.
First of all, we must recognize that it is arguably not rights or litiga-
tion per se, but the limitations of the Civil Rights Act in particular, that
have been part of the problem. The Civil Rights Act was built to achieve
at best modest change; it was designed to be a very limited resource for
social transformation. The Act was vague about the terms of what counts
as discrimination, as I mentioned at the outset. If we go back to the rec-
ord of debates, we see that discourses about discrimination are all over
the place and often no place at the same time. Moreover, the Act relied
on private litigation as a mechanism of enforcement and deterrence,
which puts the burden on victims to become plaintiffs and develop a le-
gal claim.'8 The EEOC, the regulatory body authorized to enforce the
Act, was given few resources, very little state capacity; it originally
could not sue, it had a very small staff, and so forth. This was a new kind
of social regulatory experiment and one that we know was designed not
to disrupt the status quo a great deal. It also became. a model for later
forms of social regulation like the Environmental Policy Act. Finally, the
inclusion of sex discrimination was an afterthought. There are many sto-
ries of how that happened. But by all accounts, in the early years, both in
terms of the Act itself and the EEOC, the issue of sex discrimination was
taken at best to be a marginal concern. The Act was primarily focused on
racial discrimination. So it is not surprising that an Act that was designed
not to have much impact did not lead to radical change. Again-to come
back to my opening words-it is surprising that it's much of a legacy to
talk about at all.
The second thing that I want to say is that a lot of critiques of rights
only focus on the most limited, narrow, negative versions of rights
grounded in the proprietarian, contract-based tradition of liberalism. But
other conceptions of rights have more positive, transformative possibili-
ties, and those rights have actually been recognized in our liberal tradi-
tion, and in fact were connected to some of the activism after the Act was
passed. Everyone knows-it has been talked about at this conference-
about the two basic standards for demonstrating discrimination in the
1964 Civil Rights Act. One is the disparate treatment standard; the other
is disparate impact. Several people said that I would be talking about
impact theory, and that is what I'm going to do now.
18. See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 85,94-95 (2010).
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Disparate treatment depends on, for the most part, a showing of
willful, intentional, or at least foreseeable indifference to harm against
victims. It can be shown by "pattern or practice," but it generally goes to
the logic of causation and demonstrated intent. Intentional discrimination
is at the core of the disparate treatment test. It best fits cases where em-
ployers, or those working under employers, engage in a certain kind of
hostile action that causes harm, usually to discrete, targeted individuals.
So it is grounded in a very individualized model of harm and of redress.
It tends to be very personalized and expressive of individual animus. The
important implication of that model is that it presumes that discrimina-
tion-whether it's sexual discrimination, gender discrimination, or race
discrimination-is anomalous in an otherwise just, market-based society.
It at least implicitly enforces the view that markets for the most part
work to ensure fairness, and we need a mechanism to deal with those
anomalous moments when some sort of racial or gender animus is dis-
played. There's an overall kind of ideological trap that I want to suggest
that goes hand-in-hand with that logic of discrimination. Again, I want to
emphasize that such logic of individualized action, of individualized
modes of discrimination and redress, are ones that are available still, and
courts are often pretty good on those types of simpler issues we might
say. However, again, we know from studies of individuals that women
and people of color are very reluctant to make claims in the workplace
out of fear of retaliation; even if you win a claim and get momentary
change, it's going to cost you in the long run. Especially in increasingly
difficult work conditions, where jobs are scarce and wages are low, the
assumption of risk that claiming and naming rights against intentional
discrimination in the workplace imposes is not something that many
people seize upon very quickly.
But I want to talk mostly about the other logic under the Civil
Rights Act, that of disparate impact, and to some degree the logic of
"pattern or practice," which I've always thought bridges the disparate
treatment and disparate impact, so I will include that under the broader
logic of impact here. I want to suggest that disparate impact is not just a
different standard of demonstrating discrimination; it's a whole different
theory of discrimination. It is, moreover, linked at least potentially to
wholly different repertoires of action demanding change. This concep-
tion of discrimination and response to discrimination was grounded in a
legacy of going back to early in the century, well before the Civil Rights
Act. It was embraced by many of the initial activists in the EEOC during
the late 1960s and was embraced by many groups that seized upon the
1964 Civil Rights Act and tried to make it work. Many people identify
disparate impact with the Griggs9 decision, and I think that is right, but I
want to move beyond the narrow legalist understanding of this precedent
19. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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to talk about what activists did in expanding the logic of harm and reme-
dy much further than what courts actually fully recognize. Creative pro-
gressive activists could always point to court decisions to justify this way
of thinking about action, but, nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that
this expansive vision was settled law at any particular moment. We
might say that the EEOC and Griggs opened a door, but the room of pos-
sible workplace political actions beyond the door was very large.
I want to suggest that there are seven features that distinguish dis-
parate impact, as imagined by worker activists in and beyond the pay
equity movement, which is where I engaged in a lot of scholarly and
activist work in the 1980s.20 These key features were common in both
gender- and race-based disparate impact claims from the late 1960s until
the late 1980s.
21
A. Discrimination Is Structural
The first and most important feature that distinguishes disparate im-
pact from disparate treatment theory is in understanding discrimination
not as anomalous and unusual in a market society, but rather that dis-
crimination-race-based, gender-based, and sexuality-based discrimina-
tion-permeates institutionalized processes and practices. Race and sex
and sexuality discrimination is structurally embedded; it is all over the
place. That is the norm. The norm is not fairness and equal treatment;
racial, gender, and sexual hierarchy is the norm. Discrimination is not a
matter of individual, personal animus necessarily, but it permeates a host
of norms, practices, and relationships, both within the employment
sphere and beyond in broader social relations that channel women and
people of color into some jobs rather than others. Those structural forces
impede mobility up ladders and across to other job ladders, to occupa-
tions that are grounded in assessments that undervalue female and racial
minority workers' worth in those jobs and what women and people of
color want and deserve from work. These discriminatory norms are re-
produced often unconsciously by practices, expectations, and assump-
tions that are reproduced over time. And they are rationalized by a host
of ideological constructs that are largely on their face blind to gender and
to race-ideological rationales about markets, merit, supply-and-
demand, and efficiency. So that is the basic premise of disparate impact
claims.
20. See generally MCCANN, supra note 2.
21. This discussion of disparate impact doctrine, its key features, and its demise is outlined in
greater detail in an unpublished paper on file with the author. Michael McCann et al., Executing
"Good" Civil Rights Law: A Political History of Wards Cove v. Atonio 1-2 (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
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B. Dispensing with Demonstrations of Intent
The structural impact is important because in many ways it dis-
penses with the formality of having to prove intentional discrimination.
First of all, intent is not the basis of disparate impact claims. The chal-
lenge is not trying to prove that there are some bad people who mean to
harm other people. The focus instead is on institutionalized practices and
protocols that reproduce hierarchy. Good people often reproduce gender
and race discrimination. The focus is on identifying oppression, not op-
pressors.
C. Enhanced Empirical Evidence
Moreover, proving intent is very difficult. That is the other really
important point here. The case for disparate impact is often empirically
much stronger than that for disparate treatment. It is often harder to
prove intentional discrimination, which focuses on a person's cognitive
processes. But it is often somewhat easier to prove disparate impact,
largely because lots of large organizations have elaborate job charts that
enable comparing wages to what people in different occupations make
and show that ladders from one job to another job do not connect to other
jobs. There are many types of institutional data that show the ways in
which work organization is unequally structured and the ways in which
wages of women in particular and people of color are systematically pro-
duced by that job segregation. Plaintiffs can put those data together with
testimony of workers in depositions and on the stand at trial, thus provid-
ing quite a compelling account about the reasons why there are dispari-
ties in wages and limited opportunities for mobility within and among
organizations.
D. Loosening Standards of Direct Causality
To empirically demonstrate patterns of discrimination is not only
easier, but it is often grounded in a logic that loosens the positivist causal
connection that is often demanded in law. If discrimination is a product
of a whole variety of interrelated practices and norms and relationships,
trying to find a single specific practice that accounts for the unequal out-
come is rather futile. The disparate impact logic invites a much more
holistic, complex, institutional way of understanding things. And in one
of the cases in which I was a part of in the 1980s, that was exactly the
way in which the cases were presented-days and days of testimony of
women's experience, along with charts of all the ladders among jobs that
can be put that next to the wages, enabling plaintiffs to paint a much
more complicated but compelling, convincing story. And it is very im-
portant that it was empirically easier to demonstrate, but it does not re-
quire that causal connection to a specific business practice. Some federal
court decisions in the 1970s supported this inclination to loosen that
causal link between specific practices and discriminatory impact.
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E. Structural Solutions for Structural Problems
If the problem is defined in structural terms, then, the solution has
to be structural. If the problem is comprehensive and built into all of the-
se interrelated practices, norms, and relationships, the solution has to be
multidimensional and comprehensive, and it probably will take a long
time to implement. In discussions about pay equity and comparable
worth, those terms are often used together, but I think it's very important
to distinguish them. Comparable worth is a technocratic fix. Most of the
campaigns for pay equity that I learned about did not seek a technocratic
fix, which the experts and consultants often wanted. As advocates used
to say, it will take at least fifty years to undo what took hundreds of years
to happen. And the solution is going to require lots of different reforms
proceeding concurrently. Activists in most cases did not look for or ex-
pect or even want a one-time fix.
F. Facilitating Collective Worker Action
Meaningful structural reform not only adopts the victim's perspec-
tive,22 as we often say, but the victims themselves have to be part of
naming the problem and shaping the reforms themselves. One of the
things that's distinctive about the pay-equity movement, and a lot of oth-
er race-based movements about which I am researching now, is that it
was critical not only to organize workers at the level of filing claims and
then at the discovery process and then at building the case in court, but it
was especially important in building worker participation into the im-
plementation of negotiated remedies. Remedies meant that workers had
to have more of a role in forming committees that would engage in long-
term monitoring processes and deal with all the connected issues of wage
equity, hiring, job promotion, building new ladders among jobs, and so
forth.
G. Expanding the Rights Agenda
And then, finally, once women and workers generally organize to
deal with those issues, they often begin to recognize other rights-based
issues that they share in common: the need for family leave, the lack of
health benefits, the lack of good retirement benefits, the lack of daycare.
A key part of the story I tried to tell about pay equity in Rights at Work is
that, once women organize, they not only become less reluctant to begin
to claim rights, but they began to think about a lot of other issues in
terms of rights that badly needed to be addressed. That was a central
point I was trying to make in the book-I interviewed hundreds of wom-
en around the country who were involved in these campaigns, and I doc-
22. The "victim's perspective" is a concept developed in Alan Freeman's classic essay. Alan
Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction, Rationalization,
Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 285, 287-88 (David Kairys ed., 1998).
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umented what often is called a developing "rights consciousness." A lot
of women said: "I never really thought about rights, I never took them
that seriously. I never considered myself a feminist; that is what white,
college-educated women do. I never considered myself a union activist.
But now I do, I consider myself a feminist union activist demanding
rights, after going through the struggle for fair pay." The political pro-
cess of claiming rights and shaping remedies changed the way they
looked at their work lives, and how they viewed themselves; it recon-
structed their subjectivities.
IV. THE EXECUTION OF GOOD CIVIL RIGHTS LAW
So we saw this explosion of workplace activity around institutional
racism and sexism around the country, starting in the late 1960s with
black construction workers and taking off more broadly in the 1970s.
When I was researching about pay-equity politics, I documented at least
100 campaigns at workplaces at local and/or state levels around the
country. Now much of this was below the radar of social scientists and of
law professors, because in most of these cases, lawsuits were filed and
they often settled. And that was the point-not to have to go to trial, or at
least to a judgment, but to get the trial, leverage for settlement or collec-
tive bargaining success, and then let the organized women workers take
over. And then continue to say we will go back and refile the lawsuit or
pursue a new lawsuit if necessary. So all this politics did not make a big
impact on case law, but it did depend on a perception that the courts were
open to these types of claims. So now we must ask: what happened?
The story I will relate now is fairly simple and tragic: if the advances that
were made during this time were due to a politics of rights at the local
level, it was also politics that undid all of this. It was macro-politics at
the national level.
The key case that I would pinpoint as a turning point in ending the
collectivist politics challenging institutional sexism and racism was
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio23 in 1989.24 I ended my 1994 book,
Rights at Work, long ago by recognizing the impact of that case, and I am
writing a book about the actual Wards Cove case now, twenty-five years
later after I did that original work. Our25 focus is on the social history of
Wards Cove. Wards Cove developed from a lawsuit that was filed by
Filipino activists who worked in the Alaskan salmon canneries, where
work conditions were structured on a modified race-based plantation
model that had been around for hundreds of years. This plantation model
was adapted from southern slavery and reproduced around the Pacific
Rim canneries in Hawaii and Alaska, as well as in the agricultural sectors
23. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
24. See McCann et al., supra note 2 1, at I.
25. The developing book and related articles are co-authored with my colleague, George
Lovell, also at the University of Washington. The book will be titled A Union by Law.
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of seasonal work in California, Oregon, and Washington. The Filipino
American plaintiffs challenged the fact that the entire workforce was
segregated-that Filipino workers and Native Americans were the only
ones who worked in the factory line doing all the cleaning and cutting up
of the fish in very dangerous and unhealthy conditions. Whereas all of
the lower level jobs were held by Asian American and Native American
workers, jobs in the middle to higher levels were all held almost exclu-
sively by white workers. Workers lived in different quarters, ate different
food, assumed very different risks, lived in different worlds. This was a
quasi-slave-based kind of system. And the plaintiffs challenged that sys-
tem as invidiously discriminatory.
The Wards Cove case was one of three cases that the Filipino can-
nery workers filed. The first two won at the trial level and then settled.
These cases advanced very important efforts by the plaintiffs to not only
change workplace conditions, but also to take over a union from corrupt,
unresponsive leaders who slipped into control during the McCarthy Era,
and who had brought in gambling rings and prostitution rings that were
basically exploiting the workers when they would go up to Alaska. The
strategy of organizing rank-and-file workers around the lawsuits worked.
As a result of filing these lawsuits, the dissident workers formed the
Alaska Cannery Workers Association, kicked out the old leaders, and
enabled a group of young, radical Filipinos and a multiracial group of
allies to take over the union.
A third prong of what the strategy, believe it or not, was to bring
down Ferdinand Marcos, the autocratic Philippine leader. The plaintiffs
were young democratic socialists and part of a broad alliance in the Pu-
get Sound area fighting against American imperial activities around the
world, including the support for Marcos. Their ambitious venture in-
curred great risks for the activists. Two of the leaders who planned the
three cases, Gene Viernes and Silme Domingo, were murdered in 1981
by Filipino gang thugs in Seattle. A later civil trial for wrongful death
showed that the thugs worked for the corrupt union boss-his gun was
the murder weapon-and that the money came from Ferdinand Marcos,
most likely with some CIA knowledge. That is a very interesting side
story-please read the book when it comes out.
Nevertheless, the minority plaintiffs of color, which included some
females, challenged the conditions at work in ways similar to legions of
black construction workers before them and women demanding pay eq-
uity after them. But what happened was that the Wards Cove claim, the
third lawsuit, unexpectedly ended up before the U.S. Supreme Court and
marked a turning point in the history of disparate impact doctrine and the
26collectivist workplace politics that it facilitated. It was a turning point
26. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-60.
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for a lot of things we've talked about today. Case law was all over the
place in the 1970s and '80s in interpreting disparate impact. Neverthe-
less, demonstrations of statistical disparities and remedies that were pro-
portional to the violation were upheld in some cases.
What the majority said in Wards Cove was stunning. The first thing
they did was erase basic precedents. It was mentioned the other day that
some of the precedents from the 1970s still exist. What was interesting
about the majority decision is that it did not recognize that they were
ignoring or overturning any precedents. The majority just disregarded
them in defining new standards. In fact, that is what the dissenting mi-
nority Justices, Stevens and Blackmun, said: Justice Stevens, writing for
four justices, referred to the "majority's facile treatment of settled law,
27
and stated that their "casual-almost summary-rejection of the statuto-
ry construction that developed in the wake of Griggs is most disturb-
ing. '28 Stevens added that the majority was "[t]urning a blind eye to the
meaning and purpose of Title VII" and lamented the conservative majori-
,,29
ty's "latest sojourn into judicial activism.
Specifically, one thing that the majority did was to change the bur-
den of proof. The majority ruling put the burden of persuasion on the
plaintiffs from start to end, which was a change in law. Moreover, the
majority demanded a clear showing of a direct causal link between spe-
cific business practices and the alleged discriminatory impact. As such,
they required a disaggregation of interrelated, historically developed
institutional relations into discrete elements of the labor supply line in
ways that implicitly gutted the structural logic of disparate impact
claims. The majority also expanded the "business necessity" defense to
the point where, as Justice White implies at one point, the prerogatives of
employers almost always will and should prevail. And the majority ex-
panded the market defense in the process, so that, as one female pay eq-
uity activist whom I interviewed long ago put it, "discrimination is all
right if everyone else does it."
Another key point was the allegation that the workers did not show
sufficient interest in the better jobs because they could not demonstrate
that any one worker engaged in protracted efforts to move out of the line
jobs into the management jobs. This is in an industry where for eighty
years, only Asian-Americans and Native Americans worked on the floor
processing fish, and only whites were hired in the other jobs! The plain-
tiffs were blamed because they did not try hard enough to break that his-
torically rigid barrier. The Court held that each aggrieved worker would
have to bring an individual lawsuit, and each lawsuit would have to show
that the plaintiff made a strong effort to break into those jobs. The prob-
27. Id. at 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 671 72.
29. Id. at 663.
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lem is that the workers needed to be more entrepreneurial, as neoliberals
put it. We've heard this about workers, right? This is the new model that
Nancy Reichman was talking about. That is what the majority of Justices
reasoned in Wards Cove. It is an interesting claim for lots of reasons, not
least that one of the "unskilled" plaintiffs went on to become an architect
and another a graduate student in public administration. In dismissing the
plaintiffs' claims, Justice White made clear whose interests should be the
base line: "Courts are generally less competent than employers to re-
structure business practices; consequently, the judiciary should proceed
with care before mandating that an employer must adopt a[n] alterna-
tive ... hiring practice in response to a Title VII suit."' 30 The dissenters
again questioned these claims by the majority about legal justification for
judicial deference to employer prerogatives.
In short, this case erased both precedents and critical social facts.
31
And in the pay-equity movement in 1989, everybody saw this ruling as
the death of pay-equity claims. If these were the new standards articulat-
ed by the highest court in the land, then the possibilities for those ele-
ments of disparate impact that were critical to the structural challenge to
discrimination in the workplace were now erased history. Many of the
activists in the pay-equity movement joined the Wards Cove plaintiffs
and other activists to push for the 1991 Civil Rights Act. As many of you
know, that Act did make some changes that were favorable to certain
elements of disparate treatment cases, but the Act did little to restore
those elements that were favorable to disparate impact. We know the
outcome of this. If you look historically at legal activity after 1991-here
I'm using the Nielsen and Nelson data-there was a dramatic increase
from 1987 to 2003 in the amount of employment litigation under the
Civil Rights Act. But what they show is that almost all of the legal action
was individualized disparate treatment cases. To refer to their data, only
6% of the cases included between two and ten plaintiffs. Only .05% of
cases had more than ten plaintiffs, which is a minimum for any meaning-
ful class action. "Collective legal mobilization is rare," they conclude.32
That's a dramatic change from the 1970s, when studies show that far
more civil rights cases were class action cases.
So how did this dramatic change occur? I think this was a pivotal
moment when the Court begins to take apart structural challenges in a
number of rulings. And we've seen other cases that have been talked
about over the last two days where this has continued on in various other
30. Id. at 661 (majority opinion) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Justice Blackmun's dissent speaks to the erasure of social facts: "One wonders whether
the majority still believes that race discrimination.., is a problem in our society, or even remembers
that it ever was." Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
32. Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employ-
ment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
175, 189 (2010).
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elements: undercutting capacity for class action, for challenging vicari-
ous liability, the Ricci33 and Walmart34 cases-all of which were out-
comes of rulings making structural challenges and collectivist kinds of
remedies difficult if not impossible.
I should mention-and this is the part of the book that we're writ-
ing-that this was certainly not a matter of just the courts acting alone;
this shift was part of a concerted coalitional strategy. Big business began
to organize in the early 1970s with the Business Roundtable, and the
Chamber of Commerce began to make a concerted effort to take away
these efforts of workers to regain voice and position and to challenge
systematic discrimination and empower unions in the workplace. They
developed sophisticated strategies to achieve those ends, and that includ-
ed working through the Reagan Administration. We see in the begin-
nings of the Reagan Administration that one of the key tools was the
claim about racial and gender "quotas." Disparate impact claims, it was
claimed, were all about installing quotas. This is interesting because the
briefs in the Wards Cove case that mentioned quotas were from the
Chamber of Commerce, from the U.S. government, and other business
interests. However, the plaintiffs in the case never asked for quotas as
remedies. We went back through the whole history of the case, and they
never mention quotas once. Then the Supreme Court comes along and
says that the case was about quotas, even while the majority never talks
about actual conditions in the workplace. Instead they wrote along the
lines of "Let's imagine that if we granted plaintiffs what they requested
in this case, what would employers do? They'd have to create quotas. We
have said quotas are not appropriate responses to the problem of discrim-
ination, so therefore the employers would become discriminators if they
used quotas." This is curious logic not only because it is ungrounded in
the case history and purely hypothetical, but also because many scholarly
studies have shown that employers almost never create quotas in re-
sponse to these kinds of problems. It's all fantasy.
And that is, I think, the situation we find ourselves in today. All of
what we've seen is that we're dealing with a context in which big busi-
ness has been very, very effective in preventing collective action by
workers, both through unions and through class action litigation. I co-
authored a book called Distorting the Law,36 which is about the attempt
of big business to undercut tort litigation, and to create the stigma of the
individual tort litigant as being frivolous, filing frivolous lawsuits and
being selfish and greedy, and the tort lawyer as just a greedy, self-
33. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
34. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
35. Robin Stryker, Disparate Impact and the Quota Debates: Law, Labor Market Sociology,
and Equal Employment Policies, 42 SoC. Q. 13, 29-36 (2001).
36. WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND
THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004).
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interested thug. The same thing has gone on in workplace discrimination
cases. There's been massive public campaign to stigmatize those who
would speak up about discrimination and injustice in the workplace. And
that is one key part of what we usually talk about with regard to the ne-
oliberal era. Neoliberalism is the reassertion of the priority of markets, of
property ownership, contracts, and competition over the premises of
equality.
This development requires us to reconsider the basic promises of
legal equality and rights in a liberal society. On one hand, we have a tra-
dition of property-based, market-based, contractarian rights about owner-
ship and about the power and prerogative of private business owners. But
we also have rights to equality, to equality as citizens to participate to-
gether in collective governance. In the simplest or broadest terms, those
equality rights have always been the key normative resource for subal-
tern groups-people of color, women, immigrants, low-income workers,
the poor-to challenge the persistent material reality of social inequality.
But what has happened now is that the language of equality has been
eviscerated so that the whole political realm is permeated by practices
and premises that are grounded in contractarian, proprietarian, market-
based logics. The worker is now imagined as the entrepreneur in compe-
tition with everyone else for scarce, low-paying jobs, individualizing
struggle in ways that only make it more difficult for collective challenge
to hierarchical power. Key legal resources that enabled such collective
challenges have been erased, or at least eroded, in civil rights law. And in
the process, the older structural logics of discrimination have been for-
gotten. As Robert Cover once argued, the legal system systematically
"forgets" a lot of visions of rights and justice, because only the winners
of lawsuits continue on as part of the story, and those who either settle or
maybe lose are just forgotten in history.37 And that is what happened in
these struggles to a large extent. So again, my interest as a sociolegal
scholar is to recover that part of history.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, I want to say that the problem is not the intrinsic limita-
tions of rights. It's not necessarily the limitations of litigation. The prob-
lem is in the killing of those legal resources of specific rights construc-
tions and litigation opportunities that once supported collective work-
place politics, what Robert Cover called "jurisgenetic" politics of vision-
ary social justice from below.
38
I put up on the screen before my talk a picture of Tyree Scott. Scott
was an African-American who fought as a marine in Vietnam, came back
37. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 47-49 (1983).
38. See id. at 11.
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home, but could not find work as an electrician with his father because
they were squeezed out of the building trades in Seattle, which were con-
trolled by all-white unions. Tyree formed his own all-black union. He set
up a public interest law firm of nonlawyers, called LELO (Labor and
Employment Law Office). The LELO leaders were the architects of the
Wards Cove case. The picture I put up before was a letter from LELO
worker activists that expressed some disagreement with their lawyer over
continuing to litigate under the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Their whole ar-
gument was that law is not neutral and apolitical. Law is simply a site of
the contestation between the haves and the have-nots. We have to view
law in that way, Tyree always stressed, as in denying it we will miss
what is really going on. His aim was not to dismiss law and rights as
meaningless, but rather to raise the bar for figuring out how to make
rights real.
And that is how I think about that moment of political activism
around workplace discrimination in the 1970s and 1980s. Again, it was
not just around gender-based wage pay equity; a lot of activism was
around race, by blacks and Asian-Americans and Latinos. The trio of
cases that included Wards Cove was part of a broad, diffuse, largely un-
coordinated movement involving legal cases by minority and female
workers-all expressing similar political aspirations for equality and
justice, from the bottom up, each mobilizing around lawsuits and Title
VII claims just like we see in pay equity cases.
So where does leave us now? One strategy might be to imagine how
can we reclaim the 1964 or 1991 Civil Rights Acts or write a new Civil
Rights Act. The plaintiffs in the Wards Cove case, immediately after
what they thought was a failure of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, formed a
national campaign and went around trying to build support for what they
called the Third Reconstruction of Civil Rights. Their goal was a new
Civil Rights Act that restored disparate impact and related challenges to
institutionalized inequality. However, they gave up after a number of
years, as even during the Clinton years there was no support for the
cause. They could not find a sympathetic public, the labor unions gave
up, women's groups focused on other issues, and there was no one in
federal government paying attention. I do not want to rule out the vision
of restoring a new civil rights act, but I am skeptical.
I think, at the very least, what we need to do instead is to draw on
the power and importance of the structural challenges-structural logics
of inequality-in a host of new, more disaggregated ways. I tend to think
that antidiscrimination, despite the ongoing radical success of LGBT
advocates, is exhausted as a framework for challenging systemic eco-
nomic inequality that most affects people of color and women. I am not
urging abandoning intent-based civil rights advocacy, but we need to
move beyond it. If we want to take the next step forward, we need to
focus directly on the bottom two-thirds of society, which is radically
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underpaid, exploited, and insecure. We need to think about a menu of
different but interrelated ways that we can bring empowerment through
wages and work opportunities to them. Then we can continue to deal
with the other manifestations of race, gender, and sexual discrimination.
If we really want to deal with the economic issues, with money, sex, and
power, we need to think and talk about it differently. Change can happen,
but it is going to have to come from below.
This means that we need to build stronger bonds among progressive
groups committed to social justice. At the policy level, I suggest several
priorities. First, we need to raise dramatically minimum wage standards,
both at local levels and at the national level. The struggle to raise the
state minimum wage in Washington to $15, which has already succeeded
in some local levels, is a place to begin. I also propose that we go back to
the Fair Labor Standards Act and begin to think about various ways to
build on that. Maybe go back to the old protective legislation model,
which paved the way for a variety of the 1930s reforms that were not
gender-specific, and think about what we might do about issues with
hours, what we need to do with family-leave policies, and the like. I will
be honest that I don't have the answers, except hat I think we need to
look for new angles to deal with the big problems.
In short, we need a comprehensive set of reforms. The 1964 Civil
Rights Act did not offer that, but many people took inspiration from the
Act to think broadly, and we should take inspiration from that past. But
even if we shift focus away from the logic of antidiscrimination, we
should not give up on rights. Rights are very important resources. Our
legacy of liberal rights authorizes claims of equal citizenship, and jobs,
work activity, and work income are very important preconditions for
becoming a respected, active citizen in public life. We find ourselves in a
period where those claims of equality have been significantly diminished
and overpowered by the claims of markets and property ownership and
private prerogative. But, I think that is where we have to resume the
struggles-back on the core terrain of making equal rights mean some-
thing again. Let us not abandon that part of the fight.
One last, closely related point: I think that we must make the im-
portant move to begin to appeal much more to positive socioeconomic
rights embedded in international human rights traditions. The United
States is woefully behind the world in taking human rights seriously.
When I look around and say, "what discursive resources can be a lever
for change?" I repeatedly come back to the human rights principles of
positive socioeconomic rights. This tradition animated A. Philip Ran-
dolph and Martin Luther King, a host of feminist activists including to-
day Martha Nussbaum, and the Filipino cannery worker activists who
were defeated by the neoliberal logic of the U.S. Supreme Court. Making
human rights discourse a reality is not going to happen tomorrow in the
United States; it is not going to happen even in my lifetime. But I do
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believe it is among the most promising routes for progressive, egalitari-
an, democratic change. Social rights fits well with claims of higher living
wage, gender- and race-based wage equity, accessible health care for all,
family leave, and a host of other causes that we have discussed at this
conference. Framing claims as human rights will not guarantee a better
world, but it is one of the most promising normative strategies for mak-
ing equal rights a real, meaningful agenda for social transformation.
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION: BIAS IN LITIGATION AND
AMONG THE JUDICIARY
DIANE S. KINGt
Whereas our justice system has long acknowledged our faith in ju-
ries as a bedrock of our judicial system, due to the value of the combined
wisdom of people with different backgrounds and beliefs, this concept is
not applied when it comes to judges. Why not? Why do we assume that
judges do not, or should not, bring their experiences to bear on their in-
terpretation of a set of circumstances?
The "Bias in Litigation and Among the Judiciary" panel was com-
posed of Judge Christine Arguello of the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado, Pat Chew, Salmon Chaired Professor and Dis-
tinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, and
Jason Bent, Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of
Law.
When then-nominee for the United States Supreme Court Judge
Sonia Sotomayor remarked about the "wise Latina judge," this remark
ignited considerable controversy. Some claimed that the nominee could
not possibly be objective or fair, while others claimed that she was just
stating the obvious. Though coming at the issue from very different di-
rections, the articles by Professors Chew and Bent examine the underly-
ing assumptions our system of justice makes as to the role played by the
backgrounds of judges.
Professor Chew's essay, entitled Anticipating the Wise Latina
Judge,' explores how alternative race and gender perspectives bring in-
sight into cases where those perspectives are relevant. By its very title,
Professor Chew captures the nub of the problem. There are those who
argue that any sort of diversity, be it sex, race, or otherwise, predisposes
a judge towards inappropriate bias. Professor Chew explores whether
fears of bias are justified.
Professor Chew compares and contrasts the application of both the
formalist model of decision making and the realist model of decision
making. Under the formalist model, the judicial analytical process is
supposed to be systematic and uniformly executed. Under the realist
model, there is an acknowledgement hat judges cannot help but bring
their backgrounds and experiences to the bench.
t Partner, King & Greisen, LLP; B.S., Colorado State University; J.D., University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley.
1. 91 DENY. U. L. REV. 853 (2014).
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As a practical matter, there are differences based upon gender and
race. Professor Chew cites to empirical research exploring how the race
and gender of judges impacts their judicial decision making when race
and gender are salient parts of the case. For example, the likelihood of a
plaintiffs success in a sex discrimination case increases by 10% when
the judge is a woman.
Professor Chew explores whether the fears regarding a "wise Lati-
na" make sense. Her point is that there is irony in the fear of the Latina
judge-why fear the Latina judge and not any other judge? Why not fear
the white male judge who is far less likely to have actually experienced
illegal discrimination? There is no empirical evidence that judges of a
particular gender or race are more likely than any other gender or race to
ignore legal principles and instead substitute their own political or per-
sonal preferences.
Professor Chew applies salience theory to explain differences in
perception. Salience theory is the explanation for why, when individuals
are bombarded with information, certain bits of that information stand
out more than other bits of the information. This theory offers explana-
tions as to why judges may have different perspectives when faced with
the same information. Professor Chew concludes that since "individuals
can be trained to find salient stimuli that would otherwise not be no-
ticed," judges should use a "deep" analysis of the factual circumstances
and the applicable legal principles in order to gain awareness of their
potential bias. This "deep" analysis involves a collaborative and intro-
spective process where the decision maker examines the perspective of,
for example, a minority judge's world view in order to understand the
judge's alternative assumptions and saliencies.
Judge Christine Arguello, who spoke on the panel, is herself a wise
Latina, having had a hardscrabble childhood and having been a partner in
several major law firms, a law professor, Managing Senior Associate
University Counsel, and Colorado's Deputy Attorney General prior to
joining the bench. Her talk reinforced the points that Professor Chew
makes. Judge Arguello emphasized that no judge is a blank slate. She
questioned why, given that fact, being a woman and Hispanic would be
perceived as a "problem" instead of an asset. Judge Arguello gave exam-
ples where her background influenced her decision making, but for the
better. Those examples emphasized that in certain circumstances, she had
an enhanced understanding and increased sensitivity that lead her to
make more informed decisions. In addition, her background and sensitiv-
ity influences her vocabulary; whereas Justice Alito uses the label "ille-
gal alien," to refer to individuals in the country illegally, Judge Arguello
prefers the label "non-citizen." Last, her background has led her to treat
pro se litigants with patience and respect. Judge Arguello's overarching
theme was that bringing a diverse perspective to the bench is an asset,
not a detriment.
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Professor Bent, in his paper Hidden Priors: Toward a Unifying
Theory of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law,2 makes the point that
judges make fundamental assumptions based upon their backgrounds and
beliefs. These fundamental assumptions, or "hidden priors," lie buried
and often hidden beneath layers of legal doctrine and analysis. By way of
example, Professor Bent looks at the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,3 and examines the hidden priors in the deci-
sion. He uses the decision to both analyze the impact of the case on dis-
parate-treatment law and to argue that despite the fact that there are
shortcomings in the use of statistical evidence which were exposed by
the Court, that statistical evidence is still important and should be exam-
ined in conjunction with the underlying assumptions.
In the Wal-Mart decision, Professor Bent exposes the hidden priors
in Wal-Mart, which are the Court's preconceptions about the background
rates of discrimination. Quoting the Court,
[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation-and
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimina-
tion-would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring
and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.
4
It is telling that Justice Scalia cites to no authority for the above
statement. Based upon this hidden prior, articulated by Justice Scalia, the
majority went on to articulate an entirely new, and more rigorous, stand-
ard to be applied in a systemic disparate treatment case-to establish a
prima facie case, the plaintiff must establish both a gross statistical dis-
parity and the identification of a particular policy or mechanism respon-
sible for generating the observed disparity. This new second element can
be satisfied through evidence of a policy of discrimination, a common
discriminating decision maker or anecdotal evidence on a larger scale
than what was produced by the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart.
Professor Bent attributes the Court's doctrinal shift to the fact that
the Court's underlying assumption about the prevalence of discrimina-
tion in society has changed from the 1970s, when discrimination was
very prevalent, to now, when at least the Court assumes that discrimina-
tion is relatively rare (this point is obviously open to debate). He goes on
to argue that the scholarship on systemic disparate treatment has, thus
far, not articulated the proper role and importance of statistical evidence;
thus, there has been no coherent theory that both advances the goals of
the doctrine, on the one hand, without overstating the reach of statistical
evidence, on the other hand. In his article, Professor Bent proposes a
2. 91 DENY. U. L. REV. 807 (2014).
3. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
4. Id. at 2554.
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theory of systemic disparate treatment that embraces hidden or Bayesian
priors and takes them into account in evaluating claims.
HIDDEN PRIORS: TOWARD A UNIFYING THEORY OF
SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW
JASON R. BENTt
ABSTRACT
Did the Court's procedural decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes undermine the substance of the systemic disparate treatment theo-
ry of employment discrimination? The answer to that question hinges on
understanding the theoretical foundation for what one scholar calls the
"most potent and least understood of the various Title VII causes of ac-
tion." The current scholarly efforts to understand systemic disparate
treatment law can be sorted into two distinct strands-methodological
and contextualist. Scholars in the methodological strand question wheth-
er statistical techniques currently used by courts are sufficient to support
an inference of discrimination. In the contextualist strand, scholars urge a
conceptual expansion of the systemic disparate treatment theory that
would impose liability on employers for wrongdoing located at the or-
ganizational level, rather than simply aggregating individual-level
claims. These two strands have advanced independently, with scholars in
each strand often overlooking the implications of progression in the oth-
er. This Article is the first attempt to unify these two scholarly strands. It
does so by exposing the inescapable role of hidden Bayesian priors-
preconceptions about background rates of discrimination-in the inter-
pretation of statistical evidence. Taking a Bayesian view, the shortcom-
ings of traditional statistical evidence identified by methodologists are
not fatal. Yet, the Bayesian view also provides the conceptual space
needed for further development of the organizational approach advanced
by contextualists. The Wal-Mart decision presents an opportunity to rad-
ically rethink this misunderstood area of antidiscrimination law, and this
Article takes the first step in developing of a coherent theory of systemic
disparate treatment that embraces Bayesian priors.
f Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law; J.D., University of Mich-
igan Law School (2000); B.A., Grinnell College (1997). Earlier versions of this paper were present-
ed at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association of Law Schools and at the 2012
Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law. Thank you to the partic-
ipants of both conferences for their helpful comments and suggestions. The paper was substantially
improved by comments received from Theresa Beiner, David Kaye, Jason Palmer, J.J. Prescott,
Gowri Ramachandran, Charles Sullivan, Louis J. Virelli Ill, Steven Willborn, and Michael J. Zim-
mer, as well as illuminating conversations on the subject with Shaina Bent, Deborah Weiss, Char-
lotte Alexander, Scott R. Bauries, Zev J. Eigen, Michael Z. Green, and Michael D. Smith. Lindsay
Houser and Michael Labbee provided exemplary research assistance. The faculty and administration
of the Stetson University College of Law generously supported this research project.
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INTRODUCTION
What, if anything, remains of the systemic disparate treatment theo-
ry of employment discrimination? This question is raised by the Supreme
Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.' Although Wal-Mart
was ostensibly a procedural case about the commonality requirement for
class certification, the opinion will have important, if deeply uncertain,
implications for the substantive law of systemic disparate treatment.2
Several scholars have questioned whether, as a practical matter, the theo-
ry survives Wal-Mart at all. 3 One thing is certain: systemic disparate
I. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. See Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 397 (2011) ("But the Court did more than pull the procedural rug out from
under the decade-long lawsuit; it called into question the future of systemic disparate treatment
law."); see also Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate
Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387, 387 (2011) ("Although Wal-Mart formally is a
case about class certification, the procedural analysis takes shape in the shadow of the substantive
theory of liability.").
3. See Green, supra note 2, at 397-98; L. Camille Hbert, The Supreme Court's 2010-2011
Labor and Employment Law Decisions. A Large and "Mixed Bag "for Employers and Employees,
15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 279, 309 (2011); Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, The Hazards of
Dukes: The Substantive Consequences of a Procedural Decision, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 123, 137
(2012). Professor Pedersen states:
The majority has rewritten the systemic disparate treatment standard to require some type
of corporate policy calling for the use of discrimination by its supervisors or else discrim-
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treatment law now sits at a historic crossroads.4 Whether it survives, and
in what form, depends on the articulation of a coherent theory of system-
ic disparate treatment that advances the remedial goals of antidiscrimina-
tion law without overstating the probative reach of statistical evidence of
observed disparities in employment outcomes.5
The scholarship on systemic disparate treatment discrimination has,
thus far, been unable to articulate such a coherent theory. Rather, the
discourse has diverged into two separate analytical strands each focusing
on a distinct aspect of systemic disparate treatment law. In the first
strand, which can be described as the methodological strand, scholars
question the ability of current statistical methodologies to support an
inference of unlawful discrimination based only on observed quantitative
disparities in employment outcomes.6 In the second strand, which may be
called the contextualist strand, scholars argue that the systemic disparate
treatment theory should be conceptually expanded to impose liability on
employers for wrongdoing located at the organizational level, rather than
simply functioning as a narrow doctrinal tool for aggregating individual-
inatory acts of one supervisor that reach an entire class of plaintiffs and can be held to
constitute a pattern or practice. Neither seems very viable.
Pedersen, supra, at 137 (footnote omitted); see also Zatz, supra note 2, at 387 ("Now Wal-Mart
threatens to turn that avenue into a dead end, in part by extending to Title VII this Court's general
hostility to the class action device." (footnote omitted)); Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes:
Taking the Protection out of Protected Classes, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 409, 457 (2012) ("If
taken seriously, that interpretation of Wal-Mart would eliminate most systemic disparate treatment
pattern or practice cases."); Charles A. Sullivan, Maybe Systemic Disparate Treatment Isn't Dead
Yet?, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof-blog/2012/12/maybe-systemic-disparate-treatment-isnt-
dead-yet.html. But see Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v.
Wal-Martfor Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
433, 434-35 (2012) (analyzing lower "court opinions from 2005 to mid-201 I" and questioning
whether the Wal-Mart opinion will have a significant practical effect on lawsuits "challenging sub-
jective employment practices").
4. In recognition of this, a group of scholars led by Professors Tristin Green and Noah Zatz
recently organized a Working Group on the Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law (Working
Group). The stated purpose of the Working Group was to consider what exactly the substantive law
of systemic disparate treatment means and to "get a head start on thinking about the post-Wal-Mart
landscape." See Zatz, supra note 2, at 387-88. The Working Group's work was published in Volume
32 of the Berkeley Journal of Employment and Labor Law. See id. at 388; Richard Thompson Ford,
Beyond Good and Evil in Civil Rights Law: The Case ofWal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 513, 513 (2011); Green, supra note 2, at 398-99 (advancing "a 'context' model of organi-
zational wrongdoing" and direct liability as superior to models focused on identifying individual
instances of discrimination); Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 455, 457-58 (2011); Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 481 (2011) (arguing that a statistical
showing alone is no longer sufficient to establish a systemic disparate treatment claim and that "it is
incumbent upon plaintiffs to explain the story the statistical presentation is telling").
5. See Green, supra note 2, at 454 (calling for an "open and frank debate about the theoreti-
cal grounding for and shape of systemic disparate treatment law"); Zatz, supra note 2, at 391 ("What
systemic disparate treatment theory needs is an account that grounds employer liability in firm-level
conduct-the connective tissue-[]not simply in dispersed individual disparate treatment, and does
so without relying exclusively on the extreme case of connective disparate treatment." (emphasis
omitted)).
6. See infra Part II.A.
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level claims of wrongdoing.7 Although there is significant tension be-
tween these two strands of scholarship, authors writing in each strand
rarely engage the key arguments or insights developed in the other. As a
result, courts are left without a coherent theory to make sense of a per-
plexing subject lying at the intersection of antidiscrimination law and
statistical theory. This Article is the first attempt to reconcile the key
differences between the methodologists and the contextualists and repre-
sents the first step in developing a unified theory of systemic disparate
treatment.
The path forward for systemic disparate treatment theory post-Wal-
Mart requires acknowledging the role of Bayesian priors-
preconceptions about background rates of employment discrimination.
8
At present, the Bayesian priors held by judges and juries in systemic
discrimination cases are obscured beneath a veneer of formalistic legal
reasoning.9 But these hidden priors operate nonetheless, invisibly affect-
ing the outcome of all systemic disparate treatment cases.'0 As this Arti-
cle will demonstrate, hidden priors can be located in the formative cases
that defined systemic disparate treatment theory in the late 1970s," as
well as in the Court's recent Wal-Mart decision, which threatens to se-
verely limit the theory.12
The objective of this Article is to develop a unifying path forward
for systemic disparate treatment law by exposing the inescapable opera-
tion of hidden Bayesian priors. The Article urges courts to openly
acknowledge the undeniable role of Bayesian priors in systemic disparate
treatment litigation and further urges scholars and courts to take up the
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. As the concept is used in this Article, a Bayesian prior is generally a pre-formed or pre-
conceived estimate of the likelihood that any given employer engaged in unlawful employment
discrimination, made before considering any given piece of additional information. Bayesian priors
may be used in an iterative fashion, such that the "prior probability" is informed by general precon-
ceptions about background rates, as updated by a cumulative assessment of all the nonstatistical
evidence in the case, but before considering the purely statistical evidence. See infra Part III.A.
9. See Deborah M. Weiss, The Impossibility ofAgnostic Discrimination Law, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1677, 1741 (2011) (observing that both the majority opinion and the dissent in Wal-Mart
"clearly turn on background assumptions that are not well-grounded in evidence").
10. See id. at 1701 ("[J]uries enter the courtroom with pre-existing views about the societal
pattern of discrimination and cannot be forced by the fiat of evidentiary exclusion to turn off their
views about that societal pattern."). Judge Richard Posner xplains that Bayesian priors can operate
at an unconscious level, using discrimination cases as an example. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How
JUDGES THINK 67-68 (2008) ("I used the example of a sex discrimination suit because it is the kind
of suit in which judges' priors are likely to differ along political lines or along racial, religious, or
gender lines that are correlated with (and often influence) political leanings, or because of different
personal or professional experiences or differences in personality.").
11. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 300 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977). Teamsters is generally considered the seminal case
on systemic disparate treatment theory. See, e.g., I CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.01, at 145 (3d ed. 2002); David G. Karro, Common Sense
About Common Claims, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMPL. L.J. 33, 45 (2007) (calling Teamsters "the
seminal pattem-or-practice case").
12. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011); see also Weiss, supra note 9, at
1740-41.
[Vol. 91:4
2014] HIDDEN PRIORS: TOWARD A UNIFYING THEORY 811
difficult challenges posed by recognizing the operation of priors. This
Article will be the first step in the development of a unified theory of
systemic disparate treatment employment discrimination. Embracing
priors will open up several challenging questions and new lines of schol-
arly inquiry about the proper management of priors in antidiscrimination
legislation and litigation. As just one example of these challenging ques-
tions: whose priors should be determinative?13 This Article will highlight
some of these second-order questions and frame the future debate over
such questions. A related article includes my own suggestions for the
proper management of priors in employment discrimination law.14 The
point of this Article, however, is to convince courts and scholars that
priors operate even when they are hidden or overlooked-meaning that
difficult questions about the management of priors should be openly de-
bated rather than simply ignored.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief introduc-
tion to the systemic disparate treatment theory, including an examination
of its foundational cases. Part II illustrates the critical juncture at which
systemic disparate treatment law now sits, exploring the two divergent
strands of legal scholarship on systemic disparate treatment theory and
the potential substantive implications of the Wal-Mart decision. Part III
lays out the Bayesian path toward a unified theory of systemic disparate
treatment law by bringing hidden priors into clear focus. Part IV briefly
identifies some of the difficult second-order questions regarding the
management of priors and lays out a scholarly agenda for addressing
those questions.
I. THE FOUNDATION OF SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW
To discern what remains of systemic disparate treatment law, we
must first examine the theory's origins. Professor Michael Selmi, in his
insightful contribution to the Working Group on the Future of Systemic
Disparate Treatment Law (Working Group), aptly described the systemic
disparate treatment theory as the "most potent and least understood of the
various Title VII causes of action."'15 Professor Selmi, along with Profes-
sor Tristin Green, was no doubt correct in characterizing systemic dis-
parate treatment law as "under-theorized."'16 Indeed, systemic disparate
treatment law has been under-theorized from its inception, a point to be
13. Possible answers to this question include the trial judge, the fact-finder, the appellate
court, or the legislature.
14. Jason R. Bent, P-Values, Priors, and Procedure in Antidiscrimination Law, 63 BUFF. L.
REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2014).
15. Selmi, supra note 4, at 478 (referring to systemic disparate treatment claims as "pattern or
practice claims").
16. See Green, supra note 2, at 418, 421; Selmi, supra note 4, at 500. Prior to Wal-Mart, the
Court and scholars had focused their attention primarily on the disparate impact theory of systemic
discrimination, rather than systemic disparate treatment. See Jason R. Bent, The Telltale Sign of
Discrimination: Probabilities, Information Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment
Theory, 44 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 797, 798-99, 799 n.5 (2011); Selmi, supra note 4, at 478.
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demonstrated herein. The theoretical and statistical foundation for sys-
temic disparate treatment law was never properly laid by the Court, lead-
ing to the current doctrinal and scholarly confusion.
As originally enacted, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pro-
hibited discrimination "because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin," but the text of the statute said nothing about proving unlawful
discrimination with statistical evidence of disparities in employment out-
comes.17 In 1977, the Supreme Court recognized the "pattern or prac-
tice," or systemic disparate treatment, theory as one type of proof
framework that plaintiffs could employ to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.1 8 The theory originated as the Supreme Court's gloss on
the statutory prohibitions found in the text of Title VII. i 9 The birth of the
systemic disparate treatment theory through judicial construction is simi-
lar to the judicial creation of the first individual disparate treatment proof
framework in McDonnell Douglas Corporation. v. Green and the dis-
parate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.2' All of these
proof frameworks developed originally as judicial scaffolding built on
top of the vague and general statutory prohibitions found in Title VII.
The two formative cases for the systemic disparate treatment theory
22are International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States and Ha-
zelwood School District v. United States,23 both decided in 1977. After
1977, the Supreme Court would not directly address the systemic dispar-
ate treatment theory again until Wal-Mart, decided in 201 1.24 The basic
17. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 254 (1964)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., primarily 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17).
In amendments enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified a proof structure
for establishing unlawful discrimination under the disparate impact theory. See Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)). Congress, however, has not explicitly codified a proof structure for the systemic disparate
treatment theory. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012).
18. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 358 (1977) (describing
the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), as
only one method of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII).
19. In laying out a proof structure for systemic disparate treatment, or "pattern or practice"
cases, the Teamsters Court drew upon language found in Section 707 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c). Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 328 n.1. This subsection originally
granted the Attorney General the authority to investigate and act upon a charge of a "pattern or
practice of discrimination." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c), (e) (1964). That
authority was subsequently transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
in 1972. See id § 2000e-6(e).
20. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
23. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
24. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 478 ("In no other area of substantive antidiscrimination case
law-indeed, perhaps no other area of law-are the leading cases three decades old."). Even in Wal-
Mart the substance of the systemic disparate treatment theory was at issue only through the prism of
a procedural class certification question. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561-
62 (2011). As discussed below, the Court did touch upon the systemic disparate treatment theory in
its 1986 decision in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), which approved the use of multiple
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idea underpinning the systemic disparate treatment theory is that unex-
plained statistical evidence of a quantitatively skewed distribution of
hiring, firing, promotion, or other employment outcomes can be evidence
that the employer unlawfully and intentionally discriminated against a
protected group.25 As the Teamsters Court famously put it:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case
such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign
of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in
a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic com-
position of the population in the community from which employees
are hired.
26
In Teamsters, the Court considered the government's claim that an
employer "had engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminating against
minorities in hiring so-called line drivers. 2 7 The government alleged that
minorities who had been hired by the employer "were given lower pay-
ing, less desirable jobs as servicemen or local city drivers, and were
thereafter discriminated against with respect to promotions and trans-
fers. 28
The Teamsters Court promulgated a two-phase framework for eval-
uating this type of systemic claim of employment discrimination. In
Phase I, plaintiffs may establish a prima facie case of systemic discrimi-
nation by showing "that unlawful discrimination has been a regular pro-
cedure or policy followed by an employer or group of employers.,,29 The
Court unequivocally approved the use of statistical evidence in making
this Phase I determination.30 If plaintiffs meet this initial burden, "[t]he
burden then shifts to the employer to defeat the prima facie showing of a
pattern or practice by demonstrating that the [plaintiff's] proof is either
inaccurate or insignificant."3' If the employer fails to defeat the plain-
regression analysis. See infra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 399-
401.
25. See Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic
Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 997 (1994).
26. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20. This Article focuses on the importance of the words
"absent explanation" in that statement and approaches those words from a Bayesian statistical per-
spective. See also Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Employment Discrim-
ination, and the 80% Rule, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW 1, 20-21 (Morris H. DeGroot et al. eds.,
1986) (arguing that the assumption described in Teamsters is untenable and can only be taken as an
aspirational statement of a court's impartiality); Kingsley R. Browne, Statistical Proof of Discrimi-
nation: Beyond "Damned Lies", 68 WASH. L. REV. 477, 482-83, 503-05 (1993) (critiquing this
"[c]entral [a]ssumption").
27. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 329.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 360.
30. Id. at 339 ('" [S]tatistical analyses have served and will continue to serve an important
role' in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a disputed issue." (quoting Mayor of Phila.
v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 620 (1974))).
31. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360.
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tiffs' prima facie showing of a pattern or practice of discrimination in
Phase I, then plaintiffs are entitled to an award of prospective relief, such
as an injunctive order.32 In Phase II, plaintiffs may seek individual relief
for each person in the alleged group of aggrieved individuals.33 The de-
termination that the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of discrim-
ination in Phase I leads to a rebuttable presumption that the employer's
pattern or practice of discrimination affected each individual claimant for
purposes of Phase II.
34
In Teamsters, the Court held that the government had carried its ini-
tial burden in Phase I by offering evidence of a statistical disparity in the
hiring of line drivers, along with the testimony of affected individuals to
bring the "cold numbers convincingly to life., 35 The Teamsters case in-
volved an extreme case of statistical disparity. The government showed
that of 1,828 line drivers only eight were African-American, and all of
those eight were hired after the litigation commenced.36 Responding to
the employer's challenge to the specific statistical comparisons used by
the government, the Court noted that no amount of fine tuning of the
statistical comparisons would change the "inexorable zero"-there had
been no African-American line drivers prior to the lawsuit.
37
In Hazelwood, systemic disparate treatment theory's second forma-
tive case, the Court reiterated its approval of the use of statistical evi-
dence to shift the burden of disproving discrimination onto the defend-
ant.38 While the statistical showing in Teamsters consisted of a very sim-
ple descriptive analysis highlighting the inexorable zero among a rela-
tively large number of line drivers, the statistical analysis at issue in Ha-
zelwood was more sophisticated.39 There, the government alleged that the
Hazelwood School District had engaged in a "pattern or practice" of dis-
crimination in hiring teachers.40 The government offered statistical evi-
dence in the form of a binomial distribution analysis, a concept explored
in depth in Part II of this Article.4' The government argued that a statisti-
cal comparison of the percentage of African-American teachers em-
ployed by the school district to the percentage of African-American
teachers in the relevant comparison labor market could serve as proof of
32. Id. at 361.
33. Id.
34. Allan G. King, "Gross Statistical Disparities" as Evidence of a Pattern and Practice of
Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal Significance, 22 LAB. LAW. 271, 282 (2007) ("[T]he pre-
sumption created primarily by this statistical proof applies to each and every class member and
requires the employer to rebut that presumption in each specific instance.").
35. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40, 342-43.
36. Id. at 337.
37. Id. at 342 n.23 (citation omitted) (internal quotation mark omitted).
38. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Zimmer, supra note 3, at 422.
40. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id at 303, 308; see infra Part II.A.I.
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a discriminatory pattern or practice in the district's hiring of teachers.42
The Court drew upon the reasoning in Teamsters and stated that "[w]here
gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case
constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.43
The Hazelwood Court endorsed the use of binomial distribution analysis
to show the required "gross statistical disparities."44 If the difference
between the expected number of African-American teachers (calculated
by reference to the relevant labor pool, or "reference class") and the ob-
served number of African-American teachers actually hired by the dis-
trict "is greater than two or three standard deviations," the Court stated,
the "hypothesis that eachers were hired without regard to race would be
suspect.
4 5
Teamsters and Hazelwood remained the leading cases on the sys-
temic disparate treatment theory until Wal-Mart.46 As statistician Paul
Meier explained, after Teamsters and Hazelwood, "a flood of statistical
tests of significance, confidence intervals, and multiple regressions thun-
dered forth from the lower courts. 47 More recently, systemic theories of
discrimination have become a centerpiece of the EEOC's enforcement
strategy. The EEOC's newly-released Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years
2012-2016 emphasizes the importance of systemic cases, and it includes
performance measures unequivocally requiring that an increasing per-
centage of the EEOC's cases be systemic cases .48 How the Wal-Mart
decision will impact private and EEOC systemic disparate treatment liti-
42. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 303, 308-09.
43. Id. at 307-08 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339); see also Selmi, supra note 4, at 480
(noting that the early systemic disparate treatment cases were "almost entirely statistical in nature").
After Hazelwood, lower courts have frequently acknowledged that a prima facie case of systemic
disparate treatment discrimination may be established by statistical evidence alone. See, e.g., EEOC
v. Olson's Dairy Queens, Inc., 989 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1993) (relying on statistical comparisons
alone to reverse district court's decision that no prima facie case had been established under the
Teamsters framework); Satchell v. FedEx Express, No. C 03-2659 SI, 2006 WL 3507913, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2006) (plaintiffs can prove their prima facie case "with or without anecdotal
testimony"); McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Servs., Inc., 349 F. Supp. 2d I, 17 (D.D.C. 2004)
("[P]laintiffs may sustain their burden at the prima facie stage exclusively on statistical evidence, for
'no sound policy reason exists for subjecting the plaintiff to the additional requirement of either
providing anecdotal evidence or showing gross disparities."' (quoting Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d
1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984))).
44. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08.
45. Id. at 308 n.14 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
46. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 492-93.
47. See Meier et al., supra note 26, at 3.
48. Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012-2016, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/strategicplan_l 2tol 6.cfm (last visited Aug. 1, 2014).
The Strategic Plan anticipates that the EEOC will adopt a performance measure based on the per-
centage of the cases in the litigation docket that are systemic cases and anticipates that the target for
this performance measure will increase every year from 2012 to 2016. See id (Performance Measure
4 for Strategy I.A.3 of Strategy Objective I). As envisioned by the Strategic Plan, the EEOC adopted
an accompanying Strategic Enforcement Plan that also emphasizes systemic discrimination litiga-
tion. Id. (app. B - Strategic Enforcement Plan & Quality Control Plan Timelines).
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gation remains to be seen and is the subject of Part II.C below.49 But it is
clear that systemic disparate treatment law is at a critical juncture. The
next Part illustrates the current divide in the legal scholarship about the
proper course of systemic disparate treatment law and considers how
Wal-Mart may represent a turning point.
II. SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT AT A CROSSROADS
A. Methodological Strand. The Limits of Statistical Evidence
Statistical evidence forms the cornerstone of most systemic dispar-
ate treatment cases.50 But the mechanism through which statistical evi-
dence is thought to justify an inference of unlawful discrimination has
been frequently misunderstood, or at least glossed over, by courts and
scholars.51 The first major strand of systemic disparate treatment scholar-
ship to develop in the wake of Teamsters and Hazelwood carefully de-
tailed the inferential limitations of the statistics offered in systemic dis-
crimination cases. Authors writing in this methodological strand took
courts to task for misinterpreting and misapplying statistical evidence to
arrive at unwarranted conclusions that discrimination, rather than chance
or luck, was the most likely explanation for a statistically significant dis-
parity in employment outcomes.
52
Understanding the nature of the methodological critiques requires a
closer look at the types of statistical evidence commonly offered in sys-
temic discrimination cases. Two types of statistical evidence have been
explicitly approved by the Court for use in employment discrimination
cases: binomial distributions, approved in Hazelwood,53 and multiple
regressions, approved by the Supreme Court in Bazemore v. Friday,54
decided in 1986.55 In both binomial distribution and multiple regression,
statistical experts look for statistically significant results. Courts often
49. Notably, Wal-Mart's holding on the commonality issue is inapplicable to systemic claims
brought by the EEOC. The EEOC's systemic discrimination cases need not comply with the class
certification requirements of Federal Rule 23. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S.
318, 323 (1980).
50. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
135 (7th ed. 2008); Meier et al., supra note 26, at 3; Selmi, supra note 4, at 485.
51. See Bent, supra note 16, at 833 n.145 (explaining how courts misinterpret statistical
evidence of discrimination); Browne, supra note 26, at 486-88 (illustrating where "courts have gone
wrong" in the use of statistical evidence of discrimination); Kinsley R. Browne, The Strangely
Persistent "Transposition Fallacy": Why "Statistically Significant" Evidence of Discrimination
May Not Be Significant, 14 LAB. LAW. 437, 437, 441-42 (1998); Richard Lempert, The Significance
of Statistical Significance: Two Authors Restate an Incontrovertible Caution. Why a Book?, 34 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 225, 237-41 (2009).
52. See infra Part II.A.3-4.
53. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
54. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
55. Id. at 387 (involving a claim of salary discrimination); see also Roberto Corrada, Ricci's
Dicta: Signaling a New Standard for Affirmative Action Under Title VII?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
241, 249 n.59 (2011) (identifying binomial distribution and multiple regression as the two types of
statistical analysis approved by the Supreme Court).
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consider statistical significance sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of systemic discrimination under Phase I of Teamsters, thus establishing
liability and shifting onto the defendant the burden of disproving dis-
crimination as to the individual claimants or class members.
56
Many, though not all, antidiscrimination scholars consider these two
statistical methodologies adequate to support an inference of unlawful
57discrimination. But it is important to understand exactly how such an
inference has been justified. The inference of discrimination arises not
because binomial distribution or regression analysis directly proves the
likelihood that the employer in question discriminated. Instead, the infer-
ence is indirect.58 The statistical techniques of binomial distribution and
multiple regression allow a statistician to conclude that chance alone
would be relatively unlikely to lead to the observed disparities given the
important assumption that employment decisions were made at random. 59
This assumption that employment decisions were made at random .is
called the null hypothesis.60 If, assuming the null hypothesis to be true,
pure chance would lead to the observed disparity in less than some pre-
determined statistically significant level of repetitions (often set at 5% or
.05), then a (frequentist)61 statistician will believe the evidence supports
rejection of the null hypothesis.62
If an observed disparity is statistically significant and the null hy-
pothesis of random decision-making can be rejected, proponents of sta-
tistical evidence argue, reason and logic should allow the court or fact
56. See King, supra note 34, at 272 (noting that in pattern or practice cases applying the
Teamsters framework "lower courts frequently have turned to 'statistical significance' as the meas-
uring rod"); Meier et al., supra note 26, at 20-21; Ramona L. Paetzold, Problems with Statistical
Significance in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 395, 395-96 (1991)
("Although [hypothesis testing] has only been used for a few decades in legal proceedings, it has
become the predominant method of statistical analysis used in employment discrimination cases.");
Selmi, supra note 4, at 481-82; see also Green, supra note 2, at 403 (reading Teamsters and Hazel-
wood as "instruct[ing] that if the disparity after accounting for legitimate factors is statistically
significant-meaning that it is unlikely due to chance-then an inference of internal systemic dis-
parate treatment can be drawn and entity liability imposed").
57. See, e.g., RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION: USING STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN DISCRIMINATION CASES § 4.13 (2005); ZIMMER
ET AL., supra note 50, at 144-45 ("When any one of these techniques is used to conclude that the
null hypothesis . .. should be rejected, the next step, based on reason and logic, should be to draw
the inference that systemic disparate treatment discrimination has occurred."). But see Browne,
supra note 26, at 488, 489 n.41 (arguing that neither binomial distribution analysis nor regression
analysis should give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination because the court cannot know
the prior unconditional probability of discrimination).
58. See Steven L. Willbom & Ramona L. Paetzold, Statistics Is a Plural Word, 122 HARV. L.
REV. F. 48, 48 (2009) ("Statistics is imperfect as proof of causation in the same way that every other
type of proof is imperfect-it is messy, indirect, uncertain, and subject to varying interpretations.").
59. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 4.13, at 38-41, § 12.03, at 7-8; ZIMMER ET
AL., supra note 50, at 142; Corrada, supra note 55, at 249 n.59.
60. PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 4.11, at 36; ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at
142.
61. See infra Part III.B for a brief discussion of the ongoing philosophical debate between
frequentists and Bayesians in the statistics literature.
62. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 4.12, at 37.
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finder to take the next step and indirectly infer that the employment deci-
sions at issue were likely the result of discrimination and were not likely
caused by chance or some other non-discriminatory factor.63 Not all
scholars are comfortable making this indirect inference from evidence of
a statistically significant disparity in employment outcomes. Some au-
thors writing in the methodological strand have repeatedly highlighted
the limitations of the binomial distribution and multiple regression meth-
odologies currently accepted by courts, and some argue that these statis-
tical techniques are simply inadequate to perform the role prescribed for
them by the Teamsters and Hazelwood opinions.64 The statistical tech-
niques at issue, and the methodological critiques, are discussed in further
detail below.
1. Binomial Distribution
In a binomial distribution analysis, the statistician typically com-
pares the observed percentage of members of a protected group, say Af-
rican-Americans, that were actually hired by the employer (or promoted,
terminated, or subjected to other employment action) to the expected
percentage of members of that group that would have been hired if the
employment decisions were made at random.65 Thus, in Hazelwood, the
government offered evidence comparing the percentage of African-
American teachers hired by the Hazelwood School District to the per-
centage of African-American teachers in St. Louis County and the City
of St. Louis, which the government considered to be the proper compari-
son labor market.66 Defendants disputed the relevance of that comparison
market by arguing that the City of St. Louis had made special attempts to
seek a 50% African-American teaching staff, thus distorting that compar-
ison pool.67 The Supreme Court ultimately approved the use of binomial
distribution analysis for comparing the racial composition of Hazel-
wood's teaching staff to "the racial composition of the qualified public
school teacher population in the relevant labor market."68 The Court,
however, left it to the district court on remand to decide the proper com-
parison labor market.
69
In performing a binomial distribution analysis, a statistician might
find that the disparity between the observed and expected percentage of
63. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 144-45.
64. See infra Part II.A.3-4.
65. See Meier et al., supra note 26, at 6-7; ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 145-51. There
are several variants on this simple binomial distribution analysis, including one-sample models, two-
sample binomial model, and one- and two-sided significance tests. See Meier et al., supra note 26, at
6-15. The methodological details of the variants are beyond the scope of this Article, and the differ-
ences between the variants are not important for purposes of the analysis that follows in this Article.
66. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310 (1977).
67. Id. at 310-11.
68. Id. at 308.
69. Id. at 312-13 ("It is thus clear that a determination of the appropriate comparative figures
in this case will depend upon further evaluation by the trial court.").
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African-American hires is statistically significant. A finding of statistical
significance at the .05 level in a binomial distribution analysis means that
random chance would lead to the observed disparity (or an even more
skewed disparity) only 1 time in 20 repetitions of the hiring process, as-
suming that employment decisions in each repetition of the hiring pro-
cess were made at random.70 Based on this result, the statistician has
some basis for rejecting the null hypothesis that employment decisions
were made at random. Importantly, however, a finding of statistical sig-
nificance at the .05 level does not mean that there is a 95% likelihood
that the employer unlawfully discriminated, nor does it mean that there is
a 5% likelihood that the disparity was caused by chance.7'
2. Multiple Regression
Multiple regression analysis involves a more sophisticated tech-
nique that can model the relationship of multiple independent, or explan-
atory, variables-such as education level, experience, and gender-with
the employment outcome or other dependent variable in question-such
as salary-given certain modeling assumptions. In a regression analysis
the statistician constructs a model that includes a number of selected
independent variables that are thought to have some predictive relation-
ship with the dependent variable in question and then attempts to isolate
the predictive effects of each particular independent variable by condi-
tioning on the other included independent variables.7 2 The multiple re-
gression model attempts to determine the characteristics of a mathemati-
cal function that best fits or explains all the observed data points for all
the included variables in the model.73
One reason that multiple regression models are appealing is that
they are able to provide results in the form of a coefficient for each inde-
70. See Paetzold, supra note 56, at 400 ("In other words, if the p-value is 0.05 or smaller, the
discrepancy between actual hiring practices and assumed hiring practices is considered to be statisti-
cally significant. If the p-value is greater than 0.05, then the discrepancy is not statistically signifi-
cant."). Setting the cutoff for statistical significance "is somewhat arbitrary." Id. There is no mathe-
matical rule requiring that it be set at .05, but that level is commonly used in the social sciences to
identify significant results. Id. For a discussion of the historical origins of the .05 level of statistical
significance, the work of R.A. Fisher, and Fisher's acknowledgment that the choice of .05 was
subjective, see Michael 1. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The Unwitting
Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 823-24 (2010).
71. E.g., Browne, supra note 51, at 449. These common misstatements of statistically signifi-
cant results are examples of the transposition fallacy. See infra Part II.A.3.
72. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 151-55; Delores A. Conway & Harry V. Roberts,
Regression Analyses in Employment Discrimination Cases, in STATISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note
26, at 107, 126 ("Multiple regression, as opposed to simple regression, permits simultaneous investi-
gation of the relationship between salaries and multiple job qualifications."). See generally D. James
Greiner, Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 533, 535-36 (2008) ("[A]
perusal of the hombooks and looseleafs discussing the use of statistics as evidence in civil rights
litigation suggests that the field is fixated on methods introduced decades ago, particularly regres-
sion, despite judicial dissatisfaction." (footnote omitted)); Willbom & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 49
(referring to regression as the "predominant statistical technique used in civil rights litigation").
73. See Greiner, supra note 72, at 541-42.
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pendent variable that tell the statistician the direction and estimated mag-
nitude of the effect of a unit change in each particular independent varia-
ble on the dependent variable of interest-salary, in this example7 4 A
regression result may indicate that a change in the gender variable from
male to female has a negative effect on annual salary (direction) and that
a change in the gender variable from male to female results in a decrease
in annual salary of $1,000 (magnitude). A statistician would have some
degree of confidence in these coefficient estimates only if certain diag-
nostic tests for model fit 75 are satisfied and only if the results found for
the independent variable of interest-in this example, gender-are statis-
tically significant.76 As with a binomial distribution model, determining
whether the coefficient is statistically significant means that the statisti-
cian tests the regression results against a null hypothesis. Here, the null
hypothesis is that the independent variable we are interested in (gender)
has no correlative relationship with the dependent variable (salary). In
other words, the null hypothesis is that the coefficient for the gender var-
iable equals 0. A multiple regression result for a given independent vari-
able will be statistically significant at the .05 level-or have a p-value of
less than .05-if, assuming the null hypothesis to be true, pure chance or
randomness would have led to the observed correlative results-or even
stronger evidence of a correlative relationship-in 5% or less of many
repetitions of the analysis.77
3. The Transposition Fallacy Challenge
A key critique levied by authors in the methodological strand, and
persuasively articulated by Professor Kingsley Browne, is that courts
regularly misinterpret statistically significant results obtained from bi-
nomial distribution or regression analysis by committing what is often
referred to as the "transposition fallacy.' 78 Courts commit the transposi-
tion fallacy, sometimes with the inadvertent help of testifying statistical
experts, by forgetting that binomial distribution and regression analyses
74. Id. at 541.
75. See generally id. at 542 ("When a [regression] diagnostic shows a lack of fit ... a consci-
entious analyst alters the model.").
76. See Willbom & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 59.
77. For additional information on interpreting the results of multiple regression analyses, see
Interpreting Regression Output, PRINCETON UNIV.,
http://dss.princeton.edu/online help/analysis/interpretingregression.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2014).
78. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT
EVIDENCE § 12.8.3.a nn. 22-23 (2d ed. 2010) (collecting cases where the error is committed);
Browne, supra note 51, at 447 ("The error committed by courts engaging in the transposition fallacy
is remarkable, however, for its ubiquity; the vast majority of courts that describe the meaning ofap-
value explain it in terms embodying the fallacy."); David H. Kaye, Statistical Significance and the
Burden of Persuasion, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 21-23 (1983).
For an interesting discussion of the transposition fallacy in the context of DNA evidence
in a criminal case, see David H. Kaye, Commentary, "False but Highly Persuasive": How Wrong
Were the Probability Estimates in McDaniel v. Brown?, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1
(2009).
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are limited to testing a null hypothesis.79 Professor Browne documents
"cases from virtually all the circuits" that misstate the import of statisti-
cal evidence by committing the transposition fallacy.80 Thus, in the case
of a binomial distribution analysis, a typical misstatement by a court
about statistical significance is: "[T]he .05 level of significance... [is]
certainly sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. [T]he .05
level. .. indicates that the odds are one in 20 that the result could have
occurred by chance."
81
This statement is incorrect. As Professor Browne points out, it con-
fuses two different conditional probabilities: First is the conditional
probability that the employer selected employees randomly given the
observed disparity-what the court incorrectly claims is shown by the
statistics.8 2 Second is the conditional probability that we would see the
observed disparity given the assumption that the employer selected em-
ployees randomly-what the statistical results actually show.8 3 A finding
of statistical significance at the .05 level means that an employer known
or assumed to hire employees at random would nonetheless arrive at
results as skewed with respect to the protected characteristic as the actual
observed disparity in no more than 1 in 20 repetitions of the hiring pro-
cedure. Importantly, statistical significance at the .05 level does not mean
that it is 95% likely that this employer's actual hiring in this particular
case was non-random, discriminatory, or otherwise suspect. Statistical
significance at the .05 level does not mean-contrary to the D.C. Cir-
cuit's assertion-that "the odds are one in 20 that the result could have
occurred by chance."
84
As Professor Browne emphasizes, the probability that the defendant
selected employees discriminatorily is actually a function of another
79. Browne, supra note 51, at 447, 447 n.25 (documenting expert testimony that appears to
include the transposition fallacy).
80. Id. at 447; see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 12.8.3.a. nn.22-23 (collecting state and
federal opinions committing the transposition fallacy); Browne, supra note 26, at 491-92 (collecting
examples from appellate courts, district courts, statistical expert witnesses, and commentators).
81. Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (quoting Segar v.
Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1282 83 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in
Browne, supra note 25, at 491 n.46.
82. See Browne, supra note 26, at 507.
83. See id.
84. Palmer, 815 F.2d at 92 (quoting Segar, 738 F.2d at 1282) (internal quotation mark omit-
ted). Notably, the district court in Wal-Mart committed the transposition fallacy when describing
statistical significance. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 156 n.23 (N.D. Cal.
2004), aff'd 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh 'g,
509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011) ("Statistical significance is measured by standard deviations. The standard deviation is a
number that quantifies the probability that chance is responsible for any difference between an
expected outcome and the observed outcome in a sample containing two groups."). For examples of
courts committing the transposition fallacy in the context of DNA match evidence in criminal cases,
see KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 12.8.5 n.96, § 14.1.2.a, and Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers?
Deciding when DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 1150-56 (2010) (urging
courts to apply Bayes' Theorem in DNA match cases).
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number: "the likelihood of discrimination prior to making the employ-
ment decision."85 In other words, the base rate or background rate of
discrimination matters when interpreting statistical evidence. If it were
known as fact that only 1% of all employers are discriminators, for ex-
ample, then a binomial distribution analysis finding a disparity statistical-
ly significant at a p-value = .05 would mean that for every 100 employers
tested we would expect to find 6 "positive" test results-5 false positives
due to chance plus 1 true positive due to the employer being guilty of
86discrimination . If we assume the base rate of discrimination is only 1%,
a positive binomial distribution test (one finding a statistically significant
disparity with p-value = .05) does not make it more likely than not that
the defendant before the court is guilty of discrimination. Rather, in the
absence of any evidence other than the base rate assumption and the
positive statistical test the probability would be 1 in 6-or about 0.17-
that the employer is a discriminator.87 Given the base rate assumption of
1%, the statistical evidence from the binomial distribution should there-
fore be insufficient by itself to establish liability, contrary to Teamsters
and Hazelwood.88
A leading employment discrimination text counters Professor
Browne's critique by noting that there is no reason necessarily to assume
"that base rate discrimination is especially rare."89 If the base rate of dis-
85. Browne, supra note 26, at 488 ("In the discrimination context, the probability that an
employer's work-force disparities are a consequence of chance is completely dependent upon a
statistic which the courts never have: the likelihood of discrimination prior to making the employ-
ment decision.").
86. It should be noted here that this is a simplified example designed to illustrate the im-
portance of the base rate, or background rate, of discrimination. This simplified example ignores the
possibility of false negatives-cases in which the employer actually discriminates but the statistical
test results are not statistically significant. The relationship between false negatives (or Type 11 error)
and false positives (or Type I error) is complex. "By adopting a standard that minimizes the number
of Type I errors, the chance of identifying discrimination when it actually occurs is reduced."
PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 2.04. One statistician's model estimates that if the level of
statistical significance is set at .05, meaning that there is a 5% risk of Type I error, the corresponding
risk of Type II error will be approximately 50%. John M. Dawson, Scientific Investigation of Fact-
The Role of the Statistician, II FORUM 896,906-08 (1976). Despite the simplifying assumption used
in these examples, the central point remains that prior probabilities will necessarily influence the
interpretation of the statistical data, and in some cases different prior probabilities will lead to drasti-
cally different conclusions about the likelihood of discrimination in any given case, even though the
statistical evidence remains exactly the same. This simplified example is used in ZIMMER ET AL.,
supra note 50, at 144.
87. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 144.
88. It is not clear precisely where the threshold should be drawn for shifting the burden of
proof onto the defendant under the Teamsters framework. Absolute certainty is, of course, not re-
quired. But what estimate of the probability of discrimination should be considered sufficient to shift
the burden onto defendant? In earlier work, I articulated one possible test for determining when to
shift the burden of proof under Teamsters that considered three factors: the unconditional prior
probability of discrimination, or estimates of background rates of discrimination; the strength of the
statistical evidence of disparity; and the parties' relative access to information. Bent, supra note 16,
at 802.
89. See ZIMMER ET AL., supra note 50, at 144 (acknowledging that Professor Browne is "theo-
retically correct" but pointing out that he "fails to demonstrate why the legal system should conclude
that base rate discrimination is especially rare"). Professor Zimmer et al., also point out the limited
legal effect of a statistical showing establishing the plaintiffs' prima facie case. The defendant has
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crimination was assumed to be 10% instead of 1%, then for every 100
employers tested we would find 15 "positive" results-5 false positives
due to chance plus 10 true positives due to the employer being guilty of
discrimination.90 In the absence of any other evidence, the probability
would then be 10 in 15-or about 0.67-that the defendant-employer is
guilty of discrimination.9 Given this higher base rate assumption of
10%, it might make sense to shift the burden of proof onto the defendant
upon a showing of statistical evidence with a p-value = .05. But rather
than refuting Browne's argument, this point only underscores the im-
portance of the base rate, i.e., the prior probability, of discrimination. A
change in base rate from 1% to 10% made all the difference!
The base rate problem is a flaw that undermines our current under-
standing of the Teamsters approach to systemic disparate treatment law.
Reasonable people can disagree about the true base rate of employment
discrimination and therefore can disagree about the prior probability of
discrimination in any given case. Hence, reasonable people can disagree
about whether an inference of discrimination or the imposition of liabil-
ity for systemic disparate treatment should attach upon a showing of a
statistically significant disparity with a p-value = .05. 9
Professor Browne's attack leads him to conclude that current statis-
tical methods for proving systemic disparate treatment should probably
be "abandoned altogether.,93 Browne also suggested, however, that tradi-
tional statistical proof might be acceptable if a more rigorous standard of
statistical significance than .05 were applied and if courts required
"strong[] anecdotal evidence" to buttress the statistical showing.94
"the opportunity to rebut by offering proof that it does not discriminate. Sufficiently strong testimo-
ny might convince the jury that it was chance that explained the disparity." Id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. ("The problem is a 'base rate' one . .
93. Browne, supra note 26, at 553 ("Hypothesis testing, with its reliance on the assumption
that the resultant p-value represents the probability that the observed distribution was a consequence
of chance and its declaration of results as 'statistically significant,' should be abandoned altogether.
Such evidence is simply irrelevant to the ultimate question." (footnote omitted)).
94. Id. at 541-42, 554. Browne appears to acknowledge the possibility of a continuing role for
statistical evidence but only where "substantially more rigorous criteria" are applied. Id. at 554. He
contends that if statistical analyses are to be used, courts should require that they show "gross statis-
tical disparities," rather than just ordinary statistical significance (often set at the .05 level), that they
be accompanied by "strong anecdotal evidence" of discrimination, and that courts adhere to proper
allocations of burdens of proof. See id. at 541-42, 549, 554. Professor Browne concludes:
If statistical proof of discrimination is still to be acceptable at all in court-which per-
haps is doubtful-courts must pay more than lip service to the principle that throughout
the litigation it is the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate that impermissible discrimination
is "the company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the unusual
practice."
Id. at 555 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977)).
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4. The Potential Outcomes Challenge
Professor Browne is not alone in criticizing traditional statistical ev-
idence offered to show systemic disparate treatment.95 Professor D.
James Greiner recently levied an attack on the use of multiple regression
analysis in discrimination cases.96 He argues that multiple regression
analysis often "give[s] the wrong answer, or contradictory answers" to
the questions that are actually important in systemic discrimination liti-
gation. The key problem, as Professor Greiner sees it, is that regres-
sions "lack ... a framework for causal inference."98 According to
Greiner, the legal community seems to believe, erroneously, "that one
can measure the causal effect of any variable by including it on the right-
hand side of the equals sign in a regression equation."
99
Professor Greiner focuses on several specific shortcomings of mul-
tiple regression models, ranging from the judgment calls required in se-
lecting which independent variables to include in the model to the poten-
tial for analyst bias in specifying the regression model and testing for
fit. 00 Fundamentally, he argues that regression models cannot support a
causal inference and therefore cannot tell judges and juries what they
actually would like to know-how likely is it that the observed dispari-
ties in employment outcomes were caused by the defendant's unlawful
discrimination?10'
Professor Greiner recommends an alternative quantitative tool for
attempting to measure causal inference in discrimination cases-
potential outcomes analysis.'02 In contrast to multiple regression, the
potential outcomes technique attempts to approximate, to the extent pos-
sible, a randomized experiment using only observational data drawn
from observed employment outcomes.'0 3 The potential outcomes model
matches up pairs-or sometimes small groups-of observational data
points that are closely correlated in all potentially relevant explanatory
covariates (e.g., position, performance evaluations, years of experience,
95. See also Ben Ikuta, Note, Why Binomial Distributions Do Not Work as Proof of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1235 (2008).
96. See Greiner, supra note 72, at 534.
97. Id. at 538.
98. Id. at 543.
99. Id. at 544.
100. See id at 544-56.
101. Id. at 556 57.
102. Id. at 557. Potential outcomes analysis is also sometimes referred to in the literature as
"matching," the "counterfactual" model, or the Rubin Causal Model. See, e.g., ROBERT B. SMITH,
MULTILEVEL MODELING OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS: A CAUSAL PERSPECTIVE 13 (2011). The modem
revival of the potential outcomes method of causal inference is often attributed to Donald Rubin. See
Guido W. Imbens & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Inference in Statistics and Social Sciences § 1.1-1.12
(Jan. 30, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), for a detailed explanation of the
potential outcomes model.
103. See Greiner, supra note 72, at 537-38, 557-58.
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education, training) but that diametrically differ on the explanatory vari-
able of interest (e.g., gender).1
0 4
In a potential outcomes model, this matching is typically performed
by creating a sort of index statistic that measures the combination of each




Once the data is sorted into matched pairs using propensity scores, it can
then be considered a rough approximation of a randomized, controlled
experiment in which one group is the control group (male) while the oth-
er is the treatment group (female).0 6 The benefit of matching is that it
allows the researcher to "borrow" the unobserved, counterfactual poten-
tial outcome for any given individual from the other individual in the
matched pair.'0 7 In other words, a potential outcomes model provides
some basis for inferring what he counterfactual state of the world would
look like-a female's salary, if that female had been male, but in all oth-
er respects identical.0 8 After matching, employment outcomes are com-
pared across the matched pairs to estimate the average treatment effect
i.e., the average effect on salary of any given individual being female,
rather than male.0 9 The researcher can further narrow the results by
looking at the average treatment effect on salary for only those in the
treatment group-females-or for only those in certain portions of the
salary distribution. 10
By isolating matched pairs, the potential outcomes technique has
the benefit of controlling for covariates using research model design,
rather than relying on a multiple regression analysis with built-in as-
sumptions about linearity and constant effects across the salary distribu-
tion.'" Further, a statistician conducting a multiple regression analysis
will usually need to peek at the regression coefficients and p-values be-
fore evaluating whether the regression model was a satisfactory fit to the
data set.112 Professor Greiner emphasizes the importance of this differ-
ence, noting that an expert using a potential outcomes analysis is more
credible because the model can be fully specified before peeking at the
results. '' 3
The potential outcomes approach may represent an improvement
over regression in many cases, and it has unquestionably increased in
104. See id. at 570-73.
105. See id. at574-75.
106. See id at 575-76.
107. See id at 562 (referring to donated values for counterfactual states).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 558-60.
110. See id. at 567-68.
111. See id. at 548,580-81.
112. See id. at 544.
113. See id.
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popularity in the social sciences. 114 Nonetheless, it still falls short of the
"gold standard" of a completely randomized experiment, as does any
technique that relies on observational data.15 Whenever a research de-
sign includes an "assignment mechanism"-that is, the force that deter-
mines whether an individual ends up in the treatment group or the control
group-that is outside the researcher's control and that is non-random, the
results will necessarily be open to challenge as a basis for causal infer-
ence. 16 Of course, in the context of employment discrimination litigation
the assignment mechanism is always non-random and is always out of
the researcher's control. A researcher obviously cannot randomly assign
individual employees to a gender treatment group-male or female-and
then observe the results. Without a controlled, randomized experiment,
the potential exists that unobserved covariates are confounding the anal-
ysis making the results misleading. Unobserved covariates cannot be
controlled for in a regression model and cannot be included in a propen-
sity score calculation to match individuals in a potential outcomes model.
The potential outcomes model suffers from other drawbacks as
well, as highlighted by Professors Steven Willborn and Ramona
Paetzold.17 Importantly, a potential outcomes analyst must make "com-
plex decisions about which variables to include" in performing the task
of matching pairs." 8 These decisions are similar to the difficult choices
that regression analysts make when determining which covariates to in-
clude in their regression models. If the calculation of propensity scores
misses certain important unobserved variables, then it is open to bias in
much the same way as a regression.'1 9 Second, the potential outcomes
approach usually requires a process called "trimming," which throws out
some potentially relevant data-those data points for which there is no
match close enough on the covariates in the other group.20 The outliers
in the tails of the distribution of covariates are simply disregarded on the
justification that they do not provide much useful information for draw-
ing inferences anyway.1 21 Throwing out data may amount to ignoring
114. See STEPHEN L. MORGAN & CHRISTOPHER WINSHIP, COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSAL
INFERENCE: METHODS AND PRINCIPLES FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH 87 (2007) ("[A]mong social scien-
tists who adopt a counterfactual perspective, matching methods are fast becoming an indispensable
technique for prosecuting causal questions, even though they usually prove to be the beginning
rather than the end of causal analysis on any particular topic.").
115. See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 50; Imbens & Rubin, supra note 102, § 15.1.
116. See Imbens & Rubin, supra note 102, § 8. 1, § 15.1.
117. See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 48-56.
118. See id. at 52 ("Inferences about outcomes are only as good as the covariates that have
been included. A similar point is also true for regression-variables that are not included in the
regression model are not controlled and their effects on the outcome cannot be ascertained."); see
also KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 12.5.3 n.43 (noting that a potential outcomes "mode of analysis
also demands an appreciation of potential confounders and adequate data if it is to 'balance covari-
ates ').
119. See MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 114, at 122 (noting that matching is vulnerable to a
"selection on the unobservables" bias).
120. See Willborn & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 55.
121. See id.; Greiner, supra note 72, at 566.
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potentially relevant evidence of discrimination. 22 Further, by trimming
the data to only those areas of the distribution of covariates where the
treatment group and the control group have sufficient overlap, a consci-
entious potential outcomes analyst will properly report the results as the
estimate of a defined local average treatment effect-that is, the average
treatment effect only for those individuals falling in the overlap region.
23
This means that the analyst cannot make causal claims about the effect of
gender on wages for those who fall outside the region of covariate over-
lap, which may very well include some plaintiffs.
Finally, and most fundamentally, as Professors Willborn and
Paetzold explain, the potential outcomes model ultimately requires the
same indirect causal inference to discrimination that regression models
require. 124 After matching, trimming, and generating an estimated local
average treatment effect, the final step in a potential outcomes analysis is
to calculate the standard error for the estimate so that the researcher can
determine whether the estimated effect is statistically significant.125 That
is, the analyst will attempt to determine how often random chance would
lead to the observation of an average treatment effect as large or larger
than the one observed and test the null hypothesis that the treatment-
gender = female-has zero effect. If the researcher rejects the null hy-
pothesis, then it may permit an indirect inference that unlawful discrimi-
nation caused the observed outcome disparities. This indirect mode of
inferring a causal effect means that potential outcomes results are vulner-
able to the same type of misinterpretation via the transposition fallacy as
the examples discussed in the preceding subpart.
So where does this discourse in the methodological strand leave us?
Professors Browne and Greiner both appear to believe that the currently-
used statistical methodologies of binomial distribution and regression
modeling are inadequate to justify an inference of discrimination. Profes-
sor Greiner advocates the use of potential outcomes models to avoid im-
plausible assumptions and potential analyst bias involved in regression
analysis.26 Professors Willborn and Paetzold freely admit the messy and
indirect nature of statistical inference using the traditional techniques, but
nonetheless contend that flawed statistical evidence-whether binomial
distributions, regressions, or potential outcomes-can still convey some
122. Willbom & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 55.
123. See MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 114, at 117 ("Resulting estimates are then interpret-
ed as estimates of a narrower treatment effect: the common-support treatment effect for the treat-
ed.").
124. See Willbom & Paetzold, supra note 58, at 60 (stating that nonstatistical circumstantial
evidence, regression, and potential outcomes all use the same causal framework by "answering the
question of how likely it is that we would see this outcome in the absence of discrimination").
125. See MORGAN & WINSHIP, supra note 114, at 118 ("After computing a matching estimate
of some form, most researchers naturally desire a measure of its expected variability across samples
of the same size from the same population, either to conduct hypothesis tests or to offer an informed
posterior distribution for the causal effect that can guide subsequent research.").
126. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
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relevant information and therefore has some value in litigation, just like
any piece of nonstatistical, circumstantial evidence of discriminatory
intent.127 Meanwhile, in the absence of a coherent methodological cri-
tique from the legal academy, courts continue to rely on binomial distri-
butions and multiple regressions and regularly misinterpret the meaning
of statistically significant results obtained therefrom.121
B. Contextualist Strand. Organizational Causes ofDiscrimination
The second strand of scholarship on systemic disparate treatment
theory has an entirely different focus. Led by Professor Tristin Green's
contribution to the Working Group, the contextualist strand represents an
attempt to expand the conception of systemic disparate treatment law to
impose liability on employers at the entity level.129 Under this view, sys-
temic disparate treatment was not meant to be a simple aggregation of
multiple instances of discrimination occurring at the individual level.
Rather, systemic disparate treatment law serves a broader purpose:
"[T]he employer's responsibility under this model turns not on identifi-
cation of a single instance or even multiple instances of disparate treat-
ment; rather, its responsibility turns on its own role in producing dispar-
ate treatment within its walls."'' 30 Professor Green, drawing upon the
literature on corporate criminality and organizational studies, urges that
employers be held directly responsible for what the entity itself has done
wrong-encouraging or allowing discrimination to thrive by the entity's
"set of attitudes and positions, which influence, constrain, and at times
even define the modes of thinking and behavior of the people who popu-
late it."''
Instead of asking whether an entity can be held vicariously liable for
negligence in supervising its individual policymakers or employees,'
32
Professor Green's context model would seek to locate wrongdoing at the
127. See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying text. The difficulties identified by scholars
writing in the methodological strand are nicely encapsulated by Professor Selmi in a story he relates
in his contribution to the Working Group:
The role statistics play in systemic discrimination cases has always been a bit of a mys-
tery, a fact that was brought home to me recently at a conference I attended with mostly
philosophers present. During a discussion of the Wal-Mart case, one of the philosophers
asked, rather incredulously, how can statistics prove intent? ... [W]e had a difficult time
providing an answer, other than to point to some of the cases.
Selmi, supra note 4, at 480.
128. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
129. See Green, supra note 2. Professor Green's proposed entity-level conceptualization of
systemic disparate treatment appears to be an idea with which Professors Hart and Ford generally
concur. Hart, supra note 4, at 456 n.2; see Ford, supra note 4, at 513-14 (advancing a "collective
justice" approach to systemic disparate treatment).
130. Green, supra note 2, at 439.
131. Id. at 439 (quoting Eli Lederman, Models for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability:
From Adaptation and Imitation Toward Aggregation and the Search for Self-Identity, 4 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 641, 686 (2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
132. As Professor Green observes, "[E]ntity liability for systemic disparate treatment has never
turned on these concepts." Green, supra note 2, at 429.
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entity level. In her words, the context model "asks whether the entity is
producing wrongdoing on an aggregate basis within its walls rather than
asking exclusively whether an identifiable high-level policy maker or
low-level decision maker acted with purpose or intent to harm or whether
the entity has done enough to police wrongdoing of individual actors."'
' 33
Professor Green's proposal of a contextual model is an important
step in systemic disparate treatment scholarship. By drawing upon stud-
ies of organizational dynamics, the contextual model appropriately rec-
ognizes that organizations can produce disparate treatment within the
organization even though it may be "difficult to isolate identifiable
wrongdoers."'34 The Wal-Mart case itself may present an example of
such a situation. There, Walmart left promotion decisions to the subjec-
tive discretion of store managers. 135 The plaintiffs alleged that this decen-
tralized, discretionary promotion policy resulted in discrimination against
female employees in the aggregate at Walmart stores across the coun-
try. 136 When each individual promotion decision in a case like Wal-Mart
is examined in isolation it may not be possible to affirmatively identify a
definitive instance of intentional disparate treatment discrimination. Yet,
social science evidence suggests that an observed company-wide dispari-
ty in promotion outcomes may nonetheless be caused by certain organi-
zational influences, attitudes, and cultures that "creat[e] the environment
in which interactions and decisions take place."'
' 37
Professor Green's approach places a focus on understanding the
causal relationship between organizational dynamics and employment
outcomes, but it does not tackle the fundamental problems of inference
highlighted by the ongoing debate in the methodological strand. In her
context model of systemic disparate treatment, Professor Green would
determine liability by "ask[ing] whether the entity is producing wrongdo-
ing on an aggregate basis within its walls," but Professor Green would
appear to accept statistically significant results from binomial distribu-
tions and multiple regression analyses to answer that question.138 She
argues that "[s]tatistics serve as evidence of regular, widespread internal
disparate treatment."'139 Professor Green explains her view of the power
133. Id. at 398-99. Professor Selmi would not ascribe to this view if it would go so far as to
impose direct liability on employers for "passively facilitating discrimination" that is not at least
causally connected to the employer's "broader cultural norms within the firm." Selmi, supra note 4,
at 503. Professor Selmi argues that such a conceptualization of systemic disparate treatment "would
come close to requiring employers to implement some form of affirmative action, something no
court is likely to require." Id.
134. Green, supra note 2, at 436.
135. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (201 I).
136. See infra Part II.C (discussing the facts and holding from Wal-Mart).
137. Green, supra note 2, at 440; see also Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title
VII as a Toolfor Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 662-63 (2003).
138. Green, supra note 2, at 398.
139. Id. at 444. Professor Green refers to "sophisticated statistical analyses" that can control for
external factors, an apparent reference to multiple regression. Id.
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of statistical evidence "[s]tatistics cannot tell us whether one would see a
particular observed disparity in the absence of discrimination, but they
can indicate the likelihood that an observed disparity (after accounting
for legitimate variables) is due to chance.'
' 40
Other scholars have made similarly inflated claims about the power
of statistics in systemic discrimination cases to prove the likelihood that
observed disparities are due to chance. Professor Selmi may not fully
endorse Professor Green's contextual model,'41 but he nonetheless ech-
oes her claim about statistical evidence: "In the context of discrimination
claims, that [statistically significant] disparity will generally be attributed
to discrimination since the function of the standard deviation analysis 
to rule out chance fluctuations."142 Professor Michael Zimmer, discuss-
ing binomial distribution analysis in a recent article about Wal-Mart,
states: "If there is a statistically significant relationship between sex and
promotions, that relationship makes it extremely unlikely to be the result
of chance."
143
The foregoing statements all exaggerate, to greater or lesser de-
grees, the power of statistical evidence obtained from binomial distribu-
tion and multiple regression analyses to cast doubt on chance as the like-
ly explanation for observed disparities. Just like the D.C. Circuit in the
passage quoted above in Part II.A, 144 scholars frequently convert statisti-
cal significance into something that it is not. A statistically significant
result does not justify the conclusion that chance can be ruled out as an
explanation for an observed disparity in a particular case, at least not
absent some hidden assumption about background rates of discrimina-
tion.145 Nor can a statistically significant result, in the absence of base
rate information, provide us with a quantified likelihood that observed
disparities are due to chance rather than discrimination.46 To rule out
chance as an unlikely explanation for observed disparities, one must con-
sider the statistical results in light of information or estimates about the
140. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
141. Selmi, supra note 4, at 503 n.107. Professor Selmi would require that the disparate em-
ployment outcomes are somehow traced to particular employees or at least to "broader cultural
norms within the firm." Id. at 503.
142. Id. at 482 (emphasis added). Likewise, Professor Ford in his contribution to the Working
Group writes: "Of course that [statistical evidence] can be and often is manipulated too, but good
statistical analysis can distinguish real evidence from spin." Ford, supra note 4, at 521. Ford explains
that as sample sizes increase, the "potential for chance to affect the analysis" decreases. Id. This is a
recognition that large sample sizes tend to more easily produce statistically significant binomial
distribution or regression results. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 4.15.
143. Zimmer, supra note 3, at 442 (emphasis added). Professor Zimmer makes a more modest
claim about the results of multiple regression analysis: "Holding all the variables other than sex
constant, the technique shows whether there is a statistically significant relationship between pay and
sex. If there is, the null hypothesis that sex and pay are unrelated should be rejected." Id. at 442-43.
144. See supra text accompanying note 82.
145. See supra Part II.A.3; see also Weiss, supra note 9, at 1746.
146. See supra text accompanying note 87.
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base rate of discrimination. 147 Unfortunately, statistical analysis of obser-
vational data alone, without some hidden assumption about background
rates, cannot "indicate the likelihood that an observed disparity (after
accounting for legitimate variables) is due to chance."'
' 48
Recall that if the background rate of discrimination is assumed to be
1% in the simplified example, then a statistically significant finding at
exactly p-value = .05 would mean that the likelihood is I in 6-or about
17%-that the observed disparity is due to discrimination (true positive)
and 5 in 6-or about 83%-that the observed disparity is due to chance
(false positive). 49 This result patently falls short of truly "rul[ing] out
chance fluctuations."'50 When operating with a 1% base rate assumption,
chance is actually a much more likely explanation for the observed dis-
parity than discrimination. What the statistically significant results do
show, given a 1% base rate assumption, is that it now appears relatively
more likely that the employer in question discriminated (17%) than we
would have estimated without the benefit of the observed statistical evi-
dence of disparity (1%). The statistical showing of a disparity does offer
valuable and probative information that should be considered, but it
simply does not and cannot rule out chance as an explanation for ob-
served disparities. 151
Neither Professor Green nor Professor Selmi, in their contributions
to the Working Group, nor Professor Zimmer, in his separate work on the
substantive implications of Wal-Mart, directly address the methodologi-
cal arguments about the limitations of statistical evidence advanced by
Professors Browne and Greiner. Although authors in both scholarly
strands are trying to make sense of systemic disparate treatment law, the
two scholarly strands have, unfortunately, rarely intersected. The meth-
odological critics focus intently on the limitations of statistical evidence
without addressing legitimate, larger questions about the importance of
organizational influences on observed employment outcomes and the
difficulty of identifying and proving discrimination.152 Yet, the contextu-
alists advocating a more expansive conceptualization of systemic dispar-
ate treatment tend to gloss over the very real limitations of statistical
evidence as a tool for reliably identifying employers that are actually
guilty of "producing disparate treatment within [their] walls."',13 For sys-
147. See supra text accompanying note 87.
148. Green, supra note 2, at 403; see also supra text accompanying note 143.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
150. Selmi, supra note 4, at 482.
151. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 12.8.2.b ("Chance affects the data, not the hypothesis.
With the frequency interpretation of chance, there is no meaningful way to assign a numerical prob-
ability to the null hypothesis.").
152. See supra Part II.A.3-4.
153. See Green, supra note 2, at 439. Interestingly, Professor Ford chalks up general skepti-
cism toward statistical evidence as a product of cognitive bias. See Ford, supra note 4, at 519-20.
Under Professor Green's conceptualization of systemic disparate treatment we would, by the defini-
tion of statistical significance at the .05 level, necessarily expect at least 5% of all employers covered
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temic disparate treatment law to survive as an important tool in the anti-
discrimination toolbox, the important theoretical advancements made in
both strands must be harmonized. With apologies to Professor Zatz, what
systemic disparate treatment really needs is an inclusive rethinking of its
theoretical foundations that incorporates the contributions of both the
methodological critics and the contextualists.
54
C. Wal-Mart: The End of Systemic Disparate Treatment?
Unexplored tensions between the methodologists and the contextu-
alists were manifested in the Wal-Mart decision. Wal-Mart was nominal-
ly a case about the requirements of commonality and typicality under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 governing class certification. 55 But
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Wal-Mart has potentially profound
implications for the substantive law of systemic disparate treatment giv-
en the skepticism with which the majority viewed statistical evidence of
observed outcome disparities. 156
Wal-Mart involved claims of discrimination on the basis of sex in
the promotion and pay practices at the giant retail chain. 57 Walmart is
the largest private employer in the United States, and the purported class
seeking Rule 23 certification included about 1.5 million female current
and former Walmart employees.5 8 Plaintiffs claimed that a decentralized
decision-making structure at Walmart led to discrimination against wom-
en.159 Plaintiffs brought claims under both the systemic disparate treat-
ment theory and the disparate impact theory-a point that is somewhat
obscured by the Court's decision.'60 The plaintiffs' theory, as described
by Justice Scalia, was "that a strong and uniform 'corporate culture'
permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discre-
by antidiscrimination laws to be held liable for "producing disparate treatment within [their] walls"
based on a finding of statistically significant outcome disparities. See Green, supra note 2, at 439.
This is true because, assuming that decisions were made at random, by chance alone we would
expect to observe such statistically significant disparities at a rate of 5%, regardless of the number of
covered employers that, in truth, are guilty of unlawful discrimination.
154. Cf Zatz, supra note 2, at 391 ("What systemic disparate treatment theory needs is an
account that grounds employer liability in firm-level conduct-the connective tissue-[]not simply
in dispersed individual disparate treatment, and does so without relying exclusively on the extreme
case of connective disparate treatment.").
155. To the extent that Wal-Mart is truly limited to application of Rule 23, it should have no
bearing on systemic disparate treatment actions brought by the EEOC on behalf of groups of ag-
grieved persons. EEOC pattern or practice claims are not governed by the class certification re-
quirements of Rule 23. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 327 (1980).
156. Green, supra note 2, at 405. Professor Green states:
If the Supreme Court continues down the path set by the majority opinion in Wat-Mart
and adopts an individualistic theoretical foundation for systemic disparate treatment
law ... the Court's 'procedural' decision will result in drastic change in the substantive
law of systemic disparate treatment as it has been practiced for more than three decades.
Id.
157. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2548.
160. Green, supra note 2, at 407 n.45.
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tionary decisionmaking of each one of Walmart's thousands of manag-
ers,,161
The district court certified the proposed class under Rule 23(b)(2),
and a divided en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the certi-
fication. 62 A majority of the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
Rule 23 requirement of commonality had not been met.163 The Court,
relying heavily on General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon,
164
determined that commonality in a case like this could be shown in one of
two ways: (1) where the purported class members were subjected to the
same biased testing procedure for purposes of evaluation by the employ-
er; or (2) where the plaintiffs could show "[s]ignificant proof that an em-
ployer operated under a general policy of discrimination" it might be
conceivable to have a broad class including both applicants for hire and
incumbent employees who are denied promotion. 165
From this, the Court reasoned that commonality was lacking be-
cause plaintiffs had adduced no "'significant proof that Walmart 'oper-
ated under a general policy of discrimination,"' as the majority thought
the Falcon Court's second prong demanded.166 Instead, the Court thought
there was evidence of the opposite, finding it significant that "Wal-
Mart's announced policy forbids sex discrimination.'67 In a revealing
passage, the Court explained why commonality must be lacking in
Walmart's decentralized decision-making system:
[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation-and
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimina-
tion-would select sex-neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring
and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all. Others
may choose to reward various attributes that produce disparate im-
pact-such as scores on general aptitude tests or educational
achievements. And still other managers may be guilty of intentional
161. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2548.
162. Id. at 2549.
163. Id. at 2556-57.
164. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
165. Id. at 159 n.15. The Falcon case was focused on the question whether, given Rule 23's
commonality and typicality requirements, a single class under Rule 23 could include two separate
groups of individuals: (1) those who were denied hire by the defendant, and (2) those who were
denied promotion by the defendant. Id.; see also Green, supra note 2, at 410. In the early develop-
ment of systemic disparate treatment law, cases would often proceed as "across the board" discrimi-
nation cases, where the class of aggrieved individuals would include combinations of different
protected groups and combinations of different adverse employment actions (such as failure to hire,
failure to promote, and termination). Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions
Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 818 (2004).
166. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15). The first prong of
Falcon was inapplicable, because the plaintiffs in Wal-Mart did not allege that they were subjected
to any biased uniform testing procedure or evaluation method. Id.
167. Id. Importantly, the defendant in Hazelwood had a similar official policy of non-
discrimination, providing that the School District would "hire all teachers on the basis of training,
preparation and recommendations, regardless of race, color or creed." Hazelwood Sch, Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303 04 (1977).
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discrimination that produces a sex-based disparity. In such a compa-
ny, demonstrating the invalidity of one manger's use of discretion
will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another's. 1
68
Professor Green rightly notes that Justice Scalia's majority opinion
appeared to embrace a policy-required view of the systemic disparate
treatment theory, representing a break with the Court's precedent.'
69
Nothing in Teamsters or Hazelwood required the plaintiffs to identify a
specific policy or a specific individual decision-maker that caused the
observed disparity. Rather, the Court in Hazelwood plainly allowed sta-
tistical evidence of a gross disparity alone to establish a prima facie case
of systemic disparate treatment discrimination without requiring the
plaintiff to single out any particular policy or mechanism responsible for
generating the observed disparity.1 70 Identifying a particular employment
practice or policy leading to a disparity is required in disparate impact
cases,17 1 but until Wal-Mart, it had never been required in systemic dis-
parate treatment cases.'72
The Wal-Mart opinion nicely highlights a tension between the two
scholarly strands. On a contextual view, the Wal-Mart plaintiffs estab-
lished all that was necessary to show that Walmart was producing dis-
parate treatment within its walls-statistically significant employment
outcome disparities. Under Professor Green's model, this would be suffi-
cient to hold Wal-Mart directly liable for its own entity-level wrongdo-
ing. The various differences between class claimants, including their
store location, their supervisors, their managers, their job duties, and so
on, would be entirely irrelevant to this determination, making class certi-
fication appropriate. Methodological scholars criticizing overreliance on
tests of statistical significance, however, would likely reach exactly the
opposite conclusion. For scholars like Professor Browne, the statistically
significant results of traditional statistical techniques, without something
more, would not be sufficient to justify an inference of disparate treat-
ment. The Wal-Mart majority appears to have sided with the methodo-
logical critics. Justice Scalia demanded more than just statistical evi-
168. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
169. Green, supra note 2, at 408, 410; see also Selmi, supra note 4, at 503 (discussing Judge
Ikuta's dissent in the Ninth Circuit's en bane decision).
170. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08 ("Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they
alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination.").
171. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l)(A)(i) (2012); see
also Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law 5 (2011) (unpublished draft of
Selmi, supra note 4) (on file with author) ("In a disparate impact claim, it is generally possible to
pinpoint a decision-to locate an agent or an explicit policy that is at the center of the allegations,
and it is mostly a specific act.").
172. Green, supra note 2, at 397 (calling the majority's policy-required view a "drastic reshap-
ing of systemic disparate treatment law"); Selmi, supra note 4, at 503 ("This is why many, like
Judge Ikuta of the Ninth Circuit and the late scholar Richard Nagareda, seek a policy or practice as
proof of discrimination, although a formal policy is not required and if there was one it should be
adjudicated under other causes of action." (footnote omitted)).
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dence of a disparity. He required some "glue" to bind the class members'
claims together-evidence of a policy of discrimination, a common
rogue decision-maker, or perhaps anecdotal evidence on a much larger
scale.73 As demonstrated below, the majority's demand for some "glue"
binding together the class members' claims reflects a change in the
Court's hidden priors from Teamsters to Wal-Mart.
III. THE BAYESIAN PATH FORWARD
"Bayesian theory is a way of systematizing the elementary point that
preconceptions play a role in rational thought. "'74
Can systemic disparate treatment law survive Wal-Mart? If, as Pro-
fessor Green argues, Wal-Mart represents a substantive shift to a new,
policy-required view of systemic disparate treatment law, then the proof
framework elucidated in Teamsters and Hazelwood is no more. This Part
argues, however, that there is a viable path forward for systemic dispar-
ate treatment law that explains the outcome in Wal-Mart and that can
also successfully reconcile some of the key concepts advanced by meth-
odologists and contextualists. That path will require courts to embrace a
Bayesian view of statistical evidence that acknowledges the importance
of preconceptions.
A. Bayesian Inference
Recall the simplified base rate examples set forth in Part II.A. In the
base rate examples, we see that when identical statistical evidence is
viewed in the context of two different base rate assumptions, we arrive at
very different likelihoods that the defendant discriminated.'7 5 This out-
come is explained by the operation of Bayes' Theorem. Bayes' Theorem
describes in mathematical terms how a decision-maker can rationally
process new information-here, an observed disparity in employment
outcomes-by combining it with the decision-maker's prior knowledge
or belief-here, the assumed base rate of discrimination-and use the
end result (usually called a "posterior probability") to make a decision
under uncertainty.176 In a Bayesian model of discrimination analysis the
173. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2552.
174. POSNER, supra note 10, at 67. Judge Posner later substitutes the term "Bayesian priors"
for the term "preconceptions," given the pejorative connotation associated with the word "precon-
ception." Id.
175. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
176. How a judge or jury processes information received in the form of pleadings, testimonial
evidence, documentary evidence, or statistical evidence is the subject of a continuing debate in
evidence literature. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, in PROBABILITY
AND INFERENCE IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: THE USES AND LIMITS OF BAYESIANISM 21, 43 (Peter
Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988) (arguing that juries engage in a "relative plausibility" analysis, in
which they choose from competing, but fully specified, alternative stories by deciding which story
best explains the evidence). Some scholars suggest that a relative plausibility model is not necessari-
ly inconsistent with Bayesian processing. Peter Tillers, Trial By Mathematics-Reconsidered, 10
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 167, 170 (2011) ("[1]t was a mistake [for critics of trial by mathematics]
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decision-maker begins by assigning some prior probability distribution to
the question at issue and then updates that probability distribution with
observed information about employment outcome disparities.
The calculations are generally more complex in Bayesian statistical
analysis than in the traditional analyses described above, but several au-
thors have provided examples in the discrimination context.,77 Professor
Ramona Paetzold succinctly illustrates Bayesian inference with the fol-
lowing example. Imagine an employer makes twenty new hires, six of
whom were women and fourteen of whom were men, even though the
employer drew from a pool of qualified applicants that contained 52%
women and 48% men.178 The question is: should an inference of discrim-
ination arise from this evidence outcome disparity? The answer likely
depends on the decision-maker's priors, or preconceptions about the like-
lihood that the employer discriminated, before viewing the observed sta-
tistical data.
A Bayesian analyst begins by assigning a prior probability distribu-
tion.179 In Professor Paetzold's example, she first assumes that the deci-
sion-maker assigns a 0.5 probability to the proposition that the hypothet-
ical employer did not discriminate at all in making hiring decisions (i.e.,
the true chance that any particular hire would be female from the quali-
fied applicant pool was exactly equal to 0.52) and that the remaining 0.5
probability is spread uniformly over all the remaining possible values
(other than 0.52) for the chances that any particular hire would be fe-
male.80 Applying Bayes' Theorem to update the prior in light of the ob-
served disparity, the decision-maker in this case would arrive at a poste-
rior probability of 0.357 that the employer did not discriminate.' 
81
The posterior probability in the foregoing example might still be
sufficient to support an inference of discrimination, but it is sensitive to
changes in the prior. If the assigned prior probability distribution is
changed-either by building in a higher or lower probability that the
employer did not discriminate or by changing how the remaining proba-
bility is distributed among the possible values for the true chance that
any particular hire would be female-then the posterior outcome chang-
es. Where the observed disparity in employment outcomes is not over-
to suppose that storytelling is inconsistent with Bayesian or mathematical analysis of evidence with
cardinal numbers .... (footnote omitted)).
177. See, e.g., Paetzold, supra note 56, at 406-07; David Kaye, Statistical Evidence of Dis-
crimination, 77 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 773, 779 (1982).
178. Paetzold, supra note 56, at 406-07.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 407.
181. Id. at 407 n.59 (providing the Bayesian calculation). Based on the assumed prior distribu-
tion, combined with the observed data reflecting an employment outcome disparity, the decision-
maker would estimate that there is approximately a 64% chance that the employer discriminated in
the hiring process, and approximately a 36% chance that the employer did not discriminate. Id. at
407.
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whelming, the effects of varying the assigned prior can be dramatic. As
Professor Paetzold notes, it is possible for traditional statistical analysis
and Bayesian analysis of the same data to reach diametrically opposite
conclusions about whether an employer likely discriminated.182 A tradi-
tional statistical analysis of a given data set might yield a statistically
significant result with a p-value of .05, while a Bayesian analysis of that
very same data might (depending on priors) yield a posterior probability
that the employer did not discriminate of 0.95.83
As the foregoing illustrates, estimates of priors can make the differ-
ence between deciding that a defendant more likely than not engaged in
systemic disparate treatment and deciding exactly the opposite, even
where the parties offer the exact same statistical evidence. Recognition
of the limitations on indirect statistical inference, the base rate problem,
and the role of prior probability estimates is critical to understanding the
evolution of systemic disparate treatment theory from Teamsters and
Hazelwood through Wal-Mart. The future of systemic disparate treat-
ment law depends on courts and scholars recognizing this fundamental
problem and developing a theoretically sound way of managing it. To
begin this task first requires a brief introduction to a long-running philo-
sophical debate in the field of statistics.
B. The Bayesian/Frequentist Divide
The problem of assigning a prior probability distribution, which will
necessarily be at least somewhat subjective and possibly deeply uncer-
tain, is the primary criticism of the Bayesian-or subjectivist-
philosophy of statistical analysis.'84 Another school of statistical thought,
frequentism-or objectivism-represents the more traditional approach
to statistical inference.'s5 A full discussion of the contours of the fre-
quentist-Bayesian divide is beyond the scope of this Article; however, a
short introduction to this philosophical debate is in order before examin-
182. Id. at 396-97 (citing Dennis V. Lindley, A Statistical Paradox, 44 BIOMETRIKA 187
(1957)).
183. Id. at 408.
184. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.05 (noting that traditional frequentist
methods are often thought to be more objective than Bayesian methods because "they appear to rely
on the sample evidence alone, without the inclusion of prior probabilities"); see also MICHAEL J.
ZIMMER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: SELECTED CASES AND STATUTES-2011 47 (Supp.
2011); Mikel Aickin, Issues and Methods in Discrimination Statistics, in STATISTICAL METHODS IN
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 159, 163 (D. H. Kaye & Mikel Aickin eds., 1986) ("Satisfactory rules
for formulating such 'prior' probabilities are not well-developed, and it is far from clear that people
do, or should, formulate and use them in the 'Bayesian' fashion stipulated by subjectivists,").
185. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.01 (describing the "traditional school of
thought in statistics" as "based on frequentist notions of probability"); Aickin, supra note 183, at 161
("Speaking very roughly, most statisticians can be categorized with regard to their attitudes towards
probability as being eitherfrequentists or subjectivists."); Rory Bahadur, The Scientific Impossibility
of Plausibility, 90 NEB. L. REV. 435, 457 (2011) ("The two main philosophies of probability theory
are the Frequentist and Bayesian models of probability.").
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ing how courts can manage the role of Bayesian priors in systemic dis-
parate treatment cases.
The frequentist view eschews the notion of specifying prior proba-
bilities altogether.'86 Instead, the frequentist looks at the statistical data
merely as evidence in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis without at-
taching any particular probability to the likelihood that the employer in
this particular case actually discriminated when it made its hiring deci-
sions. A frequentist finding a gender disparity statistically significant at
the .05 level might believe the statistical evidence is sufficient reason to
reject the null hypothesis that employers hire from the labor pool at ran-
dom with respect to gender.'87 But the frequentist does not form any spe-
cific opinion about the likelihood that this employer, during this particu-
lar set of hiring decisions, acted discriminatorily. Instead, the frequentist
rejects the null hypothesis using the following predictive logic:
[T]o say that an event [here, random hiring leading to the observed
disparity by chance] has probability 0.05 is not so much a statement
about any particular occurrence or nonoccurrence of the event, but is
rather a prediction about future repetitions of the setting in which the
• .188
event might occur.
In other words, the frequentist imagines an infinite repetition of the
set of hiring decisions and determines the frequency with which random
hiring would lead to the observed disparate result. This frequentist view
of statistics appears, at least initially, to be more objective than the
Bayesian view because it does not require the decision-maker to specify
and employ a subjective, uncertain, or imprecise prior probability.
The frequentist critique of Bayesianism holds force for settings
where experiments can be repeated many times, especially when using
experimental conditions rather than observational data, but the critique is
less potent in the context of judicial decision-making. A judge or jury
must make a ruling based on the evidence presented in the single case
before it, and does not have the luxury of repeating a hypothetical hiring
process or a controlled hiring experiment many times over to observe a
multitude of outcomes.89 Thus, some scholars, including Professor Rory
186. See infra text accompanying notes 195-96.
187. See Paetzold, supra note 56, at 399-400.
188. Aickin, supra note 184, at 162 (second emphasis added); see also KAYE ET AL., supra
note 78, § 12.8.2.b. ("With the frequency interpretation of chance, there is no meaningful way to
assign a numerical probability to the null hypothesis."); Paetzold, supra note 56, at 401 ("It should
be noted that this traditional method of testing is referred to as the 'frequentist' method of testing
because the p-value r presents a 'long-run frequency' interpretation of probability .... In order for
the probability to be accurately interpreted, it must be possible to conceive of an infinite number of
relevant, nearly identical hiring decisions facing the employer.").
189. Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal Con-
sumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931, 969 (1999) ("[T]he classical statistical meth-
od seeks to ascertain recurrent patterns, using observations about occurrences in the past to predict
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Bahadur and Professor Ramona Paetzold, have argued that Bayesian
reasoning is the better way to view statistical proof in the courtroom.
Professor Bahadur argues:
Frequentist models are ill-suited for use in the legal system because
they involve computing probability in idealized, non-real-world con-
texts, and they are incapable of incorporating preexisting information
into the decision process .... Bayesian probability analysis, by con-
trast, is an approach to statistics which "formally seeks to utilize prior
information." ... Bayesian probability, like legal inference, essential-
ly seeks to process information in a manner that yields the most op-
timal inferences based on the information.
190
Likewise, Professor Paetzold has argued for a switch from fre-
quentism to Bayesianism in the specific context of employment discrim-
ination cases.'9 1 She notes that the information provided by frequentist
statistical methods, including testing the null hypothesis of random hiring
decisions, is so "at odds" with the purpose of a judicial proceeding that it
leads to confusion and error, including the transposition fallacy.192 Pro-
fessor Paetzold writes:
In order for the ... [p-value from frequentist analysis] to be accurate-
ly interpreted, it must be possible to conceive of an infinite number
of relevant, nearly identical hiring decisions facing the employer. In
other words, the frequentist approach requires consideration of hypo-
thetical evidence (i.e., hypothetical hiring decisions) that were not ac-
tually a part of the employer's past hiring practices. The correct in-
terpretation of p-values is sufficiently at odds with the factfinder's
needs that courts often have difficulty in interpreting the statistical
evidence.
193
Although many statisticians can generally be categorized as fre-
quentist or Bayesian in their philosophies, some take a more nuanced
view by using "whichever approach seems to be appropriate to the nature
of the problem at hand."'' 94 The Bayesian approach seems especially apt
in systemic disparate treatment cases in light of the base rate and causal
inference problems highlighted by the methodological critics. Further,
the frequentist disdain for using subjective prior probabilities is mislead-
ing in the context of judicial decision-making. Making liability decisions
about an individual employer's set of employment actions based on a
frequentist rejection of the null hypothesis necessarily carries with it the
the future.... Adjudication, by contrast, usually seeks to determine the truth about a particular
dispute, which usually concerns events in the past.").
190. Bahadur, supra note 185, at 457-58 (footnotes omitted).
191. Paetzold, supra note 56, at 412 ("There are strong reasons for switching to Bayesian
methods of statistical inference in employment discrimination cases.").
192. Id. at 401.
193. Id. (footnote omitted).
194. Aickin, supra note 184, at 162.
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use of an implied, hidden prior probability. The following subparts illus-
trate the hidden role of Bayesian priors in judicial decision-making in
systemic disparate treatment cases, including Teamsters, Hazelwood, and
Wal Mart.
C. Hidden Priors in Judicial Use ofFrequentist Statistics
Frequentists decry Bayesians' reliance on unknowable, subjective
prior probabilities.'95 But when a decision-maker draws an inference of
discrimination in a particular systemic disparate treatment case based on
a finding of statistical significance at the .05 level, the frequentist en-
courages the use of a built-in, unstated, and unexamined prior probabil-
ity. Courts and juries relying on frequentist statistical significance to shift
the burden of proof or determine liability use built-in priors without real-
izing it. As Professors Paetzold and Willborn explain:
Although traditional methods are often viewed as more objective in
the sense that they appear to rely on the sample evidence alone, with-
out the inclusion of prior probabilities, virtually any inference that a
frequentist makes implies a corresponding Bayesian inference with
respect to some assignment of prior probabilities. In other words, the
traditional approach can be viewed as operating with a built-in set of
prior beliefs. The fact-finder in a discrimination case would arguably
be better served by examining explicitly a wide range of prior beliefs,
for it is only then that the fragility or robustness of the inference
about discrimination can be assessed. 1
96
This point is illustrated by revisiting one of the simplified examples
from Part II.A.3. Assume that a systemic disparate treatment case is
brought against Employer A. In Phase I of the Teamsters framework, the
plaintiffs present statistical evidence in the form of a binomial distribu-
tion analysis of Employer A's hiring patterns. The frequentist statistician
expert testifies that the p-value for the observed disparity in Employer
A's hiring data is exactly .05, making the results just statistically signifi-
cant at the .05 level. Recall that the correct interpretation of this statisti-
cal finding is as follows: Assuming that Employer A hired randomly
from the relevant labor pool, we would expect to see results showing this
level of disparity only 5 times in every 100-or I in 20-repetitions of
the hiring process. Assume that no other evidence is offered by either
plaintiffs or Employer A. From this statistical evidence alone, the fact-
finder determines in Phase I that Employer A more likely than not en-
gaged in an unlawful pattern or practice of discrimination, and Employer
A is therefore liable for a systemic violation of Title VII. Such a finding
195. See, e.g., Samuel R. Lucas, The Road to Hell...: The Statistics Proposal as the Final
Solution to the Sovereign's Human Rights Question, 30 Wis. INT'L L.J. 259, 319-20 (2012).
196. PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.05 (footnotes omitted). As Paetzold and
Willbom note, this is a point that commentators often miss when dismissing Bayesian methods. Id. §
12.05 n.2.
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appears to be justified, and possibly even prescribed, by the Court's
opinion in Hazelwood. Per Teamsters, this finding in Phase I has the ef-
fect of establishing Employer A's wrongdoing, justifying prospective
relief, and shifting the burden of proof to Employer A for Phase II, in
which individual relief for the class members will be considered.
By drawing this inference of systemic discrimination and imposing
liability at Phase I from only the frequentist statistical proof presented,
the fact-finder has actually applied a built-in Bayesian prior probability
without realizing or acknowledging as much. The fact-finder in this sim-
plified example has implicitly assumed that the prior probability of dis-
crimination must be greater than 5%. At a base rate of exactly 5% dis-
crimination, with an observed statistical disparity having a p-value of
.05, one would expect exactly 5 true positives and 5 false positives when
performing the statistical test on 100 employers. A fact-finder consider-
ing this statistical evidence under a 5% base rate assumption would
therefore believe the evidence to be precisely in equipoise as to whether
Employer A engaged in an unlawful pattern or practice of discrimination.
It is exactly as likely that the defendant before the fact-finder is one of
the true positives as it is one of the false positives. Given that plaintiffs
bear the initial burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful discrimi-
nation,97 the fact-finder should find in favor of Employer A if it believed
the base rate to be exactly 5% or less.'98 But if the fact-finder assumed
any base rate of discrimination higher than 5%, it would find that plain-
tiffs succeeded in showing that it is more likely than not that Employer A
engaged in unlawful discrimination.
By determining that Employer A engaged in systemic discrimina-
tion based on only the statistical evidence with a p-value of .05, the fact-
finder in this simplified example has implicitly assumed a base rate of
discrimination exceeding 5%. It may well be that assuming a base rate of
systemic discrimination higher than 5% is justified, but this point is nev-
er considered by the litigants, the statistical experts, the court, or the fact-
finder. Instead, the implied prior probability assumption is obscured-
hidden within the steps of indirect logical inferences drawn from the
statistics. The frequentist interpretation of statistical probability, at least
as it has been applied by courts in systemic discrimination cases, is no
197. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
198. This analysis would be complicated if the inquiry involved not just consideration of
whether the employer more probably than not engaged in unlawful discrimination. I have previously
argued elsewhere that because the systemic disparate treatment theory is fundamentally a burden
allocation scheme, at least as to recovery for individual class members, the parties' relative access to
information should also be considered in Phase I. Bent, supra note 16, at 818. The addition of other
factors, such as the parties' information costs, would complicate the formula and change the critical
cutoff number from > 0.5 (representing the preponderance of the evidence) to some higher or lower
figure, but it would not change the fact that hidden priors will play a role in the probability compo-
nent of the analysis.
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less subjective than the Bayesian approach; it just appears that way on
the surface. Such hidden priors have influenced the development of sys-
temic disparate treatment law beginning with Teamsters and Hazelwood
and continuing through Wal-Mart.
D. Hidden Priors in Teamsters and Hazelwood.- The Foundational Flaw
The systemic disparate treatment theory of unlawful discrimination
was first clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in 1977 in Teamsters
and Hazelwood.199 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was still a
relatively new development in the employment landscape, and intention-
al, open discrimination against minorities and women was still preva-
200lent. Professor Selmi, in his contribution to the Working Group, notes
the importance of the era in which these seminal cases were decided:
[I]n the 1970s, it was relatively easy to draw inferences of discrimi-
nation based on statistics, even relatively crude statistics as were of-
fered in Teamsters and Hazelwood. In these early cases, there was
not much of a need to explain the source of the statistical disparity
given that employers routinely discriminated against African Ameri-
cans and women prior to the passage of the 1964 Act, and those hab-
its appeared to die quite slowly.
20 1
In other words, the possibility of intentional discrimination on the
basis of race or gender was an ever-present and obvious potential expla-
nation for observed disparities in hiring, promotion, or other employment
practices. The role of statistics in the early cases, Professor Selmi argues,




Of course, as explained above, the statistics do not eliminate the
possibility that observed disparities were the product of chance. The sta-
tistics do not even necessarily make it more likely than not that the ob-
served disparities were caused by chance. That will depend on the level
of statistical significance (or the p-value) obtained in the statistical analy-
sis, combined with estimated background rates or priors.
Teamsters and Hazelwood were built upon hidden priors. Professor
Selmi is surely correct when he notes: "It was not just the companies'
own history of discrimination that allowed for an inference of discrimi-
nation but it was also the prevalence of discrimination at the time."20 3 As
he puts it, the foundational cases "were of a particular era" and "social
conditions have surely changed.
204
199. See supra Part I.
200. Selmi, supra note 4, at 485-86.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
204. Id. at 487.
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This observation reveals the importance of prior probabilities oper-
ating beneath the surface in the foundational cases. The prevalence of
discrimination at the time Teamsters and Hazelwood were decided gen-
erally influenced estimates or preconceptions about how likely it was that
any given employer was engaged in unlawful discrimination, before any
consideration of other evidence in the case. Statistical showings in cases
like Hazelwood had to be considered in the context, and against the
backdrop, of those prior beliefs about the background rates, or preva-
lence, of employment discrimination. As Professor Selmi points out,
once a statistically significant disparity was shown, and if an employer
could not convince the court of some alternative explanation for the ob-
served skew in hiring numbers, the Court was prepared to accept the next
205most obvious explanation at that time: intentional disparate treatment°.
Unsurprisingly, the Court did not openly discuss prior probabilities
or base rates of discrimination in Teamsters or Hazelwood. In both cases,
the Court appears to begin with an unstated assumption that the base rate
of intentional discrimination was relatively high; hence, discrimination
becomes the obvious explanation for observing statistically significant
hiring disparities.20 6 The very structure that the Teamsters opinion pre-
scribes for analyzing systemic disparate treatment cases is underpinned
by an unstated prior belief that sufficient baseline levels of discrimina-
tion existed to make discrimination a reasonable explanation in the face
of statistically significant disparities. In Hazelwood, the Court reinforced
that notion, reflecting a similar, unstated prior baseline belief °20 7 The
theoretical and statistical foundations of systemic disparate treatment law
were flawed from the beginning because of the Court's failure to recog-
nize the hidden role of priors. Unstated prior probabilities have been ly-
ing beneath the surface of systemic disparate treatment law since 1977.
E. Hidden Priors in Wal-Mart: How Changing Priors Changed Substan-
tive Doctrine
Professor Suzanna Sherry argues that shifts in the Supreme Court's
"intuitions about how the world works," or to use her term, "foundational
facts," can result in shifting legal doctrine even where the Court denies
that a doctrinal shift has occurred.20 8 This sort of shift in foundational
facts is precisely what occurred in Wal-Mart. The Court's changing in-
tuitions about the background likelihood of discrimination led it to apply
systemic disparate treatment doctrine in ways that threaten to undercut
Teamsters and Hazelwood entirely.
205. See id. at 485-87.
206. See supra text accompanying note 202.
207. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-09 (1977).
208. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145,
146-47 (2011).
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Why did the Wal-Mart Court demand more of plaintiffs than it did
in Teamsters or Hazelwood for an inference of systemic discrimina-
tion?20 9 Professor Selmi contends that discrimination has become a less
obvious explanation for observed statistical disparities than it was in the
1970s and much of the 1980s.2 He notes:
[O]nce we moved farther away from the era of plain and open exclu-
sionary policies, it has become less clear, at least to the courts, that
discrimination provides the best explanation for the observed dispari-
ties. Importantly, while social conditions have surely changed, the
theory underlying the pattern or practice cause of action has not, and
indeed, the mid-1970s cases of Teamsters and Hazelwood remain
surprisingly relevant today.
211
Neither Professor Selmi nor the Court refers expressly to changes in
Bayesian prior probabilities-no doubt because the Bayesian view of
statistical inference has not been widely accepted in employment dis-
crimination law21 2 and because the hidden priors are buried beneath fre-
quentist inferential reasoning.213 But Professor Selmi's basic point can be
recast in Bayesian terms: the prior probability of discrimination, or the
base rate against which the observed statistical disparity should be
judged, has significantly declined since the 1970s. The estimated back-
ground likelihood that any particular employer is engaged in systemic
discrimination has declined enough to make it "less clear" that "discrim-
ination [always] provides the best explanation for the observed dispari-
ties.2 14
Glimpses of changed priors can be observed by comparing language
in Wal-Mart to language found in the early cases. As Professor Deborah
Weiss notes, Justice Scalia's ruminations about what "most managers in
any corporation" would do are particularly revealing.215 One can certain-
ly question the empirical accuracy of Justice Scalia's assertion that most
managers, if left to their own devices, would choose "sex-neutral, per-
formance-based criteria" to evaluate employees,216 but there can be little
doubt that the same statement would not likely have appeared in a Su-
209. On this point, it may be argued that Wal-Mart did not speak directly to the substance of
systemic disparate treatment law, but only to the procedural question involving Rule 23. But given
that most systemic disparate treatment claims (other than those filed by the EEOC) are brought as
class actions under Rule 23, and that the merits inquiry often merges with the certification inquiry, it
may make little difference. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 480, 493.
210. Id. at 487.
211. Id.
212. See PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.01 ("One increasingly popular school of
statistical inference is the Bayesian school. Although the school is well-known among statisticians
and some social scientists, it is only marginally recognized at law.").
213. See supra Part 11.B.
214. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 487.
215. Weiss, supra note 9, at 1687, 1741; see also supra text accompanying note 172 (quoting
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011)).
216. See supra text accompanying note 172 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554).
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preme Court opinion in 1977. Whether Scalia's unsupported observation
is accurate or not, it is reasonable to presume that it is at least closer to a
true statement about intentional discrimination now than it would have
been if the same words had been written in 1977. Justice Scalia's unsup-
ported assertion reflects his intuition about how the world works, and his
intuition is that discrimination is not common.17
Further evidence of changed priors can be found in the importance
that the majority places on Walmart's official policy of non-
discrimination, as compared to its treatment of a similar School District
policy in Hazelwood. The Wal-Mart majority noted: "Wal-Mart's an-
nounced policy forbids sex discrimination, and as the District Court rec-
ognized the company imposes penalties for denials of equal employment
opportunity.' ' 218 As described above, the Wal-Mart majority believed this
official company policy prohibiting discrimination undermined the
commonality requirement because individual managers would not likely
have discriminated in the face of the official policy.
219
Contrast this to Hazelwood. There, the Hazelwood School District
had an "officially promulgated policy 'to hire all teachers on the basis of
training, preparation and recommendations, regardless of race, color or
creed.' 220 Yet, this evidence did not appear to affect the Court's assess-
ment of the requirements for a prima facie showing of systemic disparate
treatment in the slightest. After mentioning the existence of this policy,
the Court focused exclusively on the relative merits of the statistical
showing.221 The Court devoted substantial attention to identifying the
proper comparison labor pool-or reference class-for purposes of con-
ducting a binomial distribution222 and to considering whether hiring dis-
crimination taking place before Title VII prohibited public employers
from discriminating might have affected observed isparities. 22 But no-
where did the Hazelwood Court suggest that the government would need
to identify particular rogue decision-makers who allegedly acted discrim-
inatorily in contravention of the official non-discrimination policy.
224
Rather, the Court made clear that statistical evidence of gross disparity
alone may "in a proper case" constitute a prima facie showing of a pat-
tern or practice of discrimination-apparently in spite of an express non-
discrimination policy.
225
217. See Weiss, supra note 9, at 1687.
218. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (citation omitted).
219. Id. at 2554.
220. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 303-04 (1977).
221. Id. at 306 12.
222. Id. at 308, 311-12.
223. Id. at 309, 309 n.15.
224. See id. at 306-13.
225. Id. at 307-08.
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Finally, the Court in Wal-Mart played up the importance of anecdo-
tal evidence of discrimination in systemic discrimination cases. While
Hazelwood indicated that statistical evidence alone could in a proper case
establish a prima facie case of systemic discrimination, 226 the Wal-Mart
ruling appears to call that statement into question. Justice Scalia points
out the weaknesses of the anecdotal evidence offered by plaintiffs:
In Teamsters v. United States, in addition to substantial statistical ev-
idence of company-wide discrimination, the Government (as plain-
tiff) produced about 40 specific accounts of racial discrimination
from particular individuals. That number was significant because the
company involved had only 6,472 employees, of whom 571 were
minorities, and the class itself consisted of around 334 persons[.] The
40 anecdotes thus represented roughly one account for every eight
members of the class .... Here, by contrast, respondents filed some
120 affidavits reporting experiences of discrimination-about 1 for
every 12,500 class members-relating to only some 235 out of Wal-
Mart's 3,400 stores .... Even if every single one of these accounts is
true, that would not demonstrate that the entire company "operate[s]• .•,,227
under a general policy of discrimination.
Traditionally, a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment has
"relied almost entirely on statistics."228 According to Professor Selmi, the
"anecdotal evidence is always of marginal significance in a pattern or
practice claim., 229 Although the Teamsters Court highlighted the anecdo-
tal evidence that "brought the cold numbers convincingly to life, 230 that
anecdotal evidence did not appear to be dispositive and the Court in Ha-
zelwood clarified that statistical evidence alone could be sufficient.3
One potential reading of Wal-Mart is that it has changed the substantive
law of systemic disparate treatment such that some "significant" or suffi-
cient level of anecdotal evidence is now required to explain what is going
on in the observed statistical disparity.232
The Court now seems less willing to infer systemic discrimination
on the basis of only statistical evidence of an observed company-wide,
statistically significant disparity in hiring, promotions, or pay, without
something more-the identification of a particular policy, mechanism, or
rogue decision-maker that produces the observed disparity. The Court's
226. Id.
227. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)). Justice
Scalia also notes that in Teamsters the forty anecdotes came from employees "spread throughout"
the company. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
228. Selmi, supra note 4, at 485.
229. Id. at 501.
230. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
231. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 307-08; see also supra note 43 (listing lower court decisions
stating that statistical evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of systemic
disparate treatment discrimination).
232. See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
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intuitions about the way the world works-or its hidden Bayesian pri-
ors-appear to have changed.33 Statistically significant evidence sug-
gesting a rejection of the null hypothesis alone was not enough for the
Wal-Mart Court to endorse the inferential leap to discrimination as the
next most obvious explanation for observed disparities.34 Instead, the
Court looked harder for other potential explanations for observed statisti-
cally significant disparities.235 After Wal-Mart, the Court may demand
evidence of a policy of discrimination, or at least some story or narrative
to explain the data, as Professor Selmi suggests. Alternatively, it might
demand some additional pieces of evidence such as a higher volume of
anecdotal testimony to nudge the probability of discrimination over the
line.
The Wal-Mart Court's approach is generally consistent with, and
can be explained by, a Bayesian view of systemic disparate treatment law
with two major caveats: (1) the Wal-Mart Court did not openly
acknowledge the role of prior probabilities, and (2) the Wal-Mart Court
used its own unstated priors, but disregarded social framework evidence
that would have helped a fact-finder form or adjust its own priors. The
majority's unsupported assertion about what most managers would do
was not recognized as a challengeable, and empirically testable, assump-
tion about the non-case-specific background likelihood of discrimina-
236
tion. Yet, the majority cast aside expert testimony on social frame-
works that would have provided valuable information about the back-
ground likelihood of discrimination in certain organizational settings
precisely because the expert was not able to offer case-specific infor-
237
mation.
F. Reconciling the Methodological and Contextualist Strands by Expos-
ing Hidden Priors
As the preceding discussion shows, Bayesian priors are at work in
systemic disparate treatment cases whether courts choose to
233. The idea that the Court's prior estimate of the base rate of discrimination would change
over the course of more than thirty years is generally consistent with statements the Court has made
regarding changing societal attitudes toward racial classifications. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 343 (2003) ("we expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be
necessary to further the interest approved today."); see also Sherry, supra note 208, at 164-65. ("It is
reasonable to suppose, however, that the passage of time might lessen the likelihood that employers
are deliberately discriminating, especially in the context of disparate impact. By the late 1980s, was
it still more likely than not that any employer who adopted an employment practice with a disparate
impact had a covert discriminatory intent? The Court apparently thought not."). Professor Sherry
highlights changes in disparate impact doctrine and individual disparate treatment burden-shifting
doctrine that she contends are attributable to the Court "chang[ing] its mind about the overall preva-
lence of racially discriminatory motives among American employers." Id. at 166.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 169-73.
235. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554-55 (2011).
236. Weiss, supra note 9, at 1687.
237. Id. at 1678.
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acknowledge them or not.238 A Bayesian view of systemic disparate
treatment would expose the role of hidden priors, rebuild the flawed the-
oretical and statistical foundations of the doctrine, and bring coherence to
the most misunderstood category of antidiscrimination claims. Further, a
Bayesian view also holds the potential to reconcile methodological and
contextualist strands of legal scholarship described in Part II.
For critics writing in the methodological strand, use of Bayesian
priors would prevent courts and experts from falling into the transposi-
tion fallacy trap and would focus fact-finders on the conditional probabil-
ity in which they are truly interested-the probability that the employer
unlawfully discriminated, given the observed disparities in employment
outcomes. Professor Browne may remain skeptical of our judicial sys-
tem's ability to generate usable estimates of prior probabilities and con-
vey them in an understandable way, but these are questions about he
source and management of priors. Part IV of this Article identifies some
of these difficult practical questions and proposes a scholarly agenda for
addressing them. For now, it is enough to note that the use of Bayesian
statistics is not unheard-of in litigation, especially in paternity cases and
DNA match criminal cases.239 Despite potential difficulties in implemen-
tation, the introduction of Bayesian logic in systemic disparate treatment
cases is now overdue.
The Bayesian approach also provides conceptual space for the con-
textualist view advanced by Professor Green. The contextualist view
posits that certain organizational or cultural dynamics operating at the
entity-level can generate disparate employment outcomes, even though
individual intentional wrongdoers cannot be identified.240 This is, essen-
tially, an argument that society underperceives the extent and relative
likelihood of employment discrimination because we cannot identify
individual wrongdoers in all cases.241 In formulating this argument, Pro-
fessor Green draws on the work of social scientists studying organiza-
tional behavior.42 Taking a Bayesian approach in the courtroom, those
same social scientists could provide expert testimony about the ways in
which organizational dynamics can and do lead to disparate treatment in
employment outcomes, even where individual intentional wrongdoers are
238. See id. at 1678-79 (contending that the application of priors are unavoidable in discrimi-
nation law generally).
239. See infra Part IV.
240. See supra Part I.B.
241. See Green, supra note 2, at 433. Professor Green states:
As a practical matter, disparate treatment is often difficult to discern on an individual
basis-it occurs subtly in day-to-day interactions, in decisions that do not lend easily to
immediate comparison, and in unstated judgments and perceptions of value and skills-
and therefore can frequently only be identified in the aggregate, where it can be shown
that members of a particular group are being denied more promotions or provided less
pay.
Id. (citation omitted).
242. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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not observed. This expert testimony would help fact-finders estimate
prior probabilities. For example, expert, non-case-specific social frame-
work testimony about organizational causes of discrimination could ap-
propriately adjust the fact-finder's estimates of prior probabilities.
One of the strengths of the Bayesian approach is its ability to incor-
porate newly-learned information in a rational and logically consistent
way by updating probability estimates. This built-in flexibility in the
Bayesian approach provides a distinct advantage over the status quo,
with its more rigid decision rule that turns on a finding of frequentist
statistical significance, and the accompanying doctrinal shifts that occur
periodically as the Supreme Court's hidden priors change over time. If
social scientists make additional breakthroughs in our understanding of
the extent or causes of employment discrimination, that new information
can be conveyed to the fact-finder in the courtroom (and, of course, sub-
jected to challenge and rebuttal by the opposing party). Priors can be
updated accordingly, and statistical evidence can be correctly interpreted
in a way that avoids the transposition fallacy and is consistent with
Bayes' Theorem. In this way, social framework evidence like that of-
fered by Dr. William Bielby in the Wal-Mart case can and should be
used to adjust the fact-finder's priors, even though it is not case-
specific 243
The Bayesian view of systemic disparate treatment law provides a
workable path forward that accommodates the contributions made by
both the methodological critics and the contextualists. It also explains the
doctrinal arc of systemic disparate treatment law from Teamsters to Wal-
Mart. Changing priors have changed the substantive law. Acknowledg-
ing the influence of priors is the first step in developing a coherent theory
of systemic disparate treatment law that accords statistical evidence of
outcome disparities its appropriate weight, yet also incorporates our
changing understandings of how discrimination operates in the work-
force.
IV. A SCHOLARLY AGENDA FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF PRIORS
Acknowledgment of the importance of priors is only the first step in
developing a unified theory of systemic disparate treatment law. A num-
243. Weiss, supra note 9, at 1679 ("Social framework evidence promises to go some way to
replacing the personal views of judges and juries with a more objective perspective."). Social
framework evidence can be relevant even though it is not case-specific, because it provides infor-
mation about potential misperceptions of background rates of discrimination. The Wal-Mart majority
dismissed the social framework testimony offered by plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Bielby, because he
"could not ... determine with any specificity how regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in
employment decisions at Wal-Mart." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553 (2011)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted). Once the role of Bayesian priors is exposed,
however, it becomes clear that Dr. Bielby's testimony was relevant to a proper interpretation of the
observed statistical disparities in employment outcomes, even though he could not offer case-
specific testimony about the true causes of disparity at Wal-Mart specifically. See Weiss, supra note
9, at 1683-87 (noting the relevance, under a Bayesian view, of "pure social framework evidence").
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ber of difficult second-order questions are immediately raised by the
recognition that prior probabilities influence the interpretation of statisti-
cal evidence of outcome disparities. These questions include:
1. Whose priors matter?244 Possible answers include the trial
judge, the trial fact-finder, appellate judges, and the legisla-
ture.
2. Relatedly, how should evaluation of priors fit into civil liti-
gation pretrial procedure, including key dispositive proce-
dures such as motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment?
3. How can Bayesian statistical inference be presented to fact-
finders at trial? Other scholars have discussed possible tech-
niques for conveying Bayesian information to jurors, includ-
ing the use of charts that provide different posterior probabil-
ities for a number of selected possible prior probability dis-
245tributions. Something similar has even been required by at
least one court in the context of Bayesian statistical inference
in the paternity testing context.
2 46
4. What are legitimate or illegitimate sources of priors? Here,
potential answers range from pure unsupported guesses to
empirical evidence on background rates of discrimination to
expert testimony about social framework causes of discrimi-
nation. Which sources are legitimate? Should some sources
receive more deference than others?
In a related paper, I offer my views on these difficult second-order
questions.247 Although these questions pose practical challenges to the
use of Bayesian statistical inference in systemic disparate treatment liti-
gation, they are not intractable. Courts already use Bayesian statistical
inference regularly in some DNA matching and paternity testing cases.248
Some scholars and statisticians have long been optimistic that courts can
adapt to the use of Bayesian statistics in discrimination cases.249
244. Professors Paetzold and Willbom identify this question, but do not attempt an answer. See
PAETZOLD & WILLBORN, supra note 57, § 12.05 n.10 ("An important legal issue would involve
whose prior probabilities should be represented. Because the Bayesian view of probability is subjec-
tive (represents an individual's uncertainty), courts would need to decide whose uncertainty the prior
distribution should represent.").
245. See, e.g., KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, § 14.3.1 (discussing the potential use of prior
probability charts in DNA match case).
246. Plemel v. Walter, 735 P.2d 1209, 1219 (Or. 1987); see also D.H. Kaye, Plemel as a Pri-
mer on Proving Paternity, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 867, 875-82 (1988).
247. Bent, supra note 14.
248. The following search in the ALLCASES Westlaw database returned 114 results:
(BAYES! or "PRIOR PROBABILIT!" or "PRIOR ODDS") & ("DNA MATCH" or
"PATERNITY"). See also KAYE ET AL., supra note 78, §§ 14.3.1-14.4.3.
249. See, e.g., Stephen E. Fienberg, The Increasing Sophistication of Statistical Assessments as
Evidence in Discrimination Litigation, 77 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N. 784, 784 (1982) ("1 believe that with
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The existence of difficult second-order questions does not counsel
in favor of ignoring prior probabilities. As demonstrated above, when
decision-makers ignore prior probabilities and draw inferences to impose
liability based on frequentist statistical significance they are, in effect,
operating with a hidden, built-in, unexamined prior. The point of this
paper is not to answer all of the difficult second-order questions that
come with acknowledging priors but rather to get the discussion started.
Once courts and scholars come to recognize the inescapable role of prior
probabilities, they can turn their attention to the second-order questions
and develop a more fully-formed system for managing priors in the
courtroom.
CONCLUSION
Wal-Mart represents a substantive move away from the systemic
disparate treatment theory as formulated in Teamsters and Hazelwood.
While evidence of a statistically significant disparity was once sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of systemic disparate treatment, the Wal-
Mart Court demanded more. This Article shows that the Court's substan-
tive doctrinal shift can be explained by recognizing the cracks in the sta-
tistical and theoretical foundations of systemic disparate treatment law
tracing back to 1977. The foundational cases rested on an unstated and
unexamined assumption about prior probabilities that a majority of the
Court seemingly no longer holds. A change in hidden priors has led to a
change in the law.
This Article challenges courts and scholars to openly acknowledge
the importance of priors in evaluating systemic discrimination cases so
that the discussion of the difficult challenges we face in managing priors
can begin. The future shape of systemic disparate treatment law will de-
pend on whether courts make the operation of priors more transparent.
Acknowledging hidden priors will bring together the academic insights
of the methodologists and the contextualists, clearing the way for consid-
eration of the second-order issues of prior management and for the inclu-
sion of social framework and other evidence of organizational causes of
discrimination. Wal-Mart should be viewed not as the death knell for
systemic disparate treatment law but rather as the instigator for a funda-
mental change in how statistical evidence of an outcome disparity is in-
terpreted in antidiscrimination law.
the proper training both statisticians and judges could and should learn to present and understand the
results of a proper Bayesian analysis.").

ANTICIPATING THE WISE LATINA JUDGE
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ABSTRACT
Sonia Sotomayor's famous "wise Latina" quote provoked a con-
servative critique. The first part of the critique proposes that Judge So-
tomayor's gender and racial background would affect her judicial deci-
sion making. The second part fears that her Latina background would
result in bias, prejudice, and unfair judicial decisions.
This Essay explores this conservative critique and discusses it more
generally. It reviews the realism model of judicial decision making, so-
cial science research on salience theory, and empirical research on judg-
es' race and gender-ultimately concluding that the first part of the con-
servative critique is correct: judges' gender and racial backgrounds affect
their decision making, at least in some cases. The Essay, however, dis-
cusses why the second part of the critique is problematic. It argues that
we should have the same positive associations, and the same anticipation
of judicial insights, about judges' gender and racial backgrounds that we
do about the other biographical details of judges' backgrounds. It sug-
gests that judges engaging in "deep analysis" of alternative gender and
racial perspectives would move them toward empathic understanding
rather than fear of bias, prejudice, and unfair results.
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INTRODUCTION
President Barack Obama nominated Sonia Sotomayor to the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2009.' She became the first Hispanic and only the third
female judge to serve on the Court.2 She was such an impressive candi-
date, credentialed in all the traditional ways,3 that you would think that
her appointment process would have been smooth sailing with no objec-
tions.
Instead, there were publicized attempts to derail her nomination.
4
This was prompted in part by Judge Sotomayor's now famous quote: "I
would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experienc-
es would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male
who hasn't lived that life."5 The language in this quote puts gender and
race front and center, given that, for instance, the term "Latina" indicates
both gender and race simultaneously.
There were a variety of responses to her statement. Some were sup-
portive.6 Others were critical, as illustrated by the strong conservative
reactions of Senator Jeff Sessions, the ranking Republican on the Senate
7Judiciary Committee. He interpreted her quote in the following way:
that her background and experiences as a Latina were indicative of her
potential bias and prejudice in judicial decision making, thereby suggest-
ing that she would not be suitable or qualified as a Supreme Court Jus-
tice.8 He feared that her personal preferences would prevail over a com-
mitment to upholding the law, thus resulting in unfair judicial decisions.
9
This conservative critique of the "wise Latina" quote can best be
understood by breaking it down into its two parts. The first part is the
belief that Judge Sotomayor's gender and racial background would affect
her judicial decision making. The second part is the fear that her gender
and racial background would affect her judicial decision-making process
I. Peter Hamby et al., Obama Nominates Sonia Sotomayor to Supreme Court, CNN (May
26, 2009, 20:27 EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/26/supreme.court.
2. Id.
3. She was educated at Princeton and Yale and was an experienced federal court judge. Id.
4. See Sen. Jeff Sessions Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to
Be an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, WASH. POST (July 14, 2009, 10:35 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/1 4 AR200907 14011 55.html (tran-
script of hearing).
5. Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 92 (2002); see
also Dana Bash & Emily Sherman, Sobomayor's 'Wise Latina' Comment a Staple of Her Speeches,
CNN (June 8, 2009, 13:39 EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/05/sotomayor.speeches/
(indicating Sotomayor's use of the phrase in other speeches).
6. Caitlin Taylor, Sotomayor's Controversial 2001 Remarks-and Their Context, ABC
NEWS (May 27, 2009, 8:46 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/05/sotomayors-cont.
7. See Sen. Jeff Sessions Holds a Hearing on the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to
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negatively, namely that the effect would be bias, prejudice, and unfair
results.
This Essay explores this critique of the "wise Latina" quote in a
broader context. We consider the first part of the critique by reviewing
the realism model of judicial decision making, highlighting social sci-
ence research on the salience theory, and finally, discussing the empirical
research on judges' gender and race. Part II of the Essay explores the
second part of the critique, the problematic inference of judicial bias and
unfair results. Part III suggests a methodology of "deep analysis" to con-
sciously integrate the full array of judicial experience into judicial deci-
sion making.
1. CONFIRMING THAT GENDER AND RACIAL BACKGROUNDS MATTER
A. Realist Model of Judicial Decision Making
Described in dozens of books on legal reasoning, law students are
tutored in the basic lawyerly skills°: spotting the legal issues, identifying
the legal principles, determining the relevant facts, and applying the
principles to the facts to reach a legal conclusion. Students learn to use
judicial opinions and statutes to convince judges of their particular advo-
cacy position.
As law students learn, however, the process of judicial analysis and
decision making is not as cut and dry as it might first appear.1 Judges are
required to filter and interpret. Among other inquires, judges must ask
the following: Which are the appropriate legal principles? What do they
mean? Which are the believable facts, and of these, which are relevant
given the applicable legal inquiries? When parties disagree about the
facts-which almost always occurs-which version is the most persua-
sive and how is that determination made?
How do judges engage in this complicated and often nuanced pro-
cess of legal filtering and interpreting? Two models of judicial decision
making offer contrasting answers.12 The formalist model envisions these
processes of judicial filtering and interpreting as systematic and uniform-
ly executed.13 Judges meticulously utilize the appropriate legal formula
10. See, e.g., TERESA KISSANE BROSTOFF & ANN SINSHEIMER, UNITED STATES LEGAL
LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 77-211 (3d ed. 2013) (describing in detail for beginning students the
American legal system using cases, using statutes, synthesizing cases, and appellate advocacy); E.
SCOTT FRUEHWALD, THINK LIKE A LAWYER: LEGAL REASONING FOR LAW STUDENTS AND
BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS (2013) (similarly describing the fundamentals of basic legal reasoning).
11. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING: IS PSYCHOLOGY
RELEVANT? (1999) (acknowledging and explaining further the complexity of judicial decision mak-
ing).
12. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19-56 (2008) (describing nine theories of
judicial behavior).
13. See Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism, Realism,
and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 420-21 (1992) (describing formal-
ist judges).
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for the dispute at hand, following the specified steps and ending up with
reasonably predictable results. The formalist model suggests there is little
opportunity for a judge's particular experiences and background to play a
role in his or her decision making, since judges have very few degrees of
freedom to exercise latitude in their interpretation. The process is pre-
sumed to be unambiguous and dictated; the "humanness" of judges is not
relevant.
As described by Judge Posner, the formalist model, what he labels
as "legalism," envisions the following:
The ideal legalist decision is the product of a syllogism in which a
rule of law supplies the major premise, the facts of the case supply
the minor one, and the decision is the conclusion. The rule might
have to be extracted from a statute or a constitutional provision, but
the legalist model comes complete with a set of rules of interpretation
(the "canons of construction"), so that interpretation too becomes a
rule-bound activity, purging judicial discretion.14
In contrast, a realist model of judicial decision making acknowledg-
es that judges are individuals who bring their background and life expe-
riences with them to the bench. When judges put on their formal robes
and enter the courtroom, they do not leave their gender, race, education,
religion, former occupations, and upbringing behind. 5 Their humanness
brings a contextual richness to their thinking. On the other hand, judges
also bring their stereotypes and cognitive biases. 16
Nonetheless, the realism model is not contrary to principled legal
analysis. Gibson and Caldeira explain that judicial "decisionmaking in-
volves far more than 'applying' the law to the facts in a mechanical or
14. POSNER, supra note 12, at 4 1.
15. As described by Judge Kozinski: "We all view reality from our own peculiar perspective;
we all have biases, interests, leanings, instincts." Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other
Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 115, 119
(David M. O'Brien ed., 4th ed. 2013).
16. Brest and Krieger, for instance, explain how common cognitive biases are found in the
legal context. PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING,
AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS 267-302 (2010). To
illustrate, people in general tend to be influenced by externally-given reference points in their deci-
sion making, what social scientists call the "anchoring and adjustment bias." Id. at 267. In one study
by Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich:
[F]ederal judges [were given] the facts of a personal injury case, in which the plaintiff
had been hospitalized for several months and was left paraplegic and confined to a
wheelchair. One group was anchored by being informed that the defendant had moved for
dismissal on the ground that the case did not meet the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum
for a diversity case; the other group was given no such anchoring information. Though
almost none of the judges granted the motion to dismiss, the average award in the an-
chored group was $882,000 compared to $1,249,000 in the unanchored group.
Id. at 269 (footnote omitted).
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syllogistic fashion," and "inevitably involves and implicates judges' per-
sonal values."'7 At the same time, they observe:
[T]his is a matter of degree-to reject mechanical jurisprudence is
not necessarily to assume unfettered discretion but only to recognize
that, within the context of the rule of law, judges have choices in
their decisions and that their choices often if not typically reflect their
own ideological predispositions. 18
In practice, judges typically exercise discretion in a principled fash-
ion, not in a strategic self-interested way, thereby protecting judicial le-
gitimacy. They are not "merely politicians in robes."'9 Judge Kozinski
further notes that judges exercise discretion, but that discretion is con-
strained by judges' own self-respect, colleagues' oversight, and the polit-
ical process, including, in some jurisdictions, removal of judges by vot-
20ers.
B. Salience Theory
Salience theory, as studied by social scientists, is also consistent
with the realists' perception of judicial decision making. Salience theory
explains that when individuals are bombarded with lots of possible stim-
uli, for instance, myriad pieces of information, some stimuli stand out
more.2' These stimuli appear to garner the individual's attention and have
heightened relevance. That is, these pieces are more salient than other
pieces of information. For example, if you are thinking about buying a
new car, you will start noticing different car models and colors more than
under normal circumstances.
The concept of salience has been discussed in varied contexts.
Nisbett, a cultural psychologist, for instance, found that in study after
study East Asians and Americans responded in qualitatively different
22ways to the same situation. In one experiment, Japanese and Americans
viewed the same animated underwater scenes then reported what they
had seen:
The first statement by Americans usually referred to a large fish in
the foreground . . . . They would say something like, "There was
what looked like a trout swimming to the right." The first statement
by Japanese usually referred to background elements: "There was a
17. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of
the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 195, 201 (2011).
18. ld. at 214.
19. Id.
20. Kozinski, supra note 15, at 116-17.
21. See generally Duane M. Rumbaugh et al., A Salience Theory of Learning and Behavior:
With Perspectives on Neurobiology and Cognition, 28 INT'L J. PRIMATOLOGY 973 (2007) (providing
background information on salience theory).
22. RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: How ASIANS AND WESTERNERS
THINK DIFFERENTLY... AND WHY (2003).
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lake or a pond." The Japanese made about 70 percent more state-
ments than Americans about background aspects of the environment,
and 100 percent more statements about relationships with inanimate
aspects of the environment, for example, that a big fish swam past
some gray seaweed. 23
In other words, East Asians are more likely to attend to the whole, while
Westerners are more likely to focus on a particular object within the
whole.
Thus, we learn from Nisbett's work that our experiences and social-
ization shape our perceptions of the world. People from different back-
grounds pay attention to different things; that is, among the array of
pieces of information and stimuli that we could pay attention to, some
things are more salient than others.
Research in medicine provides another example of salience, or in
this case, the lack of it. Credentialed radiologists were asked to look at
five lung CT scans, each which contained about ten nodules or abnormal-
24 2ities. They were asked to click on anything strange on the scans . On
the final scan, a figure of a dancing gorilla about forty-eight times the
size of an average nodule was placed in the upper right hand quadrant.26
Twenty out of the twenty-four radiologists admitted they were unable to
see the gorilla even though they scrolled past it an average of 4.3 times
and twelve had looked directly at it.2 7 After being asked if they were able
to see the gorilla, the radiologists were shown the slide again and asked if
they saw anything unusual.28 They all were able to see the gorilla this
time,29 thus suggesting that individuals can be trained to find salient
stimuli that would otherwise not be noticed.
Thus, we learn from this study that training someone to be an expert
often means training them to pay particular attention to certain things. As
a consequence, however, the training may also result in these experts
ignoring other things, even when they are right before their eyes. This
tendency has been called "inattentional blindness."
30
23. See The Geography of Thought: How Culture Colors the Way the Mind Works, REGENTS
U. MICH. (Feb. 27, 2003), http://www.ns.umich.edu/Releases/2003/FebO3/rO22703a.html (internal
quotation marks omitted) (describing Nisbett's research).
24. Trafton Drew et al., The Invisible Gorilla Strikes Again: Sustained Inattentional Blindness
in Expert Observers, 24 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1848, 1849 (2013).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1850.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1848.
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C. Empirical Research on Judges' Gender and Judges' Race
Substantial empirical research on judges' gender and race also indi-
cates that different backgrounds can affect judicial decision making, and




Consider this hypothetical: A judge hears a female employee's de-
tailed complaint of her supervisor's sexual harassment. Consistent with
applicable legal principles,32 her lawyers argue: (1) the harassment was
because of her sex; (2) the harassment was so "pervasive and severe" that
it created a "hostile work environment"; and (3) therefore the defendant's
actions were illegal. The judge then hears the supervisor and employer
argue that the plaintiff-employee has not established the legal require-
ments for sexual harassment. Instead, they posit that (1) if there was har-
assment, it was not because of her sex but attributable to something else;
(2) even if there was sexual harassment, it was not "severe or pervasive"
enough to create a "hostile work environment"; and (3) therefore their
conduct was not illegal.
How do judges analyze these arguments? Well-established case law
directs judges to ask: What would a reasonable person conclude?33 It
turns out that if we attach a gender to the reasonable person, you get dif-
ferent conclusions about whether a set of facts is perceived as sexual
harassment or not.34 The reasonable man and the reasonable woman do
not see eye to eye; they instead view what constitutes sexual harassment
with very different lenses.35 These findings suggest that the "reasonable
person standard" is more variable than the formalist model would indi-
cate, leaving the judge to essentially project his or her own beliefs onto
what is supposed to be some objectively-defined reference point.
Given the differences among men and women in general, the real-
ism model of judicial decision making would predict that female judges
and male judges also would differ in their perceptions of sexual harass-
ment and sexual discrimination. Indeed, the weight of empirical research
31. See, e.g., CASSIA SPOHN, How Do JUDGES DECIDE?: THE SEARCH FOR FAIRNESS AND
JUSTICE IN PUNISHMENT 107-22 (2d ed. 2009) (describing research on the ffects of judges' race
and gender on outcomes in criminal law cases).
32. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (clarifying the elements of a
hostile environment claim); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(indicating that the harassment must be because of the protected status).
33. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite
Corp., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 260, 265 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 759 F.2d
355 (4th Cir. 1985).
34. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman Standard.- A Meta-Analytic Review of
Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 33, 35 (1998);
Barbara A. Gutek & Maureen O'Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reasonable Woman Standard,
51 J. Soc. ISSUES, no. 1, at 151, 154 (1995).
35. Gutek & O'Connor, supra note 34, at 155.
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on judges' gender supports that prediction.36 A review of fourteen studies
found that female judges in federal appellate courts have decision-
making patterns distinct from male judges in sexual discrimination cas-
es.3 7 Namely, female judges are more likely to hold for plaintiff employ-
ees, who are most likely women.38 In Peresie's study of sex discrimina-
tion and sexual harassment cases in the federal courts, she found that
female judges and male judges differed in their decision-making pat-
terns.39 Male judges held in favor of the plaintiffs 24% of the time; fe-
male judges held in favor of the plaintiffs 39% of the time.40 Another
study by Boyd, Epstein, and Martin also found that, when dealing with
sex discrimination suits, female judges found in favor of plaintiffs more
frequently than male judges.4' In fact, they conclude that the likelihood
of a plaintiff's success increases by about 10% if the judge is a woman.42
Thus, it appears that female judges had different perceptions than male
judges about what was salient; they saw things that male judges did not
see. Conversely, male judges apparently saw things that made them rule
more often in favor of the defendants.
2. Judges' Race
The realism model is also supported in empirical research on judg-
es' race. Again, let me offer a hypothetical similar to the gender-based
one above: A judge hears a black employee's detailed complaint of racial
harassment. As required by the applicable legal principles,4 3 his lawyers
argue that (1) the harassment was because of his race; (2) the harassment
was so "pervasive and severe" that it created a "hostile work environ-
ment"; and (3) therefore the defendants engaged in illegal conduct. The
judge then hears the supervisor and employer argue that the plaintiff has
not established the legal requirements for racial harassment. Instead, they
argue that (1) if there was harassment, it was not because of his race but
is attributable to a non-race-related reason; (2) even if there was racial
harassment, it was not "severe or pervasive" enough to create a "hostile
work environment"; and (3) therefore their actions were not illegal.
36. See Pat K. Chew, Judges' Gender and Employment Discrimination Cases: Emerging
Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 359, 366 (2011).
37. Id. at 366; see also SALLY J. KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE
JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER 28 (2013) (reviewing research).
38. See Chew, supra note 36, at 366.
39. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1761 (2005).
40. Id. at 1769.
41. Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of
Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390-92 (2010).
42. Id. at 390.
43. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (clarifying the elements of a
hostile environment claim); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)
(indicating the harassment must be because of the protected status).
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The law again refers judges to the "reasonable person" in her or his
filtering and interpreting process.44 Yet if we attach a race to the reason-
able person, different conclusions result about whether racial discrimina-
tion has occurred.45 Thus, a reasonable African-American and a reasona-
ble white American may well have different reasonableness perceptions.
And again, consistent with the realism model, empirical research es-
tablishes that judges' race makes a difference in legal conclusions in
racial harassment cases.46 In two studies of federal district court cases,
Kelley and I found that judges of different races had distinct decision-
making patterns: African American judges held for plaintiffs 46% of the
time, Hispanic judges 19% of the time, and white judges 21% of the
time.47
Contrary to what a "monolithic minority judge" model would sug-
gest, African-American judges and Hispanic judges had significantly
different decision-making patterns, with African-American judges much
more likely to hold for plaintiffs than Hispanic judges (or judges of any
other racial group).48 In fact, when Hispanic judges are studied inde-
pendently of other minority judges, their decision-making pattern is more
similar to that of white judges.49 Furthermore, judges of every race, in-
cluding white judges, end up being more pro-plaintiff when the plaintiff
is of the same race.50 This finding suggests that judges of all races identi-
fy more readily with plaintiffs of the same racial background.
Thus, the empirical research indicates that there are cases where
judges' gender and race make a difference. For judges' gender, it in-
cludes sex discrimination and sexual harassment disputes; for judges'
race, it includes race discrimination and racial harassment disputes. An
explanation for these results, consistent with the realism model and sali-
ence theory, is that individuals of different genders and of different races
have different life experiences and these varied backgrounds affect how
they determine if sex discrimination or race discrimination has occurred.
44. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite
Corp., 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 260, 265 (D. Md. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 759 F.2d
355 (4th Cir. 1985).
45. See, e.g., K.A. DIXON ET AL., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: How AMERICANS VIEW
DISCRIMINATION AND RACE ON THE JOB 1 (2002), available at
http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/iles/content/A Workplace Divided.pdf (indicating
that white workers are far more likely than minority workers to believe that everyone is treated fairly
at work).
46. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical
Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2009) [hereinafter Chew &
Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge]; Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, The Realism of Race in
Judicial Decision Making: An Empirical Analysis of Plaintiffs' Race and Judges' Race, 28 HARV. J.
ON RACIAL& ETHNIC JUST. 91,91 (2012) [hereinafter Chew & Kelley, The Realism of Race].
47. Chew & Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge, supra note 46, at 1143; see also Chew &
Kelley, The Realism of Race, supra note 46, at 103-07.
48. Chew & Kelley, The Realism of Race, supra note 46, at 104.
49. Id. at 100.
50. Id. at 110.
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Note, however, that the judges' sex and race does not appear to
make a difference in all cases. For example, Kelley and I found that fe-
male and male judges did not have distinct decision-making patterns in
racial harassment cases.5' Boyd and her colleagues found no gender-
52related differences in twelve subject areas.
II. QUESTIONING THE FEAR OF BIAS
Recalling the conservative critique of the wise Latina quote, it ap-
pears that the first part of the critique is correct: that is, that Justice So-
tomayor and other judges' gender and racial backgrounds affect heir
decision making. As described in Part I of this Essay, the realism model
of judicial-decision-making, salience theory, and empirical research on
judges' gender and race all support that conclusion.
But now I want to shift gears and focus on the second part of the
conservative critique's logic, that is, the fear that Justice Sotomayor's
gender and racial background will lead to judicial bias, prejudice, and
unfair results. I think this second part of the conservative critique is prob-
lematic. If indeed bias exists in the judiciary, why would we be more
suspicious of a Latina judge than any other judge? Why not the male
judge? Why not the white judge? Indeed, why should we presumptively
accuse any of these judges of bias because of their gender or race?
Would this not be a form of gender or racial profiling? I know of no em-
pirical evidence that judges of a particular gender or race are more likely
than any other gender or race to ignore legal principles and instead sub-
stitute their own political or personal preferences.53
Let's try a "thought experiment." Judges have all kinds of back-
grounds and experiences. Here are some miscellaneous details from the
biographies of current and former judges:
Judge l's background: Father was a plant manager with Bethlehem
Steel; has adopted children; has had recurring seizures.
54
Judge 2's background: Has diabetes; former partner in a commercial
litigation law firm in Manhattan specializing in litigation against al-
leged counterfeiters of Fendi goods.55
51. Chew & Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge, supra note 46, at 1143 (showing that
plaintiffs are successful 26% of the time before female judges and 21% of the time before male
judges).
52. Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 41, at 390.
53. Unfortunately, there are judicial abuses of professional duties. We can all recall, for
instance, cases of judicial corruption, but the perpetrators are not disproportionately white or minori-
ty, male or female. As noted earlier, judges as a group are subject to cognitive biases, but again,
there is no evidence that these biases are more prevalent in one gender or race than in others. See
supra text accompanying note 16.
54. Todd S. Purdum, Jodi Wilgoren & Pam Belluck, Court Nominee's Life Is Rooted in Faith
and Respect for Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2005, at Al; Michael D. Shear, Chief Justice Suffers
Seizure Roberts Is Fine, Spokeswoman Says, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at AO1.
55. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Trailblazer and a Dreamer, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at Al.
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Judge 3's background: Served in naval intelligence as a code breaker;
started his own law firm specializing in antitrust law.
56
Judge 4's background: Grew up on a cattle ranch in Arizona; pre-
college education in a private all-girls school in El Paso, Texas;
spouse suffered from Alzheimer's for many years.57
My question to you: Will these judges' experiences affect their de-
cisions in cases where those experiences are relevant? For examples,
might Judges 1 and 2 draw from their own health care experiences when
analyzing a health care case? Or would Judge 3's experience in naval
intelligence affect his thinking in a case dealing with national security?
Or in a case dealing with property rights, might Judge 4 draw on her
background growing up in a ranching family?
Will these judges' backgrounds affect their decisions in cases where
their experiences are salient? Of course. So Judges 1 and 2, Justices Rob-
erts and Sotomayor respectively, would likely draw from their health
care experiences when analyzing a health care case. And Judge 3, former
Justice Stevens's experience in naval intelligence would inform his
thinking in a case dealing with national security. And Judge 4, former
Justice O'Connor, also might draw from her ranching experience in a
dispute over property rights. Thus, consistent with the first part of the
conservative critique, a judge's background may well play a role in her
or his decision making.
But here is a second question: Did these background details prompt
you to question the judges' commitment o following the law? Did you
fear that Justice Roberts or Justice Sotomayor, in deciding a case dealing
with health care laws, would act on their personal or political preferences
rather than adhere to established legal rules and precedents? Did you fear
that that Justice O'Connor would be biased in a case dealing with a
ranching-related dispute; or that Justice Stevens would be biased when
analyzing a case dealing with naval intelligence?
My guess is that you did not have those fears. As you considered
their backgrounds and their qualifications to be judges, I am guessing
that you viewed this information about their backgrounds neutrally. Or
perhaps you even associated their backgrounds and their judicial decision
making positively. Your reasoning would be that their backgrounds
might provide useful insights and particular attentiveness to cases where
their knowledge of the health care system, ranching, or military intelli-
56. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, Justice John Paul Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, at
650.
57. Sandra Day O'Connor, THE OYEZ PROJECT,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/sandra day_oconnor (last visited Mar. 7, 2014); Adam Bernstein, John
J. O'Connor Il, 79; Husband of Supreme Court Justice, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/1 1  I/AR2009111119571 .html.
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gence would be salient. While their perceptions may vary from individu-
als without these particular experiences, you might plausibly assume that
their varied perceptions could enhance rather than corrupt the judicial
process; that they would be able to offer insights about the facts and legal
principles that others would be unable to offer, drawing from their back-
ground for more nuanced, better-informed, and fairer judicial decisions.
So if our reaction to this broad array of backgrounds is neutral, or
even positive, why not also think positively about individuals' gender
and racial backgrounds and perspectives? Why not similarly anticipate
that individuals of varied gender and racial backgrounds would offer
insights about the facts and legal principles in cases where their back-
ground is salient; that they can draw from their experiences so that there
are more nuanced, better-informed, fairer judicial decisions.
Based on my own experience in interactions with hundreds of judg-
es,58 1 think judges themselves illustrate a contrary impulse-an impulse
to view the worldviews of judges of other races as somehow biased or
faulty.
When presented with our empirical findings that judges of different
races have different decision-making patterns, judges sometimes have
both speculative and defensive reactions.
For example, some judges, who are often but not always white, are
on the defense. They argue that minority judges' legal conclusions must
be incorrect, while white judges' legal conclusions are correct.59 Their
implicit assumption is that white judges in racial harassment cases set the
standard; it is their interpretation of the law that should be the norm.
They presume that minority judges favor minority plaintiffs in unfair
ways or that minority judges' legal analysis is otherwise lacking. Perhaps
they are thinking that minority judges are affirmative action law students
who are presumptively not as skilled or intelligent as non-minority stu-
dents. Thus, that same inferior skill and intelligence makes them less
skilled and intelligent as judges.
A second group of judges, who are often but not always minority,
are also defensive. They argue that it is the white judges who are incor-
58. Among other events, I led workshops and was a featured speaker at the following: (1)
National Workshops for Federal Magistrate Judges, Federal Judiciary Center, Denver and Miami
(2012); (2) Annual Meeting of the National Consortium on Racial and Ethnic Fairness in the Court
(May 2009); (3) ABA Midyear Presentation, Judicial Division and over twenty other sponsors
(2010). Also, I received dozens of comments from judges and others on articles describing my
research. E.g., Mike Green, Report: Race Matters in Judicial Decision-Making, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 13, 2010, 5:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-green/report-race-matters-in-
jub 461526.html; Edward A. Adams, Race & Gender of Judges Make Enormous Differences in
Rulings, Studies Find, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 6, 2010, 19:20 CDT),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/race gender ofjudges make enormous differences in ru
lings studies find aba/.
59. This is based on my experiences, described supra note 58.
[Vol. 91:4
ANTICIPATING THE WISE LATINA JUDGE
rect and the minority judges that are correct. They presume that white
judges are biased, perhaps unconsciously, against minority plaintiffs.
They assume that even in a post-Obama world, whites are still naive
about how discrimination occurs and how pervasive and impactful stere-
otyping continues to be. They believe that white judges, for instance, do
not see the subtle bias that pervades the workplace, and thus are less like-
ly to call harassment racially based or sufficiently serious to result in a
hostile workplace. Meanwhile, from their vantage point, minority judges
see and experience ongoing subtle bias and, therefore, find minority
plaintiffs' claims of it persuasive.
III. MOVING FORWARD
The challenge is how do we move forward from the conservative
critique and defensive positions that are not constructive? How do we
take advantage of the varied perspectives of all judges, of all genders, of
all races?
How do we move from Senator Sessions's fear that Justice So-
tomayor's Latina background will result in judicial bias, prejudice, and
unfair results to an alternative attitude? This alternative mindset is antici-
pation that her Latina background (and all the other details of her and
other judges' background) will result in judicial insight, more nuanced
understanding of facts and law, and therefore fairer results.
A. Deep Analysis
Drawing from anthropologists Avruch and Black's work on inter-
cultural conflicts, an approach they call "thick" 60 and I call "deep analy-
sis," appears particularly apt-at least as a starting point.
1. Acknowledge Opaqueness
"Acknowledging opaqueness" is the first of two steps in the deep
analysis process. Judges and others can begin by recognizing that there is
a range of legitimate perspectives distinct from their own. These alterna-
tive perspectives may not be immediately understandable or familiar.
Avruch and Black would describe these as "opaque" perspectives be-
cause, on their face, they do not seem comprehensible or correct.61 In
contrast, one's own perspective and those of individuals who share your
perspective are "transparent"; that is, they are readily understandable,
naturally sensible, and familiar to you. This transparency is particularly
reinforced if your perspective is also the norm.
60. See Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, Conflict Resolution in Intercultural Settings: Prob-
lems and Prospects, in THE CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER 7, 10 (Pat K. Chew ed., 2001) (inter-
nal quotation mark omitted).
61. Id. at9.
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Thus, for example, if you are a male judge who shares the reasona-
ble man's view of what constitutes sexual harassment, then you will nat-
urally interpret the facts in a sexual harassment claim in a way that is
sensible and familiar to you. In contrast, the view of a female judge who
shares the reasonable woman's view of sexual harassment will not make
much sense to you. It will be an unfamiliar and less comprehensible in-
terpretation of the facts; it will be opaque to you. As a male judge, your
own interpretation will be transparent and because it is also the norm, it
will be easy to be confident that your view is correct. Avruch and Black,
however, recommend that male judges begin by acknowledging there is
an alternative perspective and that it is opaque to them.62
2. Pause and Empathically Assess
Once one recognizes that there is an alternative perspective, Avruch
and Black suggest our first impulse is to dismiss these alternative views
because they are inconsistent with our worldview.63 Our inclination is to
reconcile differences in our worldview by comparing them to our set of
norms, values, and beliefs. If they do not match up, our tendency is to
dismiss or criticize them. Instead, Avruch and Black suggest you pause
and suspend any judgments.64 As Judge Kozinski suggests in describing
judicial decision making generally: allow yourself to doubt and question
your own impulses.
65
Instead of assuming that others holding alternative views are biased,
consider instead how novel perspectives may hold particularly valuable
insight to the issues at hand. Ask how these alternative worldviews might
expand your thinking and deepen your understanding of what is occur-
ring. In other words, think "deeply" about these alternative perspectives.
Try to understand the underlying assumptions and premises of the alter-
native view and how they might differ from your underlying assump-
tions.
Thus, male judges in sexual harassment cases should resist the im-
pulse to discount an alternative view offered by a "reasonable woman"
judge. Avoid or at least suspend a presumption of her prejudiced bias in
favor of one party in a way that is unfair and unmerited. Instead, they
should query what are the underlying assumptions of the alternative
view. What does the female judge find most salient and why does that
factor seem so relevant to her? If she is inclined toward a different legal
conclusion, empathically try to understand why. What insights can you
gain? That is, how does her perspective help you gain a more accurate
and meaningful understanding of the laws and of the facts? (Of course,
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Kozinski, supra note 15, at 119.
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female judges would do the same exercise when listening to their male
colleagues.)
While the above examples of deep analysis deal with male and fe-
male judges in sexual harassment cases, the same process could be ap-
plied to judges of different races in racial harassment cases. Thus, a
white judge can begin by acknowledging the legitimate alternative per-
spectives of black or Hispanic judges. Rather than immediately assuming
that their perspective is correct, white judges should pause to do a deep
analysis of the minority judge's worldview, empathically understanding
these alternative assumptions and saliences. Instead of framing the alter-
native worldview as bias, consider it as judicial insight. (Again, minority
judges should do the same.)
66
B. Evidence of Deep Analysis
This analysis of gender-related and race-related judicial saliences
may not be as abstract and impractical as one might think at first glance.
In fact, while they do not label the process as deep analysis, there is in-
ferential evidence that judges already engage in some version of this
collaborative and introspective process. In particular, the research on the
effect of mixed-gender and mixed-race judicial panels is telling.
Boyd and her colleagues found in their study of sex discrimination
cases that a male judge on an appellate panel was more likely to rule in
favor of a plaintiff if at least one female judge sat on the appellate pan-
el.67 The difference between all-male versus mixed-gender panels had
measurable consequences for litigants.
[The probability of an all-male panel] supporting the plaintiff in a sex
discrimination dispute never exceeds 0.20-not even for the most
liberal of male judges. But for mixed sex panels the probability never
falls below 0.20 for even the most conservative males. For males at
relatively average levels of ideology, the likelihood of a liberal, pro-
plaintiff vote increases by almost 85 percent when sitting with a fe-
male judge.
68
69Another example is Cox and Miles's study of voting rights cases.
They investigated whether the presence of an African-American judge on
a judicial panel affects the votes of his or her colleagues.70 They found
that it made a significant difference, with white judges more likely to
66. To take it a step further, even though white and Hispanic judges hold for the plaintiff with
similar frequency (21% and 19% respectively), white judges should not assume that Hispanic judges
reached their decision in a similar fashion (and vice versa). See supra note 47 and accompanying
text. Different facts or legal interpretations may have been salient to each group.
67. Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 41, at 406.
68. Chew, supra note 36, at 367.
69. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2008).
70. Id. at 34.
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vote in favor of liability when they sit with an African-American col-
league.71 The researchers theorized that white judges' view of the merits
of the case might change when they deliberate with African-American
colleagues who share their different experiences and information relating
to discriminatory practices.72
Thus, one explanation of these research findings is that when judi-
cial panels are confronted with facts and issues on which women or mi-
norities have particular insight, the panels pause to more deeply analyze
what is occurring. It would appear that male judges listen and are willing
to learn from the alternative perspectives of female judges, while white
judges are willing to learn from the alternative perspectives of black
judges. Moreover, it appears that jurists might decide a case differently
than they would have without this deep analysis of their varied perspec-
tives.
CONCLUSION
Conservative critics interpreted Justice Sotomayor's wise Latina
quote to mean two things: first, that her gender and racial background
would affect her judicial decision making; and second, that her back-
ground would affect her decision making negatively, namely that it
would lead to bias, prejudice, and unfair results. This Essay agrees with
the first part of the conservative critique and discusses it more broadly,
ultimately finding substantial support that judges' gender and racial
backgrounds do indeed affect their decision making in certain cases.
However, this Essay finds the second part of the conservative critique
problematic. It argues that we should anticipate that information about a
judge's gender and racial background should prompt a positive associa-
tion with judicial decision making, rather than a fear of bias and preju-
dice. Finally, the Essay suggests that judges engage in a deep analysis
when they encounter alternative perspectives from judges of other gen-





CHAPTER INTRODUCTION: PAY INEQUALITY, ACCESS TO
WORK, AND DISCRIMINATION
NANTIYA RUANt
At the half-century anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, it is high time to address the pervasive and well-entrenched pay
inequity women face in American workplaces. As the presenters on the
"Pay Inequality, Access to Work, and Discrimination" Panel observed,
progress on the gender wage gap is at a standstill. For full-time, year-
round workers in 2012, the median salary for women was 76.5% of the
median salary for men-nearly identical to the gap reported in 2001.'
Moreover, today's workforce is filled with part-time female workers who
are at the mercy of their supervisors for their pay (e.g., the number and
scheduling of hours they work). The number of part-time workers has
steadily increased over the last decade, with the total number of part-time
workers exceeding twenty-seven million.2 Two-thirds of part-time work-
ers are women, and as the Congressional Joint Economic Committee has
recognized, the gender pay gap is partly driven by the earning penalty for
part-time work, which pays less per hour than the same or equivalent
work done by full-timers.3 Most commentators agree that if the overall
rate of change from 1964 to today remains the same going forward,
women in today's labor market will never experience gender wage parity
during their working lives.
4
Professor Martha Chamallas set the backdrop for our discussion on
America's persistent wage inequality by reminding us of the revisionist
history of Title VII. Professor Chamallas is best known for her work on
the intersection of anti-discrimination and tort law, but her 1986 article
on pay inequality based on the predominance of women in part-time
work was groundbreaking in this field of study. In her talk titled "Vicari-
ous Liability under Title VII: A Vanishing Act," Professor Chamallas
t Lawyering Process Professor and Director, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
1. See Ben Penn, Gender Pay Gap Won't Close Until 2058, IWPF Projects, as Democrats
Push for Law, 181 DAILY LAB. REP. A-12 (2013) ("While women have made tremendous strides in
their earnings relative to men since 1960, none of that progress has taken place since 2000 .... ").
2. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release Table A-8:
Employed persons by class of worker and part-time status, (July 03, 2014),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t08.htm.
3. See Staff of Joint Econ. Comm., 111 th Cong., The Earnings Penalty for Part-Time Work:
An Obstacle to Equal Pay 1-2 (2010), available at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File-id=74203874-3821-44e4-b369-
4efbe 14d8745.
4. See Penn, supra note 1; see also Jillian Berman, Gender Pay Gap Likely Won't Go Away
Until After You Retire: Study, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 23, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/23/gender-pay-gap-close_n_3975638.html.
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reminded us that who is held responsible for workplace harms is a vital
inquiry to address the inequalities faced by working women. As yet an-
other example of inappropriate incorporation of tort doctrines into anti-
discrimination protections, agency principles that limit the reach of re-
sponsible parties impair anti-discrimination efforts by shielding account-
able parties, including co-workers. Professor Chamallas left the audience
with a glimpse into a future where we revive a modem day Civil Rights
Restoration Act to address the courts' continued dismantling of Title VII
protections.
Professor Melissa Hart focused attention on one particular case of
wage inequality in the legal academy's own backyard as a vehicle to
analyze key issues surrounding the gender pay gap. In her talk titled
"Missing the Forest for the Trees: Gender Pay Discrimination in Aca-
demia," Professor Hart told the story of University of Denver Professor
Lucy Marsh's wage-discrimination litigation against her law-school em-
ployer to address gender disparities amongst tenured male and female
professors, as well as to get access to pay data (a hidden trove of evi-
dence in private institutions). By looking closely at the narrative sur-
rounding Professor Marsh's lawsuit, Professor Hart unpacks the system
justification relied upon by employers for individual difference in pay.
As seen in other areas of discrimination law, the gender pay-gap debate
ignores structural causes, such as biased evaluation systems and unfair
gender stereotyping, because "the pull of individual explanations is
overwhelmingly strong." Professor Hart concludes that to meet Title VII
mandates and adequately address the persistent gender pay gap, employ-
ers must resist resorting to individual explanations for each pay decision
and instead, look closely at the structural differences that undergird such
decisions.
This proved a perfect segue to Professor Gowri Ramachandran's
presentation on "Pay Transparency," which squarely addressed how to
achieve procedural and substantive justice for women caught in the pay
gap. As the Lilly Ledbetter case proved, women too often have to rely
upon happenstance and luck in discovering that they are paid unfairly in
relation to their male counterparts. Forcing employers to reveal salaries
publically would uncover the oft-hidden disparities. Professor Rama-
chandran convincingly showed us that the defenses to such pay transpar-
ency are nothing but a straw man set up by resistant employers. By ad-
dressing such myths as women's weaker negotiation skills and the need
to preserve the status quo, Professor Ramachandran concludes that pay
transparency can pave the way to closing the pay gap that continues to
allude us.
Addressing business concerns in order to most effectively close the
pay gap was also at the center of Professor Nancy Reichman's talk on
"Equal Pay for Equal Work: Some Observations and Worries." As the
Chair of Colorado's Pay Equity Commission, as well as an empirical
[Vol. 91:4
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socio-legal scholar, Dr. Reichman relied upon her experience negotiating
treacherous political waters to share insights into how to best collaborate
with employers to reach compromise on critical issues for low-wage
working women. As employers prioritize containing labor costs over
cultivating employees, many workers in low-wage jobs are forced to
adapt to non-standard, often chaotic scheduling made possible because of
advances in scheduling technologies. Dr. Reichman convincingly argued
that it is time to change the way we think about pay equity. Workplace
fairness between women and men should no longer be framed merely by
total disparities in pay, but also by disparities in hours given to women
seeking as much work as their male counterparts. Doing so recognizes
the realities of many female workers in today's workplace and addresses
the shortfalls thus far absent from the civil rights conversation about pay
equity. Dr. Reichman made the business case for gender pay equity by
addressing how deterrence and iversity improve the bottom line.
Provocative and compelling, our final presenter was Professor
Michelle Travis, who challenged the causal narratives that sustain our
gender compensation divide in her talk, "Disabling the Gender Pay Gap:
Lessons from the Social Model of Disability." Many social commenta-
tors encourage women to "lean in" and take responsibility for their se-
cond-class employment status by exhaustively working to "fix" them-
selves and their situations. Professor Travis explains that the resilience of
the gender pay gap has been fueled in part by simplified and strategic
causal narratives (such as "women don't ask") that move responsibility
away from the employers that have built and sustained gender pay ine-
quality as a standard feature of the American workplace. To combat this,
we should take cues from the disability rights movement-a movement
that effectively provided a new causal narrative that shifted both the pub-
lic's attention and the law's focus from a medical model of difference to
the role of employer practices and structures in producing inequality for
individuals with impairments, which are not themselves inherently limit-
ing. By changing the narrative to center on the shortcomings of employ-
ers' structured employment practices, instead of inadequacies of women
in these structures, Professor Travis argues effectively that the equal pay
movement can make better strides towards parity in pay.
Those in attendance to these excellent presentations agreed that our
five panelists provided a thorough and thought-provoking framework by
which to re-conceptualize pay equity in today's varied workplaces. This
civil rights anniversary should have been celebrated by congratulating
ourselves on achieving gender pay parity. Instead, we must galvanize for
the next fifty years to ensure that pay equality is a reality for the next
generation of female workers.





Women in virtually every job category still make less than men.
Academia is no exception. This Article will explore some of the structur-
al explanations for this continued disparity and the continued resistance
to seriously confronting those structural barriers to equality. Using the
still-unfolding story of a charge of discrimination filed against a universi-
ty, this Article examines the script that has become all-too-familiar in
discussions about the gender pay gap, whether in academia or elsewhere.
The basic storyline in pay discrimination litigation is this: Evidence is
presented about he existence of a gap between men's earnings and
women's earnings. The response is that the numbers cannot be looked at
as a group because there are individual explanations for each pay deci-
sion. With this move, the focus of attention is shifted from an evaluation
of the troubling structural picture to an evaluation of an individual em-
ployee. Until we are willing to resist that shift, it will be nearly impossi-
ble to address the root causes of continued pay inequity.
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INTRODUCTION
Any gap in the pay of men and women, whether forty or ten or one
percent, is an implicit statement to our children that we value the
work of our daughters less than that of our sons.
-Dreves v. Hudson Group Retail, L.L. C.
Although it has been illegal to discriminate on the basis of sex in
setting pay for more than fifty years now, women in academia-like
women in virtually every job category-still make less than their male
counterparts. Discussions about why that pay gap persists tend to break
down into uncomfortable disagreements about whether it can best be
explained by lower performing or less ambitious women or by sexist
supervisors. In fact, the reasons for pay disparities rarely fit within either
narrative. Instead, continued pay inequity in academia is more plausibly
explained as a function of the structure of academic jobs and the highly
subjective ways that the academy has come to define merit. As in other
areas of discrimination, however, it is hard to keep the focus of the gen-
der pay gap debate on its structural causes. The pull of individual expla-
nation is overwhelming strong.
The pull of individual explanation is also, perhaps not surprisingly,
a central element of litigation over pay disparities, even when the claim
reveals structural disparities that seem to reach well beyond any individ-
ual employee's rate of pay. This Article will use the still-unfolding story
of a charge of discrimination filed against a university to examine the
script that has become all-too-familiar in discussions about the gender
pay gap, whether in academia or elsewhere. Here is the basic storyline:
Evidence is presented about the existence of a gap between men's earn-
ings and women's earnings. The response is that the numbers cannot be
looked at as a group because there are individual explanations for each
pay decision. What this script does is to shift the focus of attention
adroitly from an evaluation of the troubling structural picture to an eval-
uation of an individual employee-usually to the woman who has raised
concerns about the structural problem.
This Article will first tell the story of Professor Lucy Marsh's
charge of discrimination, filed against the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law in July 2013. It will then examine the ways in which the
circumstances that create pay disparity in academia are in fact structur-
al-even when they are described as individual. Finally, the Essay will
consider why the move from the systemic to the individual in the pay
discrimination narrative is so persistent-why do we continue to miss the
forest for the trees?
1. No. 2:iI-CV-4, 2013 WL 2634429, at *13 (D. Vt. June 12, 2013).
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I. PROFESSOR LUCY MARSH'S LAWSUIT
In July 2013, Professor Lucy Marsh, a forty-year veteran of the
University of Denver Sturm College of Law (DU Law), filed a charge of
employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).2 The charge alleges violations of both Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act (EPA), stemming
from the fact that Professor Marsh's salary is lower than those of her
male colleagues.3 In addition to challenging her own salary as discrimi-
natory, the charge filed by Professor Marsh observes that the gender pay
disparity at DU Law is systemic, stating that "female professors at the
Law School were discriminated against with respect o compensation
because of their gender, and were paid less than men performing substan-
tially equal work under similar conditions in the same establishment."
4
Professor Marsh's charge followed the circulation of a memo to the
DU Law faculty in December 2012 in which Dean Martin Katz ex-
plained a set of competitive merit raises he had recently awarded to top-
performing faculty members as a result of a university-wide initiative.5
After explaining the raises he did give, the dean went on to explain that
the funds for this round of raises were allocated "without regard to trying
to correct potential inequities."6 He did, however, look at the school's
salary structure "to see if there appeared to be any significant gender
disparities," and he found, among other things, that:
The median salary for female Full Professors was $7,532/year less
than that for males before this round of raises and $11,282/year less
than that for males after this round of raises. The mean salary for fe-
male Full Professors was $14,870/year less than that for males before
this round of raises and $15,859/year less than that for males after
this round of raises.
7
It was these numbers that prompted Professor Marsh to file her charge
with the EEOC.
Professor Marsh's discrimination claim garnered national attention
in part because it coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the enactment
of the EPA and the continued prevalence of gender pay disparity had
been a recently announced focus of concern for the EEOC.8 Among aca-
2. Colleen O'Connor, DU Professor Files Gender-Based Wage-Bias Case Against Law
School, DENV. POST, July 10, 2013, at 6A.
3. Id.
4. PROFESSOR LUCY MARSH: ATTACHMENT TO EEOC INTAKE QUESTIONNAIRE, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/1 52792415/EEOC-addendum.
5. Memorandum from Martin Katz, Dean, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, to the Facul-
ty of Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law: Faculty Salary Competitiveness Initiative (Dec. 13,
2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/l 52790023/DU-Faculty-Competitiveness.
6. Id. at3.
7. Id. at 3-4.
8. O'Connor, supra note 2.
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demics, her claim received attention as well because it told a familiar
story; the gender wage gap in academia is not unique to DU Law School.
A 2006 study of salaries by the American Association of University Pro-
fessors found that the average salary for female full professors was 88%
of male faculty members at the same rank.9 The wage gap across the
academic spectrum remains at about 81%, in large part because the ranks
of tenure-track and full professors are still dominated by men, while
women make up the majority of the lower status, untenured teaching
positions at universities.1°
Professor Marsh's case is also remarkably similar to other instances
of gender wage disparity in the way that her employer responded to evi-
dence of a gender wage gap. In his December 2012 memo to the faculty,
after reporting the median salary difference among full professors of over
$11,000 and mean salary difference of almost $16,000, Dean Katz as-
serted that "there is only so much that one can glean from looking at the-
se figures."'" These numbers have less meaning, according to the memo,
because:
there are at least three significant determinants of individual salary
differences: (1) differential starting salaries (accounting for teaching
and legal experience), as well as any special circumstances or deals
that may have affected that number, (2) differential merit raises, often
over many years, and (3) other circumstances in individual salary his-
tories, such as offers from other schools or lasting salary effects from
holding administrative positions. Accordingly, to determine whether
a salary gap reflects inequity requires an individualized analysis. 12
While the dean invited individual faculty members to talk with him if
they had concerns about the numbers his memo had revealed, he closed
by noting that "unless I have strong evidence to the contrary, I will need
to assume that all of my predecessors' merit raises were accurate reflec-
tions of performance." 13
Dean Katz's explanation does two things that are particularly nota-
ble. First, his response to the numbers he has just revealed shifts the fo-
cus of attention. The question that he asks us to focus on is not, Why is
the average salary among female professors at DU Law School nearly
$16,000 lower than that among their male colleagues? Instead, it is
whether Lucy Marsh-or any other female faculty member-is good
enough to be earning more. The consequences of that shift cannot be
9. MARTHA S. WEST & JOHN W. CURTIS, AAUP FACULTY GENDER EQUITY INDICATORS
2006, at 11 (2006), available at hup://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/63396944-44BE-4ABA-9815-
5792D93856F I/0/AAUPGenderEquitylndicators2006.pdf.
10. John W. Curtis, Faculty Salary Equity: Still a Gender Gap?, ON CAMPUS WITH WOMEN
(2010), http://www.aacu.org/ocww/volume39_ 1/feature.cfm?section=2.
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overstated. In addition to refocusing from the structural to the individual,
the dean's memo makes a starting assumption-that all past merit raises
accurately reflected performance-that itself rests on a necessary addi-
tional assumption that the gender pay disparity reflects a corresponding
gender performance disparity. Women have been paid less because they
have performed less well. Neither of these aspects of the memo is
unique. But the fact that this is how conversations about salary disparities
in academia tend to go does not mean that they should.
II. THE STRUCTURES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO GENDER PAY DISPARITY IN
ACADEMIC WORK
Much of the explanation for gender pay inequity in academia today
is structural, embedded within the assumptions that have come to define
merit and status in the academic job market. The mix of scholarship,
teaching, and service that generally defines the academic job privileges
scholarship significantly over the other facets of the job, but women are
more regularly pressed into additional teaching and service obligations.
Even within the broad categories of teaching, service, and scholarship,
women's work is systematically undervalued. While similar patterns of
gender stereotyping, segregation, and second tiering occur throughout the
academy, this discussion will focus specifically on women in legal aca-
demia. In doing so, it will draw from the work of other scholars who
have examined how law faculties reproduce gender stereotypes by focus-
ing "on those invisible law school structures and practices that have a
disparate effect on women faculty members."'4
Gender inequity in law school faculties, as in other parts of the
academy, begins with segregation and stratification. There are signifi-
cantly fewer women than men on the tenure track and it remains the case
that women are generally steered into lower status, lower security posi-
tions at law schools.15 The most recent data from the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools (AALS) show very slow increases in the number of
women faculty members in the most prestigious roles in law schools. In
the thirteen years between academic year 1995-1996 and academic year
2008-2009, the percentage of women full professors increased from
18.1% to just 29.9%. 6 During that same time period, the percentage of
14. Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law School Faculties, 2009 BYU L. REV. 99,
105.
15. Id. at 10 1-04; see also Marina Angel, Women Lawyers of All Colors Steered to Contin-
gent Positions in Law Schools and Law Firms, 26 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 169, 175-76 (2006);
Richard K. Neumann Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC.
313, 314 (2000) (finding that "everywhere in legal education the line between the conventional
tenure track and the lesser forms of faculty employment has become a line of gender segregation").
16. see THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., AALS STATISTICAL REPORT ON LAW FACULTY (2000-
09), available at http://www.aals.org/resources_statistical.php (compare the data in Table 2A of the
2001-02 Report with the data in the Titles section of the 2008-09 Report); Paula A. Monopoli,
Gender and the Crisis in Legal Education: Remaking the Academy in Our Image, 2012 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1745, 1747.
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women law school deans went from 8.4% to 20.6%.'1 By contrast, in
2008-2009 the percentage of lecturers and instructors who were women
was 60.2 and 66.4% respectively, a drop of less than 10% in either cate-
gory from the 1995-1996 academic year.'8 Looking at the tenure track
itself, while the percentage of assistant professors who are women has
been nearly 50% (and higher in many years) since 1993, the percentage
of full professors who are women has yet to exceed 30%.19 Women who
start on the law school academic ladder don't stay on it or move up it at
the same rate that men do. This segregation and stratification is an im-
portant piece of the inequity puzzle, particularly in the ways that it rein-
forces stereotypes about gender and status.
Job segregation does not, however, explain the gender pay gap with-
in the rank of full professor at DU Law (and, no doubt, at other law
schools). This is an important point because job segregation is so often
identified as explaining wage disparity and as being a function of indi-
vidual men's and women's choices. Even putting to the side the ques-
tions about how freely these choices are made, choice cannot explain the
persistence of pay disparity. "Too often, both women and men dismiss
the pay gap as simply a matter of different choices, but even women who
make the same occupational choices that men make will not typically
end up with the same earnings.,,20 The explanations for wage disparities
between men and women within the same job category must be some-
thing other than job segregation.
At law schools accredited by the AALS, faculty members are sup-
posed to be evaluated based on scholarship, teaching, and service.21 At
most schools, the stated formula for evaluation is 40% scholarship, 40%
teaching, and 20% service. Conventional wisdom is that this formula
understates the importance of scholarship and overstates the importance
of both teaching and service to actual annual evaluations. Whatever the
actual formula might be, an overarching concern about evaluation in the
legal academy is that the job of law professor has come to be defined in
ways that demand more than full-time commitment and availability. In
this way, law schools-like law firms-are what organizational theorists
17. THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., supra note 16. In 2011, only 20.6% of law school deans
were women. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN
THE LAW 2011, at 3 (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/201 I/cwpcurrentglance statistics_20
I .authcheckdam.pdf.
18. THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., supra note 16. In 1995-1996, AALS categorized lecturers
and instructors as a single group, rather than dividing them into two distinct groups. During that
academic year, 70.8% of lecturers and instructors were female. Id.
19. Id. Note that this finding is based on the most recent data in the 2008-09 Report.
20. JUDY GOLDBERG DEY & CATHERINE HILL, AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC, FOUND.,
BEHIND THE PAY GAP 2-3 (2007), available at http://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Behind-the-Pay-
Gap.pdf.
21. THE ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., BYLAWS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW
SCHOOLS, INC. §§ 6-4, 6-6 (2008), available at http://www.aals.org/about handbook bylaws.php.
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,,22doraiainioedescribe as "gendered organizations. A gendered organization is one
"defined, conceptualized, and structured in ways that puts a premium on
masculine characteristics, including a willingness to work 'on demand,'
free from domestic responsibilities.23 When the demands of the organi-
zation put a premium on absolute availability, structural bias flowing
from these demands may call into question nominally neutral concep-
tions of merit. 24
While scholarly excellence sounds like a gender-neutral evaluation
criterion, there is much in the definition of scholarly excellence that fos-
ters or permits inequity. Several scholars have argued that the focus on
scholarship as the near exclusive measure of merit on law school facul-
ties has a disparate negative impact on women. In part, this may be
because the "trial period" of the scholarly track to tenure disadvantages
women because of its timing; most law professors are developing toward
tenure between twenty-seven and thirty-seven years old.26 This is also the
time in life when most women who are going to have families start those
families. The demands of scholarly productivity and the demands of
young children are at best inconsistent. As Paula Monopoli has recently
observed, these demands become even more unrealistic when scholarly
productivity is expected to be simultaneous with a regular schedule of
teaching and service.2 7
Moreover, excellence in scholarship is an extremely subjective
standard. Law schools often turn to publication venue as a proxy for ex-
cellence because of the difficulties with evaluating excellence in any
28other way. But the assumption that placement reflects merit is suspect
in a field where the vast majority of law reviews are run by and articles
selected by students with one or two years of legal studies. A 2010 study
of the authors published in the top law journals found "significant gender
disparity in publication" in these top journals.29 Scholarly excellence is
also defined, or significantly shaped, by the author's reputation in the
field.30 And reputation in the field, in turn, is shaped not only by the mer-
it of any individual piece of scholarship, but also by participation in con-
22. See Joyce S. Sterling & Nancy Reichman, Navigating the Gap: Reflections on 20 Years
Researching Gender Disparities in the Legal Profession, 8 FIU L. REV. 515, 519 (2013).
23. Id.
24. Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4 GENDER
& SOC'Y 139, 148-50 (1990).
25. See, e.g., Monopoli, supra note 16, at 1759-60.
26. McGinley, supra note 14, at 120-21.
27. Monopoli, supra note 16, at 1760.
28. Cf Deborah Jones Merritt, Research and Teaching on Law Faculties: An Empirical Ex-
ploration, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 765, 771 (1998) (using publication in a "top-twenty" journal as a
measure of the quality of an article).
29. Minna J. Kotkin, Of Authorship and Audacity: An Empirical Study of Gender Disparity
and Privilege in the "Top Ten" Law Reviews, 31 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 385, 386 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Christine Hurt & Tung Yin, Blogging While Untenured and Other Extreme
Sports, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1235, 1248 (2006) ("The goal of a junior professor who wishes to
advance in academia is to be recognized nationally as a capable scholar.")
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ferences and other forms of national outreach. The marketing time re-
quired to develop the "national reputation" that many schools now define
as the touchstone of scholarly excellence is significant. The explosion of
the blogosphere has only exacerbated these phenomena. Being visible on
the Internet has become an important part of developing a national repu-
tation but the time-consuming and time-sensitive nature of maintaining a
blog is hard to square with an effort to balance work and family com-
mitments.31 Unfortunately, the premium placed on being invited to, and
accepting invitations to, conferences around the country adds to the sub-
jectivity of the excellence measure, as conference organizers will tend to
invite the people they know and feel comfortable with. The extensive
scholarship on the risks of bias in systems built on subjective evaluation
has tended to focus more on evaluation internal to an organization,12 but
the same phenomena are at play with evaluations made across institu-
tions.
A willingness to be considered for lateral moves is also a significant
contributor to national reputation-and the existence of a lateral offer (or
even the possibility that one might be in the offing) is a common expla-
nation for salary differentials.33 But willingness to relocate continues to
be a gendered attribute, as women continue to be more constrained by
their partners' careers and their family obligations.34 In the absence of
significant social change, using this factor as either a measure of excel-
lence or as an independent salary variable will consistently and predicta-
bly disadvantage women.
Turning from scholarship to the less valued but still-required areas
of teaching and service, the evidence that bias infects evaluation and
work allocation in these areas is abundant. In terms of allocation of re-
sponsibilities, a number of studies have found that women in academia
spend more time on teaching and on service than their male counter-
31. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Tales of a Law Professor Lateral Nothing, 39 U. Mem. L. Rev.
125, 130-32 (2008) (discussing the importance of blogging to developing a national reputation and
getting noticed in the lateral hiring market).
32. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1051 (1991); Tristin K.
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treat-
ment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 151-152 (2003); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Con-
tent of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Op-
portunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164-65 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Lloyd Cohen, Comments on the Legal Education Cartel, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 25, 36 (2008) (discussing the need to increase a faculty member's salary in the face of com-
peting offers).
34. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, What the Internet Age Means for Female Scholars, 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 46, 47 (2006) ("Start with a relatively uncontroversial premise. In American society,
women-including women employed full-time outside the home-still do far more 'care-taking'
than men. They do more housework, cook more meals, and spend more time caring for children.
Some men, of course, do more of these tasks than many women-but the average man does not.
Many professional men with children have wives who don't work outside the home, at least if there
are young children in the picture; meanwhile, very few working women, mothers or otherwise, have
husbands who don't work outside the home.").
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parts.35 And within each area, women often have to work harder than
men to be viewed as equally good. For example, studies have found that
women faculty members have to prove their competence in the class-
room more than men do.3 6 Other studies have demonstrated that female
faculty are segregated in lower-status course offerings.37 Women profes-
sors also often find themselves with busier office hours and more student
questions than their male counterparts.38
In the area of service work, female faculty again tend to get the
short end of the stick. As Nancy Levit has aptly described it, much of the
work that women are asked to do on law school faculties is the "house-
39work" of the institution. Women are more often asked to chair or serve
on the lower status committees that address student life and experiences
rather than on the more powerful committees such as appointments or
tenure and promotion.40 Even more disturbing is the possibility, suggest-
ed by Ann McGinley, that as women take on the more prestigious
roles- associate deanships or chairs of the once higher status commit-
tees-"[i]nternal work seems to be less important to the prestige of the
school and, concomitantly, to the career of the faculty member.,41 Ser-
vice work that once was important, and handled by male faculty mem-
bers, has become less important as women have broken into its ranks.42
Now even the once-important service work is left to women, leaving the
men free to focus on their own individual scholarship and the work of
developing the requisite national reputation through participation in con-
ferences and the Internet self-promotion that has become such a central
element of legal academic production.43
An over-arching challenge to all of these measures of evaluation-
scholarship, teaching, and service-is that excellence in each is hard to
35. John W. Curtis, Persistent Inequity: Gender and Academic Employment 5 (Apr. 11, 2011)
(unpublished report), available at http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/08E023AB-E6D8-4DBD-
99A0-24E5EB73A760/0/persistent inequity.pdf.
36. See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, Confronting Expectations: Women in the Legal Acade-
my, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 333, 334 (1996); Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student
Evaluations of Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 235, 265-67 (2008).
37. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Rooms of Their Own: An Empirical Study of Occupa-
tional Segregation by Gender Among Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. REV. 293, 295-96 (2004);
Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About Affirma-
tive Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 258-273 (1997). When women teach in
lower-status areas, their scholarly production is likely also to be in those lower-status fields. This job
segregation may thus contribute to the challenges women face gaining national recognition as schol-
ars as well. Merritt & Reskin, supra, at 267.
38. See, e.g., Susan B. Apel, Gender and Invisible Work: Musings of a Woman Law Profes-
sor, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 993, 999-1000 (1997).
39. Nancy Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its Place: Sex Segregation and the Domestication of
Female Academics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 777 (2001).
40. Id. at 786-87; see also Apel, supra note 38, at 1000-02.
41. McGinley, supra note 14, at 150; see Kristen Monroe et al., Gender Equality in Academ-
ia: Bad News from the Trenches, and Some Possible Solutions, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 215, 219-20
(2008).
42. McGinley, supra note 14, at 150-5 1.
43. Id.; see also Levit supra note 39, at 785-89.
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define without resorting to extremely subjective standards. And yet, the
more informal and subjective an evaluation system is, the more likely it
will be applied unevenly.44 This may be one piece of why, as one district
court recently recognized, "women who have earned professional de-
grees, work longer hours, or hold management positions are subject to•• , 45
some of the largest pay disparities. Academia, like many other fields
requiring professional degrees, has developed evaluation metrics that are
extremely difficult to standardize. An evaluation of whether these met-
rics are being applied correctly or fairly is consequently more difficult.
III. THE SHIFT FROM THE STRUCTURAL TO THE INDIVIDUAL
While these structural attributes of legal academia are very likely to
be major contributors to gender pay disparities, conversations about pay
inequity tend to move-like Dean Katz's memo-quickly to individual
explanations and a focus on what might explain why any individual fe-
male faculty member receives lower pay than her male peers.
A number of factors might explain this instinct to focus on the indi-
vidual, rather than the structural. First, the law that governs pay discrimi-
nation claims pushes to individual explanations. Second, for those inside
the structures of legal academia, it is uncomfortable to consider the im-
plications of structural biases. Solutions for these structural problems are
also not immediately apparent. It is easier to focus on individual employ-
ees, to look for the aberration, than it is to consider that the entire system
may be broken.
A. Legal Standards Push to the Individual Explanation
The law of pay discrimination has been written and interpreted to
favor the individual instead of the structural explanation for disparities.
Both the EPA and Title VII incorporate elements and defenses that focus
attention on specific employees and discrete employment decisions.
A prima facie case under the EPA requires a woman to prove that
she was paid differently from male employees for "equal work on jobs
the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,,,• 46
and which are performed under similar working conditions. The de-
fendant is then able to respond with one of four statutorily defined af-
firmative defenses.47 Of the four, the one that is most common in aca-
demic settings is an argument that the differential is "based on any other
44. See, e.g., Sterling & Reichman, supra note 22, at 520-21.
45. Dreves v. Hudson Grp. Retail, L.L.C., No. 2: I-cv-4, 2013 WL 2634429, at *12 (D. Vt.
June 12, 2013); see also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT 1045: HIGHLIGHTS OF
WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN 2012, at 9, 11 (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpswom20l2.pdf
(showing an eamings ratio of 73% between women and men who have earned a bachelor's degree or
higher, and a pay ratio of 71.6% for women in management, professional, and related occupations).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
47. Id.
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factor other than sex."48 Both the prima facie case and the "factor other
than sex" defense result in extensive discussion of not only an individual
plaintiff, but also specifically identified opposite sex comparators, even
in instances where the challenged employment practices are structural.
Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College49 offers a particularly clear ex-
ample of this in the academic context. The Department of Labor (DOL)
brought this case as a result of its investigation into employment patterns
at the college, first among custodial employees and then within the facul-
ty ranks.50 While DOL challenged the college's hiring and pay-setting
practices at a structural level-arguing that the college's entire approach
to employment decision making was excessively subjective-the focus
of the court's decision is on six specific women and their specific com-
parators.5' The structural challenge is relegated to a footnote, as the
EPA's statutory requirements push the court into the one-to-one compar-
isons that dominate the opinion.
One of the most significant challenges of an EPA claim for an aca-
demic is that "plaintiffs in non-standardized jobs have a difficult time
showing that they can even compare themselves to their peers.52 Some
courts and commentators question whether the EPA even applies to jobs
in fields such as academia.53 The argument is that the statute was really
designed for standardized jobs in which it is evident that two people are
performing the "same" work. In academia, where professors do different
amounts of research and writing, teach different classes with different
numbers of students, and provide different services to the law school or
the legal community, it is hard to know whether two people can ever
reasonably be described as doing the same work. 4 This argument puts
48. Id. The other available defenses are the presence of a seniority system, a merit system, or
a system that "measures earnings by quantity or quality of production." Id.
49. 765 F.2d 1026 (11th Cir. 1985).
50. Id. at 1029.
51. Id. at 1030-33 & 1030 n.6.
52. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act's Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L.
REV. 17, 31 (2010).
53. See id. at 39-41 (discussing the difficulties of applying the EPA to situations involving
professionals in high-level, non-standardized positions).
54. Cf Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 338 F.3d 693, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2003) (looking
behind nearly identical job titles to evaluate whether the particular circumstances of a female profes-
sor and her male comparator were different and concluding that their jobs were not the "same");
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1452 (2d Cir. 1995) (highlighting that although plaintiff and
comparator were both assistant professors teaching biology, plaintiff had not established a prima
facie case under the EPA because, "at one point, [plaintiff] acknowledged that [comparator] had
responsibilities [plaintiff] did not share"); Strag v. Bd. of Trs., 55 F.3d 943, 950 (4th Cir. 1995)
(describing how the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the EPA because her pro-
posed comparator taught in the biology department, while she taught mathematics); Spaulding v.
Univ. of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that the nursing faculty at the univer-
sity failed to establish proof of sufficiently similar work when comparing nursing work to work in
other disciplines of the university), overruled by Antonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477
(9th Cir. 1987). See generally Ana M. Perez-Arrieta, Note, Defenses to Sex-Based Wage Discrimina-
tion Claims at Educational Institutions: Exploring "Equal Work" and "Any Other Factor Other
Than Sex" in the Faculty Context, 31 J.C. & U. L. 393, 399-403 (2005).
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too heavy a burden on plaintiffs.55 The better approach is to accept the
employer's job titles-Assistant Professor or Professor, for example-as
defining the job and leave questions about quantity or quality of work
actually performed as part of the employer's defense.56 Either way, how-
ever, the comparison of the plaintiff's work to the work of other identi-
fied employees directs attention to the individual faculty members and
away from the structures of the workplace and its system of evaluation.
For an academic plaintiff who makes out a prima facie case, she is
likely to face a relatively predictable set of "factor other than sex" af-
firmative defense arguments. Many of them, in fact, were included in
Dean Katz's memo to the DU Law faculty. In particular, "differential
starting salaries . . . [and] special circumstances or deals that may have
affected that number" and "other circumstances in individual salary his-
tories, such as offers from other schools" are two common explana-
tions-both in litigation and out-for pay disparities.57 These defenses
are most often discussed in terms of "market factors" in judicial opin-
ions, and many courts-though not all-have accepted the argument that
market factors can be the non-sex-based explanation for gender wage
disparities.58 The use of market factors to explain differential pay should,
however, be carefully examined. Insights from social science research
have taught us a great deal about the limits of the "market" as a neutral
source of information about men's and women's actual potential or per-
formance.59 Indeed, Nicole Porter and Jessica Vartanian recently argued
that "[p]rior salaries and outside competitive offers are not always neu-
tral; they are often tainted with bias, and we should eliminate the effect
of that bias by precluding employers from relying on these factors when
setting pay. 6 ° Some courts have similarly recognized the gender bias
that infects the market and have expressed reluctance to incorporate that
bias into the law.61 Even those courts, however, have ultimately allowed
55. It also seems to ignore the fact that, when Congress created exceptions to the Fair Labor
Standards Act for professional employees in 1972, the legislature specifically provided that profes-
sional employees remained protected by the EPA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012).
56. See, e.g., Brock v. Ga. Sw. Coll., 765 F.2d 1026, 1033-34 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("We hold,
however, that plaintiff can meet its burden of going forward by showing that the teachers compared
are in the same discipline and that their job is to teach classes to students in that discipline. To re-
quire plaintiff to do more would be unrealistic, for it would require plaintiff to prove the absence of
any conceivable difference between teaching class X and teaching class Y, without defendant even
having to allege specific differences." (footnote omitted)).
57. See Katz, supra note 5, at 4.
58. See Perez-Arrieta, supra note 54, at 409-13 (collecting cases in which courts have consid-
ered such market forces as the basis for pay disparities).
59. Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay
Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 183-90 (2011).
60. Id. at 190.
61. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 877 n.7 (9th Cir. 1982); Drum v.
Leeson Elec. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 & n.9 (W.D. Mo. 2008), rev'd, 565 F.3d 1071 (8th
Cir. 2009). But see Wernsing v. Dep't of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 470-71 (7th Cir. 2005) (con-
cluding that criticizing the market as being gender-biased will not defeat a defendant's reliance on
the market as a factor other than sex).
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the market arguments to shield defendants from liability without looking
too closely at the structural dynamics at play in that market.
62
A third element that the DU Law memo raised as an explanation for
the significant gender gap in full-professor salaries at the law school was
"differential merit raises.' 63 This is certainly among the most common
factors other than sex raised to explain pay disparities. 64 As discussed
above, however, a university's evaluation metrics and their application
may suffer from structural flaws that contribute significantly to salary
inequities.6 5 In Kovacevich v. Kent State University,66 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals, recognizing this reality, reinstated a jury verdict be-
cause the appellate court concluded that the jury could reasonably have
been suspicious of a "merit award system [that] was driven largely by an
opaque, decision-making process at the administrative level . . . and re-
warded men disproportionately to women."67 The Kovacevich decision is
unique among reported appellate cases to acknowledge that a system
described by neutral qualities such as merit may nonetheless be applied
in ways that create sex-based disparities that violate the EPA.
Academic plaintiffs are not often successful in pursuing challenges
under the EPA. A 2010 study of federal appellate EPA cases found that
of the twenty-three such cases involving university professors, the plain-
tiffs lost 65% of the time, frequently at summary judgment.68 In these
cases, courts have tended to treat a university's evaluation of teaching
ability and scholarship, as well as the university assessment of market
demand, with a great deal of deference.69 Indeed, some courts view the
need for deference to universities to be even greater than the need for
deference to other employers because they see faculty hiring as tied di-
rectly to academic freedom, and academic freedom to the First Amend-
ment.70 As the First Circuit expressed it in an early EPA case:
62. For a remarkable exception to this general approach, see Dreves v. Hudson Grp. Retail,
L.L.C., No. 2:1 l-cv-4,2013 WL 2634429, at *13 (D. Vt. June 12, 2013).
63. See Katz, supra note 5, at 4.
64. See, e.g., Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11 th Cir. 1988).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 21-45.
66. 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 827. One of the things that made Kovacevich rather unique among EPA decisions is
that the appellate court had the benefit of a jury verdict to review; most EPA cases from academic
settings, despite the fact-driven nature of the EPA inquiry, have been dismissed by courts at sum-
mary judgment. Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 33-34.
68. See Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 33.
69. This deference to universities and its impact on the viability of discrimination claims in
academic institutions has been long recognized. See, e.g., Susan L. Pacholski, Title VII in the Uni-
versity: The Difference Academic Freedom Makes, 59 U. CHi. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1992) ("Courts in
the United States have traditionally exercised restraint in cases involving the academic decisions of
colleges and universities."); Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to
Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67, 69 (1994) (noting that "the federal courts have always
deferred to academic institutions and hesitated to scrutinize the faculty personnel process").
70. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. Of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("Our Nation is deeply
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amend-
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A university is, of course, not free of the Equal Pay Act, but when
it is confronted with possibly opposing pressures or obligations,
some of which involve the difficult subject of gender, it must be al-
lowed substantial room to maneuver, rather than find itself between
the devil and the deep blue sea. Otherwise, instead of some measure
of academic freedom, it will face the constant prospect of judicial re-
proof.
71
The invocation of academic freedom as a barrier to judicial evaluation of
pay disparities risks insulating significant structural inequity from any
review in the academic setting. Together with a more general judicial
reluctance to look behind individual explanations for the structural caus-
es of disparity, this judicial deference to academic employers has made
the EPA a very tough path for women professors challenging pay inequi-
ties.
Pay discrimination claims can, of course, also be pursued through
the prohibitions against sex discrimination contained in Title VII. This
route presents a slightly different set of hurdles for plaintiffs challenging
gender-based pay disparities. While Title VII does not require that plain-
tiffs identify specific comparators performing similar work to pursue a
claim, a disparate treatment claim does demand that the plaintiff provide
sufficient evidence to suggest that the employer intentionally discrimi-
nated based on sex in making pay decisions. The focus on employer in-
tent operates in much the same way that the EPA requirements do, to
push parties and the court to individual explanations for decision making.
Moreover, Title VII specifically incorporates the affirmative defenses
contained in the EPA, so the "factor other than sex" analysis is effective-
ly the same under the two statutes. Ultimately, as Tristin Green has not-
ed, "[t]raditional disparate treatment theory conceptualizes discrimina-
tion as individual, measurable, and static. 72
Many scholars, including Green, have argued in recent years for ap-
plication of antidiscrimination laws in ways that recognize the structural
nature of discrimination and that shift focus away from the individual-
ized model to recognize and remedy systemic harms.73 This scholarly
push was paralleled during the 2000s by impact litigation efforts led by
national public interest law firms like Equal Rights Advocates and the
ment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."); J. Peter Byr-
ne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 265-67
(1989).
71. Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792, 797 (1 st Cir. 1984) (footnote omitted).
72. Green, supra note 32 at 112.
73. Id. at II1- 12; see also, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4-20 (2006); Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach
as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 850 (2007);
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741,
767-88 (2005); Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace:
Some Preliminary Observations, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 641-42 (1998).
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Impact Fund.74 These lawsuits, most famously the challenge mounted by
Betty Dukes and other plaintiffs against pay and promotion discrimina-
tion at Wal-Mart, challenged the excessively subjective, unguided deci-
sion-making policies that led to significant gender inequities at Wal-Mart
Stores all over the country.75 For many years, these suits seemed to be
making inroads into the individual-focused presumptions in discrimina-
tion liability. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court's 2011 deci-
76sion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes made systemic challenges under
Title VII much more difficult precisely because of the Court's reluctance
to permit challenges that do not have "significant proof' linking com-
plained-of structural problems to individual decisions.77
B. Challenging Structure Is Hard
Even outside of litigation, discussions of pay equity tend to drift to
consideration of individual employees or decision makers. At bottom, it
is easier to talk about whether one person or another is making the right
amount of money than it is to talk about whether an entire system of
evaluation and pay setting is flawed.
Asserting that the structure of a job or a workplace is biased is rela-
tively easy from outside of that job or workplace. But making the same
claim from within is much harder. For law professors evaluating a gender
pay gap in legal academia, there is a natural push away from condemning
the system itself as biased. Social science research on "system justifica-
tion" demonstrates that both those who benefit from and those who are
harmed by implicit structural biases will take great pains to justify the
status quo of the systems within which they are operating.78 Part of the
challenge that contributes to system justification is that acknowledging
systemic flaws requires a person to then decide whether to address them
or ignore them. Neither choice is easy.
74. See generally Hart, supra note 73, at 778-88. As the Impact Fund explains on its website,
the Fund "maintains an active litigation docket in order to stay at the forefront of the class action and
collective action legal field and to demonstrate the means for using these legal mechanisms to
achieve broad social change." Litigation, IMPACT FUND, http://impactfund.org/litigation/ (last visited
July 18, 2014). Similarly, Equal Rights Advocates has "transformed the law for hundreds of thou-
sands of women and girls for over four decades through impact litigation, advice and counseling,
and policy reform." Fighting for Women's Equality, EQUAL RTS. ADVOCS.,
http://www.equalrights.org/our-work/ (last visited July 18, 2014). Interestingly, Equal Rights Advo-
cates has been working with Lucy Marsh on her dispute with the University of Denver. See Cynthia
Foster, Client Professor Lucy Marsh Called "Champion for Fair Pay" by Colorado Law Week,
EQUAL RTS. ADVOCS. (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.equalrights.org/client-professor-lucy-marsh-called-
champion-for-fair-pay-by-colorado-law-week/; see also O'Connor, supra note 2.
75. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011); see also Melissa Hart,
Learning from Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 355, 359-65 (2006).
76. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
77. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of
Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 883 (2004) (em-
phasis omitted).
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Imagine you are a legal academic (if you are reading this law re-
view article, you probably are a legal academic): you have decided to
join a profession in which the metrics that are being used to define merit
include excellence in scholarship, teaching, and service. If you've been a
legal academic for any amount of time, you've been trying to write law
review articles, agonizing over which law journals accept or reject them,
worrying about whether your articles are cited in other articles, and
whether you are invited to national conferences, or asked to guest blog
on some much-read site or another. You've been working long hours to
succeed in these efforts, and we haven't even gotten to teaching or ser-
vice yet. If you open up the Pandora's Box of questions about whether
the system of evaluation that has pushed you to work so hard at these
things suffers from structural bias, you not only have to question what
you have been spending all of these hours doing, but you also have to
decide whether to keep doing it or to push for some different system. If
you have received positive feedback for your success within this system,
you would have to ask whether your success is truly meaningful if the
evaluation system is flawed. And even if you have not received the kind
of feedback you might have hoped for, you have still been striving within
this system, and rejecting or questioning it means questioning your own
choices.
Moreover, if you were to decide to push for a different system, it
isn't immediately obvious what that different system would be. Even in
the current climate of uncertainty for law schools and critique of legal
education, it is hard to find serious proposals for restructuring the current
system of responsibilities and rewards in legal academia. Paula Monopoli
recently made an interesting suggestion for decoupling productive teach-
ing years from productive scholarly years in recognition of how difficult
it is to do both things well simultaneously.79 The ABA Task Force on the
Future of Legal Education has gently suggested moving away from ten-
ure for law professors.80 Their concerns are not with gender pay equity,
but with the costs of legal education.81 It is possible, though, that a shift
away from a tenure system that privileges scholarship might have gen-
der-leveling effects. It seems equally likely that the job of law professor
in schools that adopt that regime will, much like the current positions of
instructor and lecturer, become sex-segregated with women dominating
the new, lower status field and men moving on to something else.
79. Monopoli, supra note 16, at 1764-74.
80. See ABA TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL EDUC., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 7, 14-16, 31 (2014), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professionalresponsibility/reportand_
recommendations of aba task force.authcheckdam.pdf.
81. Id. at 31 (discussing the tenure standards as standards that should be reevaluated in light
of their impact on the cost ofa JD education).
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The structural problems are equally difficult from the perspective of
a well-intentioned decision maker. DU Law's Dean Katz is, I believe,
just such a decision maker. Put yourself for a moment in his shoes.
You've looked at the spread of salaries for full professors, and you have
found that the median salary for female full professors is far below the
median salary for male full professors. What should you do?8 2 You could
decide to provide across-the-board increases for female faculty members
to address the disparity. That is what Virginia Commonwealth University
did in 1996.83 In response, male faculty members brought a lawsuit chal-
lenging the raises as sex discrimination.84 And litigation risk is not the
only reason that an across-the-board equity adjustment may not be the
best choice. At some point, focusing on the forest can lead one to ignore
the individual trees. What do you do about a hard-working, talented male
professor who will be leapt over in an across-the-board adjustment? It is
not difficult to see why a more nuanced approach to salary adjustment
would be appealing. And yet, if you decide not to do a uniform adjust-
ment, but to only adjust certain salaries, you are moving to individual
evaluation.
It is not entirely surprising that one of the common structural solu-
tions proposed to address gender pay gaps, in academia and elsewhere, is
a system of lockstep pay increases. The argument for lockstep pay rec-
ognizes that "[a]s long as salaries are determined primarily by private
individual negotiation or administrative discretion, inequities will
reemerge.,85 Lockstep salaries, set at years of service, avoid the subjec-
tivity of annual evaluations of merit. They also eliminate the salary ma-
neuvering that can occur with lateral offers, and the "special deals" made
at hiring. As a mechanism for salary equity, lockstep pay is pretty per-
fect. As a mechanism for job equity, it may not be. Lockstep pay ensures
that people are paid the same amount at each year of service. It does not
ensure that they work as hard. Before reformers embrace lockstep pay as
a solution to the pay equity problem, they should consider carefully what
inequities might unintentionally be created by such a system.
Most scholars who examine gender disparities among academics
emphasize the need for salary transparency as a first step to addressing
.86 11 -cieiti eadthese disparities. Professor Marsh's story is instructive in this regard.
82. In the months following his December 2012 memo to the faculty, Dean Katz hired a
consulting firm to conduct an equity study of salaries at the Law School to assess "whether there are
individual or structural factors that have contributed to pay distinctions on the basis of gender." E-
mail from Martin J. Katz, Dean, Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, to Denver Law Community
(Feb. 27, 2014, 2:26 PM) (on file with author). The results of that study will be released to the law
school, and it remains to be seen whether equity adjustments or other changes will occur.
83. See Smith v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 84 F.3d 672, 674-75 (4th Cir. 1996).
84. Id. at 674; see also Maitland v. Univ. of Minn., 155 F.3d 1013, 1015 (8th Cir. 1998) (male
professors brought a lawsuit arguing that implementation of a gender-based salary adjustment dis-
criminated against them).
85. Curtis, supra note 10.
86. See Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 63-64; Sterling & Reichman, supra note 22, at 518.
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While Marsh and other women had raised questions about whether there
was salary disparity at DU Law, the University of Denver is like most
private employers in maintaining secrecy about salaries.87 Only when the
dean of the law school, in an effort to be more transparent, circulated a
memo to the faculty identifying a significant difference in median pay
for male and female full professors did the possibility of a direct chal-
lenge to that disparity become evident.
There certainly may be benefits to transparency. One of the com-
mon explanations offered for pay disparities is that "[w]omen don't
ask. '88 Without transparency, however, it is at best complicated to place
the blame for disparity at the feet of those being paid less. "Unless wage
rates are published, women do not know what to demand."89 Thus, trans-
parency might encourage negotiation. Transparency might also encour-
age better behavior by schools, as decision makers will be called on to
articulate explanations for inequities. Transparency is also hard. When
colleagues are aware of who is being paid more and who is being paid
less, the opportunities for hurt feelings and anger are significant. Trans-
parency risks having a corrosive impact on workplace culture. The bene-
fits may outweigh those risks, but it is not immediately obvious that they
will.
IV. A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE TO MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES
The fact that challenging structure is hard does not mean it
shouldn't be done. It might even mean just the opposite-we should be
challenging structure precisely because it is hard. To that end, perhaps
the most troubling line in Dean Katz's memo to the DU faculty is his
statement that "unless I have strong evidence to the contrary, I will need
to assume that all of my predecessors' merit raises were accurate reflec-
tions of performance."90 With that starting assumption, current salary
disparities are frozen in place as presumptively reflecting the relative
merit of the individual faculty members. Embedded in that assumption,
given the gender disparities in full professor salaries, seems to be a fur-
ther assumption that male faculty members are, on the whole, better per-
formers than female faculty members.
87. See, e.g., Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1044 &
n.1 (2012) (noting that studies show that most employees in the United States work for employers
who maintain salary confidentiality rules).
88. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: THE HIGH COST OF
AVOIDING NEGOTIATION-AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE ix-x (2007).
89. Eisenberg, supra note 52, at 65; see also Paula A. Monopoli, In a Different Voice: Les-
sons from Ledbetter, 34 J.C. & U.L. 555, 556-57 (2008) ("Any good negotiation relies in large part
on information .... Without reliable data on where one stands in the faculty array vis-A-vis male
colleagues, and with amorphous standards of merit that rule in the academy, women are at a signifi-
cant disadvantage.").
90. Katz, supra note 5, at 4.
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What would it look like to make a different assumption? What if a
dean, confronted with systemic gender disparities, were to assume in-
stead that these gender disparities would not have developed absent dis-
crimination in either the standards being applied or the way those stand-
ards are being applied? How would that starting point affect pay deci-
sions?
One principle that might be properly applied in such a circumstance
is "first, do no harm."91 Perhaps an employer who encounters a signifi-
cant gender pay disparity should be barred from offering raises that ex-
acerbate the disparity. Once a pay disparity, like that in the salaries of
full professors at DU Law, comes to light, available raise pools can only
be allocated in ways that either decrease or maintain the disparity. This
"do no harm" approach would be analogous to the three-part est applied
in evaluating claims under Title IX, which prohibits gender discrimina-
tion in funding for educational programs.92 In the Title IX context, a uni-
versity facing a challenge to its funding of athletic programs must show
either that it provides proportionate funding for male and female athletic
programs; that it is engaged in a "continuing practice of program expan-
sion" to meet the interests of the underrepresented sex; or that "it can be
demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex
have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present pro-
gram."93 The practical result of this test is that a university cannot make
an existing funding inequity worse. In order to demonstrate that it is
meeting one of the three requirements, the university will have to show
either that there is no existing inequity or that progress is being made
toward addressing an existing inequity.
Applied in the context of salary setting, this approach would allow a
decision maker tasked with offering merit raises, or competitive-salary
raises, to make the individual assessments necessary for that type of
raise. But it would also require that decision maker to acknowledge the
structural problem presented by the wage disparity-and to acknowledge
it as a structural problem, rather than simply as a series of individual
stories.
CONCLUSION
The frustrating persistence of gender pay inequity is a systemic
problem, and yet pay equity is just one of many employment contexts in
which structural causes are too often overlooked as discussion turns in-
stead to individual explanations. Unfortunately, the move from the struc-
91. This expression, from the Latin primum non nocere is a basic principle of bioethics. See
Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1226 (27th ed. 2000).
92. 20 U.S.C § 168 1(b) (2012).
93. 44 Fed. Reg. 71418 (Dec. 11, 1979); see also DEBORAH L. BRAKE, GETTING IN THE
GAME: TITLE IX AND THE WOMEN'S SPORTS REVOLUTION 62-82 (2010).
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tural to the individual significantly diminishes the likelihood of systemic
change. It is a move we can no longer afford.
DISABLING THE GENDER PAY GAP:
LESSONS FROM THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY
MICHELLE A. TRAVISt
ABSTRACT
As we celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Title VII's prohibition
against sex-based compensation discrimination in the workplace, the
gender wage gap remains robust and progress toward gender pay equity
has stalled. This Article reveals the role that causal narratives play in
undermining the law's potential for reducing the gender pay gap. The
most recent causal narrative is illustrated by the "women don't ask" and
"lean in" storylines, which reveal our society's entrenched view that
women themselves are responsible for their own pay inequality. This
causal narrative has also embedded itself in subtle but pernicious ways in
antidiscrimination doctrine, which helps shield employers from legal
liability for gender pay disparities.
The disability civil rights movement has faced a similar challenge,
and its successful response provides a potential path forward on gender
pay issues. The causal narrative that erected barriers for disability rights
was engrained in the medical model of disability, which also identified
internal deficits as the source of individuals' own limitations. The disa-
bility rights movement responded with a reconceptualized "social mod-
el," which explains disability instead as the result of the environment in
which an individual's characteristics interact. The social model of disa-
bility provides an alternative causal narrative: one that shifts focus onto
the role played by employer practices and organizational norms in pro-
ducing inequality. This Article explores how a social model approach to
women's compensation could help shift the causal focus away from the
manner in which women negotiate and onto the institutional practices
that produce unequal results. In doing so, the social model may help re-
suscitate Title VII's disparate impact heory to allow challenges to em-
ployment practices that base compensation on employees' individual
demands, thereby moving us toward more effective structural solutions
to the gender pay divide.
t Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship and Professor of Law, University of San Francis-
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tance, and to Richard Dickson for his support.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRO D UCTIO N ...................................................................................... 894
I. COMMON GROUND: RESISTING INTERNAL CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION .. 899
A. The Medical Model of Disability ................................................. 902
B. Gender and the "Women Don't Ask'" Narrative ......................... 903
II. LEARNING FROM THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: USING THE
SOCIAL MODEL TO SHIFT CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS TO EMPLOYERS 913
A. The Social Model of Disability .................................................... 914
B. A Social Model of the Gender Pay Gap ...................................... 916
C O N C LU SIO N ......................................................................................... 922
INTRODUCTION
For the past decade, progress on the overall gender wage gap has
come to a virtual standstill.' For full-time, year-round workers in 2012,
the median salary for women was 76.5% of the median salary for men-
2a gap that was nearly identical to the gap reported in 2001. Gender pay
disparity is much larger for some women than others, particularly for
women of color,3 and it exists even after controlling for factors such as
education, skill level, and hours worked.4 If the overall rate of change
from 1960 to 2012 remains the same in the future, most women in the
paid labor market today will never experience gender wage parity during
their working lives.5 At the same time that we are celebrating the fiftieth
anniversary of Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination in the
workplace,6 experts are actually extending their projections for the length
7of time that it will take to eventually close the gender pay gap.
Although designing successful legal tools to combat the gender pay
gap does not necessarily require a complete understanding of why the
1. See Meghan Casserly, The Geography of the Gender Pay Gap: Women's Earnings by
State, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 8:30 AM),
http://www. forbes.com/sites/meghancasserly/2013/09/19/the-geography-of-the-gender-pay-gap-
womens-earnings-by-state/ ("For more than a decade now, the comparison between the median
earnings of full-time employed men and women in the U.S. has remained a stubborn 77% ....");
Ben Penn, Gender Pay Gap Won't Close Until 2058, IWPF Projects, as Democrats Push for Law,
DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 18, 2013, at A-12 ("While women have made tremendous strides in their
earnings relative to men since 1960, none of that progress has taken place since 2000 .... ").
2. See Penn, supra note 1, at A-12.
3. On Pay Gap, Millennial Women Near Parity)-for Now, PEW RES. CENTER (Dec. 11,
2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/12/I i/on-pay-gap-millennial-women-near-parity-for-
now/ (providing details about the gender wage gap based on survey data from October 2013).
4. See Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043, 1049-51
(2012) (summarizing the "great deal of evidence that women ... still experience large pay gaps,"
even when controlling for other factors).
5. See Penn, supra note 1, at A-12; see also Jillian Berman, Gender Pay Gap Likely Won't
Go Away Until After You Retire: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2013, 11:42 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/23/gender-pay-gap-close_n 3975638.html.
6. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)).
7. See Berman, supra note 5.
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gap exists, causal narratives have played an enormously influential role
in Title VII's relative lack of success in the arena of sex-based wage dis-
crimination. Because both our social and our legal assessments of re-
sponsibility typically follow our attributions of causation, causal narra-
tives are powerful tools for shaping the law's effect, whether or not our
causal assessments are accurate, sufficiently nuanced, or legally rele-
vant. According to social scientists who study causal attribution theo-
ry-i.e., the cognitive processes by which we arrive at explanations for
social events9-we are not exceptionally skilled at this task. Although
our causal attribution process is efficient, often unconscious, and highly
adaptive, it is also systematically biased.0
One causal attribution bias is toward oversimplification, which of-
ten shows up when several causes are necessary for an event or outcome
to occur." Tort law refers to this scenario as one involving "multiple
necessary causes."'2 In such a scenario, we tend to single out and identify
one of the multiple necessary circumstances as the cause, which then
becomes the target for placing responsibility, be it credit or blame.13 The
gender pay gap is just such a multi-causal social phenomenon. The resili-
ence of the gender pay gap has been fueled in part by simplified-and
strategic-causal narratives that have directed responsibility away from
the employers that have built, entrenched, and sustained gender pay me-
8. See Michelle A. Travis, The PDA's Causation Effect: Observations of an Unreasonable
Woman, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 53-54 (2009); see also STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF
THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN NATURE 232 (2007) ("Our concept of causation
is indispensable to our attribution of credit and blame in everyday life.").
9. See Travis, supra note 8, at 54 ("Causal attribution theory is the branch of social cognition
theory that studies the process by which people arrive at explanations for social events."); see also
MILES HEWSTONE, CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION: FROM COGNITIVE PROCESSES TO COLLECTIVE BELIEFS
37-38 (1989) (describing causal attribution theory); Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His
Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in COGNITIVE THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 337, 338-39, 348-49 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978) (same); Michelle A. Travis,
Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 55 VAND. L. REV. 481, 509-10
(2002) [hereinafter Travis, Perceived Disabilities] (same).
10. Travis, supra note 8, at 54; see also HEWSTONE, supra note 9, at 61 (describing the adap-
tive but biased nature of our causal attribution processes); Travis, Perceived Disabilities, supra note
9, at 509-42 (summarizing the social science research on causal attribution biases).
I1. See PINKER, supra note 8, at 213.
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§§ 26 cmts. c, i, 27 cmts. d, e (2010); see also John D. Rue, Note, Returning to the Roots of the
Bramble Bush: The "But For" Test Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Insti-
tute's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2709 & n.232 (2003)
(describing the Restatement's distinction between multiple necessary causes, which are "members of
a causal set which are in themselves necessary to cause the harm, even if they are insufficient to do
so by themselves," and multiple sufficient causes, which "occur where there are two forces, operat-
ing independently, and each is sufficient to cause the harm"); Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra
Kincannon, The Relation Between Counterfactual "But For" and Causal Reasoning: Experimental
Findings and Implications for Jurors' Decisions, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 251-52 (2001)
(distinguishing multiple necessary cause situations in which several causes "are necessary but nei-
ther alone is sufficient," from multiple sufficient cause situations in which either of two causes
would be sufficient by itself to produce the outcome but "neither alone is necessary").
13. See PINKER, supra note 8, at 213-14 ("People somehow distinguish just one of the neces-
sary conditions for an event as its cause and the others as mere enablers.., even when all are equal-
ly necessary.").
2014]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
quality as a standard feature of the American workplace. This Article
explores this important role that causal narratives play in sustaining the
gender compensation divide. 4
Social psychologists generally characterize causal attributions as ei-
ther "internal" or "external."'15 Internal attributions are ones that identify
the primary cause of a social event as some characteristic, feature, or trait
of an actor involved in the event, while external attributions are ones that
identify the primary cause as some aspect of the situation or environment
in which the event took place.'6 When an observer concludes that a par-
ticular outcome was caused by an actor's effort, intelligence, ability,
attitude, personality, emotions, or physical or mental condition, the ob-
server is making an internal attribution.17 If the observer instead deems
the cause to be the weather conditions or the difficulty of the task, for
example, an external attribution is being made.'8 In other words, internal
causal attributions focus on "something about the person," while external
causal attributions focus on "something about the situation."'9
Under this taxonomy, internal causal attributions for the gender pay
gap focus on characteristics of the women who are being paid less than
men for their work. External causal attributions, in contrast, focus on
aspects of either of the two environments in which women are interact-
ing: aspects of the particular employer that is compensating women less
than men, or aspects of the broader labor market within which all em-
ployers and employees operate. When an employer is charged with sex-
based compensation discrimination, the employer thus has two targets for
shifting causal attribution away from itself: either to the labor market or
to the women who are being underpaid.
In Title VII's early years, employers successfully sold a narrative
that identified "the market" as the cause of the gender pay gap. Employ-
ers portrayed themselves as passive price-takers who simply set wages
based on external market forces, which resulted in lower pay for women
than for men. 2 Courts readily accepted this single, external causal attrib-
ution as a basis for shifting legal responsibility away from employers for
14. Cf Travis, supra note 8 (analyzing the role of causal attribution narratives in combating
pregnancy discrimination in the workplace).
15. See HEWSTONE, supra note 9, at 30-31. This causal attribution dimension has also been
referred to as the "person" versus "environment" dimension, or the "dispositional" versus "situation-




19. See Christopher Peterson et al., The Attributional Style Questionnaire, 6 COGNITIVE
THERAPY& RES. 287, 288 (1982).
20. See Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579, 596 (2001) (review-
ing ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY: COURTS,
MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999)) (describing the causal narrative "of
employers as passively paying the going rate for labor"--i.e., employers' assertion that "the 'market
made me do it"').
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sex-based compensation disparities.21 In 1999, however, two sociolo-
gists, Robert Nelson and William Bridges, published an influential em-
pirical analysis debunking that oversimplified causal narrative and re-
vealing the additional, necessary role played by employers' own wage
scales, personnel bureaucracies, and other organizational practices that
decouple individual employers' wages from labor market prices.22 Femi-
nist legal scholars quickly leveraged this research to help reveal the mul-
ti-causal nature of the gender pay gap and to challenge employers' mar-
ket-based defenses to gender pay discrimination claims.23 Nelson and
Bridges' research provided an empirical basis for undermining the causal
narrative that the market dictates employers' pay decisions, thereby mak-
ing more salient the necessary causal role of individual employers in
24sustaining the gender pay gap.
Employers then seized upon another oversimplified-and even
more strategic-causal narrative: one that focused instead on women
themselves. Early on, this causal narrative was framed in terms of wom-
en's "lack of interest" in and "choice" not to pursue high-paid positions
25and job opportunities. Courts also readily accepted this internal causal
attribution, once again allowing employers to evade legal responsibility
for sex-based compensation disparities.26 But although the lack of inter-
est causal narrative effectively shifted blame for between-job pay differ-
21. See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 283, 348-49 (2003) (compiling case law allowing employers to use a market defense to Title VII
disparate impact claims alleging gender pay discrimination).
22. See ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY:
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA 2-3, 8, 9, 14, 51, 76, 310, 313-15
(1999) (using in-depth case studies to show that much of the between-job gender pay gap cannot be
explained by external market forces); see also Chamallas, supra note 20, at 580 (describing how
Nelson and Bridges demonstrated that employers are not "merely following the market," but rather
that "a sizeable portion of the pay differential-resided in the employers' own actions in setting
internal pay scales to suit their organizations' needs and values").
23. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 20, at 581, 600, 607, 612 (arguing that evidence identify-
ing a causal role for the gender pay gap within organizations "paves the way for disparate impact
theory under their new analysis of the causes of gender wage disparities").
24. See NELSON & BRIDGES, supra note 22, at 51 (concluding from case study analysis that a
significant portion of the gender wage gap "arises inside or is perpetuated by employing organiza-
tions"); see also Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 807, 819
(2010) (arguing that because "[t]he market defense draws its strength from the assertion that wages
are determined by external forces," employers should no longer be able to use that defense once that
premise is "questioned by empirical analysis"); Travis, supra note 21, at 352 (explaining how Nel-
son and Bridges "provided a factual basis for undermining courts' causation analysis" through case
studies "identifying specific organizational practices that help generate gender pay differences").
25. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories about Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1749, 1750 (1990); see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, The Blame Game: How the Rhetoric
of Choice Blames the Achievement Gap on Women, 8 F.I.U. L. REV. 447, 449-50 (2013) (demon-
strating how the "blame game" and the "autonomy myth" about women making unconstrained
choices that are free from gender stereotypes and norms contributes to our failure to scrutinize struc-
tural discrimination in the workplace (internal quotation marks omitted)).
26. See Travis, supra note 21, at 348-49 (summarizing case law allowing employers to de-
fend gender pay discrimination claims by raising a "choice" or "lack of interest" defense (internal
quotation marks omitted)). See generally Schultz, supra note 25 (analyzing case law).
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entials, it could not address the gender pay gap that exists within the
same jobs and for employees with the same skills and education. That is
where the "women don't ask" causal narrative stepped in to fill the void.
The women don't ask narrative identifies women's inability or un-
willingness to negotiate for wage parity as the cause of the gender wage
gap. This internal causal attribution focusing on women as a source of
their own pay inequality has become deeply entrenched in our society,
internalized by women, and built into our antidiscrimination law in sub-
tle and pernicious ways. Moreover, unlike the external market narrative,
internal causal attributions are typically more difficult to disrupt. Actors
generally are more salient than the situations in which they act, so we are
biased toward overestimating the causal role of people's internal charac-
teristics and underestimating the causal role of situational factors that
27constrain behavior and dictate outcomes. This bias is so pervasive that
social scientists call it the "fundamental attribution error.'
28
This bias will make it difficult to launch a simple empirical attack
on the accuracy of the women don't ask causal narrative, in part because
a simple reading of the social science research does indeed demonstrate
differences in women's and men's wage negotiation approaches and re-
sults.29 The research also demonstrates, however, that women's wage
negotiation approaches are constrained by biased employment practices
and that women's wage negotiation results are negatively affected by
gender stereotypes,30 which certainly should be highlighted as part of a
strategy for disrupting the women don't ask causal story. But the depth
and pervasiveness of this narrative makes it unlikely that a major shift
will result solely from a more nuanced reading of the negotiation re-
search.
Combatting the causal attribution to women as the responsible
agents for the gender pay gap will require a broader theoretical tool. That
tool may be borrowed from the disability civil rights movement, which
has successfully achieved a very similar goal of disrupting a pervasive
internal causal narrative. That narrative was housed within the medical
model of disability, which-like the women don't ask narrative-
identified internal deficits within impaired individuals as the primary
source of employees' limitations.31 But unlike in the gender context,
where this type of internal causal narrative remains entirely acceptable,
27. See HEWSTONE, supra note 9, at 50; see also Travis, Perceived Disabilities, supra note 9,
at 519-20 (describing the causal attribution bias by which we "overestimate the role of an actor's
internal, dispositional characteristics and... underestimate the power of the situation in controlling
the actor's behavior").
28. See Ross, supra note 9, at 348-49 (coining the term and noting that this robust bias "has
been noted by many theorists" and "disputed by few").
29. See infra notes 56, 134-35 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 75-78, 136-40 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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the disability civil rights movement has effectively shifted the causal
focus of inequality onto the workplace itself.
Disability theorists achieved this success by reconceptualizing disa-
bility under the "social model," which understands disability as the result
of the environment in which an impairment interacts.32 The social model
of disability provided a new causal narrative that shifted both the pub-
lic's attention and the law's focus onto the role of employer practices and
structures in producing inequality for individuals with impairments,
which are not themselves inherently limiting.33 In the same way, a social
model approach to women's compensation could shift the causal focus
away from women's own negotiation techniques and onto the institution-
al practices that render those non-inherently limiting approaches "disa-
bling" with respect to women's pay. In this way, the social model has the
potential to move us toward more effective structural solutions to gender
pay inequality, including resuscitating Title VII's disparate impact theory
to allow challenges to facially neutral practices that base compensation
on employees' individual wage demands or requests.
Part I begins by exploring the common ground that is shared by the
women's rights movement and the disability rights movement-both of
which must actively resist internal causal attributions that place respon-
sibility for workplace inequality onto their own members. While recog-
nizing the historic ambivalence of many feminists to join forces with the
disability rights community, this Part explains how the women don't ask
narrative presents an analogous hurdle to that presented by the medical
model of disability. Part II discusses the potential benefits of borrowing
the social model approach from disability civil rights to reframe the dis-
cussion about women's pay. The social model is best understood as a
theory of causation that identifies employers as one of the multiple nec-
essary causes in workplace inequality, which is a critical move that has
been missing in attempts to combat the gender pay gap.
I. COMMON GROUND: RESISTING INTERNAL CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION
Despite facing many similar obstacles and sharing many similar
goals, the women's rights movement generally has been reticent to join
forces with the disability rights movement in their shared quest for
workplace equality.34 This reticence is in part a vestige of the equal
treatment side of the "equal treatment vs. special treatment" debate,
32. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
34. See Sheerine Alemzadeh, Claiming Disability, Reclaiming Pregnancy: A Critical Analysis
of the ADA's Pregnancy Exclusion, 27 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 1, 16 (2012) (explaining that
"feminist legal advocates historically have been hesitant to ally with the disability rights move-
ment").
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which historically divided the feminist legal community.35 This debate
arose when making difficult strategic decisions about whether women's
workplace equality would be advanced more effectively by highlighting
women's and men's similarities and seeking formal equality, or by ac-
knowledging women's and men's differences and seeking gender-
specific policies or workplace restructuring that takes those differences
into account.36 The equal treatment approach distanced the women's
rights movement from the disability rights movement, which expressly
embraces a difference approach to equality that is now reflected in the
accommodation mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).37
The focus on accommodations for individuals with disabilities lead
many feminists to fear that aligning women with the disabled might
magnify gender stereotypes of women as weak, incapable, and in need of
paternalistic legal protections.38 Although this fear itself reflects disabil-
ity bias and comes with the cost of inhibiting women's access to valuable
workplace accommodations,39 it is also understandable given the "special
treatment stigma" that attaches to marginalized groups that are perceived
to be in need of extra assistance or care.40 This resistance to aligning the
women's movement with the disability rights movement is illustrated by
many feminists' opposition to characterizing pregnancy as a disability.
4'
Even under the recently expanded ADA, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunities Commission (EEOC) continues to take the position that pregnan-
35. See id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing how this historic "fissure" in
the feminist community has affected contemporary legal advocacy for women's workplace equality).
36. See generally Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treat-
ment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).
38. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 17-18, 25-26 (arguing that the backlash against the
ADA raised concerns that linking women's rights to disability rights might evoke the same type of
protectionist and paternalist responses that the women's movement was trying to attack). A similar
dynamic has taken place within the transgender community. See Zach Strassburger, Note, Disability
Law and the Disability Rights Movement for Transpeople, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 337, 349-50
(2012) (explaining how some activists have recognized "that transpeople are hesitant to identify as
disabled because they see disability as a flaw").
39. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 21, 24 (arguing that "[f]eminist disavowal of pregnancy
as a disability has the potential to reinforce discriminatory attitudes towards both disabled people
and women," and that when feminist legal advocates "steer[] clear of disability discourse," they
effectively "engag[e] in the same discriminatory attitudes they have been subjected to").
40. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1108-15 (2014) [hereinafter Por-
ter, Mutual Marginalization]; see also Nicole Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrat-
ed Approach to Solving the Caregiver Conundrum for "Real" Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777,
802-03 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Synergistic Solutions] (describing the "special treatment stigma"
that attaches to accommodation recipients and that is manifested by "both co-employee resentment
as well as employers' reluctance to hire or promote" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 3, 16, 21, 29 (describing the "historical reticence in the
feminist community to advocate for a pregnancy rights framework grounded on the premise that
pregnant women are disabled persons," which has led to a "[fqeminist disavowal of pregnancy as a
disability").
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42
cy is not an impairment for purposes of disability discrimination law,
so many feminists purposely work around that characterization when
seeking to advance pregnant women's rights.43
Now that both movements have achieved some level of success in
combatting stereotypes and employment discrimination in their respec-
tive spheres, however, some scholars and advocates have begun to argue
that the potential benefits of joining forces outweigh the potential risks.
44
This is particularly true in the context of pregnancy, where there is a
move to bring pregnancy under the disability umbrella.45 This shift has
also been fueled by work/family scholars, who recognize that the shared
interest in workplace flexibility is a unifying objective for many individ-
uals with disabilities and workers with caregiving responsibilities.46
This increasing willingness of women's advocates and feminist le-
gal scholars to leverage successful aspects of the disability civil rights
movement provides an opportunity to make progress with the seemingly
42. See EEOC, Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 FED. REG. 16,978, 17,007 (March 25, 2011) (revising 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) to reiterate that "conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a phys-
iological disorder are also not impairments").
43. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Robin Devaux, Danielle Fuschetti & Carolyn Salmon, A Sip
of Cool Water: Pregnancy Accommodation After the ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 97, 110, 114-19 (2013) (accepting that pregnancy itself is not a disability but arguing that "a
broad range of pregnancy-related conditions" are disabilities under the amended ADA); see also
Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 24-25 (explaining "why feminist legal advocates may fear inheriting
ADA backlash if they use the ADA to obtain accommodations for pregnant women").
44. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 35 (urging greater examination of "the intersections of
disability theory and feminist legal theory"). Members of the transgender community have grappled
with a similar question of whether "gender-variant" individuals should or should not seek protection
under disability law. See Strassburger, supra note 38, at 338. Advocates recently have been arguing
that the benefits of doing so outweigh the potential risks. See id. at 338-39, 375 (arguing that "both
transsexuals and the existing disability rights movement will benefit from the cooperation" and by
"[florming a strong partnership").
45. See, e.g., Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as "Disability" and the Amended Americans with
Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 443, 443 (2012) (arguing that pregnancy should be deemed a disa-
bility under the ADAAA); see also Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 21, 24 (arguing that "the bifurca-
tion of pregnancy from disability rights discourse ignores critical junctures at which feminist and
disability theories converge, " and urging pregnancy rights advocates to "band with the disability
rights movement to dismantle stereotypes about the able-bodied worker"). A similar movement is
taking place within the transgender community. See Strassburger, supra note 38, at 350 (explaining
that "the disability and trans communities have already begun to work together on issues largely
ignored in broader LGB activism, such as gender-neutral public restrooms").
46. See, e.g., Porter, Mutual Marginalization, supra note 40, at 1102 (arguing that the distinc-
tions between caregivers and individuals with disabilities "pale in comparison to the experiences that
these two groups share in common," and arguing to extend the right to reasonable accommodations
to cover caregivers); Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans
with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 353 (2009)
(highlighting the potential for coalition-building between work/family advocates and disability rights
advocates); see also Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Possibilities for Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 621-22 (2004). See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Con-
flict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305,
306-07, 327-28 (2004) (discussing working parents' need for flexibility and accommodation in their
work life); Kelly Timmerman, Note, Accommodating for the Work/Family Conflict: A Proposed
Public Policy Exception, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 281, 283 (2004).
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intractable gender wage gap that still remains robust even fifty years
after Title VII's enactment. Moreover, unlike in the pregnancy and
work/family contexts in which the use of disability theory typically seeks
to advance accommodation rights with all of their attendant "special
treatment" baggage, disability rights theory has the potential to help re-
frame the gender wage debate in ways that may move women forward
even within the confines of a very conventional antidiscrimination
framework. The starting point for such leveraging is identifying a com-
mon source of inequality against which the disability rights movement
has made more headway than have advocates for women's rights. That
common source of inequality is the shared need to resist and unsettle an
internal causal attribution for inequality. For individuals with disabilities,
an internal causal attribution was entrenched within the medicalmodel of
disability, while an internal causal attribution for women implicitly re-
sides in the women don't ask narrative that pervades discussions of the
gender wage gap.
A. The Medical Model of Disability
Although the disability rights movement is a pluralistic endeavor
with diverse participants and goals,47 one objective became both a unify-
ing force and a critical catalyst for achieving legal change for individuals
with disabilities: dismantling the medical model of disability.48 The med-
ical model conceptualized disability as a personal and intrinsic deficit
that needed to be fixed or cured.49 By locating the causal source of disa-
bility within individuals, the medical model made it easy to deflect re-
sponsibility for employment inequality away from employers, and it im-
plicitly blamed individuals with disabilities for their own lack of success
in the workplace.50 Rather than empowering courts, the medical model
bestowed tremendous power upon medical "experts," who were needed
both to identify the deficits and to suggest a treatment or deliver a cure.5'
Over time, it became clear to members of the disability rights movement
that meaningful social and legal progress would not be made without
47. See Michelle A. Travis, Impairment as Protected Status: A New Universality for Disabil-
ity Rights, 46 GA. L. REV. 937, 943 (2012).
48. See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 13 (2009).
49. See id. at 18; Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't "Just Right ": The Entrenchment
of the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 185-87 (2008);
Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 266, 268
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 3d ed. 2010); Travis, supra note 47, at 943.
50. See Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649-53
(1999) (describing the societal effects of the medical model).
51. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 22 (explaining that the medical model "places disabled
individuals in a unique power dialectic with the medical community, where presenting certain symp-
toms is essential to attain the diagnosis that legitimizes the individual's claim to disability entitle-
ments"); Areheart, supra note 49, at 186 (explaining how the medical model frames social responses
"either as rehabilitation efforts to enable the individual to overcome the effects of the disability, or
medical efforts to find a cure"); Travis, supra note 47, at 975-76 (describing how the medical model
of disability "abdicat[es] ... control to medical professionals").
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first dismantling the medical model of disability and shifting the causal
focus of employment inequality to the workplace structures, practices,
and norms that rendered various physical and mental characteristics lim-
iting in their effects.
B. Gender and the "Women Don't Ask" Narrative
An internal causal attribution for the source of inequality similarly
has entrenched itself in debates about the gender wage gap. In the gender
context, the internal causal attribution resides within the women don't
ask narrative. Like the medical model of disability that locates the cause
of inequality within impaired individuals themselves, the pervasive
women don't ask narrative locates the causal source of the gender pay
gap within women, who purportedly lack the ability or the will to negoti-
ate effectively for wage parity. By implicitly blaming women for their
own income inequality-and linking the source to an internal deficiency
that is assumed to be even more within the victim's control than most
physical or mental impairments-this narrative has been extraordinarily
effective at deflecting employers' responsibility for gender wage inequal-
ity.52 As with the medical model of disability, the internal causal theory
for the gender wage gap implicitly bestows power upon "experts"-in
this context, social psychologists and negotiation skills trainers-who
become necessary to help identify and fix women's deficiencies.
The internal causal narrative is deeply ingrained in public rhetoric,
as women in the workforce are inundated with messaging about the role
that their own behavioral failings play in their unequal pay and career
advancement. Women are told to "lean in," to "pushback," to "stand up,"
to "take charge," to be a "go-getter," to take a "place at the table," and to
just "ask for it."' 53 This narrative gained widespread prominence with the
2003 book by Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever titled Women Don't
Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide.54 The book was reprinted in
2007 under the title, Women Don't Ask: The High Cost of Avoiding Ne-
gotiation-and Positive Strategies for Change.55 Using interviews and
other data from psychology, sociology, and economics, the authors re-
vealed women's lower propensity relative to men to initiate negotiations
52. See Christine Elzer, Wheeling, Dealing, and the Glass Ceiling: Why the Gender Differ-
ence in Salary Negotiation Is Not a "Factor Other Than Sex" Under the Equal Pay Act, 10 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. I, 9 (2009) ("The more society blames women for their own reluctance to negotiate,
the less culpable employers appear for paying women less than their male counterparts."); Porter,
supra note 25, at 447, 458-60 (analyzing how women are blamed for the gender wage gap by char-
acterizing women's lower pay as a "[c]hoice" and an "unwillingness to negotiate on their own be-
half' (internal quotation marks omitted)).
53. These phrases all come from popular book titles. See infra notes 54-70.
54. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE
GENDER DIVIDE (Princeton U. Press) (2003) [hereinafter BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T
ASK 1].
55. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: THE HIGH COST OF
AVOIDING NEGOTIATION-AND POSITIVE STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (Random House Publ'g Grp.
2007) [hereinafter BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK 1I].
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on their own behalf.56 A year after the reprinted version was published,
the same authors wrote a follow-up book titled, Ask for It: How Women
Can Use the Power of Negotiation to Get What They Really Want.57 This
follow-up book claims to provide "the action plan that women all over
the country requested.,58 According to the book's description on Ama-
zon, this book "teaches [women] how to ask effectively, in ways that feel
comfortable to you as a woman.
59
Although Women Don't Ask provided a catchy phrase for encapsu-
lating the internal causal attribution for the gender wage gap, it was by
no means an isolated work. Another example with a similar (albeit less
catchy) title showed up on the bookstands just after Babcock and
Laschever's first book: Why Women Earn Less: How to Make What
You're Really Worth.60 Women who read the book's description on Am-
azon will likely agree that "[u]nder-eaming is an insidious problem," but
they may be surprised to learn that it is a problem "with psychological
roots that run deep.",61 But the book's description also provides ready (if
demeaning) reassurance, along with an expert plan for women to cure
their ills:
Luckily, there's help. This book is a practical, step-by-step guide for
under-earning women who are ready to turn their lives around. It de-
mystifies the process of under-earning, explores its underlying psy-
chological and emotional issues, and offers practical advice and strat-
egies to help overcome it. Why Women Earn Less explains how you
can be better paid for the work you do. It maps out, on a practical
level, how to overcome the bad habits that contribute to earning less
than you deserve. As you do so, you will find yourself not only bene-
fiting from an improved bottom line, but also enjoying a renewed
sense of optimism and personal satisfaction.
62
On the heels of Women Don't Ask followed a wealth of other self-
help books, all from "experts" who purport to have diagnosed the inter-
nal causes for women's unequal pay and who provide treatment plans for
56. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK 1, supra note 54, at 1-4, 17-129.
57. LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT: HOW WOMEN CAN USE THE POWER
OF NEGOTIATION TO GET WHAT THEY REALLY WANT (2008) [hereinafter BABCOCK & LASCHEVER,
ASK FOR IT].
58. See Ask for It: How Women Can Use Negotiation to Get What They Really Want,
AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Ask-For-lt-Negotiation-Really-ebook/dp/B00I3TTLBQ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT, supra note 57).
59. Id.
60. MIKELANN R. VALTERRA, WHY WOMEN EARN LESS: HOW TO MAKE WHAT YOU'RE
REALLY WORTH (2004).
61. Why Women Earn Less: How to Make What You're Really Worth, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/BO04SPD94C/ref=s9 wish co d99 g351_il (last visited Apr.
5, 2014) (describing VALTERRA, supra note 60).
62. Id.
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women to narrow the gap.63 In Nice Girls Don't Get the Corner Office:
101 Unconscious Mistakes Women Make that Sabotage Their Careers,
women can learn how to fix the "girlish behaviors" that "[s]abotage
[t]heir [c]areers."' In Pushback. How Smart Women Ask-and Stand
Up-for What They Want, a leadership consultant provides women with
the "self-advocacy" tools to get "what is rightlfully yours."65 The authors
of Hardball for Women show women "how to break patterns of behavior
that have put them at a disadvantage in the business world of men.,
66
And for women who still remain uncured, there are many other expert
treatments to try, such as See Jane Lead: 99 Ways for Women to Take
Charge at Work,67 and Her Place at the Table: A Woman's Guide to Ne-
gotiating Five Key Challenges to Leadership Success.68 For women who
care both about the gender wage gap and about their appearance, there is
even a guide for addressing deficits in both arenas simultaneously: The
Go-Getter Girl's Guide: Get What You Want in Work and Life (and Look
Great While You're at It).69
This internal causal narrative reached even loftier heights and great-
er perceived legitimacy when Facebook's Chief Operating Officer, Sher-
yl Sandberg, began promoting her new book, Lean In: Women, Work,
and the Will to Lead.70 Now women's personal deficits have a packaged
sound bite to go with them-the failure to lean in. In two sentences in the
63. See Elzer, supra note 52, at 3 (describing the emergence of books and websites over the
past decade that "teach[] women to be better negotiators," and arguing that they depend upon an
"underlying premise.., that women are not as good at negotiating as men are").
64. Nice Girls Don't Get the Corner Office: 101 Unconscious Mistakes Women Make that
Sabotage Their Careers, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Nice-Girls-Dont-Corner-
Office/dp/0446693316/ref=pd sim b 2 (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing LOIS P. FRANKEL,
NICE GIRLS DON'T GET THE CORNER OFFICE: 101 UNCONSCIOUS MISTAKES WOMEN MAKE THAT
SABOTAGE THEIR CAREERS (2010)).
65. Pushback: How Smart Women Ask-and Stand Up-for What They Want, AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/Pushback-Smart-Women-Ask-Up/dp/1 118104900/ref=pd sim b 13/ (last
visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing SELENA REZVANI, PUSHBACK: HOW SMART WOMEN ASK-AND
STAND UP-FOR WHAT THEY WANT (2012)).
66. Hardball for Women, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/HardbalI-Women-Revised-Pat-
Heim/dp/0452286417/ref=pdsim b 7 (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (describing PAT HElM & SUSAN K.
GOLANT, HARDBALL FOR WOMEN (rev'd ed. 2005)).
67. LOIS P. FRANKEL, SEE JANE LEAD: 99 WAYS FOR WOMEN TO TAKE CHARGE AT WORK
(2009).
68. DEBORAH M. KOLB, JUDITH WILLIAMS & CAROL FROHL[NGER, HER PLACE AT THE
TABLE: A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO NEGOTIATING FIVE KEY CHALLENGES TO LEADERSHIP SUCCESS
(2010); see also DEBORAH M. KOLB & JUDITH WILLIAMS, THE SHADOW NEGOTIATION: HOW
WOMEN CAN MASTER THE HIDDEN AGENDAS THAT DETERMINE BARGAINING SUCCESS (2000); LEE
E. MILLER & JESSICA MILLER, A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATING: HOW TO
CONVINCE, COLLABORATE, AND CREATE YOUR WAY TO AGREEMENT (2002). A second edition of
the Millers' book was published in 2010 sporting a book cover telling women to "never be taken
advantage of again." See LEE E. MILLER & JESSICA MILLER, A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO SUCCESSFUL
NEGOTIATING (2d ed. 2010) (cover photo available at http://www.amazon.com/Womans-
Successfful-Negotiating-Second-Edition/dp/0071746501 ).
69. DEBRA SHIGLEY, THE GO-GETTER GIRL'S GUIDE: GET WHAT YOU WANT IN WORK AND
LIFE (AND LOOK GREAT WHILE YOU'RE AT IT) (2009).
70. SHERYL SANDBERG WITH NELL SCOVELL, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO
LEAD (2013).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
book's introduction, Sandberg acknowledges criticisms about the internal
causal narrative upon which her advice is built: "I know some believe
that by focusing on what women can change themselves-pressing them
to lean in-it seems like I am letting our institutions off the hook," she
notes, "[o]r even worse, they accuse me of blaming the victim. ' '71 But
rather than engaging those critiques, she brushes them aside, saying "I
have heard these criticisms in the past and I know that I will hear
them... in the future., 72 "The time is long overdue," she proceeds un-
daunted, "to encourage more women to dream the possible dream.73 The
dream is "possible," according to Sandberg-despite the fact that the
gender wage gap still exists fifty years after the enactment of Title VII-
because women themselves are a cause of their own workplace inequali-
ty and therefore should be able to implement a cure. "We move closer to
the larger goal of true equality," she proclaims, "with each woman who
,,74leans in.
To Sandberg's credit, she is one of the few self-designated experts
advising women on negotiation skills to acknowledge the flawed as-
sumption that women will narrow the gender pay gap simply by negotiat-
ing to the same degree and in the same manner as men. "[W]e need to
recognize that women often have good cause to be reluctant to advocate
for their own interests," Sandberg wisely cautions, "because doing so can
easily backfire., 75 "For men," she explains, "there is truly no harm in
asking," because society expects men to advocate on their own behalf.
76
"But since women are expected to be concerned with others," Sandberg
explains, "when they advocate for themselves or point to their own val-
ue, both men and women react unfavorably.,77 Sandberg is correct. Re-
search reveals that evaluators resist working with a woman colleague if
they know she has negotiated for higher pay because the mere act of self-
advocacy violates female gender norms, which results in the woman be-
ing perceived as too demanding and less likeable.78
71. Id. at 10-11.
72. Id. at 11.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 45. This statement is well supported by social science research. See infra notes 136-
40.
76. SANDBERG, supra note 70, at 45.
77. Id.
78. See Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Lei Lai, Social Incentives for Gender Differ-
ences in the Propensity to Initiate Negotiations: Sometimes It Does Hurt to Ask, 103
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 84-95 (2007) (describing findings
from a series of empirical studies); Hannah Riley Bowles & Linda Babcock, When Doesn't It Hurt
Her to Ask? Framing and Justification Reduce the Social Risks of Initiating Compensation Negotia-
tions 2 (Dec. 14, 2008) (unpublished conference paper), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-l1316162 (noting that "[i]n multiple studies, researchers have found evalua-
tors to be significantly less inclined to work with a woman who attempts to negotiate for higher
compensation as compared to one who does not"); Hannah Riley Bowles & Kathleen L. McGinn,
Untapped Potential in the Study of Negotiation and Gender Inequality in Organizations, 2 ACAD.
MGMT. ANNALS 99, 109 (2008) (summarizing research finding that "participants were significantly
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But despite being aware of this research, Sandberg focuses her p o-
posals neither on the employment decision makers (her peers) who act on
these gender stereotypes, nor on the situational constraints in workplace
negotiations that systematically disadvantage women. Instead she focus-
es on women themselves. Sandberg advises women to adopt a "commu-
nal approach" to their negotiations, which she analogizes to "cross[ing] a
minefield backward in high heels.79 She instructs women to "provide a
legitimate explanation for the negotiation," to "invok[e] common inter-
ests, emphasiz[e] larger goals, and [to] approach[] the negotiation as
solving a problem as opposed to taking a critical stance."80 For this to be
effective, Sandberg advises, women must "combine niceness with insist-
ence" and be sure to "smil[e] frequently," while "expressing appreciation
and concern." 81
When a woman executive as successful as Sheryl Sandberg-who
has access to such a powerful platform upon which to engage the public
about issues of gender inequality in pay and career advancement-
nevertheless uses that platform to advise women to "smil[e] frequent-
ly," 82 it demonstrates the depths to which the internal causal narrative has
been absorbed and accepted in our society. This is not to say that Sand-
berg is providing erroneous advice. In fact, it is well-founded in the psy-
chological literature.83 But the fact that researchers have been able to
identify and document the situational constraints and the invidious gen-
der stereotypes that affect employment decision makers' reactions to
women in the workplace renders even less defensible the continued un-
willingness to confront the institutional discrimination that underlies the
gender wage gap.
84
less inclined to work with a woman who had attempted to negotiate as compared to one who had
stayed mum, and male participants consistently penalized women more than men for attempting to
negotiate"); see also Ramachandran, supra note 4, at 1060 (explaining that "even when [women] do
stand up for themselves, they may be penalized for it").
79. SANDBERG, supra note 70, at 47-48.
80. Id.
81. Id at 48.
82. Id.
83. See Hannah Riley Bowles & Linda Babcock, How Can Women Escape the Compensation
Negotiation Dilemma? Relational Accounts Are One Answer, 37 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 80, 91
(2012) [hereinafter Bowles & Babcock, How Can Women Escape] (concluding from two empirical
studies "that female negotiators can reduce social resistance to their self-advocacy and improve their
negotiation outcomes if they legitimize their requests in a manner that also communicates their
concern for organizational relationships"); Bowles & Babcock, When Doesn't It Hurt Her to Ask?,
supra note 78 (manuscript at 1) (finding in a series of empirical studies that women may reduce the
social risks of initiating negotiations for higher pay by "using a communal frame to communicate
concern for relationships" or "justifying the request with external validation," such as an external job
offer).
84. If Sandberg had framed her advice differently, the immediate value that it may provide to
women who are poised near the top of professional careers (and who therefore cannot wait for struc-
tural or legal reforms) might have outweighed the downside of publicly reinforcing the internal
causal narrative of women's workplace inequality. Rather than suggesting that her book is a new
"feminist manifesto," see SANDBERG, supra note 70, at 9, she could have explicitly recognized the
necessary role that employers play in sustaining women's inequality and the illegitimacy of placing
2014)
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While the pervasiveness of the internal causal narrative in our socie-
ty is pernicious enough on its own, even more disappointing is the way in
which Title VII has invited this narrative into legal doctrine. In doing so,
Title VII reinforces rather than disrupts this powerful source of pay ine-
quality. Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating on the
basis of sex, race, color, religion or national origin in hiring, firing, com-
pensation, or other "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."
85
However, § 703(h) of Title VII-known as "the Bennett Amendment"-
carves out an exception that applies only to claims of compensation dis-
crimination and only to the protected status of sex, thereby providing less
legal protection only for sex-based discrimination in pay.86
The Bennett Amendment states that "[i]t shall not be an unlawful
employment practice ... for any employer to differentiate upon the basis
of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation
paid... if such differentiation is authorized by the [Equal Pay Act]. 87
The Equal Pay Act (EPA), enacted prior to Title VII, prohibits employers
that are covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act from paying women
less than men for "equal work" on jobs requiring "equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions."88 The EPA contains four exceptions for pay differentials that are
based on: (1) "a seniority system"; (2) "a merit system"; (3) "a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production"; or (4)
"any other factor other than sex."89 The Bennett Amendment incorpo-
rates these four defenses to gender-based compensation discrimination
claims from the EPA into Title VII, which means that an employer will
not violate Title VII by discriminating against women in their pay if the
causal responsibility on women, but then described her advice as an interim step that might provide
some immediate assistance for those women in privileged situations that enable them to "lean in,"
while continuing to pursue the more important and longer-term task of changing the organizational
norms that disadvantage women. For a similar book that successfully achieves this constructive
balance, see JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL DEMPSEY, WHAT WORKS FOR WOMEN AT WORK: FOUR
PATTERNS WORKING WOMEN NEED TO KNOW (2014).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012).
86. Id. § 2000e-2(h). Congress also grants differential protection levels against intentional
discrimination by not subjecting race and color to the bona fide occupational qualification defense to
disparate treatment claims, see id § 2000e-2(e)(l), and by granting a modest accommodation right
for religion, see id. § 2000e(j).
87. Id. § 2000e-2(h). The legislative history of the Bennett Amendment is very limited. See
Pamela L. Perry, Let Them Become Professionals: An Analysis of the Failure to Enforce Title Vii's
Pay Equity Mandate, 14 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 127, 160 & n.140, 161 (1991) (summarizing the
Bennett Amendment's legislative history). The protected status of sex was not added to Title VII
until two days before the House vote, and it was not until the House version was on the Senate floor
for final consideration that Senator Bennett offered his Amendment as a concern arose over possible
inconsistencies between Title VII and the EPA. See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171-
73 (1981); 110 CONG. REC. 13310, 13647 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
89. Id.
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pay differences are based on seniority, merit, or production systems, or
on "any other factor other than sex.
9 °
Sex-based compensation discrimination claims are still cognizable
under Title VII, which theoretically remains broader than the EPA be-
cause it does not limit antidiscrimination protection only to situations in
which lower paid women are performing substantially similar work as
higher paid men.9' But the "any other factor other than sex" defense has
dramatically undercut the efficacy of Title VII's protection against sex-
based pay discrimination by opening the door to internal causal narra-
tives that shield the gender pay gap from legal review. This is particular-
ly true in the context of disparate impact claims, which otherwise would
have the most potential for redressing employer pay practices that base
92compensation in full or in part on individual employee negotiations.
A Title VII disparate impact claim requires proof that a facially neu-
tral particular employment practice causes women to experience substan-
tially different outcomes than men.93 The employer must then defend the
practice by demonstrating that it is "job related" and "consistent with
business necessity."94 If the employer meets that burden, the plaintiff
may still succeed by showing that a less discriminatory alternative em-
ployment practice exists that serves the employer's business needs.95 If a
plaintiff succeeds in a disparate impact case, the plaintiff may receive
back pay but is not entitled to compensatory or punitive damages, or to a
jury trial.96 The power of a disparate impact claim is that it enables a
97court to enjoin the illegal employment practice. In a pay equity case, a
court could force an employer to eliminate the challenged wage-setting
90. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 167-80; see also Charles B. Craver, If Women Don't Ask: Impli-
cations for Bargaining Encounters, the Equal Pay Act, and Title VII, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1104,
1118-22 (2004) (describing how the Bennett Amendment affects Title VII claims); Porter, Synergis-
tic Solutions, supra note 40, at 830-31 (same).
91. See Craver, supra note 90, at 1118; see also Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Var-
tanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 180
(2011) (noting that unlike the EPA, "Title VII extends to pay discrimination involving dissimilar
jobs").
92. See Perry, supra note 87, at 159 (describing how "the Bennett Amendment has proven to
be a barrier to many sex-based wage discrimination cases that rely on the disparate impact doctrine
of Title VII").
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2012).
94. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1 )(A)(i).
95. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (k)(l)(C).
96. See id. § 1981(b).
97. See id. § 2002e-2(k)(l)(A)(i); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (hold-
ing that "[i]f an employment practice which operates to exclude [members of a protected class]
cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited"); see also Travis, supra
note 21, at 373-74 (describing the remedy for a disparate impact claim); Stewart J. Schwab & Ste-
ven L. Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1197, 1238 (2003) (explaining that "[t]he standard judicial remedy in a Title VII disparate impact
case requires the employer to change the policy or standard for everybody").
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practice and require the employer to set up an alternative method for
establishing employees' pay.98
Unfortunately, courts have been very willing to allow employers to
use the factor other than sex defense as a way to sidestep disparate im-
pact law by shifting causal attention away from the employer's role in
wage setting and onto other causal sources.99 The Bennett Amendment's
incorporation of the factor other than sex defense allows the law to ig-
nore one of the necessary causes, i.e., the employer, in what is really a
multiple-necessary-cause scenario. Employers have used this strategy
effectively with external causal narratives that invoke a variety of mar-
ket-related excuses for gender pay disparities, as well as with internal
causal narratives that invoke women's own "choices" as the cause of
their own pay inequality.10 0
As the women don't ask narrative gained prominence socially, em-
ployers also have seized upon this specific version of an internal causal
narrative to continue shielding themselves from legal liability for sex-
based pay discrimination claims. Many courts have rejected gender pay
equity claims by accepting an employer's argument that women's failure
to negotiate as successfully as men supports the factor other than sex
defense.'0' Even the EEOC has bought into this causal narrative, as illus-
trated in its compliance manual that lists examples of gender wage dis-
parities that it would not consider to be violations of the EPA."2 One
listed example is when an employer gave "the same opening offer" to
both a male and female employee, but the female employee "ended up
with a lower starting salary" because she "did not bargain as assertively
as the male."'1 3 Not only does the term "assertively" itself reflect gender
stereotypes, but the EEOC also ignores social science research demon-
strating that a woman who negotiates in the same manner as a man is
likely to be penalized for her efforts, both by obtaining less favorable
98. See Chamallas, supra note 20, at 581, 611 (describing a disparate impact remedy in the
pay equity context).
99. See Travis, supra note 21, at 348 (explaining how employers "falsely dichotomiz[e]" the
causes of women's workplace inequality and use causes outside the workplace to skirt the applica-
tion of Title VII law); Travis, supra note 8, at 54 (observing that "courts often implicitly decide
whether to view the employee or the employer as the 'cause' of the employment event at issue").
100. See Travis, supra note 21, at 348-49 (compiling case law allowing employers to use a
"market," "choice," or "lack of interest" defense to Title VII disparate impact claims (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
101. Elzer, supra note 52, at 10-21 (summarizing case law and finding that, "[a]lmost without
exception, courts hold that salary negotiation is a valid 'factor other than sex' that justifies an em-
ployer paying a man more than a woman who performs substantially equal work"); see Rabin-
Margalioth, supra note 24, at 807-23 (analyzing employers' legal success in justifying gender pay
differentials on the basis of "market forces," including "individual pay demands" and "bargaining
effectiveness"); Ramachandran, supra note 4, at 1047 (explaining how courts are "reluctant to hold
employers liable for discrimination that results, in part, from ... the socialization of women ... to
negotiate less aggressively").
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results in the wage negotiation and by suffering residual dislike by other
workers who then perceive her as overly aggressive.104
While most of these claims have been formally styled as alleged
EPA violations,10 5 the Bennett Amendment incorporates this causal bar-
rier into Title VII. Even though an employer's selection of a pay-setting
practice that relies upon individual employee negotiation is, by defini-
tion, another necessary cause of the gender pay disparity, the Bennett
Amendment effectively allows that practice to avoid scrutiny by block-
ing the claim before getting to the business necessity defense, which
would require an employer to justify its practice.106 This risk of undercut-
ting Title VIi's ability to address facially neutral but discriminatory pay
practices through a broad application of the factor other than sex defense
has been compounded by Supreme Court dicta suggesting that the Ben-
nett Amendment may bar the use of the disparate impact theory altogeth-
er in the context of sex-based pay equity claims.0 7 This dicta suggests
that the legal gap is even wider between the protection that is provided
for women's pay disparities and all other forms of status-based employ-
ment discrimination.
The women don't ask narrative has become so accepted that even
legislators who have recognized the inadequacy of our existing legal
tools for combatting the gender pay gap are willing to reinforce it and
lend it credibility. The internal causal attribution has found its way into
104. See supra note 78 and infra notes 136-40.
105. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 174-75, 178-79 (summarizing cases in which
employers successfully defended EPA claims by using the excuse that "the male has negotiated for
more pay").
106. See Rabin-Margalioth, supro note 24, at 812 & n.24 (analyzing how employers have
successfully argued under existing law "that there is no legal obligation to offer individual workers
more than their initial pay demands, even if implementation of a wage scheme based on employee
wage demands ultimately disadvantages women").
107. In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court held that disparate impact claims are
cognizable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005) (plurality
opinion). In reaching that holding, the Court stated that "if Congress intended to prohibit all dispar-
ate-impact claims, it certainly could have done so," and it then used the EPA as an example. Id. at
239 n. I. "For instance, in the Equal Pay Act," noted the Court, "Congress barred recovery if a pay
differential was based 'on any other factor'-reasonable or unreasonable-'other than sex."' Id
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012)). Many commentators have read this dicta as a potential bar
on disparate impact claims for sex-based pay equity under Title VII, which incorporates the "any
other factor other than sex" defense from the EPA. See, e.g., William E. Doyle Jr., Implications of
Smith v. City of Jackson on Equal Pay Act Claims and Sex-Based Pay Discrimination Claims under
Title VII, 21 LAB. LAW. 183, 183-85, 188-90 (2005) (arguing that the "implication" from the Smith
dicta "is that the disparate impact theory is ruled out as a basis for sex-based pay discrimination
claims under Title VII"); Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 40, at 831 (explaining that Su-
preme Court dicta has made it "unclear" whether disparate impact claims for sex-based wage dis-
crimination are cognizable); Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 24, at 828 (describing the dicta in Smith
as "a strong suggestion ... that the EPA's fourth affirmative defense effectively rules out disparate
impact" claims under Title VII). But see Perry, supra note 87, at 158-74 (arguing that courts have
incorrectly interpreted the Bennett Amendment to constrain Title VII disparate impact claims); Mark
B. Seidenfeld, Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under the Title VII Disparate Impact Doc-
trine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1083, 1088-95 (1982) (arguing that the Bennett Amendment should not
preclude Title VII disparate impact claims for sex-based wage discrimination).
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the text of one of the most progressive pieces of proposed legislation that
is backed by some of the most progressive women in Congress: the
Paycheck Fairness Act (PFA).'°8 The PFA's goal is "to provide more
effective remedies to victims of discrimination in the payment of wages
on the basis of sex."10 9 The bill recognizes the importance of eliminating
the gender pay gap not only to "reduc[e] the number of working women
earning unfairly low wages," but also to enhance "women's retirement
security," to "reduc[e] the dependence on public assistance," and to
"promot[e] stable families by enabling all family members to earn a fair
rate of pay." 10 To achieve these goals, the bill seeks to expand the
EPA's impact by narrowing the factor other than sex defense to apply
only to "a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or
experience.""' The PFA also would require an employer to demonstrate
that the factor is job-related and consistent with business necessity, and it
would give employees the opportunity to demonstrate "that an alternative
employment practice exists that would serve the same business purpose
without producing such differential."
'"1 2
If the bill stopped there, it could indeed go a significant distance
toward restoring disparate impact claims in the context of gender-based
compensation."3 But the PFA includes an additional provision that im-
plicitly endorses and entrenches the internal causal narrative that the bill
is designed to dismantle. Section 5 of the PFA is titled, "Negotiation
Skills Training for Girls and Women."'" 14 This section would authorize
the Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the Secretary of Education,
to establish a competitive grant program for selected public agencies,
private nonprofits, and community-based organizations to "carry out an
effective negotiation skills training program that empowers girls and
women."" 5 According to the Act, funded programs would "help girls and
women strengthen their negotiation skills to allow the girls and women
108. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/1l3/s84. A version of The Paycheck Fairness Act was first
introduced by then-Senator Hillary Clinton and Representative Rosa DeLauro in 2005. See Paycheck
Fairness Act, S. 841, 109th Cong. (2005). The most recent version was sponsored by Senator Barba-
ra Mikulski, along with cosponsors Senators Barbara Boxer and Dianne Feinstein, among other
prominent women democrats. See Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84.
109. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84.
110. Id. § 2(3)(B), (4)(C)(ii)-(iii).
I1l. Id. § 3(a)(2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. § 3(a)(3). The Paycheck Fairness Act would also prohibit employers from retaliating
against employees for discussing wages with co-workers, id § 3(b), would increase penalties, in-
cluding compensatory and punitive damage awards, id. § 3(c), and would allow class actions, id.
§ 3(c)(4).
113. See Elzer, supra note 52, at 30-33 (analyzing the potential effect of the Paycheck Fairness
Act on claims targeting negotiation); see also Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 195-202 (ana-
lyzing how the PFA would affect EPA cases in which an employer invokes a market excuse to
justify a gender pay disparity).
114. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84 § 5.
115. Id. § 5(a).
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to obtain higher salaries and rates of compensation that are equal to those
paid to similarly situated male employees."
'" 6
While empowering girls and women is certainly a laudable goal and
one that is difficult to criticize in the abstract, this particular form of
"empowerment" rests on the assumptions that women's negotiation skills
are deficient, that experts can treat the deficiency, and that women them-
selves are responsible for moving their wages to an "equal" level with
similarly situated men. Moreover, the PFA's validation of the relevance
of gender-based negotiation skills may enable employers to successfully
invoke differences in negotiation outcomes as a "bona fide factor other
than sex,"'1 17 which would undermine the PFA's attempt to narrow that
broad-based efense in the first place."
8
The PFA highlights how little progress the women's rights move-
ment has made in resisting the internal causal attribution that places re-
sponsibility for the gender pay gap within women themselves. The disa-
bility rights movement, in contrast, has made tremendous strides in dis-
mantling the internal causal attribution narrative that historically pre-
vented its members from holding employers responsible for the work-
place inequality faced by individuals with disabilities. That success was
achieved by replacing the medical model of disability with the social
model of disability, which shifted the causal focus from individuals onto
employers-a shift that is also needed in the context of the gender pay
gap.
II. LEARNING FROM THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT: USING THE
SOCIAL MODEL TO SHIFT CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS TO EMPLOYERS
The social model of disability provides a theory that might help
overcome the common barrier that women who experience wage ine-
quality share with individuals with disabilities. This model recognizes
the socially constructed nature of a marginalized and therefore limiting
116. Id. § 5(a)(5).
117. Id. § 3(a)(2) (internal quotation mark omitted).
118. But see Elzer, supra note 52, at 33 (suggesting that the presence of the negotiation funding
provision would improve plaintiffs' chances for success in an EPA claim challenging unequal pay
resulting from individual negotiations because "courts would be more likely to account for [gender
differences in negotiation] if a statute authorized government-funded negotiation training programs
designed for the express purpose of teaching women and girls how to obtain higher salaries"). The
PFA also includes a brief provision stating that the EEOC "shall provide training to ... affected
individuals and entities on matters involving discrimination in the payment of wages," Paycheck
Fairness Act, S. 84 § 4, and a longer provision on "Research, Education, and Outreach," which
would require the Secretary of Labor to "conduct studies and provide information to employers,
labor organizations, and the general public concerning the means available to eliminate pay dispari-
ties between men and women," id. § 6. While these provisions are on the right track in attempting to
combat the institutional sources of the gender wage gap, neither provision contains details about
what such training, studies, and information would contain, nor does it identify any of the known
sources of the gender wage disparity, including employers' stereotypic reliance upon and reactions
to individual employee negotiations. It leaves open the possibility that employers will simply be
educated about women's own deficient negotiation skills as a source of the gender pay gap.
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status, and it uses that recognition as a tool to shift causal attributions
both in society and in the law.
A. The Social Model of Disability
Members of the disability civil rights movement recognized that re-
ducing stigma and achieving meaningful antidiscrimination protection
would first require combatting the internal causal attribution that was
entrenched in the medical model of disability. "9 The movement therefore
unified around a central goal of reconceptualizing disability not as an
inherently limiting individual trait but rather as a social construct created
by the interaction between mental or physical characteristics and contin-
gent aspects of our environment that impose restrictions.'20
Under the social model, the term "impairment" is used solely to de-
scribe a mental or physical condition, which is not inherently limiting
independent from the context and environment in which it interacts.121 A
"disability," in contrast, refers not to an internal attribute, but instead to
the limitations that are socially "imposed on top of one's impairment."'
' 22
The social model is thus best understood not as a normative stance or
123policy prescription, but rather as a causal attribution theory. It provides
a theoretical basis for shifting from an internal to an external causal at-
tribution to explain the source of inequality for individuals with impair-
ments.124 The crowning achievement of the social model of disability
was to shift causal responsibility for workplace inequality away from
individuals' physical and mental impairments and onto the "architectural,
social, and economic environment" that renders those impairments limit-
ing. 1
25
119. See Travis, supra note 47, at 943; see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 48, at 13 (describing
"the endorsement of a social rather than a medical model of disability" as "the one position that
approaches consensus within the movement").
120. See Travis, supra note 47, at 943; see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 48, at 18 (describing
the social model of disability); Crossley, supra note 50, at 653-55 (explaining that "the social model
of disability sees disadvantages as flowing from social systems and structures"); Chai R. Feldblum,
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What
Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 100 (2000) (describing the social mod-
el's understanding that "actual limitations that flow from an individual's physical or mental impair-
ment often result from the manner in which society itself is structured"); Shakespeare, supra note 49,
at 268 (explaining that the social model views disability as "a relationship between people with
impairment and a disabling society").
121. See Shakespeare, supra note 49, at 268; Travis, supra note 47, at 944; Shelley Tremain,
On the Government of Disability, 27 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 617, 620 (2001).
122. Tremain, supra note 121, at 620; Travis, supra note 47, at 944 (describing the social
model's distinction between impairment and disability).
123. See Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
1251, 1251, 1255 (2007); see also Travis, supra note 47, at 944 (describing the social model as a
causal theory).
124. See Samaha, supra note 123, at 1255; Travis, supra note 47, at 944.
125. Samaha, supra note 123, at 1255; Travis, supra note 47, at 944 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The social model not only unified very diverse members of the dis-
ability rights movement, but it also provided the foundation for legal and
policy change. The most significant result was congressional enactment
of the ADA's reasonable accommodation mandate.126 The accommoda-
tion mandate recognizes that both an individual's impairment and aspects
of the workplace are multiple necessary causes of an individual's inabil-
ity to perform essential job tasks. The accommodation mandate therefore
obligates employers to make reasonable modifications to workplace
practices, policies, structures, and norms in order to reduce the functional
effects of impairments that otherwise are not inherently limiting. By ren-
dering legally irrelevant the particular diagnosis, the specific source, or
the potential treatments for an individual's impairment, the ADA also
shifted power away from medical experts.1
27
The social model of disability has not achieved all of the goals of
the disability rights movement, nor is it without shortcomings.28 But it
has achieved far more progress than the women's rights movement has
achieved in delegitimizing the internal causal narrative for the gender
pay gap and resting power away from negotiation "experts" who are be-
ing increasingly empowered to diagnose and cure women's deficiencies.
Social model theorists did not undertake this momentous shift all on
their own. To the contrary, early social modelists actually borrowed from
and leveraged certain aspects of feminist legal theory-in particular,
theories about the socially constructed nature of gender-in order to de-
velop and ground the social model of disability.129 As Professor Carlos
Ball has explained, it was feminist theory that led disability rights advo-
cates "to grapple with the social contexts that often determine whether
particular physical or mental impairments translate into disabilities.'
' 30
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).
127. See Strassburger, supra note 38, at 364 (explaining that "[i]n the social model of disabil-
ity, doctors are no longer the center of the story"); Travis, supra note 47, at 975-76 (describing one
goal of the social model of disability as trying to delegitimize "the medical model's abdication of
control to medical professionals"). This shift was strengthened in the Americans with Disabilities
Act Amendments Act of 2008, which clarified that one's disability status is assessed in an unmiti-
gated state, rendering irrelevant the potential medical treatments that are available to ameliorate an
impairment. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)).
128. See, e.g., Areheart, supra note 49, at 192-225 (explaining the ways in which "the medical
model remains firmly entrenched" in social and legal context, despite the movement's focus on the
social model of disability); Travis, supra note 47, at 975-76 (explaining that one shortcoming of the
social model of disability is that it left the definition of impairment in the hands of medical profes-
sionals, "which is precisely what the social model of disability had intended to undermine by replac-
ing the medical model").
129. See, e.g., Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 22 (describing the work by early social model
theorist Susan Wendell); see also Carlos A. Ball, Lookingfor Theory in All the Right Places: Femi-
nist and Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 105, 141-42
(2005) (explaining how disability discrimination law is built upon "the feminist position on differ-
ence and equality," and arguing that "[w]hat disability discrimination law demands is something
much closer to the understanding of equality held by feminist theory, one sensitive and attuned to
issues of difference").
130. Ball, supra note 129, at 134-35.
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Such borrowing, however, has generally occurred in the direction of dis-
ability rights advocates seeking to align with gender theory, rather than
the reverse.' At this important juncture fifty years after the enactment
of Title VII, it is time for women's advocates to claim the social model
as a tool with untapped potential for combatting the gender pay gap. 32
B. A Social Model of the Gender Pay Gap
The women don't ask narrative is analogous to the medical model
of disability in that it focuses on perceived deficiencies within the indi-
viduals who are experiencing workplace inequality, and it therefore looks
to experts to provide a treatment or cure. In the disability context, the
medical model viewed impairments as deficits and sought help from
medical professionals, while in the gender context, the women don't ask
narrative views women's approach to negotiation as a deficit and seeks
help from psychologists and negotiation experts. Applying a social mod-
el to the gender pay gap would make explicit the fact that gender pay
disparities are actually the result of the interaction between the way in
which women negotiate and the environment in which that negotiation
occurs. A social model would recognize that the use of an employment
practice that sets wages based in whole or in part on individual bargain-
ing without pay transparency is what renders "disabling" any unique
aspects of women's negotiation style.
One critical result of the social model of disability was to reveal that
physical and mental impairments are merely differences that are not in-
herently limiting outside of the context in which they interact. Applying
a social model to the gender pay gap would similarly provide a way to
push women's negotiation differences from the normative realm into the
merely descriptive. A social model reveals that any unique aspects of
women's approach to negotiation are not necessarily deficits outside of
an environment that renders them limiting in obtaining equal pay. In oth-
er words, a social model prevents observers from ignoring context. It
recognizes when a multiple-necessary-cause scenario exists, and it forces
attention onto the situational cause that is otherwise overshadowed by the
personal. Specifically, it focuses attention onto the aspects of an employ-
er's compensation system that are necessary to produce the gender pay
131. See Alemzadeh, supra note 34, at 30 (observing that the recent move to characterize
pregnancy as a disability has been launched by disability scholars, "rather than from an advocate
focusing primarily on pregnancy rights"). A notable exception is scholars who have used the ADA's
accommodation mandate to provide comparators for supporting broader accommodation rights under
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in
the Workplace, 25 STETSON L. REV. 1, 27-38 (1995); Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Inter-
action of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 1004-11, 1018-35 (2013).
132. Cf Strassburger, supra note 38, at 338-39 (arguing that "transgender, transsexual, and
otherwise gender-variant or genderqueer activists can benefit from gender identity protections in-
formed by the social model of disability" because the social model provides "a stronger long-term
theoretical construct" than those offered by sex discrimination law (footnote omitted)).
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gap. In doing so, the social model would shift power away from "ex-
perts" who, under the current internal causal narrative, are needed to
diagnose and treat women's negotiation deficiencies, which is a process
that itself carries economic and psychological costs.
33
Just as the social model of disability does not deny that physical and
mental impairments exist, a social model of the gender pay gap does not
need to reject the existence of general differences in the ways that wom-
en as a group and men as a group approach wage negotiations on their
own behalf. The authors of Women Don 't Ask persuasively demonstrate,
for example, that women negotiate their starting salaries and ask for rais-
es less frequently than men,'34 and a body of research supports that con-
clusion. 35 The social model merely reveals that those differences are
only deficits because of the employment practices that render them so-
in other words, the differences may be socially real but legally irrelevant.
The empirical research on the gender pay gap not only supports the
social model's notion that limitations are produced by the interaction
between internal differences and the social environment in which the
different individuals are engaged, but it also reveals that this interaction
is neither random nor neutral. To the contrary, this interaction is highly
dependent upon gender stereotypes and bias.'36 The research demon-
strates, for example, that employers react more negatively to and take
tougher positions against women who attempt to negotiate their wages
than employers do for men who engage in the same type of self-
advocacy.'37 In addition, evaluators-both men and women-tend to
133. Cf id. at 364 (arguing that the disability rights movement's shift "from a medical model
of disability to a social model" can benefit other marginalized groups, like members of the trans
community, to "avoid the economic and psychological costs" of using medical diagnoses "to secure
protections").
134. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK I, supra note 54, at 1-4, 17- 129.
135. See Bowles & McGinn, supra note 78, at 105-06 (summarizing research findings "sug-
gest[ing] that male managers and professionals negotiate higher starting pay than their female
peers"); Elzer, supra note 52, at 3-9, 34 (summarizing the social science research on gender differ-
ences in negotiation approaches and results, and concluding "that gender differences in negotiation
are real"); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 184-92 (summarizing research documenting wom-
en's differential propensity to negotiate for higher compensation than men); Rabin-Margalioth,
supra note 24, at 814-18 (summarizing research demonstrating that women as a group assess the
economic value of their work lower than men do when pay-rate information is unavailable, and that
there are "systemic differences in the way women and men approach and handle wage negotiation");
Ramachandran, supra note 4, at 1059-60 (summarizing research on the differential negotiation
patterns of women and men and how that contributes to the gender pay gap). See generally Charles
B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation Performance, 5 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 299 (1999) (describing differences in women's and men's negotiation styles).
136. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 164 (explaining that "when women do negoti-
ate, gender schemas can and do influence the way employers react").
137. See Bowles & McGinn, supra note 78, at 108-09 (summarizing studies finding that wom-
en will achieve less successful pay negotiation results than men when they "take a stereotypically
masculine approach and advocate assertively for their self-interest"); see also BABCOCK &
LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK I, supra note 54, at 87 (explaining that "an assertive woman, no
matter how well she presents her arguments in a negotiation, risks decreasing her likeability and
therefore her ability to influence the other side"); Elzer, supra note 52, at 2, 6-8 (summarizing
research demonstrating that "employers may react more negatively to women who do attempt to
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further penalize women for attempting to negotiate for higher pay by
deeming them less likeable and overly aggressive, and therefore being
less willing to work with them in the future.'38 Women's tendency not to
negotiate for higher wages is thus a "rational decision" that correctly
takes into account the fact that society "punish[es] women for being ag-
gressive."139 Gender differences in negotiation cannot meaningfully be
extricated from social context-"namely that men and women 'face dif-
ferent social incentives' when deciding whether to initiate negotia-
tion."' 14 In other words, internal differences in women's and men's ap-
proaches to negotiation are caused in part by external realities of the
workplace.
Social scientists have recognized the implications that this research
has for crafting solutions and legal reforms. Because the research
demonstrates that the differences in women's negotiation tendencies and
results are contingent upon the gender-biased environment in which the
negotiation takes place, social scientists have argued that we "should
shift the discussion of prescriptive implications away from fixing the
women to addressing the social conditions that motivate these gender
differences."'141 The social model used in the disability context would
provide a theoretical framework to help scaffold those views as advo-
cates try to combat the causal narrative not just socially but doctrinally as
well.
While the disability rights movement ultimately leveraged the social
model of disability into the reasonable accommodation mandate in disa-
bility discrimination law, the women's rights movement has significant
room to progress without yet needing to go that far. Applying the social
model to the gender wage gap could provide the basis for the more mod-
est step of jettisoning the Bennett Amendment and resuscitating the dis-
negotiate than they do to similarly-situated men"); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 184-95
(summarizing research showing that employers "react less favorably to" and "take a much tougher
stance against female employees who negotiate on their own behalf').
138. See supra notes 135-37; see also Elzer, supra note 52, at 7-9 (summarizing research
showing that "employers sometimes react more negatively toward women who negotiate than they
do towards male negotiators"); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 194 (concluding that "[s]elf-
promotion is so important for negotiating on one's own behalf and yet women are penalized for such
self-promotion").
139. Elzer, supra note 52, at 9.
140. Id. at 8-9 (quoting Bowles, Babcock & Lai, supra note 78, at 100); see also Bowles &
Babcock, How Can Women Escape, supra note 83, at 80-81 (summarizing research showing "that
women have good reason to be more reticent than men about negotiating for higher compensation
because women pay a higher social cost than men for doing so"). See generally Mary E. Wade,
Women and Salary Negotiation: The Costs of Self-Advocacy, 25 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 65 (2001)
(describing the social and psychological costs that women pay for self-advocacy).
141. Bowles, Babcock & Lai, supra note 78, at 100; see also Iris Bohnet & Hannah Riley
Bowles, Special Section: Gender in Negotiation: Introduction, 24 NEGOTIATION J. 389, 390 (2008)
(explaining that "what recent research has shown is that gender effects on negotiation are contingent
on situational factors"); Elzer, supra note 52, at 9 (arguing that the "shift in focus from internal
motivations to external factors" to explain why women negotiate less successfully makes it harder
for employers to "escape liability by claiming that their male employees are better negotiators").
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parate impact doctrine in the context of sex-based wage discrimination
claims. 142
The social model is entirely consistent with conventional disparate
impact doctrine. Disparate impact law always deals with situations in-
volving a facially neutral employment practice, which interacts with
some real difference that distinguishes the members of a protected group
from others, thereby producing disproportionate results. All disparate
impact claims involve multiple necessary causes-one cause being the
employer's practice and another being something that differentiates the
protected class members from others.43 An employer's neutral practice
could not disparately impact a particular group if the members of that
group did not differ from the members of another group in some mean-
ingful way.44 Yet disparate impact doctrine does not care whether those
distinguishing characteristics are "physical, social, or cultural in na-
ture."'145 In fact, disparate impact doctrine deems those distinguishing
characteristics irrelevant in assessing an employer's liability. 146 Disparate
impact doctrine "treats the employer's criterion as the cause of a dispari-
ty," even though it is only one of the necessary factors for producing the
outcome.47 The defining feature of disparate impact doctrine-what
makes this model "a distinct and powerful feature on the antidiscrimina-
tion landscape"-is its refusal to ignore the employer's causal role just
because there is some feature about the members of a protected group
that is also necessary to produce the disparate results.48 Professors Ra-
mona Paetzold and Steven Willbom describe this defining feature of
disparate impact theory as "causation with blinders.' 49
This multi-causal reality has not created a stumbling block for
courts in disparate impact claims based on statuses other than sex and in
contexts other than compensation.50 The Supreme Court's decision in
142. See Chamallas, supra note 20, at 581, 600, 606 (urging the need "to revive disparate
impact theory for use in pay equity disputes"); Perry, supra note 87, at 137 (arguing that "[t]he
judiciary's refusal to enforce pay equity as mandated by Title VIl's disparate impact theory must be
challenged"); Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 24, at 818 (arguing that an employer's use of individual
negotiations to set salaries adversely affects women and should support a disparate impact claim).
143. See Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View
of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 353 (1996) ("[E]very disparate impact case
depends on an adverse impact that is created jointly by social factors and the employer's employ-
ment practice."); Travis, supra note 21, at 349-50 (noting the multi-causal nature of all disparate
impact claims).
144. See Travis, supra note 21, at 349-50.
145. See id
146. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 143, at 354 (explaining that disparate impact doc-
trine "ignore[s] causes external to the employer that contribute to the impact," which means that
"employers may be held legally responsible for impacts that are 'caused' in substantial part by
factors external to the employers").
147. Id. at 353-54, 364 (emphasis added).
148. See id. at 364.
149. Id. at 353-54, 364.
150. See Travis, supra note 21, at 350.
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,15' in which the Court first recognized the
disparate impact theory under Title VII, is a prototypic example. 52 In
Griggs, the Court used the disparate impact doctrine to invalidate an em-
ployer's facially neutral practice of requiring applicants to have a high
school diploma, which at the time excluded African-American applicants
at a higher rate than white applicants.153 The fact that the disproportion-
ate results resulted both from the employer's hiring practice and from the
social reality that a lower percentage of African-Americans than whites
received high school diplomas did not prevent the Court from invalidat-
ing the hiring practice under the disparate impact doctrine. The em-
ployer was not permitted to point to African-Americans' lesser success in
completing high school as a way to shield itself from liability for its neu-
tral hiring practice, which it could not lawfully retain unless it could
demonstrate that it was job-related and consistent with business necessi-
ty.
55
Yet that is precisely what the Bennett Amendment permits employ-
ers to do in the context of gender pay equity claims. By incorporating the
EPA's factor other than sex defense into Title VII, the Bennett Amend-
ment reverses the typical causation blinders in a disparate impact claim
involving sex-based pay disparities. The factor other than sex defense not
only allows contributing factors that reside outside the employer to be-
come legally relevant, but it treats those factors as the cause of the gen-
der wage inequity. The Bennett Amendment permits employers to point
to women's lesser success in negotiation as a way to shield the employer
from liability for its facially neutral hiring practice that bases compensa-
tion on individual negotiation without pay transparency, thereby allow-
ing the employer's wage-setting practice to avoid scrutiny for business
necessity because the case never gets to the defense stage.'56 There is no
151. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
152. Id. at 431; see Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 143, at 352-53 (using Griggs to illustrate
"the multiple causation present in all disparate impact cases"); Travis, supra note 21, at 350 (analyz-
ing the multiple necessary causes in the Griggs case).
153. 401 U.S. at 436.
154. Id.; see Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 143, at 352-53 (explaining that the disparate
impact in Griggs was "caused" both by "the social conditions that resulted in a lower proportion of
blacks than whites with high school diplomas" and the employer's use of a high school diploma
requirement to make hiring decisions (internal quotation marks omitted)); Travis, supra note 21, at
350 (describing the multiple causes of the disparate impact in Griggs).
155. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 143, at 393 (explaining that evidence of "causative
factors" that have their source within the employees who are experiencing disproportionately nega-
tive employment outcomes are irrelevant in a disparate impact case).
156. Cf Perry, supra note 87, at 128, 131, 136-37 (arguing that disparate impact doctrine
should require courts to examine the business justification of any type of "pay-setting practice[]" that
is "consequentially preferential to men"). Even if an employer could overcome the business necessi-
ty hurdle, women could still win a disparate impact claim by demonstrating a less discriminatory
alternative pay-setting practice. Social science research could aid that endeavor by suggesting specif-
ic situational changes that reduce the potential effects of gender on negotiation outcomes. See, e.g.,
Hannah Riley Bowles, Linda Babcock & Kathleen L. McGinn, Constraints and Triggers: Situation-
al Mechanics of Gender in Negotiation, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 951, 952-58, 962
(2005). One example is to decrease situational and structural ambiguity, which means specifying
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legitimate reason to treat disparate impact claims differently in the con-
text of sex-based compensation practices.'57 But the internal causal narra-
tive of women's own responsibility for the gender wage gap-our failure
to lean in, to speak up, and to just ask-is so pervasive and entrenched
that it has rendered the employer's pay-setting practice invisible. Apply-
ing the social model of disability to the gender wage gap renders visible
the multiple necessary causes of gender pay disparities and focuses atten-
tion on the employer's causal role.
The social model thus supports elimination of the Bennett Amend-
ment from Title VII (or at least elimination of the factor other than sex
defense from the four defenses that the Amendment currently incorpo-
rates). While this proposal is similar to the PFA and to other scholars'
proposals for interpreting or applying the EPA's factor other than sex
defense more narrowly, 58 eliminating the Bennett Amendment from
Title VII would go further toward leveling the playing field for Title VII
claims, and it would do so by directly addressing the source of the prob-
lem.
The PFA only amends the EPA, and it does so by narrowing but not
eliminating the factor other than sex defense. The PFA would amend the
EPA to allow the factor other than sex defense to apply only to "a bona
fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience."'
159
The PFA then tracks the steps in a conventional Title VII disparate im-
pact claim, by requiring an employer to demonstrate that the factor is
job-related and consistent with business necessity, and allowing employ-
ees to demonstrate "that an alternative employment practice exists that
more clearly "how parties are supposed to interact with one another," and making explicit the "eco-
nomic structure of the negotiation," such as letting parties know "the limits of the bargaining range
and appropriate standards for agreement." Id. (describing the results of two empirical studies). Based
on that research, women could argue that a less discriminatory alternative pay-setting practice would
structure wage negotiations to decrease situational and structural ambiguity in how the interaction
should proceed and in the economic parameters of the bargaining range. See id.
157. See Perry, supra note 87, at 184 (arguing that "applying standard Title VI disparate
impact doctrine to any claim of sex-based wage discrimination should result in analysis which is
indistinguishable from that done in other disparate impact claims").
158. See, e.g., Craver, supra note 90, at 1114-17 (interpreting the factor other than sex defense
narrowly to conclude that "[i]f an employer were to succumb to male bargaining entreaties with
respect to jobs that are substantially equal to those of women who do not ask about the possibility of
more advantageous employment terms, the women would have claims under the EPA"); Elzer, supra
note 52, at 2-3, 9, 21 (arguing that salary negotiation should not be deemed a valid factor other than
sex in an EPA claim because "gender differences in negotiation arise out of unequal bargaining
power"); Porter & Vartanian, supra note 91, at 165-66, 195-203 (proposing to adopt the PFA's
amendment for limiting the "'any other factor other than sex' defense, but to jettison the uncapped
damage provision to make the bill more politically viable (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
proposal for amending the EPA that is most analogous to this Article's proposal for amending Ti-
tle VII is Professor Rabin-Margalioth's suggestion for changing the EPA so that mere proof that "a
female employee is compensated at a lower rate than a comparable male employee for the same
work" would "trigger[] the obligation to inquire whether this can be justified." See Rabin-
Margalioth, supra note 24, at 808-09.
159. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 84, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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would serve the same business purpose without producing such differen-
tial." 60 Although this appears to be quite similar to a full revival of the
disparate impact doctrine, it continues to violate the defining feature of
disparate impact theory: the legal irrelevance of causal factors outside of
the employer. Although the PFA narrows the non-employer causes that
may be invoked to shield the employer from legal liability by ignoring
the necessary causal role that is also played by the employer's neutral
pay practice, that shield nonetheless remains. By leaving the Bennett
Amendment intact-which would then incorporate the narrower factor
other than sex defense into Title VII-the PFA would still allow room
for employers to avoid the causation blinders that are the defining feature
of the disparate impact doctrine in all other areas of Title VII law.
By focusing on the Bennett Amendment and reviving the disparate
impact doctrine, leveraging the social model of disability may help the
women's rights movement make headway on the gender pay gap without
having to take on the special treatment stigma that attaches to an accom-
modation right. The social model merely provides the theoretical basis
for delegitimizing the internal causal narrative of the gender pay gap,
thereby revealing the illegitimacy of the Bennett Amendment's "second
class treatment" of sex-based compensation discrimination claims.1
6
1
Using the social model toward this end is thus consistent with an equal
treatment and formal equality approach. Its objective is to bring Ti-
tle VII's protection for sex-based compensation discrimination up to the
same level as the protection that Title VII provides for all other statuses
in all other types of employment discrimination claims. 162
CONCLUSION
Causal narratives are enormously influential in directing not only
our social assessments of responsibility but also our legal assessments of
discrimination liability. The women don't ask narrative has been particu-
larly powerful. This narrative holds women themselves responsible for
the gender wage gap, and it buttresses a legal regime that allows employ-
ers to avoid liability for pay-setting practices that are built upon gender
stereotypes and that entrench gender pay inequality. Although the social
160. Id. § 3(a)(3)(B).
161. See Perry, supra note 87, at 184 (describing Title Vil's "unique and second class treat-
ment" for gender-based pay equity claims).
162. See id. at 158 (noting that "[t]he Bennett Amendment, by its terms, singles out sex-based
wage discrimination for different treatment under Title VII" (footnotes omitted)); see also Rabin-
Margalioth, supra note 24, at 828 n.104 (arguing that reading the Bennett Amendment to rule out
disparate impact claims under Title VII "would lead to an implausible situation where two similar
claims of Title VII compensation discrimination, one claiming race or national origin base[d] dis-
crimination and the other claiming sex based discrimination, would not be offered the same scope of
protection"). The heightened protection for race and color in disparate treatment claims would still
exist in Title V1l's exemption of those statuses from the bona fide occupational qualification de-
fense, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l), as would the modest accommodation right for religion, see id.
§ 2000e-2(e)(2).
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science research itself reveals this reality by demonstrating the role that
gender stereotypes play in creating and sustaining women's differential
negotiation approaches and results, the women don't ask causal narrative
is so pervasive that it needs a theoretical framework to help shift the in-
ternal causal attribution upon which the narrative rests. The social model
is a causal attribution theory that achieved a similar objective for disabil-
ity rights, by replacing the internal causal attribution of the medical mod-
el of disability with an external causal attribution that focused instead on
the employment practices that render various characteristics disabling.
As a causal attribution theory, the social model provides a useful tool for
the women's rights movement, which needs a way to make salient the
role that employers' wage-setting practices play in sustaining the gender
pay gap.
Challenging the legal relevance of the women don't ask narrative in
Title VII law is an important step, but it is likely only one of many steps
that will be needed to eventually bridge the gender pay gap. Placing sex-
based disparate impact compensation claims on par with all other types
of disparate impact claims is a critical start, but there are many ways in
which courts have undermined the transformative potential of the dispar-
ate impact doctrine more generally, which will also need attention. These
general issues include, among others, courts' unwillingness to character-
ize deeply entrenched employment norms and organizational structures
as "particular employment practices" that are subject to disparate impact
review.163 They also include courts' unwillingness to engage in deep
scrutiny under the business necessity defense.164 It is also hard to imagine
the gender pay gap ever disappearing without a major shift toward pay
transparency.165 But none of these proposed reforms will likely move
forward if we continue to allow the women don't ask causal narrative to
dominate the gender wage debate. It is time for the women's rights
movement to lean out by shifting our causal narrative away from women
and onto the workplace practices that render women's negotiation less
lucrative than men's.
163. See Chamallas, supra note 20, at 609 (noting the problem of characterizing complex pay-
setting systems as particular employment practices for purposes of a disparate impact challenge);
Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 40, at 806-20 (proposing EEOC guidance that would "rede-
fine 'employment practice' to include workplace norms that often go unnoticed"); Michelle A.
Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 3, 36-46, 77-91 (2005) (analyzing case law to reveal how courts treat default organiza-
tional structures as non-practices, thereby shielding them from a disparate impact challenge).
164. See Porter, Synergistic Sohtions, supra note 40, at 806-21 (proposing EEOC guidance to
"requir[e] a more searching business necessity inquiry"); Travis, supra note 21, at 360-68 (analyz-
ing case law indicating that "courts increasingly have deferred to employers' business decisions" and
urging a higher bar for the business necessity defense).
165. See generally Ramachandran, supra note 4, at 1046 (arguing for pay transparency-i.e.,
"the ability for employees to find out what other employees in their workplace make"-as a way to
help address the gender pay gap).
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CHAPTER INTRODUCTION: SEXUAL ORIENTATION
SUSANNAH W. POLLVOGTt
What is the relationship between discrimination based on sex and
discrimination based on sexual orientation? To what extent have sexual
minorities been able to rely on Title VII's antidiscrimination protections?
To what extent should they be able to? These and other questions were
addressed by the participants in the Sexual Orientation panel at the Re-
visiting Sex Symposium.
Professor Jessica Clarke launched the discussion with an incisive
inquiry into how courts determine sexual orientation for purposes of Title
VII. "But wait," you might say. "If Title VII doesn't protect sexual orien-
tation, why would courts be looking into this issue in the first place?"
The answer proceeds in several steps. In connection with protecting
against sexual discrimination in the workplace, Title VII protects against
workplace sexual harassment. Workplace sexual harassment, in turn, is
considered discriminatory based on one of three theories: that it uses sex
identity to facilitate domination (using sexuality as power); that it en-
forces stereotypes (generally, of women as sex objects); or that it repre-
sents the harasser taking the victim's sex into account. As Professor
Clarke pointed out, none of these three theories require the harasser to
have a particular, genuinely held sexual orientation. A straight man can
use his sexuality to dominate another man; a gay man harassing a woman
could be enforcing stereotypes; a gay woman harassing a man could be
taking her victim's sex into account.
And yet, despite the irrelevance of sexual orientation to the theories
of sexual-harassment-as-sex-discrimination, a number of courts have
determined that sexual harassment only "counts" if the harasser's sexual
orientation places him in a position to genuinely desire the victim. As
Professor Clarke persuasively argues, this is problematic on at least two
levels. First, it misunderstands sexual harassment as an expression of
genuine sexual desire as opposed to an exercise of power. Second, the
method by which courts attempt to assess the "true" sexual orientation of
the harasser is flawed.
Specifically, the courts that Professor Clarke examined tended to
place a great deal of weight on the harasser's self-identification as heter-
osexual. Thus, even where a male harasser made repeated, overtly sexual
advances to a male colleague, the fact that the harasser was married with
t Associate Professor, Washburn University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School, 1998;
B.A., Williams College, 1994.
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children verified his heterosexual identity and negated any harassment
claim.
Professor Zachary Kramer touched on similar themes, drawing dis-
tinctions between "old discrimination" (which tended to be formal and
based on one's membership in a particular social group) and "new dis-
crimination" (which may be informal and based on one's individual gen-
der or sexual identity). Title VII, Kramer asserts, deals well with with old
discrimination but is ill-equipped to deal with new discrimination. This is
in part because we have come to see gender and sexual identity as much
more complicated, making the dynamics of discrimination more compli-
cated as well. Courts perceive these as "hard cases."
Professor Kramer proposed the model of religious discrimination as
an alternative framework for thinking about the dynamics of discrimina-
tion. There are several aspects of the way that we conceptualize religious
discrimination that make it a useful tool for understanding new discrimi-
nation on the basis of other traits. First, this body of law acknowledges
that one can be discriminated against both on the basis of status (e.g.,
because you are Jewish) and on the basis of conduct (e.g., because you
observe the Sabbath). Second, it allows the individual wide discretion in
defining her religious beliefs and practices. Third, it can protect individ-
uals regardless of whether they are identified with a larger group or are
the only one to subscribe to their particular belief system. Thus, it is a
vigorous and flexible approach to protecting individual identity.
Professor Erin Buzuvis explored a practical litigation strategy for
addressing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation despite the
fact that it is not a protected trait under Title VII. Specifically, Buzuvis
discussed the dynamics of retaliation claims under Title VII. If, for ex-
ample, a gay employee is harassed on the basis of his sexual orientation,
that underlying ("predicate") discrimination is not addressed by Title
VII. But, if the employee complains about he harassment o a supervi-
sor, and is then subjected to adverse employment action for lodging the
complaint, the employee may have a claim based on retaliation under the
Act. The retaliation protection extends not only to reporting of valid dis-
crimination claims but also to colorable (but ultimately invalid) discrimi-
nation claims-in the interest of not stifling whistleblowers acting in
good faith.
The crux of these arguments is whether the employee had a good
faith and "reasonable belief' that the underlying discrimination was ac-
tionable-even if that belief was not true as a matter of law. There are
two possible scenarios here: that the employee believed that sexual orien-
tation was protected under Title VII, or that what is characterized as har-
assment on the basis of sexual orientation is actually a form of sex dis-
crimination-in particular, being targeted because of one's failure to
conform to sex roles or stereotypes.
[Vol. 91:4
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In conclusion, Professor Buzuvis explored the fascinating notion
that the legal concept of reasonable belief could be influenced by social
practice. That is, the more that gays and lesbians are protected from dis-
crimination in other arenas, the more viable an individual employee's
reasonable belief that harassment on the basis of sexual orientation was
actionable under Title VII.
The overall theme of our discussion was that claims of sexual orien-
tation discrimination brought under Title VII are pushing our thinking
about the relationship between sex and sexual orientation, how courts
understand sex and sexual identity, and the ways in which academics and
advocates can influence the emerging law in this field.

A REASONABLE BELIEF: IN SUPPORT OF LGBT
PLAINTIFFS' TITLE VII RETALIATION CLAIMS
ERIN E. BUZUViSt
ABSTRACT
When an LGBT employee is punished for complaining about dis-
crimination in the workplace, he or she has two potential causes of action
under Title VII: first, a challenge to the underlying discrimination, and
second, a challenge to the resulting retaliation. The first claim is vulnera-
ble to dismissal under courts' narrow interpretation of Title VII's prohi-
bition of discrimination "because of sex" as applied to LGBT plaintiffs.
But such an outcome need not determine the fate of the second claim.
Faithful application of retaliation law's "reasonable belief' standard,
which protects a plaintiff from reprisal so long as she reasonably be-
lieved that she was complaining about unlawful discrimination, should
allow LGBT plaintiffs to successfully challenge the reprisal, even if the
court determines that the underlying discrimination was not "because of
sex." This Article provides several arguments in support of such reason-
able belief, in order to strengthen both the law's protection from retalia-
tion in general as well as the challenges of obtaining relief for workplace
discrimination against LGBT individuals.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the prevalence of discrimination against lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, and transgender (LGBT) employees in the workplace,1 Title VII
does not expressly prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation or transgender status. For this reason, until such time
as Congress changes the law, an LGBT employee who suffers discrimi-
nation on the job must formulate his or her claim as one of sex discrimi-
nation in order to gain relief under federal law. Fortunately, this has been
possible in many cases. Courts have found Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination to apply where plaintiffs were targeted for their gen-
der nonconformity2 or change of sex,3 and where the plaintiff was har-
assed in a sexual manner.4 At the same time, LGBT plaintiffs frequently
run up against the limits of these approaches, such as when courts nar-
rowly interpret the plaintiffs evidence of gender nonconformity5 or ad-
here to restrictive precedents that foreclose expansive definitions of sex
discrimination.6 As such, sex discrimination claims are a second-best
solution for LGBT plaintiffs-an insufficient work-around to the prob-
lem created by Title VII's omission of sexual orientation and gender
identity as protected characteristics.
With a toolbox limited to second-best solutions, it is useful to have
as many as possible from which to choose. To that end, this Article seeks
to make a modest contribution to the toolbox by generating support for
1. Jennifer C. Pizer et al., Evidence of Persistent and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination
Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing
for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 719 (2012).
2. EEOC v. Bob Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 472 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel v.
Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573
(6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir. 2001); Schmedding v.
Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999).
3. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210-11 (D.D.C. 2006).
4. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002); Heller v. Colum-
bia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1217 (D. Or. 2002).
5. E.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting gay
plaintiffs sex discrimination claim because he "failed to allege that he did not conform to traditional
gender stereotypes in any observable way at work").
6. E.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2007).
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another work-around: retaliation claims. Many times, particularly in har-
assment cases, an LGBT employee who suffers discrimination on the job
also endures reprisals for having reported it. These reprisals ought to
qualify for protection under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, even in
cases where the underlying discrimination does not appear to the court to
be an instance of actionable sex discrimination. With few exceptions,7
however, courts often summarily dismiss attendant retaliation claims
with no further analysis other than to note that the underlying discrimina-
tion was not itself a violation of law.8 This approach flies in the face of
Supreme Court precedent, which has interpreted Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision to potentially apply in cases where the plaintiff rea-
sonably believes that the complained-of discrimination violates the stat-
ute.9
There are many reasons why LGBT employees could reasonably
believe that discrimination about which they complain violates Title VII.
First, though an erroneous belief, it is widely assumed that a federal ban
on sexual orientation discrimination already exists.1° This collective as-
sumption likely derives from an increasing number of state-level protec-
tions against discrimination and the well-known political and legislative
victories in the marriage-equality movement. Second, even if a court
rejects that it is reasonable to believe that federal law prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation, that court should still be willing
to consider that an LGBT employee reasonably believed that the com-
plained-of discrimination was actionable sex discrimination. The reason-
ableness of this belief is underscored by the fact that federal courts no
longer categorically deny sex discrimination claims by LGBT plaintiffs.
Most circuit courts of appeal have either decided sex discrimination
claims in favor of an LGBT plaintiff," or at least addressed the possibil-
7. E.g., Dawson v. Entek Int'l, 630 F.3d 928, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2011); McCarthy v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CIV. 2:09-2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL 4006634, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
8, 2011). In McCarthy the court stated:
There cannot be any doubt that the plaintiffs in this case were reasonable in believing
that Title VII prohibited defendant from terminating their coworker based on his sexual
orientation. Not only has there been a growing gay rights movement in this country, the
courts have also recognized sexual orientation as a status that merits heightened protec-
tion.
McCarthy, 2011 WL 4006634, at *4 (citation omitted).
8. E.g., Larson v. United Air Lines, 482 F. App'x 344, 351 (10th Cir. 2012); Gilbert v.
Country Music Ass'n, 432 F. App'x 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2011); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods.,
Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1060 (7th Cir. 2003); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc.,
224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir. 2000).
9. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001).
10. A survey by the Center for American Progress found that "9 of out [sic] 10 voters errone-
ously think that a federal law is already in place protecting gay and transgender people from work-
place discrimination." Jeff Krehely, Polls Show Huge Public Support for Gay and Transgender
Workplace Protections, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, June 2, 2011,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/Igbt/news/2011/06/02/9716/polls-show-huge-public-
support-for-gay-and-transgender-workplace-protections/.
11. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566,
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ity of doing so in cases where the plaintiff properly alleged and support-
ed a claim based on gender nonconformity. 2 Moreover, interpretations
of Title VII-whether by the courts or, most recently, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)13-are increasingly recog-
nizing the inextricable convergence of sex, sexual orientation, and gen-
der identity.'4 Even if the judge in a plaintiffs case does not think, for
example, that "faggot" is a gender-based slur, 5 it is hardly unreasonable
for the plaintiff to believe that it is. In laying out support for an LGBT
plaintiff's reasonable belief in the illegality of the underlying discrimina-
tion, this Article hopes to strengthen the potential for retaliation claims to
be successful in general, and in particular for those plaintiffs who would
otherwise be without recourse under Title VII.
Part I of this Article will first explain briefly why, despite courts'
expanding interpretations of sex discrimination, Title VII's prohibition
on sex discrimination remains a limited remedy for workplace discrimi-
nation against LGBT employees. Part II examines Title VII's anti-
retaliation provision and the reasonable belief doctrine and provides ex-
amples of retaliation cases predicated on anti-LGBT discrimination. Fi-
nally, Part III provides support for LGBT plaintiffs' reasonable belief
that underlying discrimination is unlawful.
I. SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AS SECOND-BEST SOLUTIONS FOR
LGBT PLAINTIFFS
Notwithstanding their vulnerability to bias and harassment on the
job, Title VII only offers limited protection to LGBT employees. As this
Part will describe, early judicial interpretations of Title VII foreclosed
interpretations that would have extended the statute's prohibition on sex
discrimination to also include discrimination based on homosexuality or
transgender status per se. The Supreme Court's 1989 ruling in Price Wa-
terhouse v. Hopkins'6 has provided relief to some LGBT plaintiffs, but
only in cases where discrimination based on gender nonconformity, read
narrowly, is also present. Notwithstanding the more robust view of sex
discrimination that is emerging from the EEOC, the courts generally
578 (6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2001); Schmed-
ding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999).
12. E.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 224 (2d Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d
Cir. 2000); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 265 (1st Cir. 1999).
13. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
14. Henderson v. Labor Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *4 (E.D.
Va. Apr. 2, 2013) ("Stereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often
necessarily blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality." (quoting Howell v. N. Cent.
Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004)) (internal quotation mark omitted)); Centola v.
Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) ("Sexual orientation harassment is often, if not
always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms.").
15. E.g., Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1060, 1067-68 (7th Cir.
2003).
16. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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have yet to embrace this view. Title VII's ban on sex discrimination thus
remains a second-best solution to employers' discrimination against
LGBT employees.
A. Early Courts Foreclose Broad Interpretations of Sex Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the federal employment
discrimination statute, prohibits an employer from refusing to hire, firing,
or otherwise discriminating against any individual "because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'17 It does not ex-
pressly enumerate sexual orientation or gender identity as protected
characteristics, and some early judicial decisions under Title VII inter-
preted this omission to exclude LGBT plaintiffs from the protections of
the statute. For example, in 1979, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
deciding DeSantis v. Pacific Telegraph & Telephone Co.,18 rejected sev-
eral arguments that sought to position sexual orientation discrimination
as a subset of sex discrimination, including the argument that discrimina-
tion against a male employee who chooses male sexual partners is sex
discrimination in that it treats him differently from a female employee
who also chooses a male sexual partner, as well as the argument that
sexual orientation discrimination relies on stereotypes about hegemonic
masculinity.'9 The court reasoned that any argument that renders all sex-
ual orientation discrimination to fall within the ambit of sex discrimina-
tion would have constituted impermissible "bootstrap[ping]" by defying
Congress's intentional exclusion of sexual orientation as a protected
characteristic under Title VII. 20 Five years later, the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines21 created a similar categorical ex-
clusion for transgender plaintiffs. In that case, the court dismissed a case
against an airline that fired a pilot after discovering that she had had sex
reassignment surgery. The court rejected Ulane's argument that the dis-
crimination she endured was "because of ... sex," either as discrimina-
tion against Ulane because of her female sex or because of her change of
sex. Both arguments would have required the court to interpret sex to
mean something other than biological sex-an interpretation the court
believed was foreclosed by congressional intent.
B. Price Waterhouse Offers Some Relief to LGBT Plaintiffs
The Supreme Court's later decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
rejected a narrow reading of sex discrimination and provided new am-
munition for LGBT plaintiffs to challenge discrimination in the work-
place. In that case, the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, had been passed over for
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012).
18. 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979).
19. Id. at 330.
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
22. Id. at 1084, 1087.
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promotion in her accounting firm because the partners thought she was
too aggressive for a woman.23 The Court viewed this as impermissible
sex discrimination because the employer's practice of rewarding aggres-
siveness in men while objecting to aggressive women placed Hopkins in
an "intolerable and impermissible catch 22." 24 With this conclusion, the
Court suggested an expanded definition of sex that includes not just
whether someone is male or female, but also how one presents one's
gender.
Lower courts have come to read Price Waterhouse for the proposi-
tion that Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against em-
ployees who do not conform to stereotyped notions of masculinity and
femininity. In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises,26 the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized that its earlier holding in DeSantis was at least partially
abrogated by Price Waterhouse when it held an employer liable for har-
assment that targeted a male employee because of his gender noncon-
formity. 27 Though the plaintiff in that case was not identified as gay, the
nature of the harassment he endured suggested that his co-workers per-
ceived him to be so; they called him "she" and other "vulgar name[s]...
cast in female terms[,]" taunted him for effeminate mannerisms, and
teased him for not sleeping with a female co-worker.28 Like the Ninth
Circuit, most courts have similarly held that Title VII prohibits anti-gay
harassment hat demonstrably targets the plaintiffs gender nonconformi-
ty.
29
Price Waterhouse also created a potential Title VII remedy for
transgender employees who endure discrimination on the job. In Smith v.
City of Salem,30 for example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
that an employer's adverse treatment of a transgender employee who had
begun to express his female gender identity on the job was prohibited by
Title VII because it targeted the plaintiff for failing to conform to stereo-
types consonant with the sex (male) they perceived the plaintiff to be.31
In so holding, the court acknowledged that earlier precedent such as
23. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (plurality opinion).
24. Id. at 251.
25. Id.
26. 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
27. Id. at 874-75.
28. Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. E.g., EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 449 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Prowel
v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 293 (3d Cir. 2009); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
260 F.3d 257, 265 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000); Higgins v.
New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261-62 (Ist Cir. 1999); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co.,
187 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999); Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 580 (7th Cir.
1997), vacated, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
30. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
31. ld. at 574-75.
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Ulane had been eviscerated by the Court's decision in Price Water-
32 3house. Other courts have ruled similarly.33
C. Narrow Interpretations of Price Waterhouse Foreclose Relief to Many
LGBT Plaintiffs
Despite broadening the scope of actionable sex discrimination, the
sex-stereotyping argument created by Price Waterhouse offers only lim-
ited protection to LGBT plaintiffs. Most significantly for gay and lesbian
plaintiffs, courts apply Price Waterhouse only to gender-nonconforming
behavior or appearance that is visible on the job.34 A remnant of the anti-
bootstrapping rationale, this limitation precludes gay and lesbian plain-
tiffs from arguing that homosexuality per se is a departure from sex ste-
reotypes that is protected from discrimination.35 This limitation ensures
that only gay and lesbian plaintiffs who are visibly gender-
nonconforming-a gay male with effeminate mannerisms, or a lesbian
with masculine ones-can potentially allege an actionable claim of sex
discrimination.
Gay and lesbian plaintiffs also have difficulty proving that the dis-
crimination they experienced was based on sex. Some courts view anti-
gay bias as an alternative to gender-based motivation for harassment, and
do not see them as overlapping or related. In these courts, evidence of
anti-gay animus-plaintiff was called a faggot, for example-reflects a
singular homophobic motive for harassment hat forecloses the possibil-
ity that the plaintiff's gender was also a target.36 With few exceptions,37
32. Id. at 573.
33. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005); Lopez v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostic Grp., 542 F. Supp. 2d 653, 656 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (examining action brought
by transsexual male-to-female (MTF) plaintiff whose job offer was revoked after she came to the
interview presenting as a woman); Doe v. United Consumer Fin. Servs., No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001
WL 34350174, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 9, 2001); see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316-17
(1 I th Cir. 2011) (holding that discrimination against a transgender plaintiff is sex discrimination for
purposes of applying heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, noting that "[a] person
is defined as transgender precisely because of the perception that his or her behavior transgresses
gender stereotypes").
34. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting plaintiff's
argument that "his supposed sexual practices, [where] he behaved more like a woman" could qualify
as actionable sex-stereotyping under Price Waterhouse); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d
211,218 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding plaintiffs evidence was insufficient to show that she was discrimi-
nated against for her gender nonconforming appearance, rather than her sexual orientation).
35. Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218. The court stated:
When utilized by an avowedly homosexual plaintiff, . . . gender stereotyping claims can
easily present problems for an adjudicator. This is for the simple reason that
"[s]tereotypical notions about how men and women should behave will often necessarily
blur into ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality." Like other courts, we have
therefore recognized that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used to "bootstrap
protection for sexual orientation into Title VII."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. I11. 2004);
Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000)).
36. Kay v. Independence Blue Cross, 142 F. App'x 48, 50-51 (3d Cir. 2005) (interpreting
plaintiffs harassment as being related to his sexual orientation rather than gender, where plaintiff
was called a "faggot" and other slurs, but was also told "[a] real man in the corporate world would
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courts have generally not embraced the view that anti-gay harassment is
the means by which some workplace environments police gender
norms.
38
The limits of Price Waterhouse are made more significant when
viewed in the context of courts' reluctance, since Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.,3 to find that the sexual nature of harassment
satisfies the requirement that harassment be motivated by the victim's
sex. In Oncale, the Court rejected the idea that same-sex harassment was
categorically excluded from protection under Title VII, in contradiction
to some lower courts that had so held.40 However, the Court went on to
emphasize that a plaintiff still needs to demonstrate that harassment was
motivated by sex, such as by offering evidence that (1) the harasser is
homosexual, and therefore motivated by sexual desire; (2) the harasser is
generally hostile to the presence of the plaintiffs sex in the workplace;
or (3) the harasser in a mixed-sex workplace singles out one sex for har-
assing treatment.41 Notably, the Court did not suggest that the highly
sexualized nature of harassment could also satisfy this burden; if it had,
the Court would not have had to remand Oncale's case on this question,
since his allegations-that co-workers restrained him while one placed
his penis on Oncale's neck and arm, that they threatened to rape him, and
that they forcibly pushed a bar of soap into his anus while he was show-
not come to work with an earring in his ear. But I guess you will never be a 'real man'!!!!!!" (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
plaintiff repeatedly called "faggot" and other gay slurs did not allege gender nonconformity claim
under Price Waterhouse); see Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 2000);
EEOC v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. l:06-CV-2569-TWT, 2008 WL 4098723, at *17 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 28, 2008); Mowery v. Escambia Cnty. Utils. Auth., No. 3:04CV382-RS-EMT, 2006 WL
327965, at *7 (N.D. Fla. 2006) ("Being forty years old, owning a home and truck, living alone, and
not discussing one's sexual partners are not feminine gender traits. These characteristics may reflect
stereotypes associated with a homosexual lifestyle, but they are not stereotypes associated with a
feminine gender."); see also Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and Manhood, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 287,
312, 314 (2011) (criticizing this approach and arguing that unprotected traits like sexual orientation
should be neutral for purposes of a sex discrimination claim).
37. E.g., Henderson v. Labor Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *1-
2, *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2013); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) ("Sexual
orientation harassment is often, if not always, motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually de-
fined gender norms. In fact, stereotypes about homosexuality are directly related to our stereotypes
about the proper roles of men and women.").
38. Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role
Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511,633 (1992)
("Homophobia is both a symptom and a primary weapon of gender discrimination; any serious
attempt to attain gender equality must aim to remove it."); Kramer, supra note 36, at 313; Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1776-77 (1998); Richard F.
Storrow, Gender Typing in Stereo: The Transgender Dilemma in Employment Discrimination, 55
ME. L. REV. 118, 142 (2002).
39. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
40. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Sen's., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523
U.S. 75 (1998); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994), abrogated by
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 75, 77; see also Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After
Oncale. Defining the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 692-93 (1998)
(describing the legal landscape for same-sex harassment prior to Oncale).
41. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80-81.
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ering-clearly would have qualified.42 With one notable exception,43 the
courts have generally been reluctant to conclude after Oncale that the
sexualized nature of harassing conduct can support a claim that same-sex
harassment is motivated by the victim's sex-an unfortunate limitation
for gay employees who are particularly vulnerable to same-sex harass-
ment. For example, in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical Center,44 the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals denied that the plaintiff, a gay man, had en-
dured harassment because of sex where the harassment, while sexual in
nature, did not reflect the harasser's sexual desire, general hostility to-
wards men, or differential treatment owards men.45 While courts gener-
ally do allow gay plaintiffs to use gender nonconformity as the basis for
arguing that harassment argets them because of sex, cases like Vickers
show that the limitations of this doctrine often leave gay plaintiffs with-
out any remedy at all.
46
Price Waterhouse is also a limited remedy for discrimination
against transgender employees in that courts may potentially apply it
only to situations like in Smith, where the employee begins to transition
on the job and is targeted for discrimination for dressing or behaving in
ways that belie the employee's natal sex. As with homosexuality, most
courts are unwilling to consider being transgender per se as gender non-
conformity. While many cases of discrimination against a transgender
employee will also involve discrimination for failing to appear and be-
have in accordance with natal sex stereotypes, and thus be actionable,
some cases will fall outside of this zone of overlap. Discrimination that
targets a transgender employee whose transgender identity is discovered
(or disclosed) but who does not (or not yet) appear as their affirmed sex
at work may not be prohibited under Price Waterhouse.47 And even in
42. Id. at 82; Oncale, 83 F.3d. at 118-19.
43. Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1066-68 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(concluding that plaintiff's allegations of "physical conduct of a sexual nature" state a cause of
action for sexual harassment under Title VII (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Edward J.
Reeves & Lainie D. Decker, Before ENDA: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Protections in
the Workplace Under Federal Law, 20 L. & SEXUALITY 61, 68 (2011) (pointing out the unique
nature of the Rene decision).
44. 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006).
45. Id. at 765.
46. Id. at 763; McCown v. St. John's Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2003);
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 264 (3d Cir. 2001); Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Reeves & Decker, supra note 43, at 68-69;
Kavita B. Ramakrishnan, Inconsistent Legal Treatment of Unwanted Sexual Advances: A Study of
the Homosexual Advance Defense, Street Harassment, and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 26
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 291, 337-39 (2011) (pointing out that heterosexual men have an
easier time prevailing on same-sex harassment claims than queer men).
47. Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 211 (D.D.C. 2006). The court stated:
A transsexual plaintiff might successfully state a Price Waterhouse-type claim if the
claim is that he or she has been discriminated against because of a failure to act or appear
masculine or feminine enough for an employer ... but such a claim must actually arise
from the employee's appearance or conduct and the employer's stereotypical perceptions.
Such a claim is not stated here, where the complaint alleges that Schroer's non-selection
was the direct result of her disclosure of her gender dysphoria nd of her intention to
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cases where a transgender employee is dressing or behaving in a manner
that belies stereotypes of his or her natal sex, courts may not agree that
48this was the employer's motivation for discrimination. For instance, the
plaintiff in Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority49 was a transgender bus driv-
er who, while on the job, had begun the process of transitioning from
male to female.50 She sued the transit authority, which fired her when she
did not agree to refrain from using women's bathrooms along her route.5'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected her argument that
using a women's bathroom on the job was gender nonconforming behav-
ior that was protected from discrimination under Price Waterhouse. As
such, the employer could rely on its concern about bathroom usage as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason in satisfaction of its burden under
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.
53
Even in cases where the gender nonconformity theory could poten-
tially apply, it is not always the plaintiffs desired approach, since it can
be undermining to a transgender plaintiffs gender identity to have to
seek relief as a nonconforming member of their natal, rather than af-
firmed, sex.54 It also validates gender stereotypes as such, since describ-
begin presenting herself as a woman, or her display of photographs of herself in feminine
attire, or both.
ld. (citation omitted). The court went on to deny the employer's motion to dismiss anyway, and later
concluded after trial that the plaintiff had presented evidence of discrimination based on gender
nonconformity. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Oiler v.
Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-3114, 2002 WL 31098541, at *2 (E.D. La. 2002) (employer
terminated transgender employee after leaming the employee identified as transgender and cross-
dressed outside of work); Jason Lee, Note, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying
Transgender Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423, 441
(2012).
48. Mary Kristen Kelly, Note, (Trans)forming Traditional Interpretations of Title VII.- "Be-
cause of Sex" and the Transgender Dilemma, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 219, 230 (2010)
(citing Myers v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 182 Fed. App'x 510, 520 (6th Cir. 2006)) (describing a case in
which a transgender plaintiffs harassment claim was dismissed "because the only evidence she was
able to show was that her supervisor referred to her as a 'he/she,' which," while offensive, did not
constitute evidence of the harasser's animus towards her gender nonconformity).
49. 502 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
50. Id. at 1218-19.
51. Id. at 1219.
52. Id. at 1224.
53. Id. McDonnell Douglas allows a plaintiff to satisfy the requirement of proving discrimina-
tory intent based on circumstantial, rather than direct, evidence of such motive. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). A plaintiff who satisfies the elements of a prima facie
case shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse em-
ployment action, which the plaintiff may rebut with evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason is
pretext for discrimination. Id. In Etsitty, the court assumed without deciding that the plaintiff had
met her burden to satisfy the prima facie case. 502 F.3d at 1224. After accepting the transit authori-
ty's rationale as legitimate and nondiscriminatory, the court then determined that Etsitty had not
proffered evidence sufficient to show that the bathroom usage rationale was pretext for discrimina-
tion based on sex/gender nonconformity. Id. at 1227.
54. Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer, Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. POL. &
Civ. RTS. L. REV. 651, 666 (2009) ("Our difficulty with the Smith case is that the court reduces
Smith's transgender identity to little more than a fashion choice to wear women's clothing."); Kelly,
supra note 48, at 230; Sharon M. McGowan, Working with Clients to Develop Compatible Visions of
What It Means to "Win" a Case: Reflections on Schroer v. Billington, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
205, 205 (2010) (quoting Diane Schroer as saying, "I haven't gone through all this only to have a
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ing a person's behavior or appearance as gender nonconforming implies
there is a "correct" gender for whatever behavior or appearance is at is-
sue.55 This might not feel right to some transgender plaintiffs, particular-
ly if their gender identity is outside the gender binary altogether.
D. Emerging Alternatives to Price Waterhouse
Because of these limitations, it is promising that alternative inter-
pretations of Title VII's application to transgender plaintiffs have begun
to emerge. In 2008, a district court judge in Washington, D.C. interpreted
the statute's ban on sex discrimination to include discrimination on the
basis of one's transsexuality. In that case, Schroer v. Billington,56 the
Library of Congress revoked a job offer it had made to "David" Schroer
(later Diane) when she disclosed her transgender status and intent to start
work as a woman. In the lawsuit that followed, the judge ruled in her
favor on two alternative grounds. First, the court applied Price Water-
house to find that the discrimination against Schroer was discrimination
because of sex, relying on evidence that the hiring supervisor was un-
comfortable with the fact that someone she had come to know as a man
would be wearing a dress and presenting as a woman in contravention of
stereotyped masculinity.58 Then the court went on to hold that even in the
absence of sex stereotyping, the employer had violated Title VII because
refusing to hire someone who changes their sex targets that person be-
cause of sex.59 It is therefore sex discrimination in the same sense that
refusing to hire someone because they have converted from one religion
to another is discrimination on the basis of religion.60 The reasoning in
this opinion extends a broader range of protection to transgender plain-
tiffs than Price Waterhouse would alone because it is available to
court vindicate my rights as a gender non-conforming man" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Storrow, supra note 38, at 149-50.
55. Devi Rao, Gender Identity Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination: Protecting Transgender
Students from Bullying and Harassment Using Title IX, 28 Wis. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 245,252,263
(2013); cf Judith Butler, Appearances Aside, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 55, 62 (2000) ("Antidiscrimination
law participates in the very practices it seeks to regulate; antidiscrimination law can become an
instrument of discrimination in the sense that it must reiterate-and entrench-the stereotypical or
discriminatory version of the social category it seeks to eliminate.").
56. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
57. Id. at 295-99.
58. Id. at 305. The judge in this case had, in an earlier decision, acknowledged the potential
limitations of framing the discrimination in Schroer's case as that of gender nonconformity:
Schroer is not seeking acceptance as a man with feminine traits. She seeks to express her
female identity, not as an effeminate male, but as a woman. She does not wish to go
against the gender grain, but with it. She has embraced the cultural mores dictating that
"Diane" is a female name and that women wear feminine attire. The problem she faces is
not because she does not conform to the Library's stereotypes about how men and wom-
en should look and behave-she adopts those norms. Rather, her problems stem from the
Library's intolerance toward a person like her, whose gender identity does not match her
anatomical sex.
Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 210-11 (D.D.C. 2006). The court went on to deny the
Library's motion to dismiss anyway. Id. at 213.
59. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 307-08.
60. Id. at 306.
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transgender plaintiffs even in the absence of evidence that the employer's
motivation for discrimination was the plaintiffs gender nonconformity
rather than her transsexuality per se.
61
While Schroer's "change of sex" rationale has yet to be cited by
other federal courts, the EEOC incorporated its rationale into a decision
that broadly construed the agency's jurisdiction to investigate claims of
sex discrimination filed by transgender employees. In Macy v. Holder,
62
the EEOC determined that a transgender applicant who was rejected for a
job with a federal agency had successfully alleged a complaint of sex
discrimination.63 The EEOC employed a broad reading of Price Water-
house to conclude that gender nonconformity includes not only visibly
transitioning on the job, as in Smith, but even simply identifying as
transgender.64 Moreover, the EEOC held that transgender plaintiffs were
not limited to alleging claims of sex discrimination based only on the
gender nonconformity approach.65 An employer who discriminates be-
cause an employee changes sex or identifies as transgender has "relied
on [the employee's] gender in making its decision," which is prohibited
under Title VII.
66
The EEOC's decision employs a broad definition of sex discrimina-
tion-broader than any courts have used to date. While it is likely to be
influential on the courts, the extent of this influence remains to be seen.
Many courts will likely defer to it as a well-reasoned interpretation of
Title VII. However, Macy's status as an adjudicatory decision that is
technically only binding on the federal sector does not necessarily re-
quire courts to extend deference in cases involving private employers.
67
As a result, courts could still reject it on grounds that it conflicts with
earlier precedent from the Ulane line of cases that foreclose Title VII
protection from discrimination because of one's transgender status.
II. TITLE VII'S ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION AND LGBT PLAINTIFFS'
REASONABLE BELIEFS
As the previous Part makes clear, Title VII offers LGBT plaintiffs
limited means to redress direct instances of employment discrimination.
As this Part will show, LGBT plaintiffs have also had limited success
pursuing retaliation claims in cases where the predicate discrimination
61. See generally Lee, supra note 47.
62. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
63. Id. at*l.
64. Id. at *7-8.
65. Id. at *10.
66. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251
(1989) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
67. Cody Perkins, Comment, Sex and Sexual Orientation: Title VII After Macy v. Holder, 65
ADMIN. L. REv. 427, 437 (2013) ("Similarly, EEOC adjudicatory decisions are granted some judicial
deference, and although they are not binding on anyone outside the federal sector, they are often
treated as indications of what will constitute 'good practice' in the future.").
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was not itself unlawful. As explained in this Part, courts have taken an
increasingly narrow view of conduct that is protected under Title VII's
prohibition against retaliation. Notwithstanding critiques of this prob-
lematic approach, it has been employed in cases involving gay plaintiffs.
Yet, the fact that some courts have read the law to offer broader protec-
tion against gay and other LGBT plaintiffs suggests and lays the
groundwork for a more promising alternative approach.
A. Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision
Protection against retaliation is essential to the enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws.68 Without it, whistleblowers would be reluctant to
report and seek remedies to redress discrimination. 69 Accordingly, Con-
gress included express statutory language in Title VII that prohibits em-
ployers from retaliating against employees who complain, whether for-
mally or informally, about discrimination made unlawful by the statute.7v
However, courts have long held that a plaintiff may prevail under Ti-
tle VII's anti-retaliation provision even if the conduct complained of
(i.e., the predicate discrimination) is not actually unlawful v.7  As Profes-
sor Brake explains, "[pirotection from retaliation would mean little if it
were otherwise.7 2 Most employees do not have specific knowledge
about discrimination law, and even those who do would be hard pressed
to predict how judges and juries would apply that law in a specific case.73
If protection from retaliation was contingent on the employee guessing
right in the face of such uncertainty, many would avoid the risky act of
whistleblowing.
74
68. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 180 (2005) (interpreting Title IX's
implied right of action to include retaliation claims, even though such protections are not expressly
contained in the statute); see also Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court's Antiretaliation Principle,
61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 375, 377-78 (2010).
69. Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 25-26 (2005).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this [subchapter], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or par-
ticipated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [subchap-
ter].
The two clauses defining protected conduct under this provision are generally known as the opposi-
tion clause and the participation clause, respectively. See, e.g., DIANNE AVERY ET AL.,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE
165, 168 (8th ed. 2010).
71. Pettway v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1004-06 (5th Cir. 1969); Sias v. City
Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (extending this rationale to the opposition
clause as well by reasoning that EEOC enforcement "would be severely chilled" if Title VII's pro-
tection against retaliation under the participation clause only applied to meritorious EEOC com-
plaints).
72. Brake, supra note 69, at 76.
73. Id. at 76-77.
74. Id. at 77; Pizer et al., supra note 1, at 734 ("LGBT employees are often reluctant to pursue
claims for fear of retaliation or of 'outing' themselves further in their workplace.").
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B. The Reasonable Belief Standard
When an employee complains of discrimination in the context of a
formal EEOC proceeding, the employee is generally protected from re-
taliation as long as the underlying complaint is not false or malicious.
75
However, in informal contexts, such as an internal complaint to the em-
ployer, an employee's protection is more narrow, extending only to situa-
tions where the employee has a good faith, reasonable belief that the
predicate discrimination is unlawful." Early courts applied this standard
to broaden, not narrow, the range of conduct protected from retaliation.
Compared to the possible alternative of requiring plaintiffs to prove that
the underlying discrimination was unlawful,77 the "reasonable belief'
standard allowed for robust protection against retaliation while still en-
suring employers' freedom to address "malicious accusations and frivo-
lous claims. '78 Increasingly, however, courts are raising the bar on what
constitutes a reasonable belief and using that requirement as grounds to
deny plaintiffs' retaliation claims.79
For example, in Clark County School District v. Breeden,80 the Su-
preme Court denied a plaintiffs retaliation claim after noting that "no
one could reasonably believe that the [alleged predicate discrimination]
violated Title VII' 'S In that case, an employee alleged that she was
transferred as punishment for complaining internally about sexual har-
assment arising from a one-time, situation-appropriate exchange in
which a supervisor repeated another person's sexual comment in the
plaintiff's presence.82 Because sexual harassment must be "severe or
75. Pettway, 411 F.2d at 1007. But see Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reading Too Much Into What
the Court Doesn't Write: How Some Federal Courts Have Limited Title Vii's Participation Clause's
Protections After Clark County School District v. Breeden, 83 WASH. L. REV. 345, 357 (2008)
(describing several cases that have, post-Breeden, imposed a "reasonable belief' requirement for
retaliation cases under the participation clause as well (internal quotation marks omitted)).
76. See, e.g., Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1982). The
court stated:
The mistake must, of course, be a sincere one; and presumably it must be reasonable...
for it seems unlikely that the framers of Title VII would have wanted to encourage the fil-
ing of utterly baseless charges by preventing employers from disciplining the employees
who made them. But it is good faith and reasonableness, not the fact of discrimination,
that is the critical inquiry in a retaliation case.
Id.
77. Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting "Reasonableness": A New Look at Title Vii's Anti-
Retaliation Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (2007).
78. Id. at 1472 (quoting Parker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
79. Moberly, supra note 68, at 448.
80. 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
81. Id. at 270.
82. Id. at 269. Specifically, the plaintiff complained about an exchange that occurred when
she, her supervisor, and "another male employee" were meeting to review reports about four indi-
viduals who had applied for a job with the school district. Id. The report on one of the applicants
recounted that he had:
[O]nce commented to a co-worker, "I hear making love to you is like making love to the
Grand Canyon." . .. [T]he [plaintiff's] supervisor read the comment aloud, [and then]
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pervasive" in order to be actionable, the Court refused to recognize that
the plaintiffs complaint about a seemingly minor incident warranted
83protection from retaliation.
Other cases since Breeden have also denied protection from retalia-
tion to plaintiffs who complained about harassment that they could not
have reasonably believed was severe or pervasive, including in cases
where the predicate harassment was arguably more serious than what
Breeden herself had challenged.8 Retaliation plaintiffs have been
thwarted by other mistakes of law regarding the predicate discrimination
as well.
85
C. Critiques of the Narrowing of Reasonable Belief
Critics have argued that Breeden's narrow reading of the reasonable
belief standard threatens to undermine the enforcement-enhancing pur-
pose of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.86 Professor Rosenthal ar-
gues that it "forces employees to essentially become employment law
experts before deciding whether to report behavior they believe is unlaw-
ful." '87 Professor Brake takes this point further, arguing that-especially
as to mistakes about whether harassment is pervasive-"[t]he problem is
not simply that most people lack the legal expertise to ascertain where
that line begins and ends, but that the uncertainties of litigation prevent
such a determination from being made in advance."8 8 In other legal con-
texts, courts do not require a "reasonable person" to have expertise she or
he does not have reason to possess,89 and such requirements in retaliation
stated, "I don't know what that means." The other employee then said, "Well, I'll tell you
later," and both men chuckled.
Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 270-71 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998)).
84. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 336, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2006) (black plaintiff
suffered reprisals and was ultimately fired for reporting an employee who said, in the wake of the
capture of the D.C. sniper, "They should put those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of
black apes and let the apes f-k them" (internal quotation marks omitted)); George v. Leavitt, 407
F.3d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (black female plaintiff from Trinidad alleged she was punished after
reporting insulting and demeaning statements of her co-workers: "On different occasions, she was
told by three separate employees to 'go back to Trinidad' . . . . On these and other occasions, her co-
workers shouted at her, told her that she should never have been hired, and told her to 'shut up."').
85. Outside of the employment context, an appellate court held that a plaintiff was not pro-
tected from retaliation because he had complained about employer practices that had a disparate
impact based on race, a cause of action that had earlier been foreclosed by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VI's implied private right of action. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 310, 315
(4th Cir. 2003).
86. Brake, supra note 69, at 81-83; Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report. The
Case for Eliminating the Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title
VIi's Anti-Retaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1130 (2007).
87. Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1131; see also Gorod, supra note 77, at 1492-93.
88. Brake, supra note 69, at 89.
89. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 290 cmt. f (1965) ("If the actor has special
knowledge, he is required to utilize it, but he is not required to possess such knowledge, unless he
holds himself out as possessing it or undertakes a course of conduct which a reasonable man would
recognize as requiring it."); Gorod, supra note 77, at 1495 n.] 14 (contrasting the narrowing view of
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cases evoke harsh consequences on a complaining employee who gets it
wrong. If she complains too soon, before the harassment has become
pervasive, then she is vulnerable to retaliation for which she cannot turn
to Title VII for redress. If she complains too late, once the harassment
has become pervasive, she must not only endure additional harassment,90
but she may also be unable to prevail on the other elements of an eventu-
al harassment claim, for two reasons. For one, her employer can argue
that her failure to complain suggests that the harassment was not "unwel-
come," one of the required elements for actionable harassment.9' The
employer can also argue that the employee's failure to complain sooner
was unreasonable, which gives rise to an employer's affirmative defense
against vicarious liability for harassment committed by a supervisor.
92
Narrow interpretations of reasonable belief threaten employers' interests
as well. When employees are deterred from complaining about problems
in the workplace, employers lack the information they require to stop
small problems from becoming big ones that deplete employee produc-
tivity and morale. Fearing retaliation, employees who would have other-
wise complained internally may also choose instead to file formal EEOC
complaints, which are costlier and more time-consuming to defend.93
For these reasons, some have argued that he courts should abandon
the requirement hat the plaintiff's belief be objectively reasonable, leav-
ing in place only the requirement of a good faith belief.94 Employers
would still be able to take adverse action against an employee who has
filed malicious or frivolous claims and, in the rest of cases, can protect
themselves against retaliation claims by refraining from taking punitive
action against a good faith complainant. This approach, while sensible,
may be unfeasible given the widespread adoption of the reasonable belief
standard in the wake of the Supreme Court's endorsement in Breeden.95
Plaintiffs may have better outcomes by making stronger arguments about
the reasonableness of their beliefs. In this spirit, other critics advocate for
pushing the boundaries of what ought to constitute a reasonable belief for
the purposes of demarking conduct protected from retaliation. Professor
Brake proposes that courts shift the vantage point of reasonableness from
that of someone with knowledge of the law to that of an ordinary em-
a reasonable mistake in retaliation law to the much more generous view of reasonable mistake that
applies to defendants claiming qualified immunity).
90. Jordan v. Alt. Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2006) (King, J., dissenting) (point-
ing out this "Catch-22").
91. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1489; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1159-60. An employer may
avoid liability for a supervisor's harassment if (1) the employer has taken reasonable care to prevent
and correct harassment, and (2) it was unreasonable for employee not to avail herself of employer's
prevention/correction opportunities. E.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
93. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1507-08; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1164-65.
94. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1500; Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1149.
95. Rosenthal, supra note 86, at 1135, 1138 (describing how Breeden motivated some courts
to adopt an objective test).
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ployee.96 She also suggests that courts could set limits on the reasonable
belief standard by asking "whether the plaintiff can make a reasoned case
that the practices opposed interfere with the goals and objectives of dis-
crimination law." 97 Another commentator suggests reforming how the
reasonable belief standard applies to cases of predicate harassment in
particular by accepting that an employee reasonably believes that an iso-
lated incident of harassment is unlawful if the incident, when repeated,
would constitute a Title VII violation.98 As explained in Part III, cases
involving retaliation against LGBT plaintiffs who have complained of
harassment are particularly useful for advancing robust and persuasive
arguments for broadening the reasonable belief doctrine along the lines
these commentators have proposed. In addition to helping LGBT plain-
tiffs find relief under a law that does not provide direct protection, a fo-
cus on these cases could lead the push back on this encroaching doctrine.
D. Judicial Decisions Ignoring Gay Plaintiffs' Reasonable Belief
Recently, LGBT plaintiffs have been among those whose retaliation
claims have been victims of the narrowing reasonable belief doctrine.
For example, in Larson v. United Air Lines,99 a gay customer service
manager alleged that he was furloughed by the airline in retaliation for
complaining about anonymous letters that he perceived to be disparaging
him because of his sexual orientation.100 Affirming the lower court's
dismissal of this claim, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that Larson's complaint amounted to protected conduct.1°1
Without citing Breeden or mentioning the reasonable belief standard, the
court required retaliation plaintiffs to demonstrate their "opposition to a
practice made an unlawful employment practice by Title VII."' 02 Since
Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion, the court reasoned, Larson's conduct was not protected from retalia-
tion under Title VII.1
0 3
96. Brake, supra note 69, at 103.
97. Id. Similarly, another recommendation is to maintain the objective standard but to evalu-
ate the reasonableness of the plaintiffs belief based on the "totality of circumstances"-including
among other factors whether the courts and other authorities are unanimous about whether particular
conduct violates Title VIL. Matthew W. Green, Jr., What's So Reasonable about Reasonableness?
Rejecting a Case Law-Centered Approach to Title V1's Reasonable Belief Doctrine, 62 U. KAN. L.
REV. 759, 799-800 (2014).
98. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1497-98.
99. 482 F. App'x 344 (10th Cir. 2012).
100. Id. at 345-46.
101. Id. at 350.
102. Id. at 351 (quoting Petersen v. Utah Dep't ofCorr., 301 F.3d 1182, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
103. Id. The court also rejected the argument that the predicate was discriminatory, since the
first anonymous letter was severely dealt with by the airline (leaving Larson no discrimination to
complain about), and the second letter did not specifically reference Larson or expressly evince
hostility towards his sexual orientation. Id. Additionally, the court determined that Larson had not
demonstrated a causal connection between his complaints about the letters and his eventual furlough,
since those who had taken his complaint were not involved in the furlough decision. Id.
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Similarly, in Gilbert v. Country Music Association,' 4 the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of an openly gay union
member's claim that his union withheld referrals because he complained
that a fellow union member had "called him a 'faggot' and threatened to
stab him."' 0 5 First, the court determined that the predicate harassment
was not actionable sexual harassment. °6 Though the court recognized
that Title VII protects against harassment motivated by the victim's fail-
ure to conform to gender stereotypes, the victim's same-sex orientation
does not itself qualify as nonconforming behavior.10 7 Rather, the plaintiff
must be targeted for gender nonconformity in his "'behavior observed at
work or affecting his job performance,' such as his 'appearance or man-
nerisms on the job,"",10 8 which the plaintiff in this case did not allege.0 9
Then, having concluded that the predicate harassment was motivated by
sexual orientation rather than sex, the court dispensed Gilbert's retalia-
tion claim in a single sentence."0 Giving no consideration to whether he
could have reasonably believed that the harassment was actionable, the
court dismissed the retaliation claim for the simple reason that Gilbert
had opposed conduct that was not itself prohibited by Title VII. "'
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also rejected a gay plain-
tiffs retaliation claim. In Hamner v. St. Vincent Hospital & Health Care
Center, Inc.,112 the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job
as a nurse because he complained about a supervising doctor's harassing
comments.113 After a trial, the lower court granted summary judgment in
favor of the hospital, which Hamner appealed."4 The Seventh Circuit
analyzed lengthy excerpts of Hamner's trial testimony about the nature
of the internal grievance he had filed."t 5 Despite Hamner's testimony that
he believed the doctor's conduct-which included mocking him by lisp-
ing and making limp wrists-was harassment because of sex, the court
read the trial transcript to support the lower court's conclusion that the
doctor's "homophobia" motivated Hamner's complaint.1 6 Yet even
though the court concluded that this predicate harassment was not ac-
tionable under Title VII, the court went on to consider whether, for pur-
104. 432 Fed. App'x 516 (6th Cir. 2011).
105. Id. at 518,521.
106. Id. at 519.
107. Id. at 519-20.
108. Id. at 519 (quoting Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006)).
109. Id. at 520 (rejecting the plaintiffs allegation that "homosexual males did not conform to
[the harasser's] male stereotypes" as an insufficient "formulaic recitation" of the gender noncon-




112. 224 F.3d 701 (7th Cir. 2000).
113. Id. at 703.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 706 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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poses of his retaliation claim, Hamner reasonably believed otherwise."
7
To this end, the court required that to be reasonable, the plaintiffs com-
plaint must at least fall into a category of discrimination that is covered
by Title VII, and Hamner's complaint, having been construed to be about
sexual orientation rather than sex, did not qualify." 18
While these three cases reach the same result, the depth of the
courts' respective analyses range in their complexity. The Tenth Circuit
denied the gay plaintiff's retaliation claim simply because Title VII does
not cover sexual orientation. 119 The Sixth Circuit at least considered the
possibility that the gay plaintiff might have suffered discrimination on
the basis of sex, but then rejected the retaliation claim without bothering
to distinguish the plaintiff's reasonable belief from the court's conclusion
that he did not.'20 Finally, the Seventh Circuit did distinguish between
actionable harassment and harassment a plaintiff reasonably could have
believed was so, but nevertheless rejected the idea that a plaintiff could
reasonably believe that harassment motivated by sexual orientation is
prohibited. 12 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hamner is
the only one of the three decisions to predate Breeden, yet it is the only
one to actually consider the reasonableness of the plaintiffs belief in the
illegality of the underlying harassment. Yet, the court's analysis of that
standard is arguably flawed, for two reasons. First, the court's reasonable
belief analysis was limited to whether Hamner reasonably believed sexu-
al orientation discrimination was illegal; 122 it did not consider whether
Hamner could have reasonably believed that the sexual orientation dis-
crimination he endured was actually, or also, discrimination because of
sex-an omission made more blameworthy by the fact that the doctor's
teasing included imitating the voice and gestures of stereotyped effemi-
nate men. 23 The second flaw of the Hamner decision is that, when read
together with Breeden, it leaves nothing left of reasonable belief and
effectively requires the plaintiff to prove the illegality of the predicate
discrimination. 24 In Breeden, the Court detected an unreasonable belief
based on the insufficient degree of harassment rather than its type.125 If
117. Id. at 706-07.
118. Id. at 707.
119. Larson v. United Air Lines, 482 F. App'x 344, 351 (10th Cir. 2011).
120. Gilbert v. Country Music Ass'n., 432 Fed. App'x 516, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2011).
121. Hamner, 224 F.3d at 706-07.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The Seventh Circuit's analysis of reasonable belief has not changed since Breeden, as
more recent decisions have relied on Hamner for the principle that "[t]he objective reasonableness of
the belief is not assessed by examining whether the conduct was persistent or severe enough to be
unlawful, but merely whether it falls into the category of conduct prohibited by the statute." Magyar
v. Saint Joseph Reg'l Med. Ctr., 544 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Hamm v. Weyauwega
Milk Prods., Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1066 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting retaliation claim of a heterosexual
male plaintiff who complained about same-sex harassment that the court determined was not action-
able).
125. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001).
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mistakes of type are also excluded from reasonable belief, as the Seventh
Circuit appears to hold, there is hardly anything left for a harassed em-
ployee to be reasonably mistaken about-a result that Breeden itself
forecloses.
E. Judicial Decisions Affirming Gay Plaintiffs Reasonable Belief
Two courts have found in favor of gay plaintiffs seeking to advance
retaliation claims based on predicate discrimination that turned out not to
be unlawful under Title VII. In Dawson v. Entek International,26 the
plaintiff appealed the lower court's dismissal of both his hostile-
environment sexual harassment claim and his claim that the employer
terminated him in retaliation for reporting the harassment.27 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that the plaintiff had not alleged action-
able sexual harassment because "Dawson presented no evidence that he
failed to conform to a gender stereotype" and even testified himself that
he "does not exhibit effeminate traits.' 28 Nevertheless, the court re-
versed the lower court's dismissal of his retaliation claim.2 9 Without
expressly addressing the reasonable belief standard, the court concluded
simply that "Dawson engaged in protected activity when he visited [a
person] in human resources to discuss his treatment and file a complaint.
This was a complaint to human resources staff based directly on sexual
orientation discrimination."'30 Though the analysis is sparse, the court
seemed to have considered the plaintiffs belief that Title VII prohibits
sexual orientation discrimination to be a reasonable one.
In a later decision applying Dawson, a federal district court in Cali-
fornia suggests as much. In that case, McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobac-
co Co.,'3' two employees prevailed at trial on a claim that their employer
took adverse action against them after they complained about sexual har-
assment as well as the harassment of their gay co-worker.'32 The em-
ployer challenged the jury instruction, which defined activity protected
from retaliation as "complaining to the defendant ... based on the plain-
tiffs reasonable belief that her employer was engaged in unlawful con-
duct, which includes subjecting an employee to a sexually hostile work
environment or discriminating against an employee on account of race,
age, sex, or sexual orientation."'33 Relying on the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Dawson, the court affirmed that the jury was properly instructed
to consider complaints about sexual orientation to be protected activity
126. 630 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011).
127. Id. at 932.
128. Id. at 937.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 936.
131. No. CIV. 2:09-2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL 4006634 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011).
132. Id. at*l.
133. Id. at *3.
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for purposes of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.134 In so doing, the
court supplied some of the missing analysis that would have made the
Dawson decision more clear. In particular, the court raised and applied
the reasonable belief standard:
There cannot be any doubt that the plaintiffs in this case
were reasonable in believing that Title VII prohibited defend-
ant from terminating their coworker based on his sexual orien-
tation. Not only has there been a growing gay rights movement
in this country, the courts have also recognized sexual orienta-
tion as a status that merits heightened protection. Accordingly,
based on the Ninth Circuit's holding in Dawson and because
plaintiffs were reasonable in believing that Title VII prohibited
defendant from discriminating based on sexual orientation, the
court's inclusion of "sexual orientation" in Instruction No. 11
was a correct statement of the law and does not merit a new
trial.'35
In support of the second sentence quoted above, the court cited ju-
dicial decisions ruling in favor of same-sex marriage and narrowing the
Defense of Marriage Act, law review articles arguing for expansive defi-
nitions of sexual harassment under Title VII that would include sexual
orientation discrimination, provisions of California law that prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and federal regulatory
policy construing the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 to include dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.136 This decision is a prom-
ising example of how courts could construe reasonable belief, and it will
serve as a foundation for some of the arguments provided in the next
Part.
In addition to these two cases affirming that complaining about anti-
LGBT harassment is protected conduct, there have also been decisions
where the courts assumed arguendo that was the case. While not as use-
ful to LGBT plaintiffs as Dawson or McCarthy, these decisions are at
least worth noting for the mere fact that even outside of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, some courts, unlike those in Larson and Gilbert, refrain from casu-
ally restricting the scope of protected conduct to exclude discrimination
reported by LGBT plaintiffs. In one such case, a federal district court in
New York cited the reasonable belief standard as the basis for its as-
sumption that a lesbian plaintiffs complaints were protected from retali-
ation under Title VII, even where the court had already determined that
the predicate harassment was itself not actionable.'3 The court preferred
134. Id. at *3-4.
135. Id. at *4 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at *4 n.5.
137. Jantz v. Emblem Health, No. 10 Civ. 6076(PKC), 2012 WL 370297, at *13 n.9 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 6, 2012). Though the plaintiff alleged that she was targeted for harassment because of her
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instead to grant summary judgment on other grounds, namely, that she
had not proffered sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the
protected activity and her eventual termination.138 Similarly, a federal
court in Alabama assumed for argument's sake that a transgender plain-
tiffs complaint about sex discrimination amounted to protected con-
duct,139 even though the sex discrimination claim itself had been dis-
missed for lack of sufficient evidence from which to construe bias.
40
Here, too, the retaliation claim failed on other grounds.'
4'
III. TOWARDS A MORE ROBUST ANALYSIS OF LGBT PLAINTIFFS'
REASONABLE BELIEFS
Discrimination against LGBT employees is a pervasive problem
that advocates should challenge by all available means. Political efforts
aimed at persuading Congress to pass a federal law that prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity 42 will, when successful, largely close the gap that leaves LGBT
Americans vulnerable to discrimination under federal law.'43  In the
failure to conform to gender stereotypes in her attraction to and relationship with a female partner,
the court construed this as sexual orientation discrimination not actionable under Title VII. Id. at *7.
138. Id. at *7.
139. Parris v. Keystone Foods, LLC, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1301 (N.D. Ala. 2013); see also
Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-RHW, 2005 WL 1502899, at *10 (E.D. Wash. 2005) ("It is
undisputed that the Plaintiff [who complained about sex discrimination related to her gender transi-
tion] engaged in protected activity.").
140. Parris, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
141. Id. at 1312.
142. The latest version of the perennially-proposed Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) would do exactly that. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th
Cong. § 4(a) (2013), which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-() to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of the individ-
ual, because of such individual's actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.
Id
143. "Largely" refers to the strong possibility that Congress would pass a version of ENDA
that exempts religious organizations, or possibly even secular employers with a religious objection,
from having to comply. Indeed, the recent version of ENDA passed by the Senate contained an
exemption for religious organizations, though an amendment that would have expanded the exemp-
tion to include objecting secular employers failed to pass. Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6; Ramsey Cox, Senate Passes EADA Amendment Designed to Protect
Churches, THE HILL (Nov. 6, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/189434-
senate-adopts-amendment-to-enda-aimed-at-protecting-churches. In contrast, Title VII only permits
such employers to discriminate against non-ministerial employees on the basis of religion, not on the
basis of other protected characteristics (the ministerial exemption, in contrast, applies to discrimina-
tion on the basis of religion and other protected characteristics). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I(a) (2012)
("This subchapter shall not apply ... to a religious corporation, association, educational institution,
or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of
its activities."); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706
(2012) (recognizing religious institution's exemption from antidiscrimination laws in the hiring of
those it deems to be ministers). Should any version of a religious exemption be included in the
version of ENDA that ultimately becomes law, Title VII would remain the only federal law poten-
tially available to LGBT non-ministerial employees to challenge discrimination by religious em-
ployers who are exempt from ENDA.
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meantime, of course, advocates can also employ a litigation strategy that
seeks to incrementally expand courts' interpretation of sex discrimination
covered by Title VII. At the same time, advocates should not ignore op-
portunities to also push back on the courts' narrowing protection against
retaliation for LGBT employees who reasonably believe that discrimina-
tion they have suffered is unlawful.'" By pushing equally hard on retal-
iation claims, advocates increase a client's chances of obtaining some
relief. Additionally, the success of such efforts would strengthen the
law's protection against retaliation, which in turn could motivate LGBT
employees to speak up about discrimination on the job. Such whistle-
blowing is the crucial precursor to litigation that continues to push for
robust interpretations of sex discrimination under Title VII. It can also
yield examples useful in the political arena to persuade Congress and
those with influence that the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) is necessary. In other words, it is worth pushing hard on retalia-
tion claims, not only for the individual litigant's sake, but in the interest
of supporting the efforts to challenge anti-LGBT discrimination on all
respective fronts. The remainder of this Part will explore arguments that
could be useful to this end.
A. Employees Might Reasonably Believe That Discrimination Based on
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Is Already Prohibited by
Federal Law
When LGBT employees report that they have been the victim of un-
lawful harassment, they may be doing so on the basis of a mistaken, yet
reasonable, belief that federal law bans discrimination based on sexual
orientation and gender identity. Indeed, surveys show that such protec-
tions are not only favored by a majority of Americans, but they are also
widely assumed to already exist. 45 As the federal district court noted in
McCarthy, this belief seems reasonable when viewed against the back-
drop of LGBT (particularly lesbian and gay) victories in the courts and in
144. Cf Kiley v. Am. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 296 Fed. App'x 107, 108
(2d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff who lost on sexual orientation and sex stereotyping claim did not even
appeal dismissal of his retaliation claim); Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 761 n.l (6th
Cir. 2006) (Vickers "fail[ed] to make any argument regarding his Title VII retaliation claim," so
therefore it was waived).
145. A survey by the Center for American Progress found that "9 of out [sic] 10 voters errone-
ously think that a federal law is already in place protecting gay and transgender people from work-
place discrimination." Krehely, supra note 10; see also Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex
to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 209, 210-11 (2012). In her article Schwartz states:
[A] 2007 poll found that only one-third of American adults were aware that federal
law ... does not provide protection for employees on the basis of sexual orientation. At
the same time, public opinion polls suggest hat Americans do not find the idea of protec-
tion against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation particularly contro-
versial. A 2008 Gallup poll found that support for homosexuals having equal rights in job
opportunities has jumped from fifty-six percent in 1977 to eighty-nine percent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
2014]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the political arena.146 Marriage equality is arguably a more controversial
prospect than employment nondiscrimination, so the fact that same-sex
marriage is now legal in a majority of states (thirty-six as of this writ-
ing)147-as well as recognized for purposes of federal law148 -could real-
istically contribute to the public perception that equality in the workplace
is at least as secure. In the context of employment, LGBT rights are also
on the rise. Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia ban employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of either sexual orientation or gender
identity, as do more than two hundred cities and counties.149 Additional-
ly, in 2011 Congress repealed the most notorious example of pervasive
employment discrimination against gays and lesbians-the military's
Don't Ask Don't Tell policy. 150 The widespread erroneous belief in fed-
eral protection against harassment of gay workers could even partially
derive from the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale,151 which did not
involve a gay plaintiff but was widely reported as a gay-rights victory.
52
At the same time, news of courtroom victories for LGBT plaintiffs such
as Diane Schroer does not necessarily emphasize the nuances of the
judge's sex discrimination rationale,153 which could also lead the general
public to erroneously believe the law protects gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender individuals by virtue of their status as such.
54
As the district court decision in McCarthy shows, it is possible for
courts to accept that a whistleblower reasonably believes that federal law
prohibits status-based discrimination against LGBT workers based on
these examples of momentum in the gay-rights movement, both in the
employment context and in general. Polling data about the public's mis-
taken belief that such laws already exists makes this argument even
stronger.155 Its weakness, however, is that it requires courts to accept
what I will call a "categorical mistake" (believing a certain category of
discrimination is prohibited when it is not) as a reasonable belief, which
146. McCarthy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. CIV. 2:09-2495 WBS DAD, 2011 WL
4006634, at *4 n.5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8,2011).
147. See Same Sex Marriage Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-laws.aspx (last updated Jan. 19,
2015).
148. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691-93 (2013).
149. Pizer et al., supra note 1, at 755, 757.
150. Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. II 1-321, § 2(f)(1)(A), 124 Stat.
3515, 3516 (2010).
151. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); see supra Part I.C.
152. E.g., Joan Biskupic, Same-Sex Harassment Is a No-No, Says Court; Landmark Ruling
Covers Situations with Both Gay and Non-Gay Participants, MOBILE REG., Mar. 5, 1998, at IA;
Richard Carelli, Same-Sex Harassing Is Illegal: Employer, Gay-Rights Groups Praise Supreme
Court Ruling, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 5, 1998, at IA; David Jackson, Court Ruling on Same-
Sex Harassment Also Victory for Gay, Lesbian Workers, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 5, 1998.
153. Jesse J. Holland, Judge Rules Transgender Discrimination Is Illegal, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark), Sept. 20, 2008, at 16; Former Army Commander Wins Transgender Lawsuit, TIMES
UNION (Albany), Sept. 20, 2008, at 5.
154. Gorod, supra note 77, at 1494 ("Moreover, employees' understandings of what constitutes
harassment will be shaped in large part by media accounts.").
155. See supra note 145.
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some courts have already refused to do.156 This tendency, however, de-
monstrably undermines Title VII enforcement. For the reasonable belief
doctrine to mean anything at all, it has to allow whistleblowers to make
some kinds of mistakes about the legal status of predicate discrimination.
Especially where courts also insist on rejecting reasonable mistakes
about the pervasiveness that harassment must reach to be actionable,
rejecting reasonable categorical mistakes leaves effectively nothing left
for an employee to be reasonably mistaken about. This result would evis-
cerate a doctrine that is both longstanding and that enjoys the apparent
endorsement of the Supreme Court,157 and ought to be challenged as
such.
B. Employees Might Reasonably Believe That Anti-LGBT Discrimination
Is Also Prohibited Sex Discrimination
When LGBT plaintiffs report harassment or other discrimination
that turns out not to be unlawful, they could also reasonably be mistaken
in believing that they were complaining about actionable sex discrimina-
tion. This is because when targeted for discrimination, sex, gender, and
sexual orientation are often, and reasonably, conflated. Sex is widely
understood to refer to one's anatomical status as male or female.158 Gen-
der is the socially-prescribed roles associated with sex, i.e., attributes that
are masculine or feminine.159 Sexual orientation is an individual's sexual
or romantic attraction to either members of the same, other, or both sex-
es.160 To say that sex and gender are conflated in our culture is to say that
society generally expects one's anatomical sex to forecast much about an
individual's behavior, personality, appearance, interests, and qualities.
Sexual orientation is also conflated with both sex and gender. Society
expects those of the male sex to be sexually attracted to those of the fe-
male sex; heterosexuality is part of what it is to be masculine. 16 If socie-
ty conflates sex, gender, and sexual orientation, then one could reasona-
ble perceive that the mindset of a discriminating employer likely follows
suit.
To put this more concretely, imagine a hypothetical gay employee.
He complains to his employer about co-workers who harass him verbally
and physically, regularly calling him a faggot. Whether or not this com-
plaint is protected from retaliation depends on whether he reasonably
believes the harassment to be motivated by gender nonconformity. Of
course, the co-workers' use of the word "faggot" implies animus towards
156. See supra note 85 and Part I.D.
157. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001).
158. Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender
& Sexual Orientation to its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 161, 164 (1996).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
187, 196.
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his sexual orientation, which the courts do not see as synonymous with
gender.1 62 But the employee may still reasonably perceive that his mas-
culinity is ultimately, or simultaneously, the target. Because he does not
date and sleep with women, his masculinity does not measure up to his
co-workers' expectations about the male sex. To him, this situation may
be as much about gender as harassment mocking him for effeminate
mannerisms. Because it is only courts' esoteric concerns about "boot-
strapping" that keep them from reading Price Waterhouse to prohibit the
"faggot" situation as well as the harassment based on his effeminate
mannerisms, they should forgive the average employee who has not read
the case law for not intuiting this distinction.
1. Reasonableness Supported by Social Science Research
Social science research validates the reasonableness of viewing an-
ti-gay harassment as a means of policing gender. Sociologist Michael
Kimmel, for example, describes homophobia as a "central organizing
principle of our cultural definition of manhood.'' 163 In our patriarchal
society, men ascribe power to themselves by calling out other men's
gender nonconformity-an act that reaffirms their own compliance with
"hegemonic" masculinity, the version of masculinity that is most power-
ful in society.164 Hegemonic masculinity requires the "relentless repudia-
tion of the feminine," including, perhaps especially, the "feminine" sexu-
al practice of having or desiring sex with men.'65 Anti-gay harassment,then, is a tool for generating and assigning male privilege. 66
Researchers have confirmed that heterosexual men's negative atti-
tudes about homosexuality derive from its perceived threat to their mas-
culinity, rather than aversion to homosexual orientation per sC. 16 7 The
connection between masculinity and homonegativity can also be seen in
research documenting heterosexual men's (but not heterosexual wom-
162. See supra note 36.
163. Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the Con-
struction of Gender Identity, in THEORIZING MASCULINITIES 119, 131 (Harry Brod & Michael
Kaufman eds., 1994).
164. See id. at 124-25, 131.
165. Id. at 125.
166. Id. at 131-32; see also MICHAEL A. MESSNER, TAKING THE FIELD: WOMEN, MEN, AND
SPORTS 67-68 (2002); C.J. PASCOE, DUDE, YOU'RE A FAG: MASCULINITY AND SEXUALITY IN HIGH
SCHOOL 52-83 (2007).
167. Michelle Davies, Correlates of Negative Attitudes Toward Gay Men: Sexism, Male Role
Norms, and Male Sexuality, 41 J. SEX RES. 259, 259 (2004); Scott W. Keiller, Masculine Norms as
Correlates of Heterosexual Men's Attitudes Toward Gay Men and Lesbian Women, II PSYCHOL.
MEN & MASCULINITY 38, 48 (2010).
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en's) less favorable view of gay men than lesbians,1 68 and the disparaging
of effeminate gay men within the gay-male community.1
69
2. Reasonableness Supported by Dicta of a Federal District Court
In addition to scientific authority, legal authority also sometimes
recognizes the inherent interrelation of sexual orientation, gender, and
sex-further marking as "reasonable" an employee's impression of anti-
gay harassment being motivated by gender. In Centola v. Potter,170 a
federal district court in Massachusetts held in favor of a gay-male em-
ployee whose co-workers used anti-gay slurs and teased him about being
gay. '7' Though holding that the plaintiff had provided sufficient evidence
that he was targeted for gender-nonconforming appearance and behavior,
the court went on to say:
The gender stereotype at work here is that "real" men should date
women, and not other men. Conceivably, a plaintiff who is perceived
by his harassers as stereotypically masculine in every way except for
his actual or perceived sexual orientation could maintain a Title VII
cause of action alleging sexual harassment because of his sex due to
his failure to conform with sexual stereotypes about what "real" men
do or don't do. 172
To be sure, the dicta quoted here, over ten years old, still represents an
extreme minority view among the federal courts, which generally do not
view homosexuality as a gender nonconformity for purposes of applying
Title VII.' 73 But the fact that it has not convinced the majority of courts
to recognize anti-gay harassment as sex discrimination does not foreclose
its value in retaliation cases by serving as a testament to the reasonable-
ness of that belief. 1
74
168. Gregory M. Herek, Sexual Prejudice and Gender: Do Heterosexuals' Attitudes Toward
Lesbians and Gay Men Differ?, 56 J. Soc. ISSUES 251, 255 (2000).
169. Francisco J. SAnchez & Eric Vilain, "Straight-Acting Gays": The Relationship Between
Masculine Consciousness, Anti-Effeminacy, and Negative Gay Identity, 41 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 11I, 112 (2012).
170. 183 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002).
171. Id. at 407.
172. Id at 410 (footnote omitted). It is also worth noting that the Centola court also went on to
consider the plaintiffs retaliation claim and, in that context, persuasively dispensed with the em-
ployer's argument that the employee had not engaged in protected conduct because he did not call it
sexual harassment when he reported it. Id at 412. It was enough to the court that the plaintiff "pre-
sented to his employers . . . events that, viewed in the light most favorable to him, constituted dis-
crimination against him on the basis of his sex due to sexual stereotyping." Id.
173. Though, it was cited recently by a federal district court in Virginia, which rejected a
defendant's motion to dismiss a Title VII case involving anti-gay harassment. Henderson v. Labor
Finders of Va., Inc., No. 3:12cv600, 2013 WL 1352158, at *4 (E.D. Va. Apr. 2, 2013) (citing Cento-
la, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 408-09).
174. See Gorod, supra note 77, at 1495-96 ("If the courts cannot agree, how are the individual
citizens supposed to know?").
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3. Reasonableness Supported by the Emerging Position of the
EEOC
In further support of the reasonableness of an employee's belief that
Title VII prohibits anti-LGBT discrimination, the EEOC has signaled
that it, too, shares this belief. For one thing, the EEOC's interpretation of
sex discrimination in Macy should not only support the reasonableness of
any transgender plaintiff's belief that discrimination is actionable, it is
also broad enough to permit the conclusion that homosexuality, too, is
protected from discrimination under Title VII. For one thing, the EEOC
endorsed a broad reading of Price Waterhouse that "gender discrimina-
tion occurs any time an employer treats an employee differently for fail-
ing to conform to any gender-based expectations or norms."'175 The
EEOC did not say "only those gender-based expectations or norms relat-
ed to how the employee behaves or appears in the workplace."' 7 6 Addi-
tionally, the EEOC broadly read Price Waterhouse's admonition that "an
employer may not take gender into account in making an employment
decision" to provide another eason, in addition to sex stereotyping, why
transgender discrimination is actionable sex discrimination. An em-
ployer who discriminates against a gay or lesbian employee is taking
gender into account in an equally broad way, in that the employer is con-
sidering the gender of the employee relative to the gender of the person
to whom he or she is sexually attracted.
78
The EEOC spells this connection out more expressly in two sepa-
rate, nonbinding decisions from 2011. In one, a gay employee filed a
complaint against his employer, the Postal Service, to challenge harass-
ment by his co-workers that stemmed from the public announcement of
his wedding to another man. 79 The agency concluded that the employee
stated a claim of plausible sex discrimination because he essentially ar-
gued that the harassment was motivated "by [the harassing co-worker's]
attitudes about stereotypical gender roles in marriage."'80 In the other
case, the EEOC determined that a lesbian employee, chided by her man-
ager about her presumed sexual practices, had stated an actionable claim
for sexual harassment, having "alleged that [the manager's] comment
175. Macy v. Holder, No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (E.E.O.C. Apr. 20, 2012).
176. Of course, as discussed in the text at notes 34-35, supra, this position conflicts with that
of courts like the Sixth Circuit, which has expressly limited gender nonconformity protected from
discrimination under Title IX to that which is observable at work. See Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr.,
453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006).
177. Macy, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Perkins, supra note 67, at 440-41.
179. Veretto v. Donahoe, No. 0120110873, 2011 WL 2663401, at *1 (E.E.O.C. July 1, 201 I).
180. Id. at *3.
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was motivated by his attitudes about stereotypical gender roles in rela-
tionships."'
' 81
The EEOC position may eventually influence the courts to view
sexual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination. Mean-
while, however, it should also be cited in support of LGBT plaintiffs'
reasonable belief in the interconnected nature of discrimination targeting
sex, gender, and sexual orientation for purposes of sustaining a retalia-
tion claim.
CONCLUSION
Until Congress enumerates sexual orientation and gender identity as
characteristics protected from employment discrimination, LGBT work-
ers who experience status-based discrimination on the job must allege
sex discrimination in order to gain relief under federal law. This ap-
proach is inherently limited by courts' insistence that sex discrimination
should not subsume all discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or gender identity. As advocates continue to push back against this re-
strictive approach, they should also make vigorous arguments in support
of employees' attendant retaliation claims. Though courts do not always
apply it faithfully, the reasonable belief doctrine ensures that retaliation
plaintiffs' success does not turn on whether they were technically correct
that the predicate discrimination was unlawful. Given, then, that retalia-
tion plaintiffs are allowed to be reasonably mistaken, mistakes about the
legal status of discrimination against LGBT employees are good candi-
dates for the label "reasonable." Aside from reasonably believing that
sexual orientation and transgender status are protected in their own right,
the interrelatedness of sex, gender, and sexual orientation support a rea-
sonable belief that the challenged discrimination is sufficiently gender-
related to warrant protection. Because there are so many arguments in
support of a reasonable mistake about the legal status of anti-LGBT dis-
crimination, these cases make an excellent vehicle to remind courts of
the proper application of reasonable belief doctrine. When these argu-
ments succeed, the retaliation doctrine will afford LGBT plaintiffs the
protection they need to more aggressively report discrimination when it
occurs. These reports, in turn, will help generate the case law necessary
to push back on the limited definition of sex discrimination and support
the political efforts to pass statutory protections for sexual orientation
and gender identity discrimination.




CHAPTER INTRODUCTION: CAREGIVING 2014
RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMANt
Intransigent. Intractable. Entrenched. Ineradicable. These are some
of the adjectives that feminist scholars have used to describe the persis-
tent problem of achieving work/family balance for caregivers. Why such
strong language? Since Title VII's enactment in 1964, we have seen ad-
ditional legislative action in this area, including congressional passage of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978' and the Family and Medical
Leave Act in 1990,2 as well as various state statutes, several of which
provide greater protection than federal law. We have also seen the devel-
opment of novel litigation strategies, such as the theory of family respon-
sibilities discrimination3 and discriminatory failure to accommodate,4
which have been embraced by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC)5 and enjoyed some success in court. And yet, the
inability to achieve work/family balance remains a significant bar to real-
izing substantive gender equality today, in 2014, much as it has for dec-
ades. Why?
The scholars participating.at the "Caregiving 2014" Panel at the Re-
visiting Sex Symposium posed this question and wrestled with its impli-
cations. Professor Michael Selmi launched the discussion with a retro-
spective, citing the minimal progress we have made in job segregation,
pay equity, and division of household labor. Professor Selmi suggested
that a reason for this may be the absence of a common goal. As a society
we remain deeply ambivalent about caregiver participation in the work-
force, particularly with regard to working mothers. What, then, should
equality for caregivers look like? Absent agreement on this question, the
only consensus point within the work-/family debate is the desire to pro-
tect caregivers' individual choices and insulate them from penalty. Pro-
t Professor of Law and Workplace Law Program Director, University of Denver Sturm
College of Law; B.A., Rutgers University; J.D. Harvard Law School; L.L.M., Temple Law School.
Special thanks to my research assistant Sarah Bryant, the caregiving panel participants, the Denver
Law faculty and community members who helped to plan and execute this event, and to all of the
editors at the Denver Law Review for their hard work and commitment.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012).
3. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of "FRED ": Family Respon-
sibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1313 (2008).
4. See Rachel Amow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law
and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work!Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1105 (2010).
5. See TITLE VII/EPA/ADEA Div., OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, Enforcement Guidance:
Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, in 2 EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 615 (2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf.
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fessor Selmi is skeptical that such a broad principle can serve as a guid-
ing framework for meaningful reform.
Professor Nicole Porter suggested that the problem lies in the struc-
ture of work itself and our unwillingness to interrogate existing work-
place norms. Drawing on case law under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), 6 Professor Porter demonstrated how courts defer to employ-
ers' judgment about the way work time is organized. Managerial choices
such as the use of rotating shifts, the preference for full-time workers,
and the strict enforcement of attendance and leave policies are treated as
essential functions of the job from which employers may not be com-
pelled to deviate. In the face of these entrenched expectations, there is
little hope that new legislation or legal strategies aimed at enhancing
caregiver protection will be successful in court. Rather, progress in the
work/family arena depends first and foremost on dismantling workplace
norms. Strategies that attack these norms directly-such as mandating
paid time off, incenting work-spreading through wage and hour reform,
and requiring audits and disclosure of flexible work practices-are a first
step.
Professor Kyle Velte's contribution focused on employer retaliation
against second-time parents, or "second child bias" (SCB). In cases of
SCB, mothers report no discrimination in the workplace after the birth of
their first child, but experience marginalization, loss of work, negative
performance evaluations, and other adverse consequences after the birth
of a second child. Professor Velte theorized a basis for SCB-the belief
that a mother fulfills her "right" to combine market work and parenting
when she has a single child-and speculated that employers' instinct to
suppress stereotype diminishes after a mother has a second. Naming SCB
and framing cases around the theory can serve an expressive function as
well as a strategic one, according to Professor Velte. Such claims ad-
vance a stereotype theory of family responsibility discrimination (FRD)
and can potentially steer the law away from reliance on comparator evi-
dence, a requirement that has been a death knell for many FRD plaintiffs.
Professor Laura Kessler closed the panel on a hopeful note, high-
lighting the numerous incremental but collectively significant steps in the
development of gender discrimination law since Title VII's enactment.
She reminded us that the law's role in effecting social change is often
invisible to those who experience its benefits and urged caution in dis-
counting the possibility of a continued role for antidiscrimination law in
effecting greater gender equality. Rather than turning to universalist re-
forms, Professor Kessler suggested that scholars and advocates incorpo-
rate the anti-essentialist critique of the discrimination framework in re-
forming discrimination law itself. We might start by breaking down doc-
6. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
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trinal walls-both within Title VII and across antidiscrimination stat-
utes-that currently impede plaintiffs in obtaining relief for intersection-
al harms like caregiver discrimination.
In this way, the panel both acknowledged Title VII's limitations and
celebrated its successes. It questioned the viability of further reform
while reaffirming the importance of Title VII to the project of securing
full equality for working women. Pessimism is the academic's luxury;
the challenge lies in finding pathways for progress using the legal tools
that we have and those we can hope to secure. In introducing the panel at
the Symposium, I jested that we should call our program "Title VII: Fifty
and Looks It." Reality, however, is far more complicated. Beauty is in
the eye of the beholder.





Scholars and feminists (and feminist scholars) have been debating
ways to ameliorate the work-family conflict for several decades. For
some of us writing in this area, it seems as if the debate is endless and
ineradicable. Unfortunately, this Article does not end the debate with
some brilliant solution. Instead, I attempt to explain why the "caregiver
conundrum" is so unwieldy and unyielding. The reason, I argue, is be-
cause of the entrenchment of structural norms in the workplace. By struc-
tural norms, I am referring to employers' rules and practices regarding
hours, shifts, schedules, attendance, leaves of absence, etc.-basically,
when and where the work is performed. In this Article, I argue that em-
ployers are very reluctant to make modifications to the structural norms
of their workplace and courts are loath to force them to do so. Because
many individuals with disabilities ask for modifications to the structural
norms pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, I use this body of
law to demonstrate the entrenchment of these norms. And because these
norms are so entrenched, I explain how proposed solutions, both litiga-
tion- and legislation-focused, will ultimately fail. Instead of the many
solutions that have been proposed thus far, the only way to truly solve
the caregiver conundrum is to dismantle the entrenchment of the struc-
tural norms.
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INTRODUCTION
The debate regarding how to ameliorate work-family conflict (also
known as caregiver discrimination, the "maternal wall,"' "family respon-
sibilities discrimination,"2 or my term, the "caregiver conundrum"3) has
been raging for several decades, since at least the debate leading up to
the passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978.4 Alt-
hough not as old as the old-fashioned kind of sex discrimination (simply
excluding women from workplaces),5 the debate over eliminating care-
giver discrimination is arguably more prevalent than discussion and de-
bate about other types of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.6
Although (or maybe because) I have written several articles in this
area,7 1 struggled with what more 1, or anyone else, could say regarding
this intractable problem. Always reform-oriented, I set out to determine
I. JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT
TO DO ABOUT IT 69-70 (2000).
2. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing
Trend of Family Responsibilities Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 171 (2006).
3. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Why Care About Caregivers? Using Communitarian Theory to
Justify Protection of "Real" Workers, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 355, 356 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Why
Care?].
4. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012).
5. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Men at Work, Fathers at Home: Uncovering the Masculine
Face of Caregiver Discrimination, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 253, 260 (2013) ("Initially, wom-
en ... attacked the most obvious forms of discrimination at work such as sex-based job classifica-
tions or harassment"). Family responsibilities discrimination is often referred to as a second-
generation discrimination theory. Id.
6. Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Badfor Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law
and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (stating that work-family conflict is a
media obsession); Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 172 (stating that there has been a 400%
increase in family responsibilities cases filed in the last ten years as compared to the prior ten-year
period).
7. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Embracing Caregiving and Respecting Choice: An Essay on the
Debate over Changing Gender Norms, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Porter, Embracing
Caregiving]; Nicole Buonocore Porter, Re-Defining Superwoman: An Essay on Overcoming the
"Maternal Wall" in the Legal Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 55 (2006); Nicole Buo-
nocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to Solving the Caregiver Conundrum
for "Real" Workers, 39 STETSON L. REV. 777 (2010) [hereinafter Porter, Synergistic Solutions];
Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3.
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whether I have missed or should revisit some compelling solution. I
came up empty-handed. As I reflected on why I was so pessimistic-why
I believed every solution would fail-I realized that the inevitable failure
of each solution had one thing in common: The entrenchment of struc-
tural norms in the workplace.8
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will briefly describe
the caregiver conundrum and how it manifests itself in the lives of work-
ing men and women. Part II will provide a summary of the various solu-
tions that have been proposed over the years, along with the accompany-
ing criticism of those proposals. Part III will discuss the entrenchment of
the structural norms of the workplace, using jurisprudence under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 9 to demonstrate the bias against
modifications to the structural norms. This Part will also explain why, in
light of the entrenchment of these practices, many of the proposed re-
forms would be unsuccessful. Finally, this Part will briefly discuss the
only type of reform that might be successful in ending the caregiver co-
nundrum-attacking the structural norms directly.
0
I. THE CAREGIVER CONUNDRUM
What is the caregiver conundrum? This is the term I use to describe
caregiver discrimination or family responsibilities discrimination, as it is
often called. I use the word "conundrum" to reflect the puzzle that is
inherent in solving this problem. I define the term broadly to include all
of the workplace norms, rules, and practices that make it difficult for
working caregivers to successfully balance work and family.'
1
My focus has always been on what I refer to as "real"'12 workers-
those who do not consistently meet their employers' expectations regard-
ing the hours and schedules worked because of their caregiving responsi-
bilities.13 As other scholars have also noted, long hours and inflexible
workplaces make it difficult for many caregivers to successfully balance
work and family. 14 Of course, I also recognize that caregivers (both men
and women) who are ideal workers still suffer from discrimination based
on stereotypes that assume that caregivers are not competent or commit-
8. For an excellent discussion of the entrenchment of structural norms in the workplace, see
CATHERINE R. ALBISTON, INSTITUTIONAL INEQUALITY AND THE MOBILIZATION OF THE FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT: RIGHTS ON LEAVE (2010).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
10. See also Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 5 (2005).
11. Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 777.
12. Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 357.
13. For a detailed description of the difficulties of caregiving, see Laura T. Kessler, The
Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of
Economic andLiberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 380 (2001).
14. See, e.g., Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental
Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 307 (2004).
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ted. However, Title VII's sex discrimination provision adequately covers
this type of discrimination through use of the stereotyping theory.5
The caregiver conundrum affects both women and men.'6 Because
women still perform eighty percent of the child-care duties,7 it is diffi-
cult for them to successfully balance work and family.' 8 As stated by
Michelle Travis, most workplaces are designed around the "full-time
face-time norm" of long hours, unlimited overtime, and uninterrupted
careers.'9 Thus, women's caregiving obligations affect their pay2 ° and
their opportunities for promotion.2' Many women try to balance work
and family by finding family-friendly workplace alternatives, although
most of these workplaces lead to the marginalization of women's ca-
reers.
22
15. See generally Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall. Relief for
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (discuss-
ing some successful cases brought by caregivers who are discriminated against on the job); Williams
& Bomstein, supra note 2, at 174-81 (discussing the stereotyping cases).
16. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 317-18 (discussing the harm to men of the ideal worker mod-
el). Interestingly, one study found that 90% of Americans favor tax incentives for employers to help
them provide flexible workplaces. Id. at 311.
17. Williams & Bomstein, supra note 2, at 174. Of course, statistics vary, although only
slightly. Travis states that American women perform two-thirds of housework and eighty percent of
all child-care. Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 283, 299 (2003). Keith Cunningham-Parmeter states that women do eighty percent of the child-
care and seventy percent of the household work. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 5, at 255.
18. See, e.g., Steven I. Locke, Family Responsibilities Discrimination and the New York City
Model: A Map for Future Legislation, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 19, 22 (2009) (stating that 59% of caregiv-
ers have had difficulty balancing work and family and 57% of that number have had to take time off
for caregiving).
19. Travis, supra note 10, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Travis also argues that this
norm has become not just descriptive of most workplaces but also normative-this is how good
workplaces are designed. Id. A good example of this norm of hard work becoming entrenched is this
quote from a senior manager reacting to a junior manager who reported a survey showing that em-
ployees wanted a more balanced work life:
Don't ever bring up "balance" again!... Everyone in this company has to work hard.
We work hard. They have to work hard. That's the way it is. Just because a few women
are concerned about balance doesn't mean we change the rules. If they choose this ca-
reer, they're going to have to pay for it in hours, like the rest of us.
Id. at 19.
20. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 5, at 255 (stating that mothers earn 60% of the wages
of fathers); Suk, supra note 6, at 59 (stating that there is a larger pay gap between men and women in
the United States than in other countries where women have better paid maternity benefits).
21. Nicole Buonocore Porter, The Blame Game:. How the Rhetoric of Choice Blames the
Achievement Gap on Women, 8 FlU L. REV. 447, 460-61 (2013); see also Kaminer, supra note 14,
at 313 (stating that mothers make career sacrifices to satisfy their caregiving responsibilities and
caregiving affects their pay); Kessler, supra note 13, at 385-86 (stating that women are more likely
to work in part-time or "mommy-track[ed]" jobs).
22. For instance, Michelle Travis discusses how telecommuting, which is frequently lauded as
a family-friendly workplace benefit, often ends up hurting women because employers use telecom-
muting to pay women less or move them to independent contractor status, which takes away their
benefits. Travis, supra note 17, at 296-302. Telecommuting also does not ease women's burden at
home, as they often end up doing more homework when telecommuting. Id. at 312-14. Meanwhile,
men who telecommute do less work at home and more market work. Id. at 313-14.
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Scholars have emphasized the importance and self-fulfillment of
23working. Some women, however, end up opting out of the workplace
completely because of the difficulty in balancing work and family. When
women opt out of the workplace, the negative effect is not limited to
women and their families, but it also affects employers and society as
companies lose valuable employees and diverse leadership.24 Even more,
25
allowing women to combine caregiving and work benefits children.
Men also suffer from the caregiver conundrum, although differently
from women.26 According to Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, one of the
new voices in the literature discussing men as caregivers, masculinities
theory requires three negative performances of working men: non-
nurturance, non-dependence, and non-expression.2 7 This means they
must avoid care work; establish themselves as breadwinners;28 and re-
main silent regarding work-family conflicts.29 Men are often discouraged
from taking leave by their employers.30 Even when they try to get in-
volved in caregiving work, women often act as gatekeepers, supervising
men in their care of the house and children, which can make men less
willing to want to be caregivers.31 Cunningham-Parmeter states that fa-
thers in dual-earner couples are more likely to report work-life conflict
than mothers.32 And when their work and family conflict, men are more
likely to silently accept workplace discipline rather than violate the
"male code" by talking about their caregiving obligations.33 Although
23. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha Fineman 's The
Autonomy Myth, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1285, 1306-07 (2005); Kaminer, supra note 14, at 314-16
(discussing the mental and economic benefits to women working); Kessler, supra note 13, at 381-84
(discussing the benefits of wage work for women and stating that women need to work to achieve
economic stability); Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1916-18 (2000).
24. Katelyn Brack, Note, American Work-Life Balance. Overcoming Family Responsibilities
Discrimination in the Workplace, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 543, 545 (2013); Kaminer, supra note 14, at
322-23 (discussing the harm employers face from failing to provide flexible workplaces).
25. Maxine Eichner argues that allowing parents to successfully combine caregiving and work
assures that children's needs are met but not fetishized. She points to the tendency of late for parents
to feel like they must spend every minute with their children, leading kids "to fall victim to the
'over-appreciated child' syndrome," in which kids have difficulty functioning without constant
attention. Eichner, supra note 23, at 1308-09; see also Kaminer, supra note 14, at 316-17.
26. Many scholars have written about men and caregiver discrimination. See, e.g., Cunning-
ham-Parmeter, supra note 5; Martin 14. Malin, Fathers & Parental Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047
(1994); Martin H. Malin, Fathers & Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25 (1998);
Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men & Responsibility, 4 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 573 (2007).
27. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 5, at 275.
28. Cunningham-Parmeter discusses how difficult it is for men to actually meet this bread-
winner goal. Id. at 279-80. Society expects men to be able to support their families but the family
wage is just a myth. Id at 279, 281. Despite working more hours than other countries (men work 47
hours per week on average and women work 35 hours per week), it is still difficult for men to be the
primary breadwinners. Id.
29. Id. at 275.
30. Id. at 290; see also Kessler, supra note 13, at 420-21 (discussing the fact that men suffer
from hostility when they seek parental eave).
31. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 5, at 277-78.
32. Id. at 283.
33. Id. at 284.
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Cunningham-Parmeter recognizes that women experience caregiver bias
at work more than men, those men who do engage in caregiving experi-
34ence severe consequences.
Most scholars (although certainly not all)35 believe that our current
36laws are ill-equipped to ameliorate the caregiver conundrum. No feder-
al statute specifically protects caregivers, although some states and local-
ities do.37 As many have argued, Title VII's sex discrimination provision,
the PDA, and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 38 provide only
limited protection to workers who experience the caregiver conundrum.39
Certainly, other than some limited access to leave under the FMLA,
caregivers are not entitled to workplace accommodations for their care-
giving.40
For some, it might be necessary for me to respond to the question:
Why should anyone care that women, and sometimes men, make deci-
sions regarding having children, caregiving, or both that affect their suc-
cess and options in the workplace? Although several articles could be
written about this very topic,41 I will address it here only briefly. Schol-
ars have argued that society has a responsibility to help make the combi-
nation of working and caregiving possible, in part because veryone ben-
efits from caregiving work.42 Although scholars disagree regarding
whether there is societal value to actually having children, most agree
34. Id at 292-93. And when employers engage in discrimination against male caregivers,
courts are less likely to see it as discriminatory. Id. at 296. Part of the reason for this is because the
masculine norms tend to be invisible. Id. "Cloaked in a veneer of ordinariness, masculinity silently
establishes social positions by convincing people that the dominant male form is the way things
ought to be." Id. Courts are more willing to see discrimination against mothers as actionable because
the stereotypes of either women as mothers but incompetent workers or competent workers but
incompetent mothers are easy to see as discriminatory. Id. at 297-98.
35. See infra Part III.A.
36. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Gauging Employer Reactions to the First Maternal Wall Suits: Com-
mentary on Keynote Speaker Joan Williams's "Beyond the Glass Ceiling," 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
27, 27 (2003) (stating that many law professors who wish to help men and women balance work and
family are discouraged by the existing state of the law); Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7,
at 790-95; Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 370-80; Travis, supra note 10, at 5-6 (discussing the
laws' inability to restructure the organizational structures of the workplace).
37. Locke, supra note 18, at 24-25, 29 (pointing to Alaska and Washington D.C. and 60
localities).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012).
39. Kaminer, supra note 14, at 307 (stating that Title VII and the FMLA have failed to ade-
quately protect working caregivers); Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 790-95; Porter,
Why Care?, supra note 3, at 370-80; see also Kessler, supra note 13, at 429.
40. Kessler, supra note 13, at 429; Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 790-95;
Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 370-80.
41. 1 have addressed this very issue before. See Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3.
42. See, e.g., Eichner, supra note 23, at 1309; Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract & Care,
76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1420 (2001); Kessler, supra note 12, at 445-47, 449 (discussing the
debate regarding the autonomy over caregiving decisions, the autonomy myth, and the harm that
comes from the autonomy myth); Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 384-90; Williams & Segal,
supra note 15, at 87-89.
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that once that decision is made, taking good care of children is a respon-
sibility, and one that benefits others.43
II.PLETHORA OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Broadly speaking, scholars have proposed solutions that fall into
three general categories: litigation-based solutions, legislation-based
solutions, and solutions aimed at changing gender norms.44 Many solu-
tions encompass more than one category. As an example, scholars pro-
pose using legislation to help change gender norms. The most common
example of this strategy is a proposed statute that would incentivize men
to take more leave to care for children (either newborn babies or children
who are ill or disabled), encouraging them to be more involved in their
children's lives.45 This Part will discuss the three types of proposals
along with the most often-cited criticisms of each.
A. Litigation-Focused Solutions
The strongest proponent of using litigation as a solution to eradicat-
ing family responsibilities discrimination is Joan Williams. Williams's
main argument (some might call it a mantra) is: "Designing workplace
objectives around an ideal worker who has a man's body and men's tra-
ditional immunity from family caregiving discriminates against women.
Eliminating that ideal is not 'accommodation'; it is the minimum re-
quirement for gender equality. 46 Thus, she argues in favor of using a
"discrimination model, linked with the business case" in order to elimi-
nate family responsibilities discrimination.47 Much of her scholarship
focuses on addressing negative cases (and responding to those scholars
who cite to negative cases), explaining why they were not litigated
43. Eichner, supra note 23, at 1303; Kaminer, supra note 14, at 319-22 (arguing that children
should be viewed as a public good); Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 388-90.
44. Others might choose to add in a fourth solution: getting the state to support caregiving
directly. See generally Eichner, supra note 22. Maxine Eichner disagrees with Martha Fineman's
proposals to have the state directly subsidize care work. Instead, she argues that the state should
support caregiving in a way that would allow individuals to combine caregiving and market work.
ld. at 1287. She argues that the state should support caregiving because it is a societal obligation to
protect the most vulnerable. Id. She, for the most part, agrees with Fineman's focus on the fact that
people are not autonomous-dependency is inevitable, and once that view is accepted, the minimal-
ist approach of the state and employers doing nothing becomes indefensible. Id. at 1291-92. Eichner,
however, argues in favor of getting employers to make changes rather than the state providing direct
subsidies in part because if the state directly subsidizes caregiving, this will only help caregivers in
the short run-those caregivers will ultimately suffer from having dropped out of the workforce. Id.
at 1306. On the other side of the debate, Mary Anne Case argues that children should not be consid-
ered a public good. Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About
Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1753, 1775, 1782 (2001). She also states that not all parents are good parents so not all parents
deserve a subsidy. Id. at 1778.
45. Ariel Meysam Ayanna, Aggressive Parental Leave Incentivizing: A Statutory Proposal
Toward Gender Equalization i the Workplace, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 297 (2007).
46. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 106.
47. Id. at 79 (internal quotation mark omitted). The idea behind using the "business case" is to
point out to employers and courts that there are financial benefits to having family-friendly work-
places; thus, it is irrational for an employer to refuse to give employees family-friendly benefits. Id.
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48properly or did not have good facts. For instance, she argues that the
plaintiff in one case was not sympathetic because she would not work
overtime after her baby was born.4 9 Williams explains that another case
failed because the plaintiff, whose termination was a product of her
morning sickness, brought her claim under the PDA.5 ° Williams points
out that the PDA does not require employers to give more leeway to
pregnant employees than it gives to other employees.
51
Williams and her co-authors also discuss several positive cases, in
which plaintiffs successfully sued under a disparate treatment theory. On
my reading, almost all of the cases cited by Williams deal with plaintiffs
being mistreated in the workplace because of employers' stereotypical
assumptions regarding working mothers.52 There were only two cases
cited by Williams and her co-authors that did not involve ideal workers.
The first case, Walsh v. National Computer Systems, Inc.,53 involved a
plaintiff who had to miss a significant amount of work because of her
son's illnesses.54 The plaintiffs boss threw a phone book at her when she
informed him her son had an ear infection and demanded she find a new
55 56doctor.5 5 In the second case, Snodgrass v. Brown, a plaintiff was termi-
nated due to too many absences.57 Because the absences were caused by
the employer's last-minute scheduling changes, and the plaintiffs subse-
quent inability to find childcare, she was able to survive summary judg-
ment on her claim. 58 Other than these two cases, however, the other cases
mentioned by Williams and her co-authors involve "ideal workers," em-
ployees who were assumed (erroneously) would not meet their employ-
ers' expectations because of their caregiving responsibilities.59
Scholars also argue that disparate impact cases can have some suc-
cess.60 Scholars point to three frequently cited cases: Roberts v. U.S.
48. Williams & Borstein, supra note 2, at 182-85; Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 102-
10.
49. Williams & Segal, supra note 14, at 103-05 (discussing Chi v. Age Group, Ltd., No. 94
CIV. 5253 (AGS), 1996 WL 627580, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1996)).
50. Id. at 105-06 (discussing Troupe v. May Dept. Stores, Inc., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 106-07.
53. No. 00-CV-82, slip op. at 2 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2002)).
54. Id. at 128 (citing Nat'l Computer Sys., No. 00-CV-82, at 2).
55. Id. (citing oral comments by Jim Kaster, plaintiff Shirleen Walsh's attorney, at the New
Glass Ceiling Conference, Washington College of Law, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 24, 2003) (transcript
available from AM. U. J. OF GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.)).
56. No. 89-1171-K, 1990 WL 198431 (D. Kan. Nov. 26, 1990).
57. Id. at *14.
58. Id. at*17.
59. See Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 124-30.
60. Kessler, supra note 13, at 412; Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment Discrimina-
tion: A Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 581 (2002); Travis, supra note
17, at 288-89 (arguing that there is untapped potential in the disparate impact theory for eliminating
workplace structures that discriminate against working caregivers); Williams & Bornstein, supra
note 2, at 182-83; Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 134.
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Postmaster General,6' in which a plaintiff successfully challenged a sick
leave policy that could not be used for the illness of a family member;
62
Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union,63 in which a pregnant
plaintiff successfully challenged a ten-day leave limit; 64 and EEOC v.
65Warshawsky & Company, where a plaintiff successfully challenged a
sick leave policy that did not allow leaves of absence until the employee
had been working for a year.66 In responding to the employer's business
necessity defense, Williams argues that litigants can point to the business
case that family-friendly policies actually save money by decreasing
attrition.
67
Michelle Travis is one of the main proponents of using the disparate
impact theory to restructure workplace norms. She states that disparate
impact theory has "great potential for addressing aspects of women's
inequality that stem from workplace organizational norms that create,
retrench, or magnify women's disproportionate conflicts between work
and family. ' 68 Although Travis recognizes that many courts are not giv-
ing the disparate impact theory the transformative potential it could
have,69 some courts correctly recognize that the organizational structures
of employers are "particular employment practices" subject to challenge
under the disparate impact theory.v One benefit of disparate impact theo-
ry, according to Travis, is that the risk of special treatment stigma is less
if the obligation to restructure workplace norms is based on the success-
ful use of the disparate impact theory.7' Travis notes that an accommoda-
tion mandate would only require an employer to make a change in
schedule, hours, attendance, or overtime requirements for one particular
employee who requested the accommodation, while the disparate impact
theory would require the employer to eliminate the practice completely.72
61. 947 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1996).
62. Id. at 287-89; Travis, supra note 17, at 357-58.
63. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
64. Id. at 819; Travis, supra note 17, at 356-57 (stating that this case was a positive case in
which the court was willing to look beyond the act/omission distinction).
65. 768 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. I11. 1991).
66. Id. at 647; Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 135.
67. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 88-89 (stating that it costs $200,000$500,000 to
replace an attorney, and even replacing lower level employees is expensive-$ 1,000 to replace a
convenience store clerk and $2,100 to replace a hotel industry employee); see also Travis, supra
note 17, at 373. Of course, other scholars note the problems with the business necessity defense. See,
e.g., Smith, supra note 60, at 597. One problem is that courts frequently give too much weight to the
short-term costs of family-friendly policies and workplaces, ignoring the long-term cost savings.
Travis, supra note 17, at 363. But see id. at 362-63 (arguing that there is at least one case where, in
dicta, the court held that courts should consider long-term benefits when looking at the business
necessity defense).
68. Travis, supra note 10, at 37.
69. Id. at 39-46.
70. Id. at 39, 84-88 (discussing the positive disparate impact cases).
71. Travis, supra note 17, at 328-29.
72. See id. at 329-30; Travis, supra note 10, at 38.
2014]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
Once the practice is eliminated, men and women-caregivers and non-
caregivers-will all benefit.
73
Williams acknowledges that litigation by itself cannot eliminate
family responsibilities discrimination. Instead, a few successful cases can
lead to social change.74 She discusses law's expressive function and the
influence of "rights talk," which allows women to stop blaming them-
selves for not being able to adequately balance work and family. 75 Fur-
thermore, successful cases can positively influence key decision-makers,
such as human resources personnel, in-house lawyers, and even some
conservatives who believe in family values.76 As Williams argues, the
threat of litigation produces more social change than actual litigation,
because employers often go beyond what the law requires.77 As Williams
summarizes: "The cases that are litigated will always be a small percent-
age of the potential cases-and they will tend to be the most egregious
ones. Ultimately, the power of 'rights talk' stems less from the cases won
than from the cases that never have to be fought.,78 The hope is that the
threat of litigation and the business case for offering family-friendly ben-
efits will motivate employers, who will therefore offer more effective
family-responsive benefits.79
Of course, many scholars argue that litigation under our current le-
gal regime is insufficient to make much of a dent in the caregiver conun-
drum, especially for those caregivers who are "real" workers-those
whose caregiving obligations affect their ability to consistently meet
their employers' workplace requirements such as strict schedules, long
hours, mandatory overtime, face time requirements, stringent attendance
policies, etc.80 Williams is a little inconsistent here. At one point, she
specifically states, "The first thing one needs in an employment discrim-
73. Travis, supra note 17, at 330; see Travis, supra note 10, at 89 (discussing the "benefits
that flexible work arrangements can have on recruiting, retention, absenteeism, and productivity").
However, there are other scholars who point out that there are few plaintiffs who have achieved
success using a disparate impact theory. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 60, at 582.
74. See Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 161 (stating that a couple of good cases can
influence courts and attorneys); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 36, at 29.
75. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 113-14.
76. Id. at 120-22 (discussing "new institutionalism," which states that legal mandates can lead
human resources personnel to go further than necessary in order to avoid liability).
77. Williams & Bomstein, supra note 2, at 186; Bisom-Rapp, supra note 36, at 30-31 (stating
that employers, counseled by human resources management and in-house counsel, will develop
compliance programs to eradicate discrimination to shield employers from liability).
78. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 121-22.
79. Id. at 161.
80. Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 357-58 (describing "real" workers). Julie Suk also
argues that litigation brought under an anti-stereotyping theory does not work for "real" women
because any time caregiving detracts from work, the law allows the caregiver to be treated the same
as if fantasy baseball detracts from one's work obligations. Suk, supra note 6, at 56. See also Ka-
miner, supra note 14, at 328 (stating that Title VII cannot be effective because it is limited to equal
treatment and therefore cannot protect working caregivers who are not meeting the ideal worker
norm); Kessler, supra note 13, at 407 (stating that Title VI1 only helps ideal workers but most wom-
en with children cannot succeed under this standard); Travis, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that schol-
ars have moved away from anti-discrimination law for remedying caregiver discrimination).
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ination suit is a 'good' plaintiff, i.e., someone who has done her job well
.... ,,8t After this statement, she devotes one paragraph to discussing
how to litigate claims for those who do not conform to the ideal worker
norm82 and concludes by stating, "[I]t is clear that Title VII can be used
to protect the rights of mothers who do not fit neatly into the ideal-
worker category.' 3 She refers to the lack of choices in the workplace as
discrimination, but her discussion of the successful cases mostly involves
ideal workers.
84
Furthermore, even when successful, litigation is viewed as being too
slow, too piecemeal,
85 too expensive, and too unpleasant for plaintiffs.
8 6
Travis argues that, although litigation helps in cases where employers
stereotype women as not competent once they become mothers,87 it is
hard to allege intentional discrimination when complaining about the
lack of family-friendly policies.88
B. Legislation-Focused Solutions
Proposals calling for additional legislation fall into two general cat-
egories: proposals for additional anti-discrimination protection based on
one's status as a caregiver and proposals for affirmative mandates. Af-
firmative mandates include proposed amendments o the FMLA or pro-
posals for an accommodation mandate similar to the accommodation
mandate for religious practices under Title VII or the reasonable accom-
modation provision under the ADA. 89
1. Adding Caregiver Status as a Protected Class
As discussed above, no federal law directly protects caregivers
against discrimination. Only a couple of jurisdictions provide such pro-
81. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 107.
82. Id. at 107-08 (stating that women who are not ideal workers can litigate these claims if
they can prove that the employer treated them poorly after they requested or used flexible work
arrangements that the employer does allow).
83. Id. at 108. She also states that she hopes that the influence of ideal worker cases will help
the real worker cases. Id.
84. Specifically, she states that if plaintiffs have failed to perform important requirements of
the job, their cases will likely fail. Id. at 141. See also Locke, supra note 18, at 31-32 (pointing out
that the EEOC guidelines on caregiver discrimination make clear that only ideal workers are protect-
ed); Kaminer, supra note 14, at 329-30 (arguing that, despite Williams's statements to the contrary,
most of the cases she cites involve ideal workers).
85. Brack, supra note 24, at 559.
86. Even those scholars who generally argue in favor of litigation recognize that litigation is
not ideal. For instance, Michelle Travis recognizes that lawsuits are not the ideal mechanism for
change in part because they are costly. Travis, supra note 17, at 320. She also argues that litigating
using a sex discrimination theory under Title VII runs the risk of characterizing work-family balance
as a women's issue, which risks further entrenching stereotypes of women as caregivers. Id.
87. Id. at 335-36.
88. Id. at 337; see also Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 790-91; Porter, Why
Care?, supra note 3, at 372.
89. Scholars also argue in favor of paid leave mandates and subsidized day care. See, e.g.,
Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 857; Eichner, supra note 23, at 1317.
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tection: Alaska and Washington, D.C.9° Scholars have discussed adding a
protected classification to Title VII; 91 earlier proposals referred to "pa-
rental status" or "familial status," but more recent proposals are broader,
referring to "caregiver status."
92
Although Peggie Smith ultimately argued against adding parental
status as a protected classification under Title VII, she was probably the
earliest and most prominent scholar to discuss such a proposal in detail.93
She discusses a statute proposed by President Clinton, entitled Ending
Discrimination Against Parents Act (EDPA),94 which would have prohib-
ited discrimination against parents "based on the assumption that they
cannot satisfy the requirements of a particular position."95 Although
Smith recognizes the benefits of such a law,96 she argues that it only
would cover ideal workers97 and that the cause of most work-life conflict
is the structural limitations of the workplace.98 Many parents are real
workers with real conflicts who cannot always meet the hour and attend-
ance requirements of the workplace.99 Smith states: "To effect purposeful
change on behalf of individuals with parental obligations, workplace
practices must be restructured to value parenting as a social good that
requires affirmative support."'
Smith further argues:
Although a parental-status-based 10 approach to discrimination stands
to promote a gender-neutral understanding of child care, and in the
process, to advance the interests of all workers with parental obliga-
90. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (2013); D.C. Code § 2-1402.1 l(a)(1) (2013); see also
Brack, supra note 24, at 554; Locke, supra note 17, at 29, 34-35 (mentioning that sixty localities
also prohibit discrimination based on parental or familial status or caregiver status, including New
York City).
91. Brack, supra note 24, at 562 (stating that family responsibilities discrimination should be
recognized under federal law and that the obvious solution would be to amend Title VII to include
discrimination based on all types of caregiving).
92. See, e.g., Stephanie J. Eifler, Choosing Not to Choose: A Legislative Solution for Working
Adults Who Wish to Be Successful Employees and Successful Caregivers, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1205,
1226-28 (2012) (proposing adding caregiver status as a protected class and defining it broadly to
include providing care for a variety of family members, including grandparents or grandchildren, in-
laws, and siblings).
93. Smith, supra note 60.
94. S. 1907, 106th Cong. (Ist Sess. 1999).
95. Smith, supra note 60, at 587.
96. Namely that it would help with the absence of male comparators; would help with inter-
sectional claims, and would help with disparate impact claims which often fail because there are too
few male caregivers to prove the requisite statistics. Id. at 589-90, 593-94.
97. Id. at 598.
98. Id. at 594-95 (stating that structural barriers cause more of the problems with work-life
balance than stereotypes).
99. Id. at 595.
100. Id.
101. Scholars used to refer to "parenting" when discussing caregiving or work-life balance.
Most scholars now are increasingly recognizing that caring for sick, disabled, or elderly spouses,
partners, parents, and other adult family members also contributes to work-family conflict. See
Williams & Borustein, supra note 2, at 17 1.
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tions, such an approach remains wedded to a limited conception of
equality, requiring only that employment decisions not reflect differ-
ences based on parenthood. Consequently, anti-discrimination legis-
lation is satisfied so long as both women and men with parenting ob-
ligations are equally ill-treated.
10 2
Smith also argues that protecting parents is not necessary because there
is not much evidence that parents suffer from discrimination based on
erroneous assumptions about their commitment to work.W3 To the extent
they do, Smith believes that parents (specifically mothers) can bring cas-
es under Title VII using a stereotyping theory.'04
Since Smith's work, other scholars have revisited the issue of pro-
tecting parental status or caregiver status.0 5 These scholars have argued
that changes since Smith's article make protecting caregiver status more
feasible and defensible.0 6 The changes to which they refer are better
research indicating that caregivers suffer from bias based on stereotypes
and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
guidance regarding family responsibilities discrimination.0 7 Even though
Smith did not think that stereotypes were being used against mothers, the
evidence now suggests otherwise.0 8
Scholars also argue that relying on sex discrimination under Title
VII is problematic because it perpetuates the stereotype that caregiving is
women's work.10 9 Furthermore, stereotypes about mothers' competence
and commitment also undermine the progress of laws allowing for ac-
commodations for caregiving.10
Many of the authors proposing an anti-discrimination provision
based on parenting or caregiver status recognize that anti-discrimination
provisions are not enough without an accommodation mandate."' One
102. Smith, supra note 60, at 572-73 (footnote omitted). The last sentence of the quoted pas-
sage is confusing. If a statute prohibited discrimination based on parental status, it would most
certainly violate the law to treat both men and women with parenting obligations badly. An employ-
er would be required to treat parents in the same way as they treat non-parents. Perhaps what Smith
means in this passage is that an employer would not be required to accommodate parenting obliga-
tions. Thus, an employer could penalize both mothers and fathers if they do not meet the attendance
requirements because of their parenting obligations. But an employer could not, under a provision
prohibiting parental status discrimination, decide not to promote mothers or fathers because of a
belief that their caregiving obligations will get in the way of their work.
103. Id. at 573.
104. Id. at 575.
105. See, e.g., Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old Problem, New Tactic: Making the
Case for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based on Family Caregiver Status, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1463 (2008).
106. Id. at 1465.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1472-73.
109. ld at 1468.
110. Id. at 1472-73. They also argue that if you prohibit parental status discrimination, this will
make the law more supportive of workplace accommodations. Id. at 1480.
111. See, e.g., Eifler, supra note 92, at 1221; Farrell & Guertin, supra note 105, at 1465-66,
1479 (stating that there is a strong case for family responsibilities legislation working in tandem with
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commentator argues that an anti-discrimination mandate protecting par-
ents is not sufficient because employers can continue to ignore caregiv-
ing and treat parents and non-parents alike." 2 I discuss the proposals for
accommodation mandates next.
2. Accommodation Mandate and Other Affirmative Mandate Solu-
tions
Over the years, scholars have proposed various affirmative mandate
solutions either as a supplement to anti-discrimination provisions or as
stand-alone provisions. The most prominent among these are proposals
to expand the right to leaves of absence;" 
3 proposals for a process law;" 14
proposals for daycare care or other subsidies to help working caregiv-
ers; 15 and proposals for an accommodation mandate, the latter of these I
turn to now.
One of the earliest proponents 16 of an accommodation mandate was
Peggie Smith. Smith argues in favor of using the religious accommoda-
tion mandate under Title VII rather than the reasonable accommodation
provision under the ADA." 17 She argues that the religious accommoda-
tion mandate is superior to the disability accommodation mandate be-
cause religious accommodations are about keeping employees in the
workplace,"8 and because religious accommodations involve deferring to
accommodation laws); Locke, supra note 18, at 19; Elizabeth Roush, Note, (Re)Entering the Work-
force: An Historical Perspective on Family Responsibilities Discrimination and the Shortcomings of
Law to Remedy It, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 221, 248-52 (2009) (stating that an anti-discrimination
provision is not enough without an accommodation mandate).
112. Locke, supra note 18, at 33.
113. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New Perspective, a
New Solution, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 327, 329-31 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, FMLA]; Por-
ter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 836-40 (discussing other scholars' proposals for subsi-
dized paid leave).
114. See, e.g., Rachel Amow-Richman, Public Law & Private Process: Toward an Incentiv-
ized Organizational Justice Model of Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25,
27; Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 804-06.
115. See, e.g., Heather S. Dixon, National Daycare: A Necessary Precursor to Gender Equality
with Newfound Promise for Success, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 561 (2005); Debbie Kaminer,
The Child Care Crisis & the Work-Family Conflict: A Policy Rationale for Federal Legislation, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 495, 513 (2007); Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 840-44.
116. Certainly other scholars have argued in favor of forcing employers to accommodate
caregiving without going into specifics regarding what such an accommodation mandate might look
like. See, e.g., Eichner, supra note 23, at 1292 (stating that caregiving is so important that it should
be accommodated even if it means adding costs to employers).
117. Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family
Conflict: Lessons from Religious Accommodations, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1443, 1445-46 (2001); see
also Kaminer, supra note 14, at 333 (advocating for an accommodation mandate for caregiving
patterned after the religious accommodation mandate under Title VII); Kessler, supra note 13, at
457-58 (stating that a religious accommodation mandate is superior to an accommodation mandate
under the ADA because religion and caregiving have some aspect of choice rather than being purely
biological, such as most disabilities).
118. Smith, supra note 117, at 1464-65. Smith contrasts the ADA, which she argues is more
about bringing people into the workplace rather than keeping them there. Id. Although getting indi-
viduals with disabilities employed was a major goal of the ADA, most ADA cases involve issues
surrounding keeping individuals with disabilities employed. Id. at 1464.
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employee choice when values conflict with work.119 Smith's proposal
involves requiring employers to accommodate employees when those
employees have a compelling parental obligation that conflicts with a
work requirement.12  Smith uses unemployment compensation cases to
help define a "compelling parental obligation."' 21 If an employee quits or
is terminated because of an unavoidable caregiving schedule conflict,
courts will still allow the employee to collect unemployment. These ob-
ligations are compelling because they would cause a reasonable person to
quit their job.122 Once an employee has met this obligation, the employer
can attempt to prove undue hardship. Smith advocates for an intermedi-
ate standard between the highly deferential de minimis standard used in
religious accommodation cases and the difficult-to-prove undue hardship
standard under the ADA.
123
Other scholars have advocated for an accommodation mandate
similar to the one contained in the ADA, or a model that combines as-
pects of the ADA model with features of the religious accommodation
model under Title VII. 124 Finally, some scholars have argued for a uni-
versal accommodation mandate.25 The argument in support of a univer-
sal accommodation mandate is that the stigma associated with getting
special treatment in the workplace will dissipate if everyone is entitled to
119. Id. at 1464; see also Kaminer, supra note 14, at 334 (stating that the religious accommo-
dation mandate makes sense because just as workplaces are built around those who are Christians,
they are also built around those without caregiving responsibilities).
120. Smith, supra note 117, at 1465-66; see also Kaminer, supra note 14, at 340 (suggesting
that employees must prove that they have a bona fide caregiving responsibility that conflicts with the
workplace rules or norms).
121. Smith, supra note 117, at 1471-72
122. Id. at 1445. For instance, most employees would risk termination rather than leaving a
young child home alone. But most employees would not risk termination to attend a field trip or a
softball game. Id. at 1471. Smith would also require the employee to show a good faith attempt to
resolve the conflict. Id. at 1472-73. Kaminer also argues in favor of a religious accommodation
mandate, in part because many of the possible accommodations for religion are similar to the ac-
commodations caregivers might need, such as schedule or shift changes. Kaminer, supra note 14, at
336-37.
123. Smith, supra note 17, at 1483.
124. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Accommodation at Work: Lessons from the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Possibilities Jbr Alleviating the American Worker Time Crunch, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 615, 634-35 (2004); Kaminer, supra note 14, at 333-358 (advocating for an
accommodation mandate similar to the religious accommodation mandate but suggesting the more
stringent undue hardship analysis under the ADA). Another commentator argues in favor of the
adoption of a federal statute similar to a proposed New York City bill that would protect against
discrimination based on caregiving status (defined broadly) and require that employers provide
reasonable accommodations to caregivers unless the accommodation would cause an undue hard-
ship, which is defined similar to the factors used in the ADA. Locke, supra note 18, at 34-36.
125. See, e.g., Case, supra note 44, at 1768 (stating that if everyone was entitled to flexibility
benefits, this would reduce the stigma parents suffer from getting special treatment); Nicole B.
Porter, Mutual Marginalization: Individuals with Disabilities and Workers with Caregiving Respon-
sibilities, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1099, 1135-38 (2014) [hereinafter Porter, Mutual Marginalization] (dis-
cussing but ultimately rejecting a universal accommodation mandate as being impractical); Michael
Stein, Anita Silvers, Bradley A. Areheart & Leslie P. Francis, Accommodating Every Body, 82 U.
CHt. L. REV. 689 (2014) (advocating for a universal accommodation mandate).
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the special treatment (which, of course, means that the treatment is not
special at all).
126
There have been many critics of the accommodation model, 27 most
prominently Joan Williams, who states: "You can't solve an institutional
problem with an individual accommodation."'' 28 Williams argues that a
religious accommodation model will fail because of a narrow interpreta-
tion of the accommodation mandate under Title VII's religious accom-
modation provisions.'29 She also argues that the ADA has been read very
narrowly.130 Williams states that because there are an infinite variety of
disabilities, an individual accommodation is the best we can do for those
with disabilities, but
[i]n the work-family arena, there is not a dazzling array but a dyad.
The question is whether workplaces will continue to be designed
around the bodies and life patterns of men, with "accommoda-
tions" offered to women, or whether workplace norms will be rede-
signed to take into account the reproductive biology and social roles
of women and family caregivers, as well. 131
Thus, we do not need accommodations, according to Williams-we only
need equality.' 
32
126. See sources cited supra note 124.
127. See, e.g., Rachel Amow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted The Future of
Work/Family Initiatives in a "Me, Inc. " World, 12 TEX J. WOMEN & L. 345, 362-67 (2003); Befort,
supra note 124, at 618, 624. There are also scholars who are skeptical about the success of an ADA-
like accommodation model because the ADA itself has experienced a backlash in the courts. See
Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 802-03 & nn. 165-68.
128. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 82 (quoting ANNE WEISBERG, CATALYST, WOMEN IN
LAW: MAKING THE CASE 18 (2011)).
129. Id. at 84. Although the one thing that Williams does not acknowledge or explore is that it
is commonly believed that the reason that courts narrowly construed the accommodation mandate
under the religious accommodation provisions was because of First Amendment concerns, which are
not present in the caregiving context. Mary Anne Case also discusses the narrow construction given
to the religious accommodation mandate under Title VII. Case, supra note 44, at 1769.
130. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 84. This was true at the time Williams published this
piece, in 2003. But the ADA was amended in 2008 and dramatically increased the coverage of the
statute. Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 GA.
L. REV. 527, 541 n.74 (2013) [hereinafter Porter, Martinizing].
131. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 84-85. 1 have always found this statement by Wil-
liams frustrating. The ways in which caregivers balance work and family are highly variable and
highly individual depending on a variety of factors, including the job, the age and health of the
children, the marital status and presence or absence of other family members, and the daycare/school
situation. Some caregivers need more lenient attendance policies to account for things like sick
children and routine doctor's appointments; some need flexible schedules; some need a straight shift
rather than a rotating shift; and, if you include pregnant women, some may need many of the same
physical modifications of the job that individuals with disabilities need; see also Kaminer, supra
note 14, at 337 (arguing that caregiving needs vary greatly).
132. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 85. Other authors argue that the problem with an
accommodation mandate is that it assumes all women need accommodations when many do not and
thus it perpetuates the idea that women are in need of special treatment. Farrell & Guertin, supra
note 105, at 1478.
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Michelle Travis also argues that litigation is better than an accom-
modation mandate, because special legislation to benefit caregivers runs
the risk of essentializing women and makes it too easy to accept gender
norms of women as caregivers.'33 Although she recognizes the benefit to
an accommodation mandate,'34 she argues that the problem with it is that
most people do not see an accommodation as a form of equal opportuni-
ty; instead, they see it as a form of affirmative action. 35 If employers
were forced to accommodate caregivers, this would likely cause resent-
ment by other employees, and might cause employers to be more reluc-
tant to hire and promote women-who are most often the caregivers.'
36
C. Changing Gender Norms
Many scholars argue that for women to be equal, either men must
assume equal caregiving responsibility or institutions must be adjusted to
accommodate caregiving.137 In recent years, several scholars have argued
that it is not only employers that cause the problem working caregivers
face.138 According to these scholars, the problem lies with the division of
labor between men and women at home.'39 In other words, women are
only disadvantaged in the workplace because they are stuck doing the
vast majority of caregiving in the home.140 If men picked up some of the
workload at home, women would be able to be more successful employ-
ees. A few scholars believe it is unfair to ask employers or the state to
133. Travis, supra note 17, at 322-23.
134. Id. at 324-25 ("In theory, a gender-neutral caregiving accommodation duty has the poten-
tial to ameliorate the work/family conflicts felt disproportionately by women, without essentializing
either women's or men's roles with regard to paid or unpaid work.").
135. Id. at 326 (pointing to the fact that the ADA is less effective because it is seen as a social
welfare statute rather than an anti-discrimination statute).
136. Id. at 327; Bisom-Rapp, supra note 36, at 28; Case, supra note 44, at 1761 (stating that if
we force employers to provide additional benefits to women with children, they will simply hire
fewer women); see also Porter, Mutual Marginalization, supra note 125. Mary Anne Case also
discusses the potential backlash if caregivers are given special benefits because employers often
make other employees pick up the slack without paying them any more. Case, supra note 44, at
1757.
137. Eichner, supra note 23, at 1289.
138. Case, supra note 44, at 1754-56 (questioning whether employers should be responsible
for ameliorating work-family conflict); Selmi, supra note 26, at 577.
139. Case, supra note 44, at 1756 (stating that resistance from men who do not want to do their
fair share of the work at home is part of the problem and the reason why women have trouble bal-
ancing work and family); Eichner, supra note 23, at 1295 (stating that many scholars believe that
getting men to do more would change things for women and would eliminate the leisure gap be-
tween men and women).
140. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 5, at 255 ("Women will not attain full equality at work
until men do more at home."); see Case, supra note 44, at 1785-86 (stating that fathers should be
forced to kick in before everyone else is asked and that fathers should not be free-riding-men's
resistance to doing more work at home is not a good reason to put the burden on employers).
141. Nancy E. Dowd, Bringing the Margin to the Center: Comprehensive Strategies for
Work/Family Policies, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 433 (2004) ("Indeed, the assumed result of
work/family balance is that it would help achieve equality: families would be treated equally, care-
givers would be supported equally, and children and family members would receive necessary and
important care equally.").
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assist caregivers when men are not being asked to do their fair share.
42
The rationale of these scholars is that when employers give more benefits
to caregivers, either leaves of absence or flexible work schedules, em-
ployers will often make other employees pick up the slack, and often
those employees are childless women.
143
Of course, stating that men should do more at home does not and
cannot automatically lead to men doing more at home.'44 It is difficult to
regulate how much childcare and housework men do. 14 5 Thus, scholars
have proposed legislation aimed at shifting the gender norms. For in-
stance, several scholars have proposed incentivizing men to take leave so
that they can help more at home. 46 It is also hoped that, if men spend
more time on leave caring for children, employers will stop believing
that women cost more to employ because of more frequent leaves of ab-
147sence.
By almost all accounts, this has proven to be an unsuccessful strate-
gy. Swedish law uses this strategy by reserving some leave only for men.
Yet men often do not take the full amount of leave to which they are
142. Case, supra note 44, at 1756 (arguing that we should not shift the burden to employers,
when men are to blame); Dowd, supra note 141, at 442 (stating that many agree that men should
play an equal or at least a stronger part in children's lives); Eichner, supra note 23, at 1296 (pointing
to Mary Anne Case as an example of a scholar who argues in favor of getting men to do more and
against requiring employers to accommodate caregiving). Eichner points to some scholars, Mary
Anne Case and Katherine Franke, who argue that feminists should stop assuming that motherhood is
natural for all women and should be promoting alternative paths for women. Eichner, supra note 23,
at 1297. These feminists argue that we should stop seeing procreation as a biological imperative and
instead see it as a cultural preference. Id. at 1298. 1 agree with some of their argument but once
someone has made a decision to have children, caring for them well is community enhancing. But
see id.; Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 389. Moreover, I agree with Eichner that if the goal is to
dissuade women from having children, the likely result is "dismal failure: if having women bear
large costs in terms of economic and social inequality would deter them from having children, hu-
manity would already be threatened with extinction." Eichner, supra note 22, at 1299.
143. Case, supra note 44, at 1757-58.
144. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 5, at 254 (stating that the goal of getting men
to do more work at home has not been realized); Travis, supra note 17, at 312.
145. Eichner, supra note 23, at 1296 (stating that proposals to get men to do more work at
home fail on a practical level); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 5, at 256 (stating that men "tal[k]
the talk" regarding wanting to spend more time caregiving but do not actually do more work); Case,
supra note 44, at 1761 (stating that men do not take more leave not because of feared stigma but
because they can get women to do it). Case also argues that when men do help out at home, they
tend to do just the fun tasks rather than the menial tasks. Id. at 1761-62. But see Cunningham-
Parmeter, supra note 5, at 283-84 (describing the stigma men face when they take on caregiving
roles).
146. Ariel Meysam Ayanna, Aggressive Parental Leave Incentivizing: A Statutory Proposal
Toward Gender Equalization in the Workplace, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 296 (2007); Arianne
Renan Barzilay, Back to the Future: Introducing Constructive Feminism for the Twenty-First Centu-
ry-A New Paradigm for the Family and Medical Leave Act, 6 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 407, 434
(2012); Joanna L. Grossman, Job Security Without Equality: The Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17, 61 (2004); Chuck Halverson, Note, From Here to Paternity:
Why Men Are Not Taking Paternity Leave Under the Family Medical Leave Act, 18 WiS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 257, 271 (2003); Michael Selmi, The Limited Vision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 44
VILL. L. REV. 395, 410-11 (1999); Michelle A. Travis, The Future of Work-Family Policy: Is
"Choice" the Right Choice? Review of Women and Employment: Changing Lives and New Chal-
lenges, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 385,419 (2009).
147. See Suk, supra note 6 (stating that Sweden has attempted this approach).
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entitled. 18 There are a couple of possible explanations for this result.
First and primarily, men and women are socialized to believe that care-
giving is women's work. Thus, taking any significant time off work
when a new baby is born or when a child is sick feels like a gender norm
violation for many men. Men also might believe (again, because of the
way they have been socialized) that they are not competent at caring for
children, especially babies.49 Finally, lessons from masculinities theory
teach us that men suffer workplace penalties when they engage in gender
non-conforming behavior such as caring for their children.1
50
Moreover, some scholars believe that even if men did more work at
home, this would not necessarily make things better, because we still live
in a society that structures work around employees without any depend-
ency obligations.'15 In other words, even if men did more work at home,
as long as employers continue to devalue caregiving work, those who
perform it will still suffer in the workplace. 52 There is also an argument
to be made that focusing on changing gender norms in the home ignores
all of the single mothers running households, many of whom are minori-
ties.'53
11. THE ENTRENCHMENT OF STRUCTURAL NORMS
In this Part, I will argue that all of the above-proposed solutions
have been and will continue to be unsuccessful because of the entrench-
ment of employers' structural norms. I will use ADA jurisprudence to
demonstrate that employers are reluctant to give employees with disabili-
ties modifications to the structural norms of the workplace, even though
those employers are often willing to accommodate employees with disa-
bilities in other ways. I then argue that, because of this entrenchment,
many of the proposals for ending the caregiver conundrum will fail. Fi-
nally, I propose that the only way to alleviate the problem is to attack the
entrenchment of structural norms directly.
148. Id. at 64. Even if men take leave immediately after the baby is born, when the leave is
incentivized, this does not lead these men to continue to do more caregiving as the child ages. Id. at
63-65. Although Suk states that the Sweden approach to incentivize men into taking more leave has
not been successful at eradicating gender norms, Sweden does have higher rates of female labor
participation and a smaller pay gap between men and women. Id. at 63.
149. In my opinion, it is easy to feel insecure about parenting newborn babies, especially if the
baby is the parents' first.
150. See generally Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 5.
151. Eichner, supra note 23, at 1296.
152. Id. at 1296-97. However, I question whether it would be possible for employers to penal-
ize all employees with children if both men and women took on equal caregiving responsibilities.
153. Kessler, supra note 13, at 421.
2014]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
A. The ADA 's Example of the Entrenchment of Structural Norms
This subpart will provide a summary of cases under the ADA that
illuminate the entrenchment of the structural norms of the workplace.
54
The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to
individuals with disabilities as long as those accommodations would
allow the employee to perform the essential functions of the job.5 5 Even
though the ADA contemplates employers providing variations from the
regular hour and shift norms of the workplace,156 many employers refuse
to do so, and many courts affirm employers' refusal by granting those
employers' motions for summary judgment.57 Most courts do this by
stating that the structural norms of the workplace (the when and where
the work is performed) are essential job functions.158 Once a job function
is deemed essential, an employer does not have to provide a reasonable
accommodation that would allow the elimination of that job function.59
One structural norm, rotating shifts, is frequently litigated. Employ-
ees with various disabilities sometimes request a waiver from the re-
quirement of working rotating shifts, arguing that a straight shift is re-
quired for managing the disability. For instance, in Bogner v. Wackenhut
Corp.,60 the plaintiff, who had epilepsy and suffered from occasional
seizures, asked to work only the day shift, as his doctor advised that it
would limit the recurrence of his seizures.16 The court held that rotating
shifts were an essential function of the job, and therefore it was unrea-
sonable to allow the plaintiff to avoid working rotating shifts as an ac-
commodation.'
62
Similarly, in Kallail v. Alliant Energy Corporate Services,163 the
plaintiff, whose job required rotating shifts, had Type I diabetes and re-
lated complications.164 Because of the difficulties associated with manag-ing her diabetes, the doctor advised, and the plaintiff requested, to work a
154. See also ALBISTON, supra note 8, at 9 ("Despite th[el accommodation mandate,... ADA
claimants have had little success obtaining changes to the schedule of work to allow for absences
because of illness or medical treatment, even though schedule adjustments are far less expensive
than changes to physical structures.").
155. See generally Travis, supra note 10, at 22 (discussing the reasonable accommodation
mandate under the ADA and the importance of defining the essential job functions).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (defining discrimination to include not making rea-
sonable accommodations to the known disabilities of employees); id § 12111(9) (defining reasona-
ble accommodations to include "part-time or modified work schedules").
157. Travis, supra note 10, at 47-49 (stating that courts are ignoring the reasonable accommo-
dation mandate of the ADA when they define the structural norms of the workplace to be "essential
job functions" and therefore immune to challenge); see also id. at 21 (stating that employers have
been and will likely continue to be resistant to voluntarily restructuring the workplace despite af-
firmative mandates to the contrary).
158. Id. at 23-24.
159. Id. at 22-23.
160. No. 05-CV-6171, 2008 WL 84590 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2008).
161. Id. at *1.
162. Id. at *6.
163. 691 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2012).
164. Id. at 927-28.
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straight day shift.165 The court accepted the employer's argument that
working rotating shifts was an essential function of the job, thereby
denying the plaintiff a remedy.1
66
In Dicksey v. New Hanover County Sheriff's Department,67 the
plaintiff was a deputy sheriff and detention officer who suffered from a
seizure disorder.'68 When he was transferred to a job that worked rotating
shifts, his doctor advised that he would be better able to control his sei-
zure disorder if he worked a straight shift.' 69 The day after the plaintiff
requested a straight shift as an accommodation for his disability, he was
terminated.70 The court held that the employer should not have to reallo-
cate essential functions of the job (working a rotating shift) or create a
new position (a straight day-shift position).'1
7
Finally, in Rehrs v. Iams Co.,172 the plaintiff, who suffered from
Type I diabetes, began having trouble managing his diabetes when his
company implemented a rotating-shift schedule for all warehouse techni-
cians. 173 He suffered a heart attack and went on leave.174 When he was
ready to return to work, his doctor submitted a letter requesting that the
plaintiff be placed on a fixed day-shift schedule because his diabetes had
become difficult to control. 75 He was allowed to work this schedule until
the employer learned that this would be a permanent schedule change, at
which point he was put on short-term disability leave.176 The court found
that the rotating shift was an essential function of the job and that allow-
ing the plaintiff to work a straight day shift would have placed a "heavier
or unfavorable burden on other technicians."'' 77 I was unable to find a
case where the court required the employer to allow a disabled plaintiff
to obtain a waiver from a rotating shift requirement.I8
165. Id. at 928.
166. Id. at 931,933.
167. 522 F. Supp. 2d 742 (E.D.N.C. 2007).
168. Id. at 744-45.
169. Id. at 745.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 748-49.
172. 486 F.3d 353 (8th Cir. 2007).
173. Id. at 354-55. For the first two years of his employment, he worked a fixed schedule from
4 p.m. to midnight. It was only after January of 2000 when Proctor & Gamble acquired lams that it
began the rotating shift schedule, which consisted of two daily twelve-hour shifts. Id. at 354.
174. Id. at 355.
175. Id. at 355.
176. Id. Interestingly, shortly after this time, Proctor & Gamble outsourced the operation of the
Aurora facility to Excel, which operates the facility using a straight-shift schedule. Id.
177. Id. at 357.
178. For other cases on this issue and other structural norm issues, see Nicole B. Porter, The
New ADA Backlash, 82 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2399724##.
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In addition, some employees with disabilities ask for accommoda-
tions regarding the number of hours required.79 For instance, in Meinen
v. Godfrey Brake Service & Supply, Inc.,'80 after the plaintiff was hospi-
talized and subsequently diagnosed with multiple sclerosis,'8' the com-
pany created two part-time positions to cover the department where the
plaintiff worked and retained a position for the plaintiff when he could
return to work. 18 When the plaintiff returned to work, he could not work
more than four hours per day.'83 The employer eventually terminated the
plaintiff.8 4 The court held that creation of a part-time position is not a
reasonable accommodation.
185
The court in White v. Standard Insurance Co.,'8 6 held that full-time
employment is an essential function of the job, and therefore the plain-
tiff, whose back pain limited her ability to work to four hours per day or
less, was not qualified.187 The court relied on the employer's evidence
that it had never employed someone in the plaintiff's position on a part-
time basis and that the employer's written job description stated that the
position was full time. 88
Working at home is another frequently requested accommodation
for individuals with disabilities and one that working caregivers might
also need. In the disability field, the majority rule is that working from
home is not a reasonable accommodation.'" As stated in the well-known
case of Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department ofAdministration90 :
Most jobs in organizations public or private involve team work under
supervision rather than solitary unsupervised work, and team work
under supervision generally cannot be performed at home without a
substantial reduction in the quality of the employee's performance.
This will no doubt change as communications technology advances,
but is the situation today. Generally, therefore, an employer is not re-
179. Of course, variation from the working hours is also a modification that working caregivers
would need. For a discussion of ADA cases involving hours worked, see Travis, supra note 10, at
24-28.
180. No. CIV. 10-5077-JLV, 2012 WL 1038676 (D.S.D. Mar. 26, 2012), report and recom-
mendation adopted in part, rejected in part by Meinen v. Godfrey Brake Service & Supply, Inc., No.
CIV. 10-5077-JLV, 2012 WL 4364669 (D.S.D. Sept. 24, 2012).
181. Id. at*1.
182. Id. at *2.
183. Id. at *7.
184. Id. at *3.
185. Id. at *10. 1 find it interesting (and somewhat infuriating) that even though the ADA lists
"part-time or modified work schedules" as possible reasonable accommodations, courts easily ignore
this by stating that the accommodation requested is not a modification to the current position, allow-
ing the employee to reduce his hours, but rather is the creation of an entirely new part-time position.
186. 529 F. App'x 547 (6th Cir. 2013).
187. Id. at 549-50.
188. Id. at 550.
189. Porter, Martinizing, supra note 130, at 549-51 (gathering cases regarding working from
home); see also Travis, supra note 10, at 29-31 (stating that most courts are following the rule in
Vande Zande that working from home is not a reasonable accommodation).
190. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
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quired to accommodate a disability by allowing the disabled worker
to work, by himself, without supervision, at home.
191
Attendance policies and leaves of absence policies are also consid-
ered structural norms of the workplace. In several cases, excessive ab-
sences have meant that an employee is not qualified to perform the es-
sential functions of the job, and courts have often held that requests for
leaves of absence are unreasonable accommodations.' 
92
Courts have held that a business does not have "to endure erratic,
unreliable attendance by its employees," even when that conduct is due
to an alleged disability.' 93 In Brown v. Honda of America,194 the defend-
ant alleged that the plaintiffs "inability to reliably attend work ren-
der[ed] her unable to perform the essential functions of her job" in the
employer's factory.19 5 Similarly, in Lewis v. New York City Police De-
partment,196 the court found that the plaintiff's regular absences, missing
a total of 207 days of work in seventeen months, established that she was
not a qualified individual.
197
In another attendance case, Basden v. Professional Transportation,
Inc.,' 98 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was not qualified when
she violated the employer's very strict attendance policy, which only
allowed eight absences in a year and did not differentiate between ab-
sences for medical and other reasons.199 Because the plaintiff had been
employed for less than one year, she was not entitled to FMLA leave.
200
The court held that because "[a]n employer is generally permitted to treat
regular attendance as an essential job requirement and need not accom-
modate erratic or unreliable attendance," her inability to come to work
regularly meant hat she was not able to perform the essential functions
of the job and was therefore not a qualified individual.2 1 The court held
that even a thirty-day leave of absence to allow her to get diagnosed and
191. Id. at 544.
192. See, e.g., Robert v. Board of Cnty. Comm'rs of Brown Cnty., 691 F.3d 1211, 1218-19
(10th Cir. 2012); Zimmerman v. Gruma Corp., No. 3:1 I-CV-01990-L, 2013 WL 3154118, at * 13,
*15 (N.D. Tex. June 21, 2013); Fuentes v. Krypton Solutions, LLC, No. 4:11cv581, 2013 WL
1391113, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2013) (stating that excessive absences makes him unqualified and
that an indefinite leave of absence is not a reasonable accommodation); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 11 13742, 2012 WL 3945540, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that plaintiff is not
qualified because of excessive absences and working from home is not a reasonable accommoda-
tion).
193. Brown v. Honda ofAm., No. 2:10-cv-459, 2012 WL 4061795, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 14,
2012).
194. Id.
195. Id. at *4.
196. 908 F. Supp. 2d 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
197. Id. at 328.
198. 714 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2013).
199. Id. at 1036-37.
200. Id. at 1039.
201. Id. at 1037.
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begin treatment for multiple sclerosis was an unreasonable accommoda-
tion.
202
These cases are just a small sample of the cases that demonstrate
how difficult it is for individuals with disabilities to obtain modifications
to the structural norms of the workplace.0 3 Because these structural
norms are so intractable, I next argue that this entrenchment will lead to
the failure of many of the proposals to solve the caregiver conundrum.
B. The Effect of the Entrenchment of Structural Norms on Proposals to
End the Caregiver Conundrum
1. The Failure of Litigation-Focused Proposals
It is easy to see why the entrenchment of structural norms leads to
the futility of sex discrimination claims brought under a disparate treat-
ment theory.204 Disparate treatment theory works well in stereotyping
cases where the plaintiff is performing as an ideal worker but the em-
ployer erroneously believes that the plaintiff lacks commitment or com-
205petence. But in many cases, where the plaintiff is a real worker rather
than an ideal worker, employers can successfully use the entrenchment
of structural norms to defeat disparate treatment claims.20 6 Because dis-
parate treatment theory only requires that an employer treat employees
the same when they are similarly situated, if a caregiver cannot meet a
stringent attendance policy or cannot work overtime as the job requires
(as just a couple of examples of entrenched structural norms), she is not
going to be seen as similarly situated to her male counterparts.
2°7
Although many scholars (including myself) have argued that dis-
parate impact theory has the potential to dismantle the structural norms
of the workplace,2 8 others have expressed skepticism about disparate
202. Id. at 1038-39; see also Travis, supra note 10, at 34-36 (discussing cases where regular
attendance is held to be an essential job function and therefore reasonable accommodations are not
required).
203. For a fascinating discussion of the history behind our country's time norms, see generally
ALBISTON, supra note 8. But see Travis, supra note 10, at 68-73 (discussing ADA cases where the
courts correctly hold that the structural norms are not essential functions and require employers to
defend their structural norms using an undue hardship analysis).
204. See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, supra note 36, at 28 (stating that workplace norms are "too en-
trenched to be dislodged through litigation").
205. See generally Williams & Bornstein, supra note 2; Williams & Segal, supra note 15.
206. Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 372; Smith, supra note 55, at 598. Even Williams,
who is in favor of litigation-focused solutions, recognizes that employees who are not performing up
to snuff-i,e., not ideal workers-are not good candidates for family responsibilities discrimination
(FRD) litigation. Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 107.
207. Suk, supra note 6, at 57 (stating that family responsibilities discrimination only works
under a sameness theory); Kaminer, supra note 14, at 328; Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note
7, at 791; Porter, Why Care?, supra note 3, at 370-71.
208. Porter, Synergistic Solutions, upra note 7, at 806-07; Travis, supra note 17, at 341 (stat-
ing that disparate impact is well-suited to address inequality because employers have to eliminate the
offending practice if it is found to cause a disparate impact); Travis, supra note 10, at 77-78.
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impact's promise.20 9 The primary problem210 is the employer's business
necessity defense. Even when a plaintiff can prove that a practice has a
statistically greater disadvantage for women than men because of wom-
en's caregiving roles, the employer has the opportunity to prove that the
practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.21 2 Assume
that a single mother is fired because she cannot work rotating shifts due
to her caregiving responsibilities. Even if she can demonstrate that the
rotating shift requirement has a disproportionate effect on women over
men,2 13 the employer will then be given the opportunity to defend the
practice. As we saw in the discussion above regarding cases under the
ADA, courts have consistently held that rotating shifts are an essential
function of the job, and therefore employers are not required to provide
214reasonable accommodations that would eliminate an essential function.
There is no reason to think that plaintiffs would fare any better under a
business necessity analysis. If courts hold that rotating shifts are an es-
sential function of the job, they are just as likely to hold that rotating
shifts are job-related and consistent with business necessity.
21 5
209. Smith, supra note 117, at 1458; Smith, supra note 60, at 582-85 (discussing the problems
with disparate impact theory).
210. To be clear, there are certainly other problems with using disparate impact theory to
challenge workplace practices that make it difficult for caregivers to successfully balance work and
family. Travis discusses many of the primary problems. The first is the difficulty in demonstrating
that a "particular employment practice" caused the disparate impact. Travis, supra note 17, at 348.
Employers often try to defend disparate impact claims by arguing that certain decisions are not
"practices" or are too complex and multi-faceted to be a "particular employment practice." Id. at
342-43 (internal quotation marks omitted); Kaminer, supra note 14, at 330. As stated by Laura
Kessler, "[w]hile there are many identifiable, affirmative employer practices and policies that serve
to disadvantage women in the workplace, they are so entrenched, so accepted as the norm, that they
are virtually invisible." Kessler, supra note 13, at 413. Travis also notes the difficulty in proving the
requisite statistics if the court requires a comparison to male employees. Travis, supra note 17, at
346; see also Kaminer, supra note 14, at 33 1; Smith, supra note 60, at 582-83. Travis also notes that
some courts make it difficult for plaintiffs to prove causation, because they often blame the disparate
impact on choices made by women. Travis, supra note 17, at 349. Travis responds that as long as
women can prove that they do more care work, that should be the end of the inquiry, even if the
reason they do more care work is based on gender norms in their families. Id. at 350. She makes an
interesting and apt comparison to Griggs v. Dukes Power Co., where the plaintiffs only had to prove
that fewer black employees had high school diplomas than white employees. Id. (discussing 401
U.S. 424 (1971)). Another problem with disparate impact cases is that sometimes courts use the
act/omission distinction, claiming that the lack of a leave policy, for example, cannot be a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact. Id. at 355; see also Dormeyer v. Comerica
Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579, 583-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the lack of a leave policy cannot
be the basis of a disparate impact claim).
211. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 17, at 362-63 (stating that courts give too much weight to
short-term cost savings); Kessler, supra note 13, at 416-17. But see Williams & Segal, supra note
15, at 79 (stating that the business case for family-friendly benefits helps challenge the employer's
business necessity defense); Kaminer, supra note 14, at 331-32.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2012).
213. She would also have to demonstrate that the rotating shift is a "particular employment
practice," rather than just part of the job, which, as described in the note above is difficult to do. See
supra note 210.
214. See supra Part III.A.
215. See Travis, supra note 10, at 36-3 8 (stating that the disparate impact analysis is analogous
with the essential job function analysis under the ADA). Other scholars agree that disparate impact is
unlikely to be successful. For instance, Susan Bisom-Rapp is skeptical that litigation can change the
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I am compelled to respond to statements made by Joan Williams,
who is arguably the strongest proponent of using litigation to induce so-
cial change. Williams criticizes those who argue that Title VII is an emp-
ty remedy. Williams questions whether scholars are being useful when
they suggest more expansive reform, such as some of the solutions dis-
cussed above.216 She states: "While scholarship and free inquiry should
flourish, having feminists devote their energies to the excavation of case
law that will be used to defeat women's claims in court seems an odd
role for feminist jurisprudence.,2 17 I have two responses to this state-
ment. First, it is not odd for feminists to debate and disagree about the
best way to achieve equality, justice, or whatever goal feminists might
have. This debate has been ongoing for years. The debate surrounding
the Cal-Fed case2 18 is a perfect example. Feminists vehemently and very
publicly disagreed about whether a California statute, requiring employ-
ers to give women pregnancy leave without requiring equal leave for
other illnesses or injuries, was preempted by the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act.219
Second, and more importantly, I find such a statement by Williams
to be akin to saying that scholars must agree with her or not discuss the
subject at all. While some scholars do advocate for litigation as a way to
ameliorate work-family conflict,220 certainly plenty of prominent scholars
believe that there is more than one way to solve the problem.221 And
structural norms of the workplace that make it difficult for caregivers to balance work and family.
She argues that employers feel the pull from the status quo in favor of management prerogative.
Bisom-Rapp, supra note 36, at 30-31. She also states that employers do not see themselves as biased
and therefore "want the freedom to manage operations as they see fit." ld. at 3 1. Peggie Smith also
argues that it is difficult to get courts to depart from the norm of "comprehensive commitment."
Smith, supra note 60, at 598.
216. See supra Part I1.B.
217. Williams& Segal, supra note 15, at 112.
218. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
219. See generally Patricia A. Shiu & Stephanie M. Wildman, Pregnancy Discrimination and
Social Change: Evolving Consciousness About a Worker's Right to Job-Protected, Paid Leave, 21
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 133-40 (2009). The debate was between so-called "special treatment"
feminists, who argued that in order for women to be treated equally in the workplace, they needed to
be afforded "special treatment," including paid leave benefits when they had a baby. Id. "Equal
treatment" feminists were worried that if women are given "special treatment" in the workplace, this
would perpetuate stereotypes of women as the weaker sex in need of special benefits in the work-
place and will make employers more reluctant to hire them. Id.
220. See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Work, Family, and Discrimination at the Bottom of the
Ladder, 19 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1,4 (2012); Travis, supra note 10, at 7-8; Travis, supra
note 17, at 288-89.
221. See, e.g., Amow-Richman, supra note 114, at 27 (arguing that we should find ways of
incentivizing employers to provide family-friendly workplaces); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 36, at 27
(stating that law professors who wish to help men and women balance work and family are discour-
aged by the existing state of the law); Schultz, supra note 23, at 1885 (arguing for measures like a
reduced workweek in addition to litigation-focused solutions); Selmi, supra note 26, at 577 (arguing
that men, as opposed to employers, should be more responsible for ameliorating work-family con-
flict); Suk, supra note 6, at 12-17 (expressing skepticism of the ability of Title VII to end caregiver
discrimination); see also Bisom-Rapp, supra note 36, at 28 (stating that workplace norms are "too
entrenched to be dislodged through litigation" and that Joan Williams is one of the few scholars that
takes a positive stance towards litigation). Even Michelle Travis, who argues in favor of litigation,
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frankly, there is only so much that can be said regarding using litigation
to eliminate family responsibilities discrimination. When Williams ques-
tions whether feminists are being helpful when they advocate for reform
besides litigation, she is, in my opinion, stifling the discussion, which
might be stifling new voices, especially junior scholars who might be
reluctant to disagree with her.
2. The Failure of Legislative Solutions
a. Protecting Caregiver Status
As discussed above, one possible solution that has been debated for
many years is either amending Title VII or enacting another statute to
protect caregivers from discrimination based on their caregiver status.
222
However, the entrenchment of structural norms will limit the success of
this type of legislation. As stated above, disparate treatment claims will
only work in cases where the employer is either intentionally discrimi-
nating based on parental or caregiver status (a relatively rare occurrence)
or the employer is making stereotypical decisions about the commitment
or competence of caregivers (a much more likely occurrence).223 But in
order to actually help those caregivers who have difficulty meeting the
hours and attendance requirements of the employer because of the their
caregiving responsibilities, employees would need to bring a disparate
impact claim, arguing that the employer's practice (either long hours,
strict attendance, rotating schedules, etc.) had a disproportionate effect
on caregivers over non-caregivers. Of course, proving the statistical dis-
parity might not be that difficult, but just as it would be difficult to chal-
lenge the employer's business necessity defense in a sex discrimination
disparate impact claim, it would also be difficult challenging the em-
ployer's business necessity defense in a caregiver discrimination dispar-
224
ate impact claim. In fact, the defense would be identical. And just as
employers have succeeded in proving that the structural norms of the
workplace are essential functions of the job in ADA claims, they will
likely succeed in proving that the structural norms of the workplace are
job-related and consistent with business necessity.
recognizes that anti-discrimination law is not the entire answer to ameliorating work-family conflict.
Travis, supra note 10, at 7-8 (stating that there is not one answer to such a multi-faceted problem);
Travis, supra note 17, at 319.
222. See supra Part I.B. These proposals used to refer specifically to "parental status" dis-
crimination or "family status" discrimination. See Smith, supra note 117. But more recent proposals
recognize the need for a more inclusive statute that would protect all kinds of caregivers, including
those who are caring for sick, disabled, or elderly adult family members, such as spouses, partners,
parents, or other relatives. See, e.g., Locke supra note 18, at 19-20.
223. See supra Part Il.B.1.
224. Smith, supra note 60, at 596-97.
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b. Accommodation Mandate and Other Affirmative-Mandate
Statutes
Because of the difficulty surrounding litigation under either a sex
discrimination or a caregiver discrimination theory, many scholars have
proposed various solutions involving affirmative mandates rather than
anti-discrimination provisions.225 Although there is some utility in in-
creased access to leaves of absence under the FMLA 226 and national or
subsidized daycare, most scholars227 agree that in order to accommodate
the various needs of most caregivers, an individualized accommodation
228mandate is necessary.
It would seem that an individual accommodation mandate could
have the most promise for ending the caregiver conundrum. However,
even assuming there was some chance that such a provision could be-
come law (which most scholars agree is very doubtful), the entrenchment
of structural norms would doom an accommodation mandate in much the
same way that the entrenchment of structural norms has doomed the ac-
commodation mandate of the ADA as applied to structural norms cas-
es. 22 9 As the cases above demonstrate, courts are very reluctant to require
employers to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees
when those accommodations involve variations of or waivers from the
structural norms of the workplace.230 Courts are reluctant to require em-
ployers to provide waivers from rotating shifts, reluctant to require em-
ployers to provide leaves of absence or waivers of attendance policies,
and reluctant to require employers to allow employees to work from
home or have part-time work schedules.23' There is no reason to think an
accommodation mandate for caregivers would fare any better than the
accommodation mandate for individuals with disabilities. In fact, there is
225. See supra Part II.B.2.
226. Increased access to FMLA can mean several things: It can mean increasing the number of
employees entitled to FMLA leave; expanding the reasons for which employees can take leaves of
absence; expanding the definition of "family" in the FMLA-expanding the group of individuals for
whom an employee can rightfully take leave to care for; increasing the amount of leave to which
employees are entitled; and providing for some wage-replacement during leaves of absence. Porter,
FMLA, supra note 113, at 16-17. See also Smith, supra note 60, at 616-17 (arguing that a positive
FMLA-type mandate is better than an anti-discrimination provision protecting parental status).
227. Of course, as stated above, Joan Williams believes that accommodation mandates are not
needed in the caregiving context because caregivers do not need individual solutions. Williams &
Segal, supra note 15, at 84-85. As I mentioned above, see supra note 131, 1 disagree that all care-
givers need the same thing in the workplace. Some caregivers require better access to leaves of
absence; some need flexible starting and ending times; some need reduced-hour or part-time work
schedules; some need more lenient attendance policies so that they can tend to sick children or cover
for sick baby-sitters; some need a waiver from rotating or evening shifts; some need waivers from
overtime or travel requirements; and some simply need occasional time off of work to take loved
ones to doctors' appointments or to attend mandatory school meetings.
228. See supra Part 11.B.2.
229. In prior work, I demonstrated that employers are more willing to provide accommodations
for the physical functions of the job than accommodations regarding the structural norms of the job.
Porter, supra note 178.
230. See supra Part l1I.A.
231. See supra Part III.A.
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some reason to believe that employers might be more reluctant to pro-
vide accommodations to caregivers because the number of caregivers is
likely to exceed the number of individuals with disabilities in the work-
place.232 Thus, the entrenchment of structural norms in the workplace
will likely doom an accommodation mandate for caregivers.
3. Even if Men and Women Performed Equal Work in the
Home...
In addition to my skepticism about the likelihood of changing gen-
der norms, even if men were to take on more caregiving tasks-perhaps
by providing better protections for men who are discriminated against for
taking on those tasks-there remains the problem of the entrenchment of
structural norms. Even if parents divide responsibilities equally, parent-
ing well will still take more time than the ideal worker norm allows. It is
true that there will be fewer career penalties if two parties divide the sick
kid days, doctors' appointments, etc. evenly, but unless the parents have
extremely healthy children, reliable nannies and back up daycare for
when the nanny is sick, or both, there will be times that one of the par-
ents will need to leave work early, not work overtime, or not go on a
business trip, not to mention taking leaves of absence when a new child
arrives. As long as employers continue to insist on the ideal worker
norm, getting men to do more caregiving will not completely solve the
caregiver conundrum.
C. Attacking the Structural Norms Directly
As I have argued above, because the entrenchment of structural
norms means the failure of most proposed solutions, it seems to me the
only other option is to attack the structural norms directly-to dismantle
them.233 I make this argument with full knowledge that it has no possible
chance of succeeding, although some employers have successfully ac-
complished this. First of all, let me be clear about what I mean. Many
scholars have discussed using litigation or an accommodation mandate to
break down employers' structural norms.2 34 I have already discussed why
232. See Porter, Mutual Marginalization, supra note 125, at 41 (making this argument although
pointing out that with the expanded definition of disability under the ADA, the number of individu-
als with disabilities is likely to increase dramatically). Although, as argued by some, not all women
with caregiving responsibilities need accommodations and the problem with an accommodation
mandate is that it assumes all women do need accommodations, thereby perpetuating stereotypes.
Farrell & Guertin, supra note 105, at 1478.
233. See ALBISTON, supra note 8, at 240 ("[R]ights strategies that target institutional arrange-
ments directly not only seem to produce better outcomes, but also avoid reifying gender and disabil-
ity [arrangements that support inequality in the workplace]"); Smith, supra note 60, at 595 ("To
effect purposeful change on behalf of individuals with parental obligations, workplace practices
must be restructured to value parenting as a social good that requires affirmative support."); Travis,
supra note 10, at 5.
234. See supra Parts IL.A & B.
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I do not believe litigation or accommodation mandates are sufficient.235
Thus, I am now referring to attacking those norms directly. Because of
space constraints, I cannot discuss each of the ideas below in detail, and
frankly, I am skeptical about any of them working. But, trying to look
outside the box, I will suggest some possibilities.
One solution discussed by scholars is a reduced-hour workweek.236
If the standard workweek were thirty-two hours instead of forty hours,
this would go a long way towards ameliorating work-family conflict. In
conjunction with this, we would need an increase in overtime pay (per-
haps double time rather than time and a half) and would need to com-
pletely eliminate or drastically decrease the number of employees who
are exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
and therefore not entitled to overtime pay. This would force employers to
hire more employees to even out the workload among those employees,
rather than require some employees (usually the non-caregivers) to pick
up the slack (often without extra pay)237 of the caregivers.
An even more drastic measure would require employers to provide
a very generous paid leave benefit package to all employees, and those
employees would be forced to take the leave, or they would lose their
pay during those weeks. Imagine that every employee is entitled to and
forced to take four weeks of leave per year (for any reason). This would
go far towards eliminating the stigma of those who ask for leave.
Finally, perhaps at the most draconian level, a system could be es-
tablished where every employer has to certify that they either offer a
certain amount of flexibility, such as offering flexible start and end
times, occasional telecommuting options, reduced-hours options, etc., or
that they can prove that the nature of the job precludes such flexibility.
238
I recognize that none of these are viable solutions. Outside the law, we
should be encouraging employers to understand that efficiency and
equality demand that they should seek to dismantle their structural norms
without being forced to do So.239
CONCLUSION
Despite the efforts of many, the caregiver conundrum remains very
difficult to solve. Men and women who have caregiving responsibilities
235. Supra Parts 1.B.1 & 2; see also Smith, supra note 60, at 598 (stating that it is difficult to
get courts to depart from an employer norm of comprehensive commitment).
236. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 23, at 1955-56.
237. Case, supra note 44, at 1757-58.
238. A less draconian version of this would be to offer tax incentives for such family-friendly
benefits. See Porter, Synergistic Solutions, supra note 7, at 821-22.
239. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 60, at 617-18 (stating that we should make efforts to restruc-
ture the workplace); Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 79 (discussing the business case for family
friendly benefits). As stated by Maxine Eichner, work and caregiving are not incompatible if we
change the way employers operate. Eichner, supra note 23, at 1308.
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still find balancing work and family difficult and this affects their job
prospects, pay, promotional opportunities, and their sanity.24° Although
scholars have spent many years debating various solutions, including
litigating under our current laws, enacting new laws, and changing gen-
der norms at home and in the workplace, these solutions have been un-
successful. In this Article, I have identified the reason so many proposed
solutions have failed and will continue to fail-the entrenchment of
structural norms. Employers are very reluctant to change the practices of
the workplace that most contribute to the caregiver conundrum: long
hours; mandatory overtime; rotating shifts, inflexible shifts; stringent
attendance policies; and inadequate leave policies. As demonstrated
through the jurisprudence under the ADA, courts rarely force employers
to modify their structural norms. Thus, I argued that the entrenchment of
the structural norms is what will doom any possible solutions to the care-
giver conundrum. The only answer to this puzzle is to dismantle the
structural norms directly. I recognize how difficult it would be to force
employers to modify their structural norms, so there remains much work
to be done to convince employers that efficiency and equality dictate that
241they should voluntarily dismantle their structural norms .
240. I use "sanity" tongue in cheek. I do not mean to suggest that all or even most working
caregivers are actually insane.
241. This is one place where the work of scholars like Joan Williams is very helpful. She has
done a very good job of highlighting the "business case" for family friendly workplaces. See, e.g.,
Williams & Segal, supra note 15, at 79, 81-82.
2014]

